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ABSTRACT 
 
In popular psychology the use-it-or-lose-it theory has become accepted; that is, an 
increase in cognitive activity, particularly in later life, can reduce cognitive decline 
associated with both pathological and healthy aging. In the field of cognitive 
neuropsychology, the use-it-or-lose-it theory can represent either the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis or use-dependency theory. The cognitive reserve hypothesis states that an 
individual must be relatively cognitively active throughout life (particularly in early 
life) in order to build up a cognitive reserve to counter cognitive decline in old age. The 
use-dependency theory asserts that a high level of cognitive activity in later life is 
sufficient to attenuate or even reverse the cognitive aging process.  
 
Even though a copious amount of research has provided support for both theories, the 
link between cognitive activity and cognitive decline remains tenuous with no clear 
causal relationship (e.g. Salthouse, 2006). This thesis has taken in consideration 
whether the use of a between-subjects design, the measures of cognitive activity and the 
assessment of cognitive functioning used in previous research may have produced a 
disproportionate postulation of the effect that cognitive activity can have on cognitive 
functioning and decline in healthy adults.  
 
Questionnaire studies in this thesis have indicated that different cognitive activities have 
a greater effect on subjective measures of cognitive functioning. Specifically, the results 
showed that undertaking cryptic crosswords frequently appear to have a greater impact 
on cognitive awareness in older adults (compared to younger adults) than other 
cognitive activities. Furthermore, there was evidence that attempting cryptic crosswords 
encouraged older adults to form a realistic understanding of their current level of 
cognitive functioning, which suggested that such crosswords may be used as an 
intervention activity to promote cognitive functioning.  
 
This was investigated by using a within-subjects intervention to examine the effect of 
regularly attempting cryptic crosswords on subjective and objective measures of 
cognitive functioning. The within-subjects approach eliminated potential mediating 
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factors that may have influenced the impact of cognitive activity of cognitive 
interventions in previous studies (e.g. Jopp & Hertzog, 2007). The results confirmed 
that cryptic crossword participation enhanced cognitive awareness in older adults, 
particularly in those who could be regarded as being at-risk of sudden cognitive decline. 
However, there was no evidence that the intervention activity promoted objective 
measures of cognitive functions, which are known to decline with age (e.g. episodic 
memory, metacognition).  
 
A within-subjects design was also used to manipulate stimulus characteristics to 
produce analogies of the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency theory. This 
technique bypassed the use of self-report measures of both cognitive activity and 
cognitive functioning, which may be intrinsically linked (e.g. Hertzog, 2009). These 
studies provided a modicum of support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis but no 
support for the use-dependency theory.  
 
A novel model of the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency theory is 
presented which implicated the metacognition system as a key component that mediates 
the effect of cognitive activity on cognitive functioning in later life. The overarching 
findings suggest that an increase in cognitive activity in later life can enhance cognitive 
awareness but, due to an age-related deficit in the metacognitive pathway, older adults 
are unable to modify their behaviour to compensate for age-related cognitive decline in 
memory functioning. Thus, it can be concluded that cognitive activity in later life can 
produce changes in subjective but not objective measures of cognitive functioning. 
Future research needs to use similar within-subjects techniques to develop accessible 
cost-effective cognitive interventions, which specifically target the metacognition 
system.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE COGNITIVE RESERVE HYPOTHESIS AND 
USE-DEPENDENCY THEORY 
 
1.1 Chapter overview 
 
The focus of this thesis is cognitive decline in healthy aging and how it may be 
attenuated by cognitive activity/stimulation; the theory known as ‗use-it-or-lose-it‘. 
Hebb (1949) was the first psychologist to acknowledge the theory of the biological 
consolidation of memory involving synaptic growth as a product of activation. This was 
supported by the view of Bliss & Lomø (1973) and the theory of Long-Term 
Potentiation (LTP). Bliss & Lomø (1973) produced evidence that synaptic stimulation 
produced neurogenesis i.e. the growth of new dendrites/synapses. As healthy aging and 
in particular dementia has the aetiology of neurodegeneration it has been hypothesised 
that cognitive stimulation could attenuate or reverse cognitive decline in healthy and/or 
pathological aging (e.g. Hertzog, Kramer, Wilson & Lindenberger, 2009; Salthouse, 
1991; Schooler, 1987).  This chapter begins with an overview of current knowledge of 
memory function in older adults, then goes on to describe how the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis and use-dependency theory may influence cognitive aging.  
 
The use-it-or-lose-it theory was developed by psychologists such as Schooler (1987), 
Salthouse (1981) and Katzman (1993), and can be separated into either the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis or the use-dependency theory. The research and theoretical 
background into both theories are presented in this chapter. The chapter will also 
identify how this thesis used different methodologies to extend the findings of previous 
research.  
 
1.2 Cognitive decline and aging 
 
There are a number of reviews of cognitive decline in healthy aging, demonstrating 
clear deficits in episodic memory function (e.g. Craik, 2002; Craik & Jennings, 1992).  
Episodic memory refers to memory for events and specific instances with a prior study 
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episode, such as the retrieval of a word from a previously presented list; or the 
recollection of a happy weekend spent in Tenerife.  Episodic memory is the focus of 
this thesis – being that it is one of the most clear cut aspects of cognitive decline in 
healthy aging.  For example, older adults have significant deficits in free recall of 
episodic memory compared to younger adults (e.g. Bleeker, Bolla-Wilson, Agnew & 
Meyers, 1988; Craik, 1977; Gordon & Clark, 1974 and Erber, 1974). A brief review is 
presented here, covering the neuroscience evidence for memory decline in this group, 
followed by an examination of memory performance on various forms of episodic task 
and some prominent theories are discussed.  Finally, strategic and metacognitive aspects 
of memory function in healthy aging are discussed. 
 
1.2.1 Neuroscience insights into memory dysfunction in healthy aging 
 
Healthy aging has been shown to particularly affect the frontal lobes, especially the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC; Raz, 2000), which is closely associated with metacognition 
(discussed in Section 1.23), executive functioning and other aspects of episodic memory 
such as encoding and retrieval (e.g. Souchay & Isingrini, 2004; Kikyo, Ohki & 
Miyashita, 2002, Reuter-Lorenz, 2000; Shimimura, 1995). There is also clear 
neurological evidence of neuronal atrophy in the temporal lobe (particularly the medial 
temporal lobe/hippocampi region, Jessberger & Gage, 2008) and the PFC during the 
healthy aging process (e.g. Raz, 2000; Reuter-Lorenz, 2000). Both of these areas have 
been shown to be related to either the encoding, consolidation or retrieval of episodic 
memories (e.g. Logan et al., 2003; Cabeza, 2002; Reuter-Lorenz, 2000; Grady, 
McIntosh, Rajah, Beig & Craik, 1999). Therefore it is logical to assume that older 
adults will show deficits in episodic memory and that these deficits will include 
encoding, consolidation and retrieval.  
 
1.2.2 Performance on tests of episodic memory 
 
Episodic memory describes a system which necessitates the separate encoding and 
retrieval of information; both have to be intact in order for memory to function.  
Overall, the research shows that older adults have a deficit in both encoding and 
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retrieval of episodic memories, however primary/short term memory appears to be 
relatively intact when measured by the recency effect (e.g. Semenza, Nichelli & 
Gamboz, 1996). For example, Craik, Byrd & Swanson (1987) showed how an increase 
in processing at the encoding/consolidation stage of learning promoting free-recall in 
older adults. Other results have indicated that the deficits in recall are due to a retrieval 
problem (e.g. Grady et al., 1999). As older adults show an improved episodic memory 
recall when using word-stem completion tasks and cued-recall/recognition other 
researchers have concluded that the episodic memory deficit apparent in healthy aging 
is due to a problem with retrieval (e.g. Park & Shaw, 1992); since the item is available 
to memory on implicit tasks, but not accessible in recall tasks.  Overall, because older 
adults benefit from environmental support (see Section 1.24) it can be assumed that 
both the encoding/consolidation and retrieval mechanisms of episodic memory are 
compromised (e.g. Light, 1991).  
 
The aging literature has typically used multi-trial tests to examine the separate 
contributions of acquisition of items into memory (a learning curve) and their retention 
from one trial to the next (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996; multi-trial learning tasks 
feature in Chapters Three, Four and Five). The use of the multi-trial technique enables 
experimental psychologists to differentiate between encoding, consolidation and 
retrieval/retention. For example, Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) demonstrated that older 
adults showed a significant deficit in both gained and lost access over a five trial recall 
task (see Chapter Three for further detail). It is hypothesised that gained access 
represents encoding and lost access represents consolidation (e.g. Woodard, Dunlosky 
& Salthouse, 1999). Compared to younger adults (aged in their 20‘s) older adults (aged 
over 60) showed apparent deficit in encoding and consolidation. Dunlosky & Salthouse 
(1996) also showed that memory deficits were apparent over a longer time period for 
older compared to younger adults, which suggested that there is also a retrieval deficit 
contributing to the decline in episodic memory in healthy aging. The findings of 
Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) are robust, in that younger adults show superior 
encoding, consolidation and retention of words when studying information in a multi-
trial technique compared to older adults.  Mitrushina, Satz, Chervinsky & D‘Ella (1991) 
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also showed that the encoding deficit of older adults continues to deteriorate after the 
age of 57. 
 
Given the neuroscience evidence above, and what is known about the neuropsychology 
of memory, various theories of memory decline have been proposed.  One theory which 
has the benefit of support from neuroscience is that older adults have a deficit in 
processes reliant upon the frontal lobe.  In the following section, memory failures in 
healthy aging are characterised as having a frontal basis (see Perfect, 1997).  
 
1.2.3 Frontal theory of cognitive aging 
 
Rylander (1939) identified dysexecutive functioning syndrome which was associated 
with damage to the prefrontal cortex. Dysexecutive functioning syndrome is 
characterised by cognitive/memory deficits which are also shared by older adults who 
show the effects of healthy aging; that is, encoding/retrieval problems, attentional 
deficits, problems with inhibiting unwanted information and problems with overall 
executive functioning (as characterised by task switching tests and divided attention 
tasks). Therefore, cognitive psychologists (e.g. Kester, Benjamin, Castel & Craik, 2002; 
Perfect, 1997) have argued that cognitive decline associated with healthy aging is 
possibly due to neurodegeneration of the frontal lobes (e.g. Stuss & Levine, 2002).  
 
Craik & Jennings (1992) demonstrated that healthy older adults show significantly 
poorer recall, but not recognition, than younger adults. This pattern of results is similar 
when comparing patients with Korsakoff‘s Syndrome (caused by chronic alcohol abuse 
which causes neurodegeneration of the frontal lobe, particularly the PFC) compared to 
controls (e.g. Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970). This further supports the view that 
healthy aging is caused by deterioration in the frontal lobe. 
 
Theories of cognitive aging have also supported this view. For example, older adults 
show a significant deficit in the ability to inhibit unwanted memory/thoughts (e.g. 
Hasher & Zacks, 1988). According to the inhibition theory of memory, older adults are 
unable to focus on a specific scenario or context which means that their memory is 
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overloaded during encoding. This phenomenon is also apparent in patients who have 
frontal lobe damage (e.g. Stuss & Levine, 2002); therefore it can be argued that the 
inhibition theory of cognitive aging and the frontal theory of cognitive aging are not 
actually competing theories as suggested by Hasher & Zacks (1988), but that the 
inhibition associated with healthy aging is a product of frontal lobe degeneration. This 
can also be argued for an alternative theory of cognitive aging; the speed of processing 
theory. Salthouse (e.g. 1996; 1991) argued that cognitive decline in healthy aging can 
be traced back to a general decline in processing speed. The theory states that because it 
takes older adults longer to process information then aspects of memory and cognition 
(e.g. encoding and retrieval) become less efficient as information is degraded over the 
extended time the processes take compared to younger adults. However, once again 
there is evidence for a decrease in processing speed in patients with damage to the 
frontal lobes (e.g. Stuss & Levine, 2002); therefore it is also possible that the aetiology 
of a decrease in processing speed is associated with frontal lobe damage.  
 
In conclusion, although patients with frontal lobe damage show a great deal of 
heterogeneity in terms of cognitive deficits displayed, there is a striking similarity 
between cognitive impairment of patients with frontal lobe damage and the cognitive 
deficits evident in healthy older adults (e.g. Perfect, 1997). The frontal theory of healthy 
aging can account for other theories of healthy aging, for example the inhibition of 
memory and the processing speed theories. Furthermore, neuroimaging studies have 
demonstrated that older adults show different patterns of activation of the frontal lobes, 
particularly the PFC, when undertaking cognitive tasks compared to younger adults 
(e.g. Cabeza, 2002; Grady et al., 1999). Therefore, it can be concluded that cognitive 
deficits apparent in healthy aging are due to a decrease in frontal lobe functioning.  
 
1.2.4 Environmental support 
 
Tulving (e.g. 1983) produced the encoding specificity principle (ESP) which predicted 
that matching environmental cues at encoding and retrieval would produce enhanced 
recall. This was also supported by the levels of processing (LOP) theory (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972) which showed that enhanced processing at encoding can increase free 
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recall. As older adults show a deficit in recall compared to recognition, it was 
hypothesised that this was due to an inability of older adults to encode information at a 
deep enough level and match it with context to aid retrieval (e.g. Craik, 1986).  
 
Research has shown that processing demands are higher in older adults than younger 
adults, particularly on tasks that involve free recall and a required increase in attention 
(e.g. Craik & Anderson, 1999). Therefore, research has investigated whether 
environmental support at encoding and retrieval can boost memory performance in 
older adults.  
 
The results show that, in healthy aging, cognitive deficits can be reduced by arranging 
the environment to provide cues for recall and enhance the encoding period (e.g. 
Charness & Bosman, 1995; Skinner, 1983). Skinner (1983) reported that it was 
important to arrange the environment of older adults to reduce processing demands, for 
example if older adults adopt a set routine for everyday tasks there is less chance of 
cognitive errors occurring (see Charness & Bosman, 1995). This theory is contrary to 
the use-dependency theory which predicts that an increase in cognitive activity (e.g. 
increasing processing demands) is required in older adults who show attenuation in 
cognitive and neurological decline associated with healthy and possibly pathological 
aging.  
 
1.2.5 Strategy use and metacognition in healthy aging 
 
First, and most importantly, healthy aging leads to subjective report of memory 
dysfunction, not just tests of objective memory.  Critically, this means of assessing 
memory also echoes the theories above; subjective reports from older adults have 
indicated a greater decline in episodic memory compared to other memory systems (e.g. 
West, Bagwell & Dark-Freudeman, 2008; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004; Bandura, 1989). 
 
Second, somewhat paradoxically, older adults are also believed to have deficits in 
awareness – they have difficulties in metacognition – loosely defined as ‗knowing what 
you know‘.  There is adequate support from empirical research which has shown that 
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older adults have significant deficits in metacognition and executive functioning (e.g. 
Souchay & Isingrini, 2004; Craik, 2000).  This is a more specific formulation of the 
executive/frontal hypothesis articulated above (see Section 1.2.3). 
 
1.2.6 Conclusion 
 
In summary, empirical research has shown that older adults report a decline in episodic 
memory. This has been supported with empirical research which has shown that older 
adults show a deficit in recall both for words (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996; 
assessed in Chapter Three) and for proper names (e.g. Cohen & Faulkner, 1986; 
Chapter Four). This deficit is more apparent in free-recall than cued-recall or 
recognition due to a hypothesised weakness in encoding, consolidation and retrieval of 
information of older compared to younger adults. This has been supported by both 
multi-trial studies (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996; Chapters Three and Four) and 
studies which have used neuroimaging techniques that have highlighted that older 
adults show abnormal activity in areas of the brain which are known to be responsible 
for both encoding, consolidation and retrieval (e.g. Cabeza, 2002; Reuter-Lorenz, 2000; 
Raz, 2000; Grady et al., 1999). Furthermore, the neuronal atrophy in the frontal lobes, 
particularly the PFC, associated with healthy aging has supported evidence which has 
shown that older adults show deficits in executive functioning and metacognition (e.g. 
Souchay & Isingrini, 2004; Perfect, 1997). The deficits of the episodic memory system, 
in both healthy and pathological aging, are very debilitating and reduce the quality of 
life and everyday functioning of older adults. Thus, it is imperative to find rehabilitation 
techniques to slow the decline of episodic memory in later life.    
 
1.3 The use-it-or-lose-it theory 
 
Popular psychology has accepted the view that regular mental/cognitive stimulation will 
attenuate cognitive decline in healthy aging and stave off pathological conditions such 
as Alzheimer‘s disease. Since the findings of Bliss & Lomø (1973) psychologists have 
hypothesised that stimulation of cognitive/neuronal networks will enhance neuronal 
growth in such networks. Salthouse (1981) predicted that cognitive stimulation would 
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reduce the decline of cognitive functioning which is directly related to advancement of 
chronological age.  
 
The use-it-or-lose-it theory was thus formed, but the theory rapidly separated to produce 
two forms of thinking with regards to the protection of cognitive activity. Based on 
animal research (e.g. Held, 1965) the cognitive reserve hypothesis predicted that 
cognitive stimulation/environmental enrichment (e.g. Black, Isaacs, Anderson, 
Alcantara, & Greenough, 1990) at an early age, when neuroplasticity is at its highest, is 
required for individuals to build up cognitive/neuronal reserve to adapt to 
cognitive/neurological degeneration associated with healthy and pathological aging (e.g. 
Nilsson, Perfilieva, Johansson, Orwar, & Eriksson, 1999). 
 
However, the research in both human and animal neurology, for example Calero & 
Navarro-Gonzalez (2003), indicate that neurogenesis/neuroplasticity is extended into 
old age. For example, Park & Reuter-Lorenz (2009) and Calero & Navarro-Gonzalez 
(2003) demonstrated that neurogenesis was still evident in older human adults aged over 
80. Taken with evidence from cross-sectional studies (e.g. Christensen & MacKinnon, 
1993), which suggest that adults who remained active in middle age and later life 
showed significantly less cognitive decline and evidence of dementia, it was theorised 
that activity in later life could also prevent cognitive/neuronal atrophy. This gave rise to 
the use-dependency theory, which had been hypothesised earlier by Edelman (1987); 
this theory stated that, due to the existence of neuroplasticity in later life, an increase in 
cognitive stimulation in later life may attenuate healthy cognitive decline and delay the 
onset of dementia.  
 
Both theories concur that cognitive stimulation is necessary to enhance neurogenesis, 
but there is a disagreement about when such cognitive stimulation is needed. There is 
empirical evidence that a combination of physical and cognitive activity can stimulate 
the release of proteins such as brain-derived neurotrophic factor (e.g. Stern et al., 2005). 
However there are still questions as to whether cognitive stimulation/activity, even at a 
young age, can attenuate or reverse cognitive decline in later life (e.g. Herzog et al., 
2009; King & Suzman, 2009).  
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1.3.1 Support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis  
 
1.3.1.1 Education 
 
One of the largest influences on early development is arguably education (e.g. Bruandet 
et al., 2008). Therefore, cognitive psychologists have argued that the number of years 
spent in full time education could represent a measure of cognitive reserve due to the 
link between education and intelligence (e.g. van Hooren et al., 2007; Mortimer, 
Snowdon & Markesbery, 2003; Alexander et al., 1997). Mortimer et al. (2003) 
conducted a large scale cross-sectional investigation into brain size, educational history 
and presence of dementia in a large cohort of nuns. Their results showed that there was 
a significant negative relationship between brain size and diagnosis of dementia. There 
was also a negative relationship between the number of years in education and the 
presence of dementia. Finally, there was also a direct relationship between brain size 
and the number of years spent in full time education. As the sample population 
consisted of nuns it can be argued that socioeconomic factors, which are directly linked 
to educational status in the general population, can be ruled out of the relationship 
between education and both brain size and the diagnosis of dementia. As the lifestyle of 
the whole sample population would be very similar it can be concluded that an increase 
in the number of years in education can be directly attributed to a decrease in the risk of 
developing dementia.  
 
Even though the results support the cognitive reserve hypothesis, leisure activities at an 
earlier age were not considered and the sample population cannot be regarded as 
representative of the whole population. Furthermore, Schooler & Mulatu (2001) showed 
that occupational status and leisure activity can also mediate the relationship between 
cognitive functioning and cognitive decline. As all the sample population in Mortimer 
et al. (2003) had the same occupation, it can be argued that the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis is supported, but it is not possible to transfer these findings to the general 
population, especially since no data was reported regarding previous 
occupations/cognitive activity before joining the convent, or the age at which the nuns 
joined the convent.  
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As reading is one of the cornerstones in western education, Alexander et al. (1997) 
investigated the relationship between reading ability, dementia severity and neural 
functioning. The results showed that individuals who displayed a higher reading ability 
also showed a reduced severity of dementia and higher neural activity in key areas of 
the brain, even when demographic mediating factors were controlled for. Alexander et 
al. (1997) argued that these results demonstrate that an increase in activity at an early 
age (i.e. mainly through education) enables individuals to build up cognitive and 
neurological reserves in key areas of the brain which are susceptible to dementia and 
possibly neurological/cognitive decline associated with healthy aging (e.g. van Hooren 
et al., 2007).  
 
Although Alexander et al. (1997) used premorbid intelligence and reading abilities to 
represent cognitive reserve, and took into consideration mediating factors such as 
occupation; it can be argued that critical factors of early adulthood/childhood were 
ignored. Barnes, Wilson, Mendes de Leon & Bennett (2006) highlighted that both social 
and environmental factors (e.g. the availability of books and cognitively stimulating 
resources) can also have a large impact on cognitive development. Wilson et al. (2005) 
also investigated the relationship between cognitive resources available earlier in life 
and cognitive functioning later in life. The results showed that the availability of 
cognitive resources (self-reported retrospectively) was significantly correlated with 
cognitive functioning. However this relationship was not significant when the 
researchers controlled for current cognitive activity.  
 
Therefore, it can be argued that the measurement of reading ability and educational 
history of Alexander et al. (1997) is an insufficient measure of cognitive reserve, even 
though it is more objective than the measures of Barnes et al. (2006), Wilson et al. 
(2005) and Kondo, Niino & Shido (1994) who used retrospective self-reports from 
participants or family members. Furthermore, although occupation was taken into 
account, there was no direct measurement of socio-economic status in Alexander et al. 
(1997), which is directly influenced by educational history and occupation; in turn, this 
can have both a direct and indirect impact on both physical and psychological health 
status (e.g. Elias & Wagster, 2007; see Section 1.4 for further discussion).  
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Kondo et al. (1994) conducted controlled case studies of individuals who had developed 
dementia. A number of factors were investigated using retrospective accounts of family 
members and documented history. The results showed that the number of years spent in 
full time education had a significant negative relationship with the age at which 
participants developed dementia. The results also showed that, at a younger age, those 
who developed dementia later in life had a higher level of psychosocial interaction as 
reported by relatives. Taken together Kondo et al. (1994) concluded that high levels of 
education and psychosocial interaction reduced the risk of developing dementia earlier 
in life by a significant amount. Overall, the results repeatedly show that the incidence of 
dementia is significantly lower in adults who have higher educational attainment or a 
greater number of years in education than those with lower educational attainments or 
fewer years in education (e.g. van Hooren et al., 2007; Callahan et al., 1996; Evans et 
al., 1993; Katzman, 1993; Zhang et al., 1990).  
 
1.3.1.2 Life-long cognitive stimulation and measures of cognitive reserve 
 
Gold et al. (1995) used a longitudinal technique with structural equation modelling to 
investigate the relationship between early adult verbal and non-verbal IQ and the same 
IQ measured in later life. Taking into account personality, lifestyle, age and health the 
results indicated that early IQ scores of non-verbal intelligence were the most reliable 
predictors of non-verbal intelligence in later life. This also appeared to be the case for 
verbal intelligence, however health and lifestyle also played a part. Although the 
analysis did not take into account leisure activities, the results show support for the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis in respect to healthy aging.  
 
However, Hertzog, Hultsch and Dixon (1999) argued that the results of Gold et al. 
(1995) could have been interpreted differently if more factors were included in the 
structural equation modelling. Hertzog et al. (1999) demonstrated that the measurement 
of verbal intelligence was not related to early life activity/occupational status. The 
critical point is that other factors were not included in Gold et al.'s (1995) research, 
which may have influenced the relationship between early life experiences and 
cognitive functioning later in life.  
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Although the relationship between education and cognitive decline/dementia indicates 
that an increased number of years in education protects against cognitive decline in later 
life (by stimulating neuronal growth at an early age) there is an alternate explanation for 
the results and the cognitive reserve hypothesis. Romainville (1994) has pointed out that 
success in education requires enhanced metacognition and skills to pass exams. 
Therefore, one argument is that a greater number of years in education is not protective 
of cognitive decline but is a demonstration of superior metacognitive abilities. Research 
has demonstrated that individuals who have a greater number of years in education 
show later onset of dementia but a faster deterioration (e.g. Bruandet et al., 2008). One 
possibility is that individuals with superior metacognitive skills (and therefore higher 
educational attainment) are more able to adjust to the cognitive decline (associated with 
preclinical dementia) until the severity of the dementia reaches a critical point when 
metacognition is significantly impaired.  
 
The two explanations of the cognitive reserve hypothesis are not mutually exclusive, it 
is possible that the neuronal growth, through stimulation, brings about an increase in 
higher order functioning, particularly associated with the frontal lobes (e.g. Hensch, 
2005; Hensch, 2004; Crowe, Andel, Pedersen, Johansson & Gatz, 2003). It is also likely 
that the two accounts of the cognitive reserve hypothesis mediate one another; that is as 
neuronal growth occurs individuals develop new cognitive abilities and an increase in a 
need for cognitively stimulating activities, which in turn stimulates further neuronal 
growth (e.g. Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008). Therefore, education is not the only 
activity which has been implicated as having the ability to produce a cognitive reserve if 
undertaken regularly early in life.  
 
Friedland et al. (2001) acknowledged that education was not the only factor which may 
influence the course of cognitive decline across the lifespan. Occupational and leisure 
activities can also have a bearing on cognitive ability in early and late adulthood. They 
used a between-subjects technique to investigate retrospective accounts of leisure 
activities including indexes of time spent undertaking various activities, number of 
activities undertaken and intensity of partaking in such activities. The results showed 
that the control group attempted significantly more activities at a greater intensity and 
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for a longer time period in early adulthood than those who were in the case group (i.e. 
with dementia). However, the results also showed that those in the case group showed 
significantly less activity in later adulthood compared to participants in the control 
group.  
 
Friedman et al. (2002) also conducted similar research but did not rely on self-report 
methods of participants. The researchers sought retrospective accounts of physical and 
intellectual activity of patients with dementia from friends and family. The results show 
that both physical and intellectual activity, particularly earlier in life, was significantly 
associated with a later onset of dementia. Both research groups argued that the 
increased activity in early adulthood represents support for the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis while the difference in activity in later adulthood is likely to be due to 
symptomology of preclinical dementia (see Section 1.4 for further discussion). 
 
Undertaking cognitive activity earlier in life is not the only factor which appears to 
influence cognitive functioning in later life. Individuals can only undertake cognitive 
activity if the environment provides the opportunity to do so; therefore Wilson et al. 
(2005) and Barnes et al. (2006) investigated whether access to cognitively stimulating 
material at different ages across the lifespan mediated cognitive function in old age. The 
results show that access to cognitively stimulating materials at childhood has a direct 
impact on cognitive functioning in old age along with number of years in education. 
The results also show that cognitive stimulation at an early age influences cognitive 
activity in early and mid adulthood which also has a significantly positive relationship 
with cognitive functioning in later life and the decrease in the likelihood of developing 
dementia. Wilson, Barnes & Bennett (2007) have reviewed the research pertaining to 
the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive decline in later life. They 
concluded that in line with Christensen & MacKinnon (1993) education and early 
adulthood/childhood cognitive stimulation can enable an individual to build up a 
cognitive reserve which can counter the cognitive/neuronal atrophy associated with both 
healthy and pathological aging.  
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1.3.1.3 Twin studies 
 
As discussed in Section 1.4 Crowe et al. (2003) acknowledged the techniques of 
retrospective self-report measures can be regarded as unreliable. They also recognized 
that the development of dementia can have a genetic component which may mediate the 
relationship between cognitive activities and the onset of dementia (e.g. King & 
Suzman, 2009; Elias & Wagster, 2007). Considering this confound, Crowe et al. (2003) 
investigated the relationship between early cognitive activities of twins and the 
development of dementia later in life. The twins had filled in a questionnaire 20 years 
before being assessed for dementia. The results indicate that the participants who had 
only undertaken activities which related to intellectual/cultural leisure pursuits and 
those who undertook activities which were defined as self-improving or domestic were 
less likely to develop dementia even after controlling for educational attainment. 
Although this appears to support the cognitive reserve hypothesis, it was unclear how 
the researchers constructed the activity categories and the questionnaire was very basic 
(e.g. when participants were asked about activities undertaken there was no rating scale, 
just nominal responses (i.e. yes/no)). 
 
1.3.1.4 Animal research 
 
Animal research has demonstrated that mammals which have been raised in enriched 
environments demonstrate superior cognitive/memory (particularly spatial memory) 
abilities and show significant differences in neurological autonomy compared to 
animals which have been raised in sterile environments. For example, Held (1965) 
raised kittens in an enriched environment from a very young age. In adulthood the cats 
demonstrated superior spatial memory abilities compared to cats which had been raised 
without an enrichment program. Furthermore the enriched cats also showed a 
significantly thicker neocortex than non-enriched cats. Mirmiran, Van Gool, Van 
Haarren, & Polak, (1986) also demonstrated that rats that were raised in an enriched 
environment showed a significantly denser and thicker cerebral cortex than rats that 
were raised in a sterile environment.  Ronn, Berezin & Bock (2000) and Nilsson, 
Perfilieva, Johansson, Orwar & Eriksson (1999) acknowledged that cognitive 
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stimulation at an early age and throughout life can produce an increase in neurogenesis 
in rodents. However, they also acknowledged that cognitive enrichment programs 
which have been used in animal studies also promote physical activity, which has also 
been linked to the release of neurochemicals which promote neurogenesis (e.g. BDNF).  
 
1.3.1.5 Summary 
 
In conclusion, the majority of research has used between-subject techniques to 
investigate the impact of early life experiences on the process of cognitive decline in 
both healthy and pathological aging. The results show support for the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis, in that, older adults who report a higher level of cognitive 
engagement/activity at an earlier age show significantly less cognitive decline and later 
onset of dementia. It is possible that this is due to an increase in cognitive resources 
which delay the effects of aging or that individuals who are more cognitively active 
earlier in life develop metacognitive abilities which enable them to respond more 
efficiently to the cognitive demands of aging. It is also likely that the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis represents a combination of both theories of how early cognitive activity 
leads to less cognitive decline in later life. Measures of cognitive reserve have been 
both objective (e.g. number of years in education or measures of intelligence (e.g. 
Mortimer et al., 2003; Alexander et al; 1997)) and subjective/self-report (e.g. Barnes et 
al., 2006; Friedman et al., 2002; Kondo et al., 1994). Methodological issues are 
reviewed in Section 1.4. 
 
1.3.2 Evidence for the use-dependency theory 
 
Research into LTP has shown that cognitive stimulation is critical for neurogenesis and 
to prevent neuronal atrophy (e.g. Bliss and Lomø, 1973). Furthermore, Baltes & 
Lindenberger (1997) concluded that 93.1% of age-related decline in cognitive 
functioning can be accounted for by sensory acuity (i.e. insufficient neurological 
stimulation). This suggests that stimulation can enhance neurogenesis, and possibly 
attenuate neurodegeneration associated with healthy and pathological aging. Park & 
Reuter-Lorenz (2009) have demonstrated that neuroplasticity exists throughout the 
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lifespan and specifically in later life. Therefore, researchers have speculated that 
cognitive stimulation/activity at a later age (or throughout the entire lifespan) can 
promote cognitive/neuronal growth and/or reduce cognitive/neuronal atrophy associated 
with either healthy or pathological aging (e.g. Edelman, 1987). 
 
1.3.2.1 The use-dependency theory and dementia 
 
Early applications of the use-dependency theory targeted persons with dementia in the 
hope that environmental stimulation would attenuate or reverse the cognitive deficits 
associated with the disorder. For example, Mirmiran et al. (1992) showed that patients 
with Alzheimer‘s disease showed a positive response when light levels were increased. 
There are two possible conclusions; first, the increase in light stimulated the 
suprachiasmatic nucleus and increased the production of certain neurotransmitters such 
as noradrenalin and serotonin. Second, the increase in light raised the sensory input of 
the patients and provided an increase in cognitive stimulation. This second possibility 
was supported by Mirmiran, van Someren & Swaab (1996) who showed that Alzheimer 
patients who were exposed to a more cognitively stimulating environment showed an 
increase in social and cognitive functioning according to carers.  
 
Although this research suggests that an increase in cognitive stimulation in patients with 
dementia can promote cognitive functioning, it must be acknowledged that reports of 
cognitive functioning were from carers and not objective or even self-report measures. 
In a classic study, Sunderland, Watts, Baddeley & Harris (1986) showed that self-report 
and carer/spouse reports of cognitive functioning in older adults are unreliable and 
arguably invalid. Furthermore, it is difficult to remove possible influences from the 
researchers in Mirmiran et al. (1996), for example, demand characteristics; the trials did 
not appear to be double blind, therefore it is difficult to draw a causal relationship 
between the supposed increase in cognitive stimulation and the reported increase in 
cognitive functioning of the dementia patients.  
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1.3.2.2 The use-dependency theory in healthy and pathological aging  
 
It was clear from the investigations of Miriman and colleagues that more understanding 
of the use-dependency theory was needed before direct interventions could be applied. 
Therefore researchers started to investigate whether the link between cognitive activity 
and functioning (or the development of cognitive impairments) was evident in 
longitudinal studies. For example, Bosma et al. (2002) conducted a six year longitudinal 
study with participants aged over 55, which monitored participants cognitive 
functioning and self-reported cognitive, physical and social activity. The results 
indicated that a higher level of all three activities was positively related to superior 
cognitive functioning. Cognitive activity, alone, was associated with higher executive 
and episodic memory functioning. However, the researchers also report that a higher 
level of functioning at baseline was also associated with higher cognitive functioning at 
the six year follow-up. The authors claim that the results show a symbiotic relationship 
between activity and cognitive functioning whereby older adults who have and maintain 
a high level of cognitive, physical and social activity show a reduced level of age-
related decline. However, the measures of all three activities were potentially limited as 
the activities were ill-defined and participants only had to report the undertaking of one 
specific activity in each category to be regarded as ‗active‘. 
 
Wilson et al. (2002) reported that an increase in one cognitive activity per day was 
associated with a significant reduction in both cognitive decline (without the presence 
of dementia) and the likelihood of developing dementia. A similar conclusion was 
found by Verghese et al. (2003), in that one less cognitive activity per day resulted in a 
significant increase in the probability of developing dementia even when controlling for 
preclinical dementia. Both Wilson et al. (2002) and Verghese et al. (2003) used a 
longitudinal technique to investigate the causation of undertaking cognitively 
stimulating activities and their results on cognitive decline in later life. Both research 
groups used a more appropriate measure of cognitive activity than Bosma et al. (2002); 
that is, there was a larger range of cognitive activities assessed and a composite score 
for overall activities was formulated on a sum from a Likert scale.  
 
 -35- 
This methodology was also used by Hultsch, Hertzog, Small & Dixon (1999), who used 
structural equation modelling to follow 250 older adults over a six year period, with 
follow-ups of approximately two years. A relatively large number of cognitive and 
everyday (self-maintenance/leisure) activities were taken into account and participants 
were tested on objective measures of cognitive functioning, including episodic memory, 
working memory, verbal fluency, general knowledge and processing speed.  
 
There was a significant influence of novel information processing activities on a 
composite measure overall cognitive functioning. Novel information processing 
activities included interests such as solving crossword puzzles, watching educational 
television programmes, doing word games and studying foreign languages. This type of 
information processing was significantly causally related to cognitive functioning, 
unlike activities such as self-maintenance (e.g. cooking one‘s own meals or maintaining 
personal hygiene). Of particular interest was that frontal lobe functioning appeared to 
have a mediating effect for cognition such as episodic memory and processing speed. 
Furthermore, novel information processing over the timescale of the study also 
appeared to have significant and direct impact on executive functioning.  
 
The results indicate that novel information processing has a direct effect on executive 
functioning which in turn mediates other aspects of cognition which are shown to 
decline in health aging. The change in novel information processing also shows a 
significant but critically large effect on current executive functioning. Therefore, 
Hultsch et al. (1999) conceived that it is impossible to determine whether a decrease in 
novel information processing causes a reduction in cognitive functioning or whether the 
natural aging process causes a decrease in overall cognitive functioning, which in turn 
forces older adults to give up undertaking novel or difficult information processing 
activities (see Section 1.4 for further discussion). This was supported by Hertzog, 
Hultsch & Dixon (1999) who analysed the data of Hultsch et al. (1999) in two different 
ways and found equivocal evidence for the two explanations for the relationship 
between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning in later life. The results showed 
that the model which used cognitive functioning as a predictor of cognitive activity was 
as significant as the model which predicted functioning from cognitive activity. In line 
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with Hertzog & Nesselroade (2003) it was concluded that all between-subjects 
models/studies of the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive decline are 
incomplete because it is impossible to take into account all variables which either effect 
or mediate cognitive functioning (e.g. Hertzog, 2009).  
 
MacKinnon, Christensen, Hofer, Korten & Jorm (2003) also used a longitudinal 
technique to investigate the relationship between cognitive and/or physical activity and 
empirical measures of crystallised and fluid intelligence. The study ran over seven years 
and took into account mainly physical activities but also a number of cognitive 
activities such as reading and watching television. The results concluded that over the 
seven year period both cognitive and physical activities significantly declined with age 
as did both measures of intelligence but particularly fluid intelligence. There was a 
significant relationship between the amount of cognitive and physical activity that 
participants undertook and the decline in intelligence over the study. However, there 
was one group of participants who showed no decline in cognitive activity but 
continued to show a decline in intellectual functioning. This raises doubts over whether 
even physical activity is the sole determinant of cognitive functioning when 
pathological aging is excluded.  
 
Although MacKinnon et al. (2003) suggests that there is viability for both cognitive and 
physical intervention techniques to reduce cognitive decline in healthy aging they point 
out that certain samples of older adults may not benefit from such interventions. It is the 
case that the sub-sample of older adults who did not show a decrease in activity but 
showed a decrease in intellectual functioning raises questions over the validity of the 
use-dependency theory. However, there is an alternate explanation, that is, that the sub-
sample already reported a very low activity level, therefore it is possible that the activity 
levels for these individuals could not significantly decrease over the study period i.e. 
floor effects.  
 
The results of MacKinnon et al. (2003) and Christensen et al. (1993) support the use-
dependency theory in that current cognitive activity is significantly higher in individuals 
who also perform better on measures of cognitive/intellectual functioning. However, it 
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must be questioned whether the measures of cognitive activities are appropriate and 
whether other measures of cognitive functioning should have been taken into account. 
As will be seen in Section 1.2, aging takes a larger toll on certain cognitive systems than 
others (e.g. episodic memory and metacognition/executive). Arguably, studies which 
have ignored cognitive functions such as episodic memory, are not focusing on the 
aspects of cognition which are most affected by age (Salthouse, 2007). 
 
1.3.2.3 Bidirectional theories 
 
The lack of a definitive causal relationship between cognitive activity and function, in 
later life, led Schooler, Mulatu & Oates (1999) to hypothesise that the relationship 
between cognitive activity and cognitive decline is bidirectional. In line with Edelman 
(1987), Schooler et al. (1999) proposed that an increase in cognitive stimulation would 
bring about an increase in cognitive functioning, which in turn will stimulate another 
increase in cognitive stimulation, because such adults will feel more able to take on 
more cognitively demanding tasks (supporting the view of Dellenbach & Zimprich, 
2008). However, Schooler et al. (1999) proposed that the opposite is also true; a lack of 
cognitive stimulation or required cognitive effort will reduce adults‘ ability and desire 
to undertake cognitively stimulating activities and hence a cycle of decline will ensue. 
 
Schooler et al. (1999) conducted interviews and took self-report measures of job 
complexity as well as conducting cognitive neuropsychological tests of abstract 
thinking and intelligence (e.g. the embedded figure test and hypothesis generation 
ability). The results showed that cognitive functioning and job complexity appeared to 
have a bidirectional relationship, which indicated that over the ten year study period, 
participants who undertook more complex occupations had a higher level of 
functioning, which in turn encouraged them to attempt more complex jobs at work. This 
indicated that individuals who were more cognitively able, undertook more cognitively 
demanding tasks and the relationship between cognitive ability and task requirements 
reinforced one another. However, Kohn et al. (1997) commented that the relationship 
between job complexity and intellectual functioning was culturally specific to the USA. 
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Kohn et al. (e.g. 1997) did not find a similar relationship between job complexity and 
intellectual functioning for employees in Poland or the Ukraine.  
 
One point which is also questionable is the sampling technique used in Schooler et al. 
(1999), specifically that individuals who had given up/left work were excluded from the 
analysis (Salthouse, 2007). One possibility why individuals left work (especially at an 
older age) could be due to a decrease in cognitive ability/cognitive functioning. 
Therefore, to remove this subsample from the final analysis may have excluded data 
that potentially might not have supported the relationship between cognitive functioning 
and job complexity. That is, Schooler et al. (1999) argued that job complexity had a 
direct (but reciprocal) relationship with cognitive functions, which indicated a partial 
causal relationship between job complexity and cognitive functioning. However, it is 
impossible to conclude a causal relationship when ruling out the factors which influence 
the unemployment/retirement of the participants who were excluded from the analysis. 
Although Schooler (2007) argued that the cognitive functioning of those who dropped 
out of work did not significantly differ from those who were still working (when 
compared at baseline) it remains questionable whether cognitive change over the period 
of the study might have impacted on the proposed reciprocal relationship which 
Schooler et al. (1999) described (e.g. Salthouse, 2007). 
 
Schooler & Mulatu (2001) took this criticism into account and also included a self-
reported measurement of leisure activities which have been shown to influence 
cognitive functioning (e.g. Barnes et al., 2006). The results of Schooler et al. (1999) 
were confirmed, in that older adults who had a higher degree of job complexity and a 
higher number of cognitive leisure activities showed significantly better cognitive 
functioning. The results also held true for individuals who were no longer working, 
which supports the use-dependency theory, in that older adults who are more 
cognitively active show and report a higher level of cognitive functioning than those 
who are less active. It must be acknowledged, however, that Schooler & Mulatu (2001) 
did not take into account a number of factors which are known to influence current 
cognitive functioning, such as potential depression or preclinical dementia (e.g. 
Hertzog, Kramer, Wilson & Lindenberger, 2009; Elias & Wagster, 2007). Furthermore, 
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once again, the dependent variables of Schooler & Mulatu (2001) exclude cognitive 
functioning, such as episodic memory, which are associated with cognitive decline in 
healthy aging.  
 
Finally, with regards to Schooler & Mulatu (2001), Salthouse (2007; 2006) also raised 
the question about the dependent variables used. A number of the dependent variables 
were extracted from interviews with the participants. Salthouse (2007) indicates that 
this type of cognitive assessment is potentially unreliable and invalid. Furthermore, the 
overall cognitive functioning composite was not significantly related to age, which 
raises further doubt over the measure which Schooler and colleagues used to measure 
cognitive functioning (see Section 1.4 for further comments).  
 
Dellenbach & Zimprich (2008) also noted a reciprocal relationship between cognitive 
functioning and cognitive activity when they conducted a cross-sectional study. 
Participants aged between 65 and 81 reported the level of engagement in typical 
intellectual activities and were assessed for crystallised and fluid intelligence. Other 
factors such as number of years in education and sex were also taken into account. The 
results showed a strong relationship between education and crystallised intelligence. 
There was also a significant positive relationship between typical intellectual 
engagement and crystallised, but not fluid intelligence. The association between 
intellectual engagement and crystallised intelligence was maintained when mediating 
factors were taken into account (e.g. education). However, the measure of crystallised 
intelligence was based on reading ability which is closely associated with many of the 
intellectual activities that Dellenbach & Zimprich (2008) measured. The lack of a 
relationship between intellectual engagement and fluid intelligence may be due to the 
use of a cross-sectional design as it is difficult to rule out preclinical dementia.  
 
Furthermore, once again there was no measure of episodic memory or metacognition, 
which both decline with age. As the relationship between intellectual engagement and 
cognitive functioning was only investigated in older adults and not younger adults it is 
difficult to determine whether the correct dependent variables were used. As 
acknowledged by Salthouse (2007) it is important to ensure that an investigation has 
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sufficient dependent variables to investigate the relationship between cognitive activity 
and cognitive decline across a wide spectrum of cognitive functions.  
 
The grouping of cognitive activities are discussed in depth in Section 1.4, however 
different grouping strategies have demonstrated how some cognitive activities may 
appear to benefit cognitive function in later life differently in different cultures. For 
example Wang et al. (2006) conducted a longitudinal investigation of the relationship 
between leisure activities and cognitive functioning in adults aged over 55 across a 5 
year period. Playing board games (e.g. Mahjong, chess, poker) was significantly related 
with a decrease in cognitive decline and the development of cognitive impairments. 
However, Jopp & Hertzog (2007) found no significant benefit, with regards to cognitive 
decline across the lifespan, of playing games such as chess or doing crosswords. 
Although the results of Jopp & Hertzog (2007) showed a positive correlation between 
playing games (including doing crosswords) and inductive reasoning, as well as verbal 
fluency, there was no dissociation of this relationship between younger and older 
participants.  
 
There are two key points from the comparison of Wang et al. (2006) and Jopp & 
Hertzog (2007); first, the age range and analysis was different in the two studies. It is 
possible that a combination of different statistical analysis and a different age range 
produced different results and implicated a positive relationship between leisure 
activities and cognitive decline in Wang et al (2006), but not in Jopp & Hertzog (2007). 
Second, the results show how different dependent variables can produce different 
results. Jopp & Hertzog (2007) used a wide range of clinical neuropsychological 
assessments to measure cognitive functioning whereas Wang et al. (2006) only used the 
Chinese version of the mini mental state exam (MMSE). Jopp & Hertzog (2007) also 
took into account subjective measures of cognitive functioning such as MemSE. 
Therefore it can be concluded that both studies have their own strengths, for example 
Jopp & Hertzog (2007) used a cross-sectional design compared to a longitudinal design 
as used by Wang et al. (2006), but both studies have produced contradictory support for 
the relationship between leisure activities and cognitive decline in later life. Section 1.4 
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also raises issues with regards to the cultural bias of the evidence which has supported 
the use-dependency theory.  
 
Some researchers (e.g. Hertzog et al., 2009) argue that cognitive activity alone is 
insufficient to counteract healthy and/or pathological cognitive decline throughout the 
later life span. Other activities, such as physical exercise or social interaction have been 
linked to a decrease in cognitive decline in later life (e.g. Bosma et al., 2002). For 
example, Bassuk, Glass & Berkman (1999) conducted a large scale longitudinal study 
to investigate the relationship between social networking/interaction and cognitive 
functioning for adults aged over 65. The results, which were supported by Lövdén, 
Ghisletta & Lindenberger (2005), indicated a significant positive relationship between 
social activity and cognitive functioning. However the cognitive assessment was very 
brief (e.g. the MMSE) and it was impossible to rule out preclinical dementia.  
 
The results from Friedman et al. (2002) and Sturman et al. (2005) also showed that 
cognitive functioning and the development of dementia was negatively associated with 
self-reported physical and cognitive functioning. Both of these indicate that physical 
activity may have a larger impact on cognitive functioning later in life due to the 
neuroimaging and neurochemical evidence that physical activity is associated with an 
increase in cerebral blood flow and production of BDNF. The link between physical 
activity and brain structure development in later life is also well established in animal 
research (e.g. Nilsson et al., 1999).  
 
1.3.2.4 Summary 
 
In conclusion, both animal and human research has shown that enrichment can increase 
the cognitive functioning of individuals in later life. As explained by Li et al. (2008) 
skill acquisition in later life is not impossible but takes longer than in early life. 
Furthermore Maguire, Woollett & Spiers (2006) point out that repeating cognitive 
activation can lead to long lasting cognitive and neurological changes such as improved 
spatial memory in London taxi/bus drivers. Cross-sectional and longitudinal research 
have confirmed a positive link between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning for 
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older adults, however the relationship does not always imply that higher rates of 
cognitive activity determine increased levels of cognitive functioning or an attenuation 
in cognitive decline (e.g. Hertzog, 2009; Hultsch et al., 1999). It is possible that 
individuals who display a higher level of cognitive functioning in earlier life are 
predisposed to undertake more cognitively stimulating activities (see Section 1.4 for 
discussion).  
 
1.3.3 Intervention studies 
 
Taking into account the methodological issues with research that has focused on the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis and the use-dependency theory (see Section 1.4) the 
weight of evidence suggests that cognitive (and/or physical/social) activity can benefit 
cognitive functioning throughout the lifespan (e.g. Hertzog et al., 2009). As described in 
Section 1.2 decline is evident in a number of cognitive domains when observing healthy 
and pathological aging. Cognitive interventions have generally focused on two specific 
techniques, either modifying the cognitive processes that are known to decline with age 
(e.g. using mnemonics to counteract encoding or consolidation difficulties in older 
adults; e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2007) or increasing overall cognitive and potentially 
physical/social activity (e.g. Carlson et al., 2008).  
 
1.3.3.1 Strategic training techniques 
 
Rebok & Balcerak (1989) trained younger and older adults in the method of loci 
mnemonic technique. Both younger and older adults were tested on immediate memory 
of twelve words and twelve digits. A between-subjects technique was used to compare 
(younger and older adults) who received/did not receive training to those who also 
received/did not receive feedback on their performance over the study. The results 
showed a significant benefit of memory performance in younger and older adults as a 
result of training, however no dissociation between younger and older participants. The 
results also did not show a significant benefit of memory performance feedback (for 
either the mnemonic or control group) in either sample population.  
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Rebok & Balcerak (1989) also took measures of MemSE before and after the study. 
Their results indicated that MemSE was not significantly affected by the training of 
mnemonics compared to the control group. The results also show that participants with 
a higher MemSE responded better to cognitive training than those with a lower MemSE 
at baseline. Finally the results show that performance feedback had a significant effect 
on MemSE, particularly for older adults, which indicates that MemSE may mediate the 
relationship between cognitive training and cognitive functioning. The authors 
concluded that an increase in MemSE, through intervention techniques, may enhance 
mnemonic interventions in older adults. 
 
Research has shown that strategic training techniques can have an immediate impact on 
recall in children, younger adults and older adults to a similar degree. However the 
long-term benefits of such training are not evident in older adults who do not receive 
refresher courses (e.g. Brehmer et al., 2008). Nyberg et al. (2003) used a mnemonic 
training technique similar to Brehmer et al. (2008). Neuroimaging revealed that younger 
adults showed a significant increase in activation in the frontal and occipital/parietal 
lobes when they were using the mnemonic technique. However, when older adults 
successfully used the training strategy there was only evidence of activation in the 
occipital/parietal lobe and not in the frontal region. This supports research by Perfect 
(1997), in that older adults show deficits which are associated with frontal lobe damage 
(e.g. executive functioning and metacognitive control). Therefore, the evidence 
indicates that mnemonic strategies, such as those used in Nyberg et al. (2003) can be 
effective in younger adults, but due to frontal deficits older adults do not implement the 
strategies which they have learnt (e.g. Brehmer et al. 2008).   
 
Ball et al. (2002) used three different training techniques and compared cognitive 
functioning of the three training techniques to a no contact control group over a two 
year period. Cognitive interventions consisted of reasoning training, processing speed 
training or episodic verbal memory training. For each experimental group there was ten 
sessions and 60% received a four session booster period of 11 months after the original 
training period. Compared to the control group, participants in each experimental group 
showed significant gains in the respective training abilities of the two year period. 
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Furthermore, the participants who received the booster session also show a significant 
increase in respective cognitive functioning for the reasoning and processing speed 
intervention groups but not in episodic memory group. However, there was no 
significant difference on self-reported independent living abilities between the control 
group and any of the experimental groups.  
 
Ball et al. (2002) argued that the lack of a significant difference between the control 
group and any of the experimental group, in terms of independent living capabilities, 
was due to the relatively short follow-up. Willis et al. (2006) conducted a five-year 
follow-up of Ball et al. (2002) and offered participants a 35 month booster session. The 
results confirmed a significant benefit of each intervention on the relevant cognitive 
training. The 35 month booster showed significant improvement for the processing 
speed group, but not the other two intervention groups. The results only showed 
significant benefits for independent living in the reasoning group. Furthermore, booster 
sessions did not appear to have a significant benefit for self-reported independent living.  
 
The results of Willis et al. (2006) indicate that certain cognitive interventions are not 
transferred to other cognitive domains (e.g. processing speed and memory training), 
however, other cognitive interventions which focus on executive functioning or 
inductive reasoning appear to increase cognitive function and are transferrable to 
everyday functioning. The relationship between inductive reasoning/executive 
functioning and metacognition is complicated but there is evidence that all three 
cognitive functions are interrelated (see Section 1.2). One of the key aspects is that 
healthy age has a significant detrimental effect on both executive functioning and 
metacognition (e.g. Souchay & Isingrini, 2004), therefore some interventions have 
focussed on promoting metacognition to enhance episodic memory functioning. 
Dunlosky, Kubat-Silman & Hertzog (2003) used a metacognitive intervention which 
taught older adults to self-test when learning paired-associates. Half of the experimental 
groups also received method of loci training with or without the self-testing training. 
The results showed a significant increase in learning paired associates for the 
experimental group compared to the control group, but only on self-paced trials and not 
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on experimenter-paced trials. Furthermore, there was no significant increase in the 
learning of single words of the experimental group over the control group.  
 
Dunlosky et al. (2007) repeated the experiment and concluded that there was no 
significant benefit of combining strategy training with self-testing because the 
participants who were only trained in either technique showed a similar increase in 
episodic memory compared to the control group. One possibility for this is that the 
group who received a combination of training techniques only received one hour tuition 
on both techniques while participants who were trained in single techniques received 
two hours tuition. However, Dunlosky et al. (2007) argue that it is most likely that the 
participants who were trained in the strategic technique learnt to self-test. The results 
also indicated that the reason why self-testing did not show benefits on experimenter-
paced trials was because the participants had insufficient time to self-test.  
 
Metacognitive training has also been shown to be effective in younger adults who have 
significantly low decision making ability at baseline. For example, Batha & Carroll, 
(2007) took self-reported metacognition and decision making measures of younger 
adults. The experimental groups were then given metacognitive training which was 
aimed at improving problem solving and decision making. Participants who showed 
poor decision making and metacognitive ability at baseline had a significant 
improvement in problem solving after training compared to the control group. However, 
participants who showed high levels of decision making and metacognition at baseline 
did not benefit from the metacognition training. Not only do the results support the view 
that there is a relationship between metacognition and decision making/problem 
solving, but also that individuals who have poor decision making (e.g. older adults; 
Aristico, Cervone & Pezzuti, 2003) may benefit from metacognitive/inductive 
reasoning training. 
 
The difference between standard memory training (e.g. method of loci) and the 
metacognitive training (e.g. strategic training) was also investigated by Cavallini, 
Pagnin & Vecchi (2003). The results show that both training techniques promoted 
objective and subjective measures of memory functioning and cognitive awareness in 
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both younger and older adults. This was the case for empirical measures of cognitive 
functioning and ecological measures of cognitive functioning/awareness. The results 
also show that strategic training has a significantly greater impact than mnemonic 
training, suggesting that metacognitive interventions are more transferable than standard 
mnemonic training techniques.  
 
As MemSE is a critical component of metacognition (e.g. Berry, 1999) some cognitive 
interventions have combined strategic training with MemSE enhancing. West et al. 
(2008) showed that a combination of strategy training and MemSE training produced 
significant gains in both self-reported cognitive awareness and episodic memory ability. 
However, as discussed in Section 1.4, the relationship between MemSE and 
metacognition in aging is not unambiguous and it is possible that enhancing MemSE in 
older adults may lead to an unrealistic opinion of ones memory ability and therefore 
lead to an over-reliance on external memory aids (e.g. Bäckman, Josephsson, Herlitz, 
Stigsdotter, & Viitanen, 1991). 
 
The role of executive functioning has also been investigated in cognitive interventions 
(e.g. Karbach & Kray, 2009). In the study by Karbach & Kray (2009) children, younger 
adults and older adults were trained in a variety of tasks which involve executive 
functioning, such as task switching, variable task switching and verbalisation before 
task switching. A number of dependent variables were used to assess near and far 
transfer effects of the intervention. There was clear evidence of near transfer effects of 
the training for all age groups, however, the far transfer effects were relatively small 
with regards to effect size. The results indicated that executive functioning training can 
be beneficial for individuals who have high executive functioning at baseline, 
supporting those of Bissig & Lustig (2007). 
 
Jennings, Webster, Kleykamp & Dagenbach (2005) investigated whether consciously-
controlled recollection of information had a significant impact on older adults ability to 
recognise words compared to a standard recollection group (i.e. when participants had 
to indicate whether a word had appeared previously) and a no-contact control group. 
The recollection technique used by Jennings et al. (2005) increased the lag between 
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repetitions of recognised words. The recollection training increased measurements of 
frontal functioning (e.g. source memory, digit substitutions etc), but did not have a 
significant effect on episodic or immediate memory functioning. Bissig & Lustig (2007) 
replicated the findings of Jennings et al. (2005), but showed that the recollection 
technique was only effective for individuals who had a better encoding strategy at 
baseline. Therefore, these results suggest that cognitive interventions are only beneficial 
in older adults who show a relatively high level of cognitive function and not effective 
for those who can be deemed to be at risk (e.g. Van der Bij, Laurent & Wensing, 2002).  
 
In conclusion, pure cognitive training techniques show significant increases in cognitive 
functioning of older adults, but mainly for the trained cognitive domain (e.g. Brehmer et 
al., 2008; Willis et al., 2006; Dunlosky et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2002; Rebok & Balcerak, 
1989). Therefore, certain cognitive training has focused on metacognition and/or 
executive functioning (e.g. Karbach & Kray, 2009; Dunlosky et al., 2007), which have 
shown greater transfer effects. However, the results of cognitive training techniques do 
not replicate the findings of investigations into the use-dependency theory. In fact the 
key findings suggest that cognitive awareness (e.g. metacognition) is a key function 
which determines cognitive functioning in later life; thus it is possible that 
metacognition may be a key component in the relationship between cognitive activity 
and cognitive functioning in later life (i.e. the use-dependency theory).  
 
1.3.3.2 Interventions based on the use-dependency theory 
 
Due to the lack of transferability of cognitive training techniques researchers have tried 
to produce interventions which mimic the use-dependency theory (e.g. Carlson et al., 
2008). Other interventions have incorporated cognitive activity with social and/or 
physical activity (e.g. Small et al., 2006). These types of studies have provided strong 
support for the evidence of plasticity in aging and have suggested that a change in 
lifestyle can attenuate cognitive decline and/or increase cognitive function in later life.  
 
Basak, Boot, Voss & Kramer (2008) investigated an everyday activity over a 
longitudinal period with regards to its effect on executive functioning. Over an eight 
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week period, the experimental group were required to play a strategy-based computer 
game and were compared to a waiting list control group. The results showed a 
significant increase in executive functioning of the experimental group. Although this 
suggests that everyday activities which require older adults to develop their strategic 
thinking improve executive functioning, it was unclear as to whether these skills were 
transferred to other cognitive domains (e.g. metacognition or episodic memory) because 
of a restricted number of dependent variables.  
 
Carlson et al. (2008) also used an everyday activity of assisting teaching of primary 
school children as a cognitive intervention for older adults. The experimental group, 
compared to a waiting list control group, were required to help children with reading 
and conflict resolution as well as organise the school library. Participants were assessed 
in memory (short-term and episodic) and executive functioning. Over the whole sample 
population memory recall decreased over the academic year of the intervention period 
and there was no significant improvement in executive functioning. However, 
participants who showed significantly low executive functioning at baseline showed a 
significant improvement in episodic memory and executive functioning. The authors 
argue that this was due to a combination of cognitive, social and physical activity of the 
experimental intervention, which had a significantly larger effect on older adults who 
can be categorised as being at risk of cognitive decline/developing cognitive 
impairments (e.g. low executive functioning).  
 
A similar, but arguably more direct, technique was used by Stine-Morrow, Parisi, 
Marrow, Greene & Park (2007) to use a multi-modal intervention to increase cognitive 
functioning in adults aged over 55. The experimental group took part in a 20 week 
programme which was designed to induce problem-solving, using different techniques, 
while working in groups. The group work was designed to increase social interaction, 
team work/compromisation and competition. The results showed a significant increase 
in objective measures of working memory, inductive reasoning, divergent thinking and 
visuo-spatial ability, compared to a no-contact control group. However, there was no 
increase in subjective measures of MemSE, mindfulness or cognitive activities, just 
need for cognition. These results indicate that activities which replicate the use-
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dependency theory promote objective measures of cognition but not subjective 
measures (see Section 1.4).  
 
A cognitive intervention technique, based on the use-dependency theory, was used by 
Tranter & Koutstaal (2008) to investigate the relationship between everyday cognitive 
activities and crystallised and fluid intelligence. Participants had a number of group 
discussions and presentations about cognitive decline and metacognition functioning in 
aging, they also took part in group activities (which involved decision-making, 
problem-solving etc), creative workshops and did homework (e.g. solving word puzzles, 
number puzzles etc). Compared to the control group, participants who undertook the 
activities over the 12 week period showed significant improvement in fluid, but not 
crystallised, intelligence. These results were still evident after controlling for number of 
years in education and self-reported cognitive activity. The findings of Tranter & 
Koutstaal (2008) are contrary to those of Dellenbach & Zimprich (2008) who reported 
that older adults who took part in more intellectually stimulating activities showed 
greater crystallised, but not fluid, intelligence.  
 
Small et al. (2006) conducted a two week intervention period which focussed on 
enhancing cognitive functioning for individuals with mild cognitive impairments. The 
intervention group took part in cognitively stimulating activities (e.g. brain teasers and 
word games), cognitive training (e.g. visualisation), cardiovascular exercises and 
changed their diet, whereas the controls maintained their usual lifestyle for the two 
week period. Participants were aged between 35 and 69, with a mean age of 53 and 
were monitored for memory and frontal functioning as well as self-reported MemSE. 
The results showed a significant increase in episodic memory, verbal fluency and 
MemSE of the experimental group compared to the matched control group.  
 
An alternative method was used by Park, Gutchess, Meade & Stine-Morrow (2007), 
which used a novel everyday activity. In line with Noice & Noice (2009; 2006), Park et 
al. (2007) argue that a cognitive intervention needs to be novel in order to stimulate 
neurogenesis. This is based on Park et al.‘s (2007) review of the neuroimaging evidence 
and showed that neurogenesis, in older adults, is significantly higher if individuals take 
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part in activities which they have never attempted before rather than a standard 
cognitive intervention training technique (e.g. speed of processing). The results of Park 
et al.‘s (2007) research is not published to date, however Noice & Noice (2009; 2006) 
showed that executive functioning and episodic memory was promoted in older adults 
who learned to act (and had not attempted such an activity before). Although, it is 
possible that this cognitive enhancement is due to physical activity as well as cognitive, 
it is likely that the novel cognitive stimulation had a significant impact.     
 
1.3.3.3 Computer-based interventions  
 
With the recent increase in awareness of the aging population and the impact of age on 
cognition, commercial products have been developed to try and stimulate older adults 
(in particular) through the use of multi-media (e.g. Nintendo‘s Brain Training products). 
In one investigation Owen et al. (2010) tested over 11,000 participants for a six week 
period to investigate whether attempting activities akin to those used in commercially 
available products such as Nintendo‘s Brain Training improved cognitive functioning in 
participants who were aged between 18 and 60. Participants were assessed on 
reasoning, verbal short-term memory, spatial short-term memory and paired-associated 
learning. The control group was required to surf the internet and access a number of 
BBC resources for an equal amount of time as the two experimental groups who 
attempted activities which were similar to those involved in brain training. The results 
showed no significant increase in cognitive functioning of the experimental group over 
the control group, but all three groups showed a significant increase in the cognitive 
measures taken. Owen et al. (2010) argue that the results demonstrate that computer-
based training techniques are not significantly better at improving cognition than simply 
surfing the internet, however it must be acknowledged that the age range was 
insufficient to investigate the use-dependency theory (see Section 1.4 for discussion).   
 
Smith et al. (2009) compared a commercially available computer-based intervention 
programme to an intervention programme which required participants to watch DVDs 
about art, history and museums, and then answer questions on the information that they 
have learned over the eight week period. The results showed that both intervention 
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techniques improve processing speed, episodic memory and frontal/executive 
functioning. The findings showed that the computer/DVD-based intervention 
significantly improved short-term verbal learning and MemSE, whereas participants in 
the activity group showed a decrease in these two measures. Unfortunately, there was 
no control group which did not take part in any cognitive activity, therefore it is difficult 
to determine whether the increases in cognitive functioning are due to the intervention 
techniques or practise effects of repeating the cognitive test (e.g. Ferrer, Salthouse, 
McArdle, Stewart & Schwartz, 2005).  
 
Rebok et al. (2007) reviewed the evidence pertaining to the use of computer or 
video/DVD intervention methods in older adults. The conclusion was that such 
techniques appear to increase subjective measures of cognitive functioning (e.g. 
MemSE or reducing the belief that one will develop dementia); however there was little 
or no evidence that these types of interventions promote objective measures of cognitive 
functioning. Rebok et al. (2007) point out that some older adults have 
metacognitive/memory strategies, which are as good as strategies that are being taught 
(through interventions), but other older adults have ineffective strategies which are 
difficult to modify with training. The authors also state that cognitive interventions 
should be cost-effective and easily accessible to all older adults; ideally, they should 
also be based on everyday activities which do not require expert training or instruction.  
 
1.3.3.4 Summary 
 
In conclusion, the results from intervention studies have shown that cognitive training 
can enhance cognitive functioning and/or attenuate cognitive decline which is 
associated with mainly healthy aging, but also pathological aging. The results also 
demonstrate how activities which are based on everyday cognitive activities can be 
effective at improving cognitive functioning in a number of different cognitive domains. 
One issue which has been highlighted by researchers (e.g. Salthouse, 2007) is that 
training programmes which are based on mnemonics or other types of laboratory-based 
memory training are not transferred to everyday cognitive functioning. However, 
training techniques that focus on metacognition and executive functioning, and which 
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use everyday activities, appear to be more transferrable across cognitive domains and 
may have a larger impact on everyday functioning.  
 
1.4 Critique of theories and evidence used to investigate the use-dependency 
theory and cognitive reserve hypothesis 
 
1.4.1 Identifying the causal relationship between cognitive activity and functioning 
 
Both the use-dependency theory and cognitive reserve hypothesis predict that cognitive 
activity will have a significant effect on cognitive functioning in later life, thus the 
unique effect of cognitive activity on functioning needs to be established. It is also 
important to understand whether the effect of cognitive activity is mediated by other 
factors which are known to effect cognitive decline. Shadish et al. (2002) described an 
inus condition whereby investigations must identify all possible factors and mediators 
which bring about a specific outcome. For example, for a forest fire to occur there must 
be a number of key factors which have to be present to initiate the event (e.g. oxygen, 
dry material and a naked flame), but there are also other mediating factors which can 
also have a significant impact on the resulting condition (e.g. the wind blowing in the 
right direction, a cigarette being thrown out of a passing car etc). There must also be 
further extenuating factors which ensures that the final outcome ensues (e.g. in the case 
of a forest fire; no passersby to intervene, no rainfall, the presence of combustible 
materials etc). The principle of investigating an inus condition must also be investigated 
in cognitive neuropsychology with regards to the relationship between cognitive activity 
and cognitive decline in healthy aging.  
 
No study has reported a direct causal link between cognitive activity and cognitive 
decline/dementia. Salthouse (2007; 2006) argued that the causal relationship between 
cognitive activity and cognitive decline in healthy (and/or pathological) aging is 
uncertain and unproven. The base of Salthouse‘s argument is partly based on the 
premise of Shadish et al. (2002), in that it is necessary to identify an inus condition 
whereby cognitive activity has a significant impact on cognitive decline/functioning 
across the lifespan. As acknowledged by Elias & Wagster (2007) and Hertzog (2009) a 
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number of other factors affect or mediate cognitive decline other than cognitive activity. 
These include factors such as genetic background (e.g. King & Suzman, 2009), diet, 
stress (and the ability to cope with stress), educational background, socioeconomic 
status, culture, social support, access to health care etc. These factors may not be 
independent of one another, but there is evidence that all these factors have either a 
direct or indirect impact on cognitive functioning throughout life and particularly in 
older age. Therefore, it is important to identify these mediating factors that have a 
significant impact on cognitive decline, which is associated with aging (e.g. Hertzog et 
al., 2009; King & Suzman, 2009; Hertzog, 2009; Elias & Wagster, 2007; Salthouse, 
2006; Glisky & Glisky, 1999).  
 
It is clearly impossible to control for every mediating factor/confounding variable 
(known or unknown) when using a between-subjects technique (e.g. Coolican, 1997). 
The majority of the support for the use-dependency theory (and cognitive reserve 
hypothesis) has used a between-subjects technique. However as Hertzog (2009) notes, it 
is impossible to take into account all confounding variables/factors which will then 
identify the strength of the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive 
decline. Taking into account all known mediating factors or confounding variables will 
reduce the variance which can be directly associated between cognitive activity and 
cognitive decline (e.g. Hertzog & Nesselroade, 2003).  
 
The only logical conclusion is to use a within-subjects technique to investigate the 
relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive decline. There are two ways of 
doing this, which can be used to investigate either the cognitive reserve hypothesis or 
use-dependency theory.  Poon & Fozard (1978) used a mixed design to investigate the 
relationship between age and naming latencies for items which were either dated or 
modern common items (e.g. a telephone from the 1920s compared to a telephone from 
the 1970s). Pictures of other objects from the 1920s, which were no longer in use in the 
1970s, were also shown to the participants, as well as objects which had just been 
invented for commercial use (e.g. a calculator). Three age groups (i.e. younger adults, 
middle aged and older adults who were over 65 years old) of participants were required 
to name the objects as fast as possible. Older adults were significantly faster at naming 
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the dated common objects and the objects which were no longer in use, whereas 
younger adults were faster at naming the objects which had just become commercially 
available. This indicates that early life experiences have a significant impact on 
cognitive functioning later in life because older adults appeared to name the dated 
objects quicker than the contemporary versions.  
 
Therefore, with regards to the use-dependency theory (and cognitive reserve 
hypothesis) there is a need to use a within-subjects technique to investigate whether an 
increase in cognitive activity has a direct effect on cognitive decline which is age-
related. With regards to the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency theory, it 
is possible to investigate this by studying one cognitive domain which can be separated 
on the basis of stimulation/activity. This technique was used in Chapter Three when 
investigating the cognitive reserve hypothesis and Chapter Four with regards to the use-
dependency theory. Furthermore, it can be argued that intervention techniques, which 
have used a between-subjects technique, cannot draw a conclusion that the cognitive 
intervention has a causal and direct effect on cognitive functioning. This is a critical 
issue as some research has suggested that older adults who have lower cognitive 
stimulation and lower cognitive functioning benefit more from cognitive intervention 
(e.g. Carlson et al., 2008; Glisky & Glisky, 1999) whereas other studies have shown 
that cognitive interventions have a larger impact on participants with a higher 
functioning at baseline (e.g. Bissig & Lustig, 2007). The use of a within-subjects 
technique for an intervention study would allow confirmation of whether the 
intervention was beneficial for the whole sample population (see Chapter Five). The 
sample population could then be separated into sub-samples to investigate whether at 
risk groups showed a different response to the intervention than the whole sample 
population, as suggested by Elias & Wagster (2007).     
 
When establishing a causal relationship of cognitive activity on age-related functioning 
it is vital to define the expected outcome. This is discussed further in Section 1.4.3 but, 
as age takes a significant toll on cognitive functions such as episodic memory, 
metacognition and executive functioning, the effect of cognitive activity on cognitive 
functioning must be more apparent in an older sample population than a younger 
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sample population in order to support either the cognitive reserve hypothesis or use-
dependency theory. Salthouse (2007; 2006) argued that to support either theory results 
must show a 2 X 2 interaction between cognitive activity and age on cognitive 
functioning (in various cognitive domains). This is not in line with Schooler (2007) who 
argued that an increase in cognitive functioning for adults who are more cognitively 
active is sufficient to support the use-dependency theory. Schooler (2007) stated that 
there was no reason why one should expect a large impact of cognitive activity on older 
adults than younger adults.  
 
However, as supported by Hertzog (2009), Salthouse (2007) pointed out that the 
premise of the use-dependency theory, in particular, is that cognitive activity can 
reverse age-related cognitive decline. The key term is ―age-related‖, because there is 
clear evidence that older adults can show high levels of cognitive plasticity; that is, 
older adults are definitely able to learn new behaviours and develop existing abilities 
(e.g. Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; Li et al., 2008). It is necessary to show that an 
increase in cognitive activity in later life has a greater impact on age-related decline in 
cognitive function which impact on everyday functioning, compared to younger adults. 
Showing that an increase in doing cryptic crosswords, for example, improves episodic 
memory to the same degree in younger and older adults is insufficient evidence to 
support the use-dependency theory. The cognitive activity/inactivity at an older age 
should have a larger effect on age-related functioning than activity/inactivity at a 
younger age to support the use-dependency theory.  
 
1.4.2 Establishing a measure of cognitive activity 
 
A further issue with research investigating the use-dependency/cognitive reserve 
hypothesis is the measure of cognitive activity. Measures of cognitive activity have 
varied over the 40 years of investigating the use-it-or-lose-it theory. For example, 
Friedman et al. (2002) asked participants to report activities which were closely 
associated with self-maintenance, but recorded these as a definition of cognitive 
activity. Conversely, Jopp & Hertzog (2007) used an extremely wide scale of activity 
measurements, which included taking part in various games (e.g. crosswords, cards), 
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using technology (e.g. surfing the internet), but also experiential activities (e.g. learning 
new languages). Other studies such as Gold et al. (1995) used measures of intelligence 
or education as a measure of cognitive reserve. 
 
There is a need to classify and categorise measures of cognitive activity (e.g. Jopp & 
Hertzog, 2010). Salthouse (2006) has provided evidence that different cognitive 
activities require a different amount of cognitive effort. Therefore, it is important to 
devise a classification of cognitive activities which allow researchers to quantify the 
level of activity being undertaken by participants. Different researchers have not only 
used different measures of activity, but also calculated total cognitive activity in 
different ways. For example Hultsch et al. (1999) classified attempting crosswords as a 
novel information processing activity, whereas Jopp & Hertzog (2007) classified 
crossword solving under games/leisure activities. Hultsch et al. (1999) demonstrated 
that their group of cognitive activities, including crossword frequency, was significantly 
associated with higher cognitive functioning later in life, but Jopp & Hertzog (2007) 
showed that their ―games‖ measure (including crossword frequency) was not associated 
with a reduction in cognitive decline or improved cognitive functioning. This raises the 
question as to which specific cognitive activities are related to attenuation in cognitive 
decline.  
 
Studies which have used activities such as self-maintenance as a measure of cognitive 
activity have shown a link between cognitive activity and the development of dementia 
(e.g. Friedman et al., 2002). However, it is likely that the relationship between self-
maintenance (as a measure of cognitive activity) declines with preclinical dementia, 
which is arguably undetectable (e.g. Wilson et al., 2007). Whereas studies which have 
investigated the effect of specific cognitive activities on cognitive decline and/or 
dementia (e.g. Verghese et al., 2003) may be able to identify cognitive activities which 
are specifically associated with an attenuation in cognitive decline and/or dementia. 
 
Salthouse (2006) argued that it is important to only measure the most cognitively 
demanding activities when measuring cognitive activity. This is also supportive of 
Parslow et al. (2006) who developed an alternative measure of cognitive activity which 
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focused on creative/self-improving activities (e.g. studying a foreign language or 
learning to play a musical instrument etc). However, Parslow et al. (2006) excluded 
leisure activities such as doing crosswords or word games. The difference between the 
measures used in Salthouse (2006) and Parslow et al. (2006) demonstrate a problem in 
the consensus as what constitutes a cognitive activity. 
 
Early research on the use-dependency theory noted that older adults who were more 
cognitively active in later life showed less cognitive decline and a later onset of 
dementia (e.g. Schooler, 1997; Edelman, 1987). These studies specifically noted that a 
higher level of leisure activities was associated with a slower/later cognitive decline. 
Therefore, arguably the original use-dependency theory implicated leisure activities as a 
way to attenuate cognitive decline in aging. 
 
The fact that studies such as Parslow et al. (2006) and Jopp & Hertzog (2007) have 
shown that self-improving activities are related to lower levels of cognitive decline is 
not surprising. Li et al. (2008) have demonstrated that skill acquisition in later life is 
possible as well as the development of expertise (e.g. Kimball & Holyoak, 2000; Dorner 
& Scholkopf, 1991). Researchers have demonstrated how an increase in educational 
attainment can have a direct and indirect impact on other factors which mediate 
cognitive functioning in later life (e.g. health awareness, access to healthcare, social 
economic status, improved diet and lifestyle; e.g. Elias & Wagster, 2007). Therefore, 
the link between educational activity in later life and a decrease in cognitive decline 
may not be due to a direct causal relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive 
functioning; thus not a true representation of the use-dependency theory/cognitive 
reserve hypothesis.  
 
As the access to activities described in Parslow et al. (2006) and some measures of Jopp 
& Hertzog (2007) are not accessible/available to the wider older population it is 
arguably more important to study common leisure activities which have been associated 
with the use-dependency theory (e.g. Wilson et al., 2007). However, it is still difficult to 
find a categorization of everyday cognitive activity. For example, certain research has 
classified watching television as a cognitive activity (e.g. Wilson et al., 2002; 
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Christensen & Mackinnon, 1993). However, Salthouse (2006) demonstrated that 
participants rated watching television as the least cognitively demanding leisure 
activity. This is a problem when researchers construct a factor which represents total 
cognitive activity; it is possible that a participant who watches television everyday will 
have a similar cognitive activity rating as someone who attempts cryptic crosswords 
everyday but never watches television. As expressed by Hultsch (personal 
communication, 18
th
 February 2010) it is possible to classify television programmes 
into different categories, but it is still difficult to determine whether participants are 
engaged in watching the programme and how much effort is required to undertake the 
activity.  
 
It is necessary to measure activities which are cognitively demanding (Salthouse, 2006), 
but unlike Wilson et al. (2007) cognitive measures should not ignore activities which 
are particularly specialised. It is possible to develop expertise in specialised activities 
such as cryptic crosswords (e.g. Forshaw, unpublished) or advanced problem solving, 
which can then be transferred to other cognitive domains. Therefore, it is necessary to 
investigate a wide range of cognitive activities and be cautious when creating a 
construct which represents total cognitive activity because some activities may have a 
larger effect on cognition than others.         
 
Furthermore, a number of measures of cognitive activity have included crossword 
frequency (e.g. Jopp & Hertzog, 2010; Barnes et al., 2006; Verghese et al., 2003), but 
not distinguished between the specific type of crossword being attempted (i.e. cryptic, 
quick or general knowledge). Although Salthouse (2006) found that participants rated 
doing crosswords as the second most effortful activity, it is clear that different types of 
crosswords require different cognitive abilities. Hambrick, Salthouse & Meinz (1999) 
acknowledged that different types of crosswords require different cognitive processes.  
 
Forshaw (unpublished) and Nickerson (1977) indicated that a number of different 
cognitive abilities are required to solve a cryptic crossword compared to a quick or 
general knowledge crossword. For example, cryptic crosswords tend to have two 
separate components to a clue, which must both match to find the solution. Forshaw 
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(unpublished) suggested that inductive reasoning is required, specifically in older 
adults, to solve cryptic crosswords. Conversely, general knowledge and quick 
crosswords rely on general knowledge or crystallized intelligence (e.g. Hambrick et al., 
1999), not necessarily inductive reasoning. 
 
To measure an overall crossword frequency may be masking the effects of one specific 
crossword because participants will report a frequency rating for whichever crossword 
they undertake. The self-testing skill required to complete a cryptic crossword is similar 
to the metacognition training used by Dunlosky et al. (2007). Therefore, it is possible 
that attempting cryptic crosswords regularly may promote metacognition. However, a 
frequency rating which does not distinguish between crossword types will produce the 
same crossword frequency rating for a participant who does quick crosswords everyday 
(but no cryptic crosswords) and a participant who attempts cryptic crosswords everyday 
(but no quick crosswords). Hence, it is necessary to investigate whether different types 
of crosswords have a different effect on cognitive functioning in later life.  
 
The discrimination between types of crosswords being measured also raises a question 
about the cultural bias of some cognitive activity measures. For example, cryptic 
crosswords are more common in Britain/Europe compared to the USA. As described by 
Hambrick et al. (1999) cryptic crosswords are only really available in certain 
newspapers or online and may not be available daily as in the UK (for example The 
New York Times prints a cryptic crossword on a Sunday, whereas many UK-based 
newspapers will print cryptic crosswords daily). The crossword puzzle is also an 
activity which is more commonly associated with western countries. Due to the 
difference in language, crosswords are not a leisure activity in China. However, Asian 
countries have developed leisure activities/games which are not widely available in 
Europe or the USA (e.g. Mahjong). Research has shown that there is still evidence for 
the use-dependency theory when measuring cognitive activities which are culturally 
specific, for example, Wang et al. (2006) showed that games which require a high 
degree of inductive reasoning are associated with a significant reduction in cognitive 
decline/dementia. Therefore it is necessary to identify the specific type of cognitive 
leisure activity that is associated with an attenuation of cognitive decline.  
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Finally, with regards to measures of cognitive activity, there is a question mark over the 
decisions taken to classify activities in a cognitive activity scale. For example Jopp & 
Hertzog (2010) and Wilson et al. (2007) argue that cognitive activities (which are 
measured in investigations of the use-dependency/cognitive reserve theory) must be 
positively correlated with cognitive functioning. However, this is highly questionable 
because it is arguably producing findings which are based on a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
That is, if researchers are only selecting cognitive activities which are positively 
correlated with cognitive functioning it is inevitable that the relationship between 
cognitive activity and cognitive functioning will be supported. It is possible that some 
cognitive activities may reduce certain measures of cognitive functioning in old age, for 
example undertaking a novel but difficult cognitive activity may reduce MemSE in the 
short-term. Reducing MemSE in older adults may not be an undesirable outcome 
because of the relationship between MemSE and metacognition. It is possible that 
cognitive activities which are not positively associated with specific cognitive functions 
may be beneficial for other cognitive functions in the long-term. Thus, it is 
inappropriate to exclude cognitive activities which may be negatively or not 
significantly associated with cognitive functioning due to the potential to either have 
mediating effects or long-term benefits for other cognitive functions.  
 
1.4.3 Measuring cognitive functioning and/or decline 
 
The measure of cognitive functioning/decline has also varied when investigating the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis and/or use-dependency theory. For example, Katzman 
(1993) and Friedman et al. (2002) investigated the relationship between cognitive 
activity and the development of dementia, whereas Jopp & Hertzog (2007) and Barnes 
et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive 
functioning in healthy aging.  
 
Even when research on pathological aging is excluded, there is a large variation in the 
measures of cognitive functioning in healthy aging. For example, Dellenbach & 
Zimprich (2008) investigated the impact of cognitive activity on crystallised and fluid 
intelligence, whereas Wilson et al. (2002) investigated the outcome measures of global 
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cognitive functioning, working memory and processing speed. Intervention studies have 
also focussed on promoting different cognitive abilities, for example Karbach & Kray 
(2009) measured executive functioning whereas West et al. (2008) investigated the 
impact of training on MemSE and episodic memory.  
 
Identifying an outcome measure or various outcome measures/dependent variables is 
critical for measuring an intervention or investigating the use-dependency theory. First, 
as mentioned above, it is important to focus on cognitive activities which show age-
related decline (e.g. episodic memory, metacognition). Second, without a consensus on 
dependent variables it is impossible to assess the support for the use-dependency theory. 
As indicated by Jopp & Hertzog (2007), many cognitive functions mediate one another 
and therefore a cognitive intervention/activity may not show a direct effect on one 
cognitive function but may do on a different cognitive function (related or unrelated). 
The lack of a consensus with regards to outcome measures of studies in this area also 
highlights a lack of agreement of how cognitive activity influences cognitive 
functioning.  
 
Some researchers have used subjective measures of cognitive functioning, whereas 
others have used objective measures of empirically recognised cognitive abilities; 
further research has used objective measures of everyday cognitive functioning based 
on a combination of subjective and objective measures (e.g. West et al., 2008; Tranter 
& Koutstaal, 2008; Cavallini et al., 2003). West et al. (2008) and Berry (1999) argue 
that cognitive activity enhances objective measures of cognitive functioning (e.g. 
paired-associated recall) through promoting MemSE and increasing participants‘ 
confidence when undertaking cognitive functions. However, other researchers have 
argued that the resulting increase in MemSE, which is associated with higher levels of 
cognitive activity, is due to the awareness that cognitive functioning is improving (or 
not declining) as a result of the cognitive activity having a direct effect on functioning 
(e.g. Jopp & Hertzog, 2007). 
 
Cognitive activities or interventions that have shown a positive relationship with 
objective measures of cognitive functioning (e.g. speed of processing; Ball et al., 2002) 
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have not always shown a positive relationship with everyday functioning (self-reported 
or objectively measured). Not only is it important to identify cognitive activities which 
are positively associated with everyday functioning, but it is also important to identify 
whether interventions which enhance certain cognitive abilities also enable an increase 
in everyday functioning. For example, Cavallini et al. (2003) showed how a 
metacognition-based intervention appeared to have a greater benefit on both objective 
and subjective measures of everyday functioning as well as laboratory-based tests of 
cognitive functioning compared to a mnemonic-based intervention.  
 
Jopp & Hertzog (2007) provided convincing evidence that the relationship between 
cognitive activity and subjective measures of cognitive functioning (e.g. MemSE) was 
mediated by actual (objectivity measured) cognitive functioning. An alternate model 
also showed that there was a link directly between cognitive activity and MemSE, but 
this association became non-significant when controlling for current cognitive 
functioning. This is converse to Berry (1999) who believed that the relationship 
between cognitive activity and MemSE determined the level of cognitive functioning.  
 
It is likely that MemSE has a partially mediating role in the relationship between 
cognitive activity and cognitive functioning. It is also likely that cognitive function, in 
old age, has a direct influence on MemSE when taking into account cognitive activity. 
Hertzog & Hultsch (2000) state that participants are likely to give up attempting certain 
activities because they lose the ability to undertake the activity, due to a decline in 
cognitive functioning. This failure of being unable to complete a cognitive activity (that 
one could complete in the past) will have a direct negative effect on MemSE.  
 
This argument by Hertzog & Hultsch (2000) fits with the classic view of metacognition 
by Nelson & Narens (1990). Figure 1.1 shows the metacognition model where the meta-
level can be regarded as MemSE. The object-level can be regarded as cognitive 
functioning which both influences and is influenced by the meta-level via the 
monitoring and control pathways respectively. A drop in cognitive functioning (i.e. 
object-level performance) will have a direct influence on MemSE (i.e. meta-level) 
through the monitoring pathway. Dunlosky, Hertzog & Powell-Moman (2005) argue 
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Meta-level 
Object-level 
that older adults appear to have a deficit in the control pathway (i.e. the ability for 
MemSE or the meta-level to affect cognitive functioning/the object-level). As older 
adults apparently have a deficit in the control pathway it is unlikely that increasing 
MemSE (the meta-level functioning) will have a significant impact on cognitive 
functioning in a wide number of cognitive domains, as proposed by West et al. (2008) 
and Berry (1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activities which involve a high level of effort should also increase the amount of 
monitoring undertaken and thus increase the feedback to MemSE. Cognitive activities 
which involve self-testing have been shown to improve metacognition and episodic 
memory functioning in older adults. Therefore it is possible that leisure activities that 
require similar cognitive abilities (e.g. self-testing) will also enable older adults to 
become more aware of their cognitive abilities (i.e. metacognition will be increased). 
This type of scenario supports the view of Hertzog & Hultsch (2000) in that it is 
possible that older adults who loose their ability to complete activities such as cryptic 
crosswords will become more aware of their cognitive decline and therefore suffer a 
decrease in MemSE. This is opposite to the view of Berry (1999) who would argue that 
a drop in MemSE would have a knock-on effect to produce a drop in cognitive 
functioning which would then discourage participants from attempting such cognitive 
activities. The evidence from Jopp & Hertzog (2007) supports the view that the 
relationship between cognitive functioning and cognitive activity mediates the 
Figure 1.1. The process of metacognition illustrated by Nelson & Narens (1990) 
Control Flow of information Monitoring 
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relationship between cognitive activity and MemSE; not that MemSE mediates the 
relationship between cognitive activity and objective measures of cognitive functioning.  
 
1.4.4 Subjective versus objective measures of cognitive activity and functioning 
 
Finally, with regards to both measures of cognitive activity and cognitive functioning, 
there has been a combination of self-report and objective measures used to measure 
both activity and functioning. Research has shown that computer-based interventions 
have a significant impact on subjective measures of cognitive ability (e.g. Rebok et al., 
2007). That is older adults who undertake these activities show an increase in MemSE 
and a decrease in the belief that they will develop dementia. However, Rebok et al. 
(2007) found no evidence that such interventions promote objective measures of 
cognitive functioning. This was also the conclusion by Rapp, Brenes & Marsh (2002) 
who found that cognitive interventions appeared to have a significantly larger impact on 
subjective compared to objective measures of cognitive functioning. However, Floyd & 
Scogin (1997) conducted a meta-analysis and concluded that cognitive interventions 
have a significantly larger affect on objective over subjective measures of 
memory/cognitive ability. Dunlosky et al. (2007) have argued that meta-analyses 
produce over representative support for particularly objective benefits of cognitive 
intervention because non-significant findings tend not to be published.  
 
Rabbitt et al. (1995) also commented that self-report measures in older adults tend to be 
unreliable. This can arguably be the case for both measures of cognitive functioning and 
activity. There is a high level of comorbidity between preclinical dementia and 
depression (e.g. Verghese et al., 2003). Furthermore both preclinical dementia and 
depression have been associated with a reduction in cognitive, social and physical 
activity (e.g. Wilson et al., 2007; Elias & Wagster, 2007). Therefore research which has 
shown a relationship between lower levels of cognitive activity and decreased cognitive 
functioning may have been finding a normal causal relationship; that is, the reduction in 
activity and functioning may have been due to either preclinical dementia or an 
alternate psychological illness such as depression. This is also possible because 
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participants with depression have demonstrated a reduced cognitive ability on both 
subjective and objective measures (e.g. Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004).  
 
Self-reported cognitive activities at the current period in time may be more valid than 
using retrospective self-reported activity measures of earlier in life that a number of 
researchers have done (e.g. Barnes et al., 2006; Friedman et al., 2002; Friedland et al., 
2001; Kondo et al., 1997; Christensen & Mackinnon, 1993).  Memon, Bartlett, Rose & 
Gray (2003) showed that older adults were significantly poorer at recalling information 
as the time period between the events and recall increased. Furthermore, some 
researchers such as Friedman et al. (2002) and Kondo et al. (1997) have used self-
reported measures of activity from friends or family of individuals who had developed 
dementia.  
 
Studies such as Barnes et al. (2006) and Friedland et al. (2001) have shown a significant 
relationship between early life activities and less cognitive decline or later onset of 
dementia. However, taking into account the potential fallibility of older adults‘ memory 
for retrospective events (e.g. Memon et al., 2003), the influence of preclinical dementia 
on self-efficacy, the reliance on family/friends for information and the number of other 
factors which may mediate cognitive activity earlier in life (e.g. parental income or 
occupation; Salthouse, 2007) it is questionable whether these techniques should be used 
to investigate the cognitive reserve hypothesis or the use-dependency theory. There is a 
need to develop an independent measure of cognitive functioning and cognitive activity 
which is arguably more objective than self-report measures. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that studies which measure self-reported cognitive activity should also use self-
reported measures of cognitive functioning as well as objective measures to investigate 
whether there is a difference between the two measures.  
 
1.4.5 Targeting the correct sample population at the appropriate age when conducting 
cognitive interventions. 
 
The most important application of the use-dependency theory (and to a lesser degree the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis) is to develop cognitive intervention which can attenuate 
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or reverse age-related cognitive decline. Following on from the criticism of studies such 
as Barnes et al. (2006), there is no agreement as to when (i.e. at what stage in life) an 
increase in cognitive functioning is required to attenuate cognitive decline or the 
development of dementia. Studies such as Barnes et al. (2006) and Mackinnon et al. 
(2003) have argued that cognitive activity is required at an earlier stage in life to 
develop a cognitive reserve or strategies to counter age-related cognitive decline. 
However, other studies have measured cognitive activity and cognitive function later in 
life to investigate the use-dependency theory (e.g. Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; 
Hultsch et al., 1999). Although it is accepted that there is a difference due to the two 
theories, research which has investigated cognitive activity in later life has not taken 
into account previous cognitive activity or other factors such as number of years in 
education which may have a mediating effect on the relationship between cognitive 
activity and cognitive functioning/decline in later life.  
 
Glisky & Glisky (1999) have suggested that cognitive intervention techniques may be 
more beneficial for older adults who can be regarded as having a low cognitive reserve 
or who are relatively cognitively inactive. This was also supported by research by 
Carlson et al. (2008) which showed that an everyday cognitive intervention activity had 
a significantly greater effect on participants who could be regarded to be at risk of 
cognitive decline/developing cognitive impairments. This is converse to the findings of 
Bissig & Lustig (2007) who demonstrated that cognitive training techniques appear to 
have a significantly greater benefit on older adults who had higher cognitive functioning 
measures at baseline. The impact of social demographic/lifestyle factors needs to be 
investigated in a way whereby specific mediating factors (e.g. lower educational 
history) can be monitored with regards to the effectiveness of a cognitive intervention 
or measure of cognitive activity. Supporting the view of Salthouse (2007) there must be 
clear evidence, to support the use-dependency theory, that an increase in cognitive 
activity in later life attenuates cognitive decline. It is conceivable that this evidence may 
only be apparent in specific sample populations (e.g. those with a fewer number of 
years in education; Christensen & Mackinnon, 1993), therefore countering the view of 
psychologists such as Schooler (2007) who claimed that cognitive activity in later life 
can be beneficial for all older adults. 
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1.4.6 Summary 
 
To recapitulate, an inus condition (e.g. Shadish et al., 2002) describes a causal 
relationship which takes into account a number of mediating factors. Therefore, when 
using a between-subjects technique it is important to be cautious when interpreting 
relationships between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning as causal. This is 
especially the case when using self-report measures of cognitive activity and/or 
cognitive functioning, and not taking into account other possible mediating factors (e.g. 
Bosma et al., 2002). Although it is the case that cross-sectional self-report techniques 
can be a useful aide in identifying cognitive activities which may have a direct or 
indirect effect on cognitive functioning, it is important to provide further evidence with 
objective measures of both cognitive activity and cognitive functioning.  
 
In conclusion, evidence which has supported the use-dependency theory and/or 
cognitive reserve hypothesis is inconsistent, in terms of designs used, activity measures, 
cognitive functioning assessed and demographic/mediating factors accounted for. There 
is a need to use objective measures of cognitive activities and also investigate whether 
specific cognitive activities have a greater impact on cognitive function than others. It is 
also necessary to investigate whether self-reported cognitive functioning differs, in 
terms of its relationship to cognitive activity, when it is measured subjectively and/or 
objectively. There is also an urgent need to devise a within-subject technique which can 
be used to investigate the effectiveness of cognitive interventions on the whole sample 
population, as well as sub-samples, while taking subjective and objective measures of 
cognitive activity and cognitive functioning. The investigations of sub-samples will 
allow analysis of mediating factors which may highlight certain groups of individuals 
who may benefit more from the intervention.  
 
1.5 Aims of the thesis  
 
It is important to identify whether different cognitive activities have a different effect on 
cognitive functioning. This will indicate whether participation in certain activities is 
associated with a higher level of functioning in later life. In turn, this will allow a 
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specific cognitive activity to be identified and used as a potential intervention activity. 
Therefore the first aim of this thesis was to investigate whether self-reported 
participation in certain activities was associated with less self-reported cognitive decline 
throughout the lifespan. As discussed in Section 1.4, it is necessary to assess current 
cognitive activity because self-report techniques of retrospective activity can potentially 
be unreliable (e.g. Memon et al., 2003).
1
  
 
Due to using self-reported measures of cognitive activity it is arguably necessary to use 
self-reported measures of cognitive functioning. This is for two reasons; first, if MemSE 
or other factors such as depression effect self-reported cognitive functioning and 
activity, then it is important to assess self-reported cognitive functioning compared to 
objective measures because it is unclear whether mediating factors have a larger impact 
on objective or self-report measures (e.g. Rebok et al, 2007; Elias & Wagster, 2007). To 
clarify, because subjective measures are being used to assess cognitive activity, it is 
prudent to use subjective measures of cognitive functioning.  
 
Second, as described in Section 1.4, it is possible that cognitive activity has a direct 
effect on metacognition. As older adults appear to have a deficit in the control pathway 
(e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2005; see Figure 1.1) it is likely that any awareness of the effect of 
cognitive activity will be apparent in subjective measures of cognitive awareness (e.g. 
MemSE). Jopp & Hertzog (2007) showed how cognitive activity can affect MemSE. 
Thus it is important to identify which specific cognitive activities have a significant 
impact on MemSE, to a greater degree in older than younger participants, because this 
may indicate specific cognitive activities which have a larger impact on metacognition. 
The fact that older adults report a greater level of cognitive awareness when 
undertaking certain cognitive activities may suggest that these activities increase 
metacognitive functioning, and therefore could be used as intervention activities. 
                                               
1
 Chapter Two specifically investigated whether different types of crosswords were associated with 
different self–reported levels of cognitive decline in healthy aging; mainly because different types of 
crosswords appear to require different cognitive functions, which may have a larger/different impact on 
age-related cognitive decline. 
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Importantly, as older adults have benefitted from metacognitive training (e.g. Dunlosky 
et al., 2007) it is important to identify an everyday activity which could potentially 
enhance metacognition. This investigation and analysis is covered in Chapter Two.  
 
A further aim of the thesis was to find an objective measure which could indicate 
cognitive activity but use an alternative technique to self-report measures. Chapters 
Three and Four investigate the cognitive reserve hypothesis and the use-dependency 
theory by using objective measures of cognitive activity and cognitive functioning. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, certain parts of one specific cognitive domain can be 
activated more frequently, throughout life, than others. For example, in the domain of 
language, high-frequency and early-acquired words are activated more and earlier than 
low-frequency and later-acquired words respectively (e.g. Li, 2009; Tan & Ward, 
2000).  
 
Both word frequency and age of acquisition (AoA) are known to effect episodic 
memory; high frequency and early-acquired words are recalled better than either low-
frequency or later-acquired words (see Chapter Three for a review of research). As 
high-frequency and early-acquired words are activated more often, in terms of their 
cognitive/neuronal representations, it is possible that this area of study could be used as 
an analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis. That is, because high-frequency and 
early-acquired, compared to low-frequency and later-acquired, words are activated 
more often throughout life it is logical to assume that cognitive/neuronal atrophy, 
associated with healthy aging, will take a greater toll on low-frequency and later-
acquired words. This has been supported in studies of dementia with regards to word 
production (e.g. Forbes-McKay et al., 2005).  
 
The cognitive reserve hypothesis states that an increased level of cognitive activity will 
protect cognitive functioning, especially if this cognitive activity is evident early in life 
and persists throughout the lifespan. Therefore, a comparison of episodic memory recall 
of high- compared to low-frequency and early- compared to later-acquired words in 
younger and older adults will mirror the cognitive reserve hypothesis. Using objective 
measures of word frequency and AoA as a measure of life-long cognitive activity will 
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negate the criticism of using self-report measures of cognitive activity (especially 
retrospective measures of childhood activity such as those used in Barnes et al, 2006).  
 
Chapter Four describes a similar technique which investigated the use-dependency 
theory. To produce an analogy of the use-dependency theory, using a within-subjects 
design, it is necessary to find a cognitive construct which was matched, in terms of 
activation/frequency, at one point earlier in life, but was separated later in life on the 
basis of activation/frequency. To clarify, the use-dependency theory states that a 
decrease in activity in later life (or an increase in cognitive activity) will result in a 
decrease (or increase) in cognitive functioning. Therefore, one aspect of a cognitive 
domain must show a decrease in activation/frequency of use to replicate the use-
dependency theory within an individual.  
 
Merry (1995) showed how certain first names decreased in popularity/frequency over a 
50-60 year period. As research has shown that older adults show a significant episodic 
memory deficit for recalling first names (e.g. Semenza, Nichelli & Gamboz, 1996), the 
ability to recall first names provided an opportunity to test the use-dependency theory 
using objective measures of cognitive functioning and cognitive activity. Due to the fact 
that the popularity of certain names reduced over a 40 year period, it is likely that the 
activation of cognitive/neuronal networks which represent such names also decrease 
(even though they were activated as frequently as names which were equally as popular 
earlier in life), therefore in line with the use-dependency theory, names which have 
remained popular should be easier to recall. According to the requirements for support 
of the use-dependency theory (i.e. a significant age X activity interaction; Salthouse, 
2007), older adults should show a significantly greater ability to recall popular 
compared to unpopular names than younger adults; specifically as popular names are 
easier to recall than unpopular names (e.g. James, 2004).  
 
Finally, as in Chapters Three and Four, the use of a within-subjects technique is critical 
to confirm a direct relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive decline in 
healthy aging. Section 1.4 describes how demographic mediating factors can affect the 
relationship between cognitive activity and age-related cognitive decline. As noted by 
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Hertzog (2009), it is impossible when using a between-subjects design to control for all 
confounding variables or mediating factors. Furthermore, it is likely that test-retest 
effects reduce the variance associated with cognitive activity when using longitudinal 
studies of cognitive decline (e.g. Ferrer et al, 2005). Research has also shown that 
participants who have withdrawn from intervention studies show lower cognitive 
functioning as well as decreased interest/frequency in cognitive activities. Therefore, 
there is a need to develop a technique that can eliminate these confounds and mediating 
factors. 
 
Chapter Five describes a counterbalanced within-subject technique which is able to 
measure the direct impact of an everyday cognitive activity intervention on cognitive 
functioning in older adults. This design enables researchers to first assess the impact of 
the intervention on the whole sample population, as older sample populations are more 
heterogeneous than younger ones (e.g. Glisky & Glisky, 1999). Second, the technique 
allows the entire sample population to be separated into sub-samples based on 
demographics which are known to influence the impact of cognitive interventions on 
cognitive functioning (e.g. number of years in education, socialisation; Elias & 
Wagster, 2007; Christensen & MacKinnon, 1993). This technique also allows for an 
independent measure of the ability of undertaking the cognitive intervention, which is 
arguably a more objective measure of cognitive activity (when controlling for time 
spent attempting the activity) than subjective measures of cognitive activity
2
.  
 
In summary, the thesis has three main aims; first, to investigate whether specific 
cognitive activities (i.e. different types of crosswords) have a greater impact on 
cognitive functioning in later life and, therefore, could be used as an intervention 
activity. Second, to use an objective measure of cognitive activity to assess the impact 
of cognitive activity on cognitive functioning in older adults. Finally, to use a within-
subject technique to eliminate, but also investigate factors (e.g. metacognition) which 
mediate the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive decline in the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis, use-dependency theory and intervention techniques.  
 
                                               
2 For example, when using self-report measures of crossword frequency (e.g. Verghese et al., 2003). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 QUESTIONNAIRE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COGNITIVE RESERVE 
HYPOTHESIS AND USE-DEPENDENCY THEORY (SUBJECTIVE 
MEASURES OF COGNITIVE ACTIVITY AND COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING) 
 
2.1 Background 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, there is no agreement about the type of cognitive activity 
required to produce observable changes in cognitive functioning. One aspect of the 
investigation into the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency theory is when 
and what type of activity is required to produce a change in cognitive functioning. Some 
studies have used self-report techniques of activity attempted earlier in life (e.g. Barnes 
et al., 2006) while others have focused on current cognitive activities (e.g. Dellenbach 
& Zimprich, 2008). It is also questionable whether activities which have been included 
in the self-report measures can all be regarded as cognitive in nature (as indicated by 
Salthouse, 2006; see Chapter One), for example Wilson et al. (2002) regarded watching 
television as a cognitive activity and Friedman, Moore, Quinn, Howieson & Kaye 
(2002) regarded self maintenance as a cognitive activity.  
 
Even studies which have attempted to focus specifically on intellectual activities may 
not have differentiated between specific types of intellectual activities. For instance, 
many self-report cognitive activity questionnaires ask about the frequency of attempting 
crossword puzzles (e.g. Wilson et al., 2005; Verghese et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 2002; 
Salthouse, Berish & Miles, 2002); however they do not discriminate between different 
types of crossword puzzle (e.g. cryptic, general knowledge and quick crosswords). The 
cognitive abilities required to complete each different type of crossword are different 
(e.g. Hambrick et al., 1999; Nickerson, 1977; Forshaw, unpublished). Therefore, it is 
necessary to narrow the spectrum of intellectual activities measured and ensure that they 
are cognitive in nature and require a relatively high demand on cognitive resources (e.g. 
Salthouse et al., 2002). Salthouse et al. (2002) showed that attempting crosswords was 
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deemed to be the second most cognitively demanding activity out of 22 cognitive 
activities, however once again the researchers did not discriminate between different 
types of crossword puzzles. 
 
Furthermore, dependent variables/outcome measures have not been constant throughout 
the four decades of research into the cognitive reserve/use-dependency theory. Some 
studies have investigated the effect of cognitive activity on healthy aging (e.g. Wilson et 
al., 2005) and other research has focused on the mediating factors associated with 
pathological aging (e.g. Friedman et al., 2002). Different cognitive domains have also 
been used to measure current cognitive functioning. For example, some studies have 
taken self-report measures of memory self-efficacy (MemSE) and metacognition (e.g.  
Cavallini, Pagnin & Vecchi, 2003) while others have used objective measures of 
cognitive functioning, such as episodic memory tests or fluid intelligence tests (e.g. 
Tranter & Koulstaal, 2008; Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; Hultsch et al., 1999). 
Bandura (1989) argued that it is more important how older adults feel about their 
current cognitive abilities, rather than objective measures of cognitive functioning when 
attempting to use intervention techniques to counter cognitive decline. According to 
Bandura (1989), an increase in MemSE in later life can help to attenuate cognitive 
decline in healthy aging. The study also suggests that undertaking cognitively 
challenging activities can boost MemSE. Therefore, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether the relationship between self-reported cognitive activity and self-
reported cognitive functioning differed across the lifespan. This is important as 
cognitive intervention studies typically measure objective memory/cognitive 
performance but do not relate this to subjective/self-reported cognitive functioning (e.g. 
Willis et al., 2006). However, it would be of interest to investigate whether there was a 
cognitive activity which had a larger effect on self-reported functioning compared to 
other activities (e.g. cryptic versus general knowledge or quick crosswords) and 
whether this information could be used to develop and intervention study (i.e. Study 
Eight, see Chapter Five). 
 
Thus, there were three aims of this chapter; first, to investigate whether the relationship 
between self-reported cognitive activity and self-reported cognitive functioning differed 
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across the lifespan. Second, to investigate whether the frequency of attempting different 
types of crosswords had a different effect on self-reported cognitive functioning at 
different stages of the lifespan. Finally, to use the theory of Shadish et al. (2002) and to 
identify an inus condition(s) whereby the relationship between cognitive activity and 
cognitive decline can be identified and replicated using intervention techniques to 
eliminate potential mediating effects (see Chapter One for further explanation; Shadish 
et al., 2002). 
 
2.1.2 Previous self-report measures of cognitive activity 
 
Before the frequency of cognitive activities can be measured it is necessary to define a 
cognitive activity. Chapter One describes how physical activities can have a direct 
influence on brain chemistry and cerebral blood flow, therefore it is necessary to 
exclude cognitive activity that has a significant requirement of physical activity (e.g. 
Wilson et al., 2007).  
 
According to Wilson et al. (2007) the assessment of cognitive activity frequency should 
also exclude esoteric cognitive activities such as solving differential equations. 
However, this exclusion of certain activities may not provide the necessary data to fully 
understand the cognitive reserve hypothesis or use-dependency theory. This is due to 
the fact that expertise has been linked to improved metacognitive abilities and the 
ability to solve problems (e.g. Kimball & Holyoak, 2000; Dorner & Scholkopf, 1991). 
To exclude some of these activities (e.g. solving cryptic crosswords or being an expert 
in foreign languages) may not tap into one theory behind the use-dependency theory, 
that is that metacognitive skills (which decline with age; Vukman, 2005; Souchay & 
Isingrini, 2004) may enable older adults to adapt to healthy and pathological decline 
associated with aging (e.g. Rebok & Balcerak, 1989). This is important because it is 
possible that completing cryptic crosswords may promote abstract thinking and 
metacognition (e.g. Forshaw, unpublished; Hambrick et al., 1999; Nickerson, 1977). 
This has a direct implication on previous cognitive activity measurements (e.g. Wilson 
et al., 2005) because it would be impossible to differentiate between individuals who do 
cryptic crosswords and individuals who only attempt quick or general knowledge 
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crosswords using previous measures of cognitive activity (e.g. Barnes et al., 2006; 
Verghese et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 2002).  
 
A more concerning assumption by researchers who have compiled cognitive activity 
questionnaires is that there should be a direct positive correlation between reported 
cognitive activity and current cognitive functioning (Wilson et al., 2007). The 
fundamental problem with this assumption is that the results of any research using such 
philosophy will result in a self-fulfilling prophecy with regards to the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis (see Shadish et al., 2002). Although it must be acknowledged that cognitive 
activity (both reported and observed) decreases in older adults with pre-clinical 
dementia (e.g. Verghese et al., 2003), it cannot be concluded that cognitive activity 
must be positively correlated with cognitive functioning throughout the lifespan of 
healthy individuals. Critically, this means that future research which has not found a 
positive relationship between self-reported cognitive activity and (self-reported or 
objected measures of) cognitive functioning must not be discarded as using an invalid 
measure of cognitive activity (Hertzog et al., 2009). Furthermore, if a cognitive activity 
is negatively associated with a measure of cognitive functioning, this may provide a 
different perspective on the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive 
functioning. 
 
Questions have been raised about the specific cognitive activities which have been 
included in questionnaires investigating frequency of cognitive activity (e.g. Salthouse, 
2006). Salthouse (2006) pointed out that some activities included in measures may not 
require as much cognitive effort than other activities. For example, Wilson et al. (2005) 
included watching television as a cognitive activity. It is debatable how much cognitive 
effort is required for a person to watch television, that is not only does it depend on 
whether the person is watching the television programme and concentrating on it but 
also the type of programme which is being watched (e.g. a documentary or news debate 
show may require more attention than a soap opera or cartoon
3
). Other studies have also 
                                               
3
 However, D. Hultsch (personal communication, 18
th
 February, 2010) separated passive television 
watching and educational television programme watching. Educational television programmes were 
incorporated into a composite with twenty-six other novel information processing tasks and this construct 
was found to mediate cognitive functioning directly. 
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taken self-report measurements of self-maintenance activities as measures of cognitive 
activities (e.g. Friedman et al., 2002; Hultsch et al., 1999). Such activities may not be 
appropriate to investigate either the cognitive reserve hypothesis or use-dependency 
theory (e.g. Salthouse, 2006; Shadish et al., 2002). The cognitive processes required for 
making a meal, for example, compared to solving a cryptic crossword are likely to be 
very different (e.g. Hertzog et al., 2009).  
 
Salthouse et al. (2002) attempted to quantify the amount of cognitive effort required in 
specific cognitive activities. Although the research did not differentiate between 
specific types of crosswords the results show that out of twenty-two cognitive activities, 
undertaking crosswords was deemed second most effortful, while watching television 
was least cognitively demanding. This is also supported by subjective research that has 
asked participants what cognitive effort is required for attempting crossword puzzles. 
Hambrick et al. (1999) produced anecdotal evidence that individuals who attempt 
crosswords believed that abstract thinking is a key cognitive component required to 
complete crosswords. This was also supported by Nickerson (1977) who reported that 
individuals who regularly undertake crosswords believe that abstract thinking and 
cognitive functions which could be encompassed by the term executive 
functioning/metacognition are required to undertake crosswords, specifically cryptic 
crosswords. 
 
Apart from the question of whether activities have been appropriately labelled 
cognitive, there is also a discrepancy in the research about when the frequency of 
cognitive activity has been measured. For example, a number of studies using cross-
sectional or longitudinal methods investigate reported current cognitive activity (e.g. 
Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; Verghese et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 2002), whereas 
other studies have asked for retrospective accounts of frequencies of cognitive activities 
earlier in life (e.g. Friedman et al., 2002; Kondo et al., 1994; Christensen & Mackinnon, 
1993). Sunderland et al. (1986) provided evidence that current measures produced by 
self-report techniques are unreliable (specifically by older adults), but there is a large 
amount of evidence that questions the validity of retrospective memories (e.g. Memon, 
Bartlett, Rose & Gray, 2003; Loftus, 1984). Rabbitt et al. (1995) have provided some 
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evidence that subjective measures of MemSE are not significantly correlated with 
objective measures of memory functioning. This is the case when composites of self-
report questions are used (which cover a number of different memory domains, such as 
short-term memory, episodic memory, perspective memory) and when specific 
questions are compared to objective measures (e.g. older participants report a lower 
recall for proper names, but this is significantly different to the objective measures). 
Rabbitt et al. (1995) have also indicated that subjective reports of health status and/or 
memory functioning can vary over time, suggesting a lack of consistency and/or 
reliability. Therefore, studies which utilise retrospective levels of cognitive activity can 
be viewed as unreliable.  
 
Overall, the measures used to date to assess cognitive activity can be viewed as 
unreliable and potentially an invalid measure of cognitive activity. Taking into account 
research which has investigated the relationship between cognitive functioning and 
attempting crossword puzzles it is clear that each type of crossword needs representing 
in any cognitive activity questionnaire. Finally due to the fact that retrospective 
memories are dubious at best, investigations into the relationship between cognitive 
activity and cognitive functioning should focus solely on self-report measures of current 
cognitive activity. 
 
2.1.3 The impact of crosswords on cognitive functioning 
 
Verghese et al. (2003) provided evidence that attempting crossword puzzles reduced the 
risk of developing dementia. This supports other research which has included the 
activity of solving crosswords in a composite of cognitive activity, which have also 
shown a negative relationship between an increase in cognitive activity (in both cross-
sectional and longitudinal techniques) and an attenuation of cognitive decline (e.g.  
Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; Wilson et al., 2002). However, it must be acknowledged 
that studies did not discriminate between the type of crosswords participants attempted 
frequently (i.e. cryptic, general knowledge or quick). Although this thesis focused on 
cognitive decline in healthy aging, the cognitive reserve hypothesis has suggested that 
an increase in cognitive activity throughout the lifespan can delay the onset of dementia. 
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Thus, if attempting crosswords can reduce the risk of dementia it is possible that they 
will also have positive benefits of cognition in healthy aging.  
 
Hambrick et al. (1999) attempted to use objective measures to quantify cognitive 
functions which promoted crossword solving abilities. Although there was some 
evidence that abstract reasoning was significantly positively correlated with the ability 
to solve crosswords, the results were ambiguous. As acknowledged by Hambrick et al. 
(1999) this is probably due to the fact that the participants attempted crosswords which 
would be termed quick or general knowledge in nature, not cryptic. Small scale 
subjective investigations by Hambrick et al. (1999) supported the results from 
Nickerson (1977) which indicated that individuals felt that abstract reasoning/executive 
functioning/metacognition was necessary to solve cryptic crosswords. Forshaw 
(unpublished) investigated which cognitive functions were required for older people to 
complete cryptic crosswords. Two specific functions were identified which are of 
relevance to the use-dependency theory. First, the results of Forshaw‘s (unpublished) 
study indicated that abstract reasoning was an important component when solving 
cryptic crosswords. Abstract reasoning has been linked to executive functioning and 
metacognition, which are both negatively associated with age (e.g. Karbach & Kray, 
2009; Tranter & Koulstaal, 2008; Vukman, 2005; Souchay & Isingrini, 2004).  
 
The relationship between cryptic crossword competency and measures of general 
intelligence was investigated in a sample of adults aged over fifty by Winder 
(unpublished). The results showed that amongst cryptic crossword experts there was a 
significant correlation between intelligence tests which focussed on abstract reasoning, 
as well as crystallised intelligence. However, in the novice crossword solvers group the 
most significant correlation with regards to the ability to solve cryptic crosswords was 
age, in that younger adults were more competent than older adults. Most of the cryptic 
crossword experts had been solving such crosswords for over twenty years, therefore it 
is possible to suggest that cryptic crosswords promoted both crystallised and fluid 
intelligence in older adults who attempt them regularly, especially since the sample 
populations in Winder‘s (unpublished) research were matched on a number of 
demographic factors which are known to affect intelligence (e.g. education).  
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Second, Forshaw (unpublished) and Hambrick et al. (1999) described how solving a 
crossword clue requires an individual to check the solution on a number of levels; that 
is, the solution must firstly fit with the clue based on the individual‘s knowledge. The 
clue must also fit with any letters from intercepting solutions in crossword grids. 
Finally, with particular reference to cryptic crossword clue‘s, it is typical that a clue will 
have two distinct meanings which need to correspond with one another (e.g. the clue 
―antelope, new we hear‖ will have the solution ―gnu‖, the solver must know that a gnu 
is a species of antelope and also that the g is silent so that the second part of the clue i.e. 
new should rhyme with the solution). Checking any solution will result in the crossword 
solver self-testing effectively. Self-testing has been shown to increase older adult‘s 
cognitive abilities, specifically MemSE and episodic memory (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 
2007; Dunlosky et al., 2003).  
 
Finally, Bandura (1989) suggested that regularly attempting cognitively challenging 
activities in later life may enable older adults to maintain a high level of MemSE. 
Bandura (1989) believed that this was important to promote confidence in an older 
adult‘s ability to continue undertaking cognitively stimulating activities. This is similar 
to the model of metacognition proposed by Nelson & Narens (1990). That is, 
individuals have an internal representation of their own cognitive ability (termed the 
meta-level). This representation is influenced by the actual cognitive functioning, which 
is termed the object-level. Both levels feed into each and it is possible that undertaking 
cryptic crosswords may promote the monitoring and control pathways in Nelson and 
Narens‘ (1990) model (see Figure 1.1).  
 
In summary, there is compelling evidence suggesting that attempting cryptic crosswords 
on a regular basis may promote cognitive functioning, particularly metacognition. 
Therefore there was a need to differentiate between the types of crosswords which self-
report questionnaires measure. Furthermore, of interest was to examine whether the 
proportion of crosswords completed by participants had any impact on dependent 
variables. It is possible that participants who are more adept at solving crosswords may 
show a higher MemSE than participants who do not solve as much of the crossword 
they attempt. In turn this may have an impact on metacognitive processes, for example, 
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being unable to solve a number of clues will increase the monitoring feedback and force 
an individual to reassess their meta-level. This should have a knock-on effect of 
changing the control that an individual will exert on future tasks (see Figure 1.1).  
 
2.1.4 Measures of cognitive functioning 
 
A number of studies have used objective measures of cognitive functioning to assess the 
relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive decline in both healthy and 
pathological aging (see Hertzog et al., 2009 and Chapter One). The approach of using 
objective measures of cognitive functioning is covered in the following chapters. 
However it can be argued that is also important to take into account older adults‘ 
subjective opinions of their own memory ability (e.g. West et al., 2008; Cavallini et al., 
2003; Bandura, 1989).  
 
According to the metacognition model of Nelson & Narens (1990) it is important to 
take into account individual‘s opinions of their own cognitive functioning. This is 
because the meta-level (see Figure 1.1) can be viewed as an individual‘s MemSE. This 
means that cognitive functioning perceived at the object-level will have a direct impact 
on MemSE. If a person feels that their current level of cognitive functioning (object-
level) is below the believed level of cognitive functioning i.e. MemSE (or meta-level) 
then the monitoring pathway will provide positive feedback to increase the meta-level. 
However, if the functioning at the object-level is below that at the meta-level, the 
monitoring pathway will readjust the meta-level to allow participants to have a more 
realistic view of their cognitive abilities and, hence, change the amount of control (i.e. 
effort) required (see Figure 1.1).  
 
In conclusion, it is important to assess the relationship between self-reported levels of 
cognitive activity and self-reported cognitive functioning. Previous studies (e.g. 
Cavallini et al., 2003) have shown a direct positive relationship between increased 
cognitive activity and improved confidence in one‘s own memory ability. It is, 
however, important to investigate whether this is the case when different types of 
cognitive activities are taken into account and whether it is also the case in the general 
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population, not just in an experimental group as investigated by Cavallini et al. (2003). 
Furthermore, it was necessary to investigate whether the relationship between cognitive 
activity and perceived cognitive functioning changes across the lifespan. Previous 
research such as Wilson et al. (2005) and Christensen & MacKinnon (1989) has 
indicated that the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning is 
significantly stronger in later life. Finally, if the results indicated that certain types of 
cognitive activities (e.g. cryptic crosswords) have a larger affect on MemSE or 
metacognition than other cognitive activities; this may allow such activities to be used 
in therapeutic interventions (see Chapter Five). 
 
2.1.5 Aims and objectives 
 
Overall, the aim of this research was to investigate whether different types of 
crosswords had a differential effect on self-reported cognitive functioning. Previous 
research had failed to discriminate between the frequency of undertaking cryptic, 
general knowledge or quick crosswords (e.g. Wilson et al., 2005; Verghese et al., 2003; 
Hultsch et al., 1999) and the effect of each crossword on perceived cognitive 
functioning. Cavallini et al. (2003) and Rebok & Balcerak (1989) indicated that 
cognitive training can promote MemSE and self-reported metacognition. The research 
presented in Chapter Two investigated the relationship between self-reported everyday 
cognitive activities and self-reported cognitive functioning (e.g. MemSE and 
metacognition). As indicated by Bandura (1989), it is important to consider the 
subjective/self-reported measures of cognitive functioning when compiling an 
intervention program. Therefore, Studies One, Two, Three, Four and Four (a) focused 
on self-report measurements of cognitive ability. Studies One and Two investigated the 
impact of attempting different types of crosswords on subjective ratings of MemSE and 
metacognition, whereas Study Three assessed the specific beliefs that participants held  
about the impact of crossword participation on cognitive functioning. Studies Four and 
Four (a) took into account participants perceived and actual ability of solving cryptic 
crosswords in relation to cognitive awareness. Study Eight (see Chapter Five) compared 
self-reported and objective measures of cognitive activity and cognitive functioning in 
an intervention style study. 
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2.2 Study One: The relationship between age, attempting cryptic, general 
knowledge and quick crosswords and self-reported cognitive functioning. 
 
Study One aimed to investigate whether there was a difference between self-reported 
frequency of participation in three different types of crosswords and self-reported 
cognitive functioning. This study also investigated whether the proportion of each type 
of crossword completed had an effect on self-reported cognitive functioning. Finally, 
Study One investigated whether any relationship between specific crossword frequency 
and/or proportion of crosswords completed and reported cognitive functioning was 
significantly different across the lifespan.  
 
2.2.1 Method 
 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
 
One hundred and five participants were recruited, mainly from the internet. Due to a 
technical error during data collection anyone aged over 65 was classed as being 66 
years old. The mean age of the sample population was 52.3 (SD = 12.8). The sample 
population has a mean number of years in full time education of 16.96 years (SD = 
3.54). 
 
2.2.1.2 Cognitive activity measures 
 
Seven cognitive activities were assessed and participants were required to rate the 
frequency with which they undertook each activity (scale ranged from 0 – 4). The mean 
frequency of attempting cryptic crosswords was 2.34 (SD = 1.54), representing a figure 
between ‗several times a month‘ and ‗several times a week‘. The mean frequency of 
participation in quick and general knowledge crosswords was 1.68 (SD = 1.43) and 1.24 
(SD = 1.07) respectively. Both values represent a frequency between ‗less than once a 
month‘ and ‗several times a month‘. It was also possible to calculate a total crossword 
activity frequency which had a mean of 5.15 (SD = 2.65) and total cognitive activity 
score which had a mean of 12.23 (SD = 3.37). It is interesting to note that the maximum 
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total cognitive activity any participant reported was 21 on a scale which could reach 28; 
therefore there is no evidence of ceiling effects when calculating total cognitive activity.  
 
Participants were also asked to indicate what proportion of each type of crossword 
which they regularly attempted they normally completed. The means for cryptic, quick 
and general knowledge crosswords were; 76.37 (SD = 32.78), 86.39 (SD = 24.28) and 
72.35 (SD = 27.28) respectively. The scale was 0 – 100% and it is clear that participants 
completed a higher percentage of quick crosswords than either cryptic or general 
knowledge crosswords. Participants were also asked whether they attempted each 
crossword on their own, with a partner or by using another form of help. Unfortunately 
this information could not be incorporated into the analysis. As expected, the composite 
of total cognitive activity was significantly correlated with all cognitive activities, 
supported previous research such as Wilson et al. (2005), however it was not 
significantly correlated with the number of years in education (r = 0.034) as suggested 
by Wilson et al. (2007). Furthermore, total crossword activity was also higher 
significantly correlated with the frequency of attempting all three crosswords and total 
cognitive activity (r (96) = 0.819, p < 0.001).  
 
2.2.1.3 Measures of self-reported cognitive functioning and health status 
 
Participants were asked to rate their current memory ability, overall health and 
crossword solving skills to when participants regarded themselves to be in their prime. 
The scale ranged from -2 (‗much worse‘) to 2 (‗much better‘) with 0 representing ‗the 
same‘. The second measure of cognitive functioning used an adapted cognitive failures 
questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald & Parkes, 1982). A value representing 
the total number of cognitive failures was calculated for each participant and the scale 
ranged from 0 to 48 (see Appendix One for full questionnaire).  
 
2.2.1.4 Design and procedure 
 
The questionnaire was distributed by hand, advertised on websites providing 
crosswords and on websites recruiting participants for psychological studies. The 
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majority of the respondents completed the questionnaire online. Community groups for 
older adults were asked to distribute the questionnaire.  
 
The analysis of the questionnaire took three forms; first, correlational analysis was used 
to identify any relationships between cognitive activity measures and reported cognitive 
functioning. Second, regression analysis was used to investigate any variables which 
accounted for a significant proportion of the variance associated with either estimates of 
participants on memory on total number of cognitive failures reported. Finally, 
ANOVA was used to compare age and reported crossword frequency on the basis of 
self-reported memory ability and total number of cognitive failures. To facilitate the 
third part of the analysis the sample population was reclassified into groups. For the 
analysis of the effect of age on self-reported cognitive functioning to types of age 
groups were created. An age split around the median age to produce a young and old 
group. Groups were created based on the median frequency of each specific type of 
crossword, total combined crossword frequency and total cognitive activity, to produce 
high versus low crossword/cognitive activity groups. The influence of percentage of 
specific crosswords completed was taken into account in various ways which will be 
described throughout the results section
4
. 
 
2.2.2 Results 
 
2.2.2.1 Correlations 
 
Table 2.1 shows the correlations between participants‘ self-reported health, memory, 
crossword skills and total number of cognitive failures, and activity variables, age, 
number of years in education and reported crossword completion rate. The results show 
the expected negative relationship between self-reported memory functioning and age (r 
(105) = -0.27, p < 0.01), but there is no significant negative correlation between age and 
total number of cognitive failures (r = -0.050). The lack of significant correlations 
                                               
4 Only key ANOVA results are reported due to the lack of results which differ from correlational and 
regression analyses.  
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between age and self-reported cognitive functioning is likely to be due to the technical 
errors when measuring age.  
 
None of the cryptic activity frequency measures were significantly correlated with 
either subjective measures of participants own memory or total number of cognitive 
failures reported. As Table 2.1 shows none of the three crosswords appear to enhance 
participant‘s confidence in their own cognitive ability. Furthermore the composite of the 
three crosswords frequency is also not significantly related to the total number of 
cognitive failures.  
 
Table 2.1. Correlations between age, number of years in education, self-reported 
cognitive activity, self-reported crossword completion and self-reported health, 
memory ability, crossword solving skills and total number of cognitive failures. 
 Health 
Own 
memory 
Crossword 
skills 
Total 
cognitive 
failures 
Age -0.138 -0.276** 0.185 -0.059 
Years in education 0.270** 0.177 0.062 -0.127 
Quick crossword -0.064 -0.060 0.041 0.055 
Cryptic crossword -0.129 -0.023 0.494** 0.078 
General Knowledge 
crossword 
0.048 0.068 0.095 0.028 
Reading 0.061 0.024 -0.126 -0.064 
Playing cards 0.037 0.128 0.142 -0.070 
Doing quizzes -0.073 -0.035 0.194* 0.144 
Playing board games 0.002 0.148 0.148 0.006 
Total crossword activity -0.095 -0.024 0.366** 0.118 
Total cognitive activity -0.034 0.034 0.387** 0.079 
Quick completion rate -0.223* -0.074 0.416** -0.028 
Cryptic completion rate -0.277** -0.092 0.455** -0.062 
General knowledge 
completion rate 
-0.155 -0.115 0.430** -0.021 
*Significant to p < 0.05 (Bonferroni corrected) 
**Significant to p < 0.01(Bonferroni corrected) 
 
Only cryptic crossword frequency is significantly correlated with self-reported 
crossword skills. This suggests that participants believe that, compared to quick and 
general knowledge crosswords, the skills required for completing cryptic crosswords 
are different. None of the three reported crossword completion rates were significantly 
related to subjective measures of memory or reported total number of cognitive failures. 
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However, this is likely to be due to the fact that completion rate of any crossword will 
rely on the frequency of participating in such crosswords, therefore partial correlations 
were used to investigate the relationship between crossword completion rate and self-
reported memory and cognitive functioning. Only cryptic crossword completion was 
significantly correlated with subjective opinions of participants own memory 
functioning after controlling for cryptic crossword frequency. 
 
To investigate the effect of age on the apparent relationship between cryptic crossword 
frequency/completion rate and self-reported memory/cognitive functioning, the sample 
population was separated into two groups based on a median age split. Correlational 
analysis showed no worthy correlations between subjective measures of participants 
memory and frequency or completion rate of cryptic crosswords (this was also true for 
quick and general knowledge crosswords). However, the results showed correlations 
nearing significance between cryptic crossword frequency in older adults and reported 
total number of cognitive failures (r (52) = 0.0248, p = 0.07). This relationship between 
cryptic crossword frequency and reported number of cognitive failures was not apparent 
in younger adults.
5
 Unlike the use-dependency theory or cognitive reserve hypothesis 
predictions, the results indicate that older adults who attempt more cryptic crosswords 
report a higher number of cognitive failures than those who attempt less cryptic 
crosswords.  
 
In conclusion, there was a lack of support from correlational analysis to indicate that 
older adults report more cognitive failures than younger adults as found in previous 
research (e.g. Broadbent et al., 1982). There was also a lack of support to suggest that 
either education or reported cognitive activities were associated with a higher self-
reported cognitive functioning level. Once again, this is not supportive of previous 
research which has indicated that increased cognitive activity will result in increased 
                                               
5 These results were supported by a 2 X 2 ANOVA using the factors of median age and median cryptic 
crossword frequency with the dependent variable of total number of cognitive failures. There was a 
significant two-way interaction between the two factors (F (1,101) = 4.255, p < 0.05, η² = 0.040). The 
marginal means indicated that younger participants who did not attempt cryptic crosswords as frequently 
as reported 15.24% more cognitive failures than younger participants who regularly attempted cryptic 
crosswords. However, older adults who reported attempting cryptic crosswords more frequently had a 
reported total number of cognitive failures which was 27.68% higher than those who did not attempt 
cryptic crosswords as frequently. 
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MemSE and metacognitive functioning (e.g. Cavallini et al., 2003; Bandura, 1989). The 
use-dependency theory predicts that the relationship between cognitive activity and 
cognitive functioning is of increased importance in later life compared to earlier in life. 
Taking into account all of the cognitive activities investigated cryptic crosswords 
appear to be the only activity which has a direct correlation with reported number of 
cognitive failures in later life, which was not the case for younger adults. Contrary to 
the use-dependency theory, the analysis suggested that older adults who attempt cryptic 
crosswords more frequently report a higher number of cognitive failures than those who 
attempt cryptic crosswords less frequently. 
 
2.2.2.2 Regression analysis 
 
In line with previous research (e.g. Christensen & Mackinnon, 1993) regression analysis 
was used to investigate the relationship between cognitive activity and self-reported 
memory/cognitive functioning in the whole population and in the older adult sample. 
The results confirmed those provided in the correlational analysis (see Section 2.2.2.1) 
and did not provide any additional understanding of the relationship between cognitive 
activity, crossword completion rate and subjective reports of ones own memory or total 
number of cognitive failures.   
 
2.2.2.3 ANOVA analysis 
 
For completeness, a series of ANOVAs were conducted to investigate the effects of the 
three specific types of crosswords, total crossword activity, total cognitive activity and 
age. This was mainly because of the technical error which meant that participants‘ age 
was classified as 66 if it exceeded 65. The factor of age had two levels based on a 
median split (young versus old). The factor of crossword frequency initially used the 
scale described in Section 2.2.1.2, however no noteworthy results were found. 
Therefore a factor for each crossword frequency was created based on a median split of 
specific crossword frequencies. Factors were also created on the median split technique 
for total crossword frequency and total cognitive frequency (i.e. in all cases the factor 
represented high versus low frequency for either specific crossword frequency or total 
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crossword/cognitive frequency). Previous research (e.g. Jopp & Herzog, 2007; 
Christensen & Mackinnon, 1993) has indicated that number of years in education may 
mediate the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning, therefore 
number of years in education was included as a covariate and if any noteworthy results 
were found between-subjects factor was included (i.e. high versus low education based 
on a median split). Specific crossword completion rates were also included as covariates 
and between-subjects factors when applicable. Only noteworthy results are reported 
below. 
 
2.2.2.3.1    Subjective measures of memory functioning 
 
Primary analysis used a 2 X 2 (specific crossword frequency or total 
crossword/cognitive frequency X age i.e. young versus old) ANOVA for the dependent 
variable of self-reported memory functioning. There was no significant main effect of 
median age on self-reported memory functioning throughout the analysis. There was 
also no significant main effect of median cryptic, median quick, median general 
knowledge, total crossword activity or total cognitive activity when these factors were 
included in separate ANOVAs with median age for this dependent variable. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence of significant 2 X 2 ANOVAs between median age 
and any of the other factors on self-reported memory functioning. The results were 
maintained when number of years in education and specific crossword completion rates 
were included in the ANOVAs separately. Overall the ANOVA analysis for this 
dependent variable did not suggest that age or frequent cognitive activity (measured in a 
variety of ways) had significant independent effects or significantly interacted.  
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
 
The aim of Study One was to investigate the impact of different types of crosswords on 
self-report measures of memory/cognitive functioning. This study also investigated 
whether self-reported crossword completion rates had an impact on MemSE. Finally, 
Study One investigated whether the impact of self-reported cognitive activity and 
MemSE had the same relationship across the lifespan.  
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Correlational results did not confirm the negative relationship between age and 
subjective measures of cognitive functioning (i.e. MemSE as measured by Broadbent et 
al., 1982), however there was a confirmation of the decrease of subjective ratings of 
participants own memory evaluations in older adults (e.g. Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). 
The results support those of Rabbitt et al. (1995) in that older adults generally remark 
that their memory is failing due to aging, however do not always report a significantly 
greater number of cognitive failures than younger adults. One possibility is that older 
adults forget cognitive failures that they have made and therefore the lack of a 
significant increase in the report of cognitive failures by older adults may suggest a 
deficit in cognitive awareness. 
 
There was no evidence that frequency of reported cognitive activity was correlated with 
reported memory or cognitive functioning. This does not support previous research that 
has indicated that an increase in cognitive activity is also associated with an increase in 
confidence in cognitive functioning (e.g. West et al., 2008; Cavallini et al., 2003). 
Overall correlational analysis did not show that cryptic, quick or general knowledge 
crosswords affected self-reported cognitive functioning differently. However, partial 
correlations indicated that the frequency of attempting cryptic crosswords had a larger 
impact on cognitive awareness in older adults than younger adults. This was supported 
by the ANOVA analysis which showed that older adults who attempted more cryptic 
crosswords reported significantly more cognitive failures than younger adults who also 
attempted cryptic crosswords regularly; however, for participants who did not regularly 
attempt cryptic crosswords, older adults reported fewer cognitive failures than younger 
adults.  
 
The direction of the relationship between frequency of undertaking cryptic crosswords 
and reported cognitive failures, in older adults, suggests that attempting such 
crosswords may promote increased executive functioning/metacognition. Cryptic 
crossword solving/participation has been linked to self-testing (Forshaw, unpublished). 
Dunlosky et al. (2007; 2003) demonstrated that self-testing can increase metacognition 
and memory functioning in older adults, therefore it can be suggested that attempting 
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cryptic crosswords in later life may also enhance metacognition; particularly the 
monitoring feedback pathway (see Figure 1.1). 
 
The results did not show that the competency in completing quick or general knowledge 
crosswords had any direct or indirect effect on self-reported cognitive functioning. 
However, the results suggest that the perceived ability to complete cryptic crosswords 
has an indirect effect on cognitive awareness. This relationship could not be 
investigated, however, because ANOVA analysis did not illuminate how cryptic 
crossword frequency and reported completion rates interacted. Arguably, this is due to 
the relatively small sample population. 
 
In conclusion, the results indicate that cryptic crosswords have a significantly larger 
affect on cognitive awareness than other types of crosswords. The affect of cryptic 
crosswords on cognitive awareness is more apparent in older than younger participants. 
The results, however, indicate that older adults who attempt more cryptic crosswords 
report more cognitive failures than those who attempt fewer such crosswords. There is 
also an apparent indirect or mediating effect of the ability to complete cryptic 
crosswords and this was investigated further in Chapter Five. Overall there is a 
modicum of support for the use-dependency theory, but a lack of support for the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis. The results suggest that attempting cryptic crosswords 
frequently may promote the awareness of cognitive decline associated with healthy 
aging, that is, metacognition may be improved in later life by undertaking cryptic 
crosswords.  
 
2.3 Study Two: The relationship between age, attempting cryptic, general 
knowledge and quick crosswords and self-reported metacognition. 
 
Study One possibly indicated that cryptic crosswords have a different effect on self-
reported cognitive functioning than quick or general knowledge crosswords, as 
suggested by Hambrick et al. (1999) and Nickerson (1977). This was particularly the 
case for older adults; however the results showed that older adults who attempted more 
cryptic crosswords reported a higher number of cognitive failures than those attempting 
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fewer such crosswords. One possible explanation of this is linked to the fact that solving 
cryptic crosswords requires self-testing or double checking solutions and clues 
(Forshaw, unpublished). Dunlosky et al. (2007; 2003) have demonstrated that self-
testing can reduce the decline in metacognition which is associated with healthy aging 
(e.g. Vukman, 2005; Souchay & Isingrini, 2004). Therefore, Study Two investigated the 
relationship between self-reported participation in a number of cognitive activities 
(including cryptic, quick and general knowledge crosswords) and self-reported 
metacognition (e.g. Troyer & Rich, 2002). 
 
2.3.1 Method 
 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
 
After the data was cropped for unfinished responses, the sample population consisted of 
2050 participants with an age range of 19 – 92 (mean = 55.35, SD = 14.15). Participants 
had a mean number of years in education of 16.81 (SD = 3.59). As in Study One, two 
factors based on age were created to enable ANOVA analysis. First, two groups (young 
versus old) were created based on a median split. Second, age groups were created 
based on 20% cumulative frequency of the total age range. Values were group 1 = ages 
19 – 44, 2 = 45 – 53, 3 = 54 – 59, 4 = 60 – 67 and 5 = 68 – 92. A factor representing a 
high and low education group was also created based on the median of total number of 
years in education.  
 
2.3.1.2 Cognitive activity measures 
 
Two extra cognitive activities were added to the seven which were used in Study One, 
this was based on Wilson et al. (2005). For cryptic crossword participation the mean 
frequency was 1.28 representing somewhere between ‗less than once a month‘ to 
‗several times a month‘. Quick and general knowledge crosswords had a mean 
frequency of 2.55 and 2.73 (respectively) which represents between ‗several times a 
month‘ and ‗several times a week‘. As in Study One, a composite of total crossword 
frequency and total cognitive activity frequency was calculated, the means were 6.57 
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(SD = 2.78) and 15.10 (SD = 4.45) respectively. Once again, self-reported completion 
rates were taken for each specific crossword. The means for cryptic crossword 
completion was 63.22 (SD = 37.87), quick crossword completion was 86.66 (SD = 
28.55) and general knowledge completion was 84.77 (SD = 22.94).  
 
To facilitate ANOVA analysis two factors of specific crossword frequency were used, 
first the reported frequency with five levels and second a high low group based on the 
median. For total crossword frequency a factor was produced based on a median split 
(high versus low). For total crossword frequency two factors were created, one based on 
a median split (high versus low) and one based on 20% groups of total cumulative 
frequency.  
 
2.3.1.3 Self-reported metacognition 
 
The questionnaire used the self-report technique developed by Troyer & Rich (2002). 
This questionnaire had three sub-sections; first a measure of MemSE, second a measure 
of what Troyer & Rich termed cognitive strength (this sub-section focuses on 
participants confidence in cognitive functioning overall, not just memory functioning) 
and memory strategies (focusing on the number of strategies used to facilitate memory 
to complete everyday tasks). Taking into account the results of Study One and those of 
Rabbitt et al. (1995) it was prudent to consider whether self-report measures which used 
fewer items and focussed specifically on memory deficits, which have been associated 
with age, showed a greater sensitivity regarding differences in cognitive activity. The 
questionnaire also measured subjective memory functioning and crossword skills as 
Study One, however these results are not reported (see Appendix Two for full 
questionnaire). 
 
2.3.1.4 Design and procedure 
 
Participants were recruited by posting adverts on two internet sites which produced 
crossword puzzles, two internet sites recruiting volunteers for psychology studies, the 
psychology department participant pool and an advert in the university newspaper. Pen 
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and paper copies were also distributed to local community centres and the older adult 
participant pool, however responses were relatively sparse in comparison to the sample 
population. The procedure for analysis was identical to that in Study One. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
 
2.3.2.1 Correlational analysis 
 
Table 2.2 shows the correlational relationship between the three dependent variables 
and the key independent variable. The relationship between cognitive strength and age 
supports previous research (e.g. Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004) in that older adults are 
significantly less confident with their own cognitive ability than younger adults. 
However there is no significant negative relationship between age and MemSE as 
reported in previous research (e.g. Bandura, 1989). The results also show a significant 
negative relationship between the number of strategies used to aid memory and age. 
This indicates that older adults have a deficit in metacognition (e.g. Vukman, 2005).  
 
As expected, number of years in education was significantly positively correlated with 
all three dependent variables. Unlike Study One taking part in cryptic, quick and 
general knowledge crosswords was significantly associated with a higher cognitive 
strength and MemSE, however none of the three crosswords significantly correlated 
with the use of memory strategies. Self-reported completion rates of all three 
crosswords were also significantly correlated with the dependent variables of cognitive 
strength and MemSE, but not the use of memory strategies. 
 
Other activities which were significantly correlated with the dependent variables 
include doing quizzes, playing a musical instrument and practising a foreign language 
regularly. Combined crossword activity was also associated with significantly higher 
cognitive strength and MemSE, but not the use of memory strategies. Total cognitive 
activity was positively correlated with all three dependent variables, however the 
correlation with the use of memory strategies is very weak and probably due to the large 
sample size (Coolican, 1997). 
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Table 2.2. Correlation coefficients between the three dependent variables and age, 
number of years in education and the frequency of self-reported cognitive 
activities. 
 
Cognitive 
Strength 
Memory Self-
efficacy 
Memory 
Strategies 
Age -0.106** -0.041 -0.088** 
Years in education 0.106** 0.077** 0.107** 
Quick crossword 0.064** 0.076** -0.032 
Cryptic crossword 0.098** 0.076** -0.026 
General Knowledge crossword 0.119** 0.146** 0.004 
Reading 0.036 0.047* 0.027 
Playing cards -0.009 0.025 0.008 
Doing quizzes 0.055* 0.046* 0.009 
Playing board games 0.032 0.030 0.08** 
Playing an instrument 0.043* 0.051* 0.078** 
Speaking a foreign language 0.080** 0.083** 0.084** 
Total crossword activity 0.147** 0.155** -0.030 
Total cognitive activity 0.144** 0.160** 0.044* 
Quick completion rate 0.077** 0.055* 0.043 
Cryptic completion rate 0.137** 0.092** -0.008 
GK completion rate 0.129** 0.133** 0.017 
*Significant to p < 0.05 (Bonferroni corrected) 
**Significant to p < 0.01 (Bonferroni corrected) 
 
Correlations were conducted for the younger and older group (based on a median split). 
Unlike Study One, the result indicated that the frequency of attempting cryptic 
crosswords and the rate of completion of such crosswords was only significantly 
correlated with MemSE in younger participants and not in older participants. However, 
both younger and older participants showed significant positive correlations between 
cryptic crosswords frequency/cryptic completion for cognitive strength. Both younger 
and older participants showed significant correlations for the frequency and ability to 
complete quick and general knowledge crosswords with MemSE and cognitive strength 
but not cognitive strategies used. No noteworthy results were found when partial 
correlations were used to investigate the relationship between crossword completion 
rates and the three dependent variables when controlling for specific crossword 
frequency.  
 
In summary, the results show that older adults report a lower cognitive strength and use 
less memory strategies, however there was no significant relationship between age and 
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MemSE. The results support the view that attempting more cognitive activities is 
associated with higher self-reported memory, cognitive and metacognition functioning. 
Unlike Study One, there was a significant positive relationship between attempting all 
three types of crosswords and cognitive/memory confidence. There was no indication 
that attempting cryptic crosswords promoted self-reported metacognition (i.e. the use of 
memory strategies) as suggested in Study One. However it is possible that the memory 
strategy questionnaire does not focus specifically on all aspects of metacognition and 
only focuses on the control aspects described by Nelson & Narens (e.g. 1990; see 
Figure 1.1).  
 
2.3.2.2 Regression analysis 
 
2.3.2.2.1   Cognitive strength results 
 
The first linear regression analysis investigated predictors of the variance associated 
with the cognitive strength dependent variable. Predictors were age which was entered 
first followed by number of years in education and the frequency of the nine cognitive 
activities. The regression equation was significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.045, F (11, 2038) = 
0.704, p < 0.001). Age accounted for a significant amount of the dependent variable (β 
= -0.106, t = -4.834, p < 0.001) as well as the number of years in education (β = 0.066, t 
= 2.894, p < 0.005), frequency of attempting cryptic (β = 0.093, t = 4.226, p < 0.001) 
and general knowledge crosswords (β = 0.125, t = 5.468, p < 0.001). When the sample 
population was reduced to older people (using a median split) only two predictors 
accounted for a significant proportion of the cognitive strength variance, which were 
doing quizzes (β = 0.093, t = 2.226, p < 0.05) and the frequency of attempting general 
knowledge crosswords (β = 0.100, t = 2.197, p < 0.05).  
 
2.3.2.2.2   MemSE results 
 
For the dependent variable of MemSE, the procedure was repeated and the regression 
equation was significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.036, F (11, 2038) = 7.995, p < 0.001). Age did 
not account for a significant amount of the variance of MemSE (t = -1.872). However, 
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number of years in education (β = 0.045, t = 1.953, p = 0.51), cryptic crossword 
frequency (β = 0.068, t = 3.077, p < 0.005), general knowledge crossword frequency (β 
= 0.141, t = 6.149, p < 0.001) and regularly speaking a foreign language (β = 0.048, t = 
2.055, p < 0.05) accounted for a significant proportion of the variance associated with 
this dependent variable. When the sample population was restricted to older adults there 
were no noteworthy changes to report. 
 
2.3.2.2.3   Reported use of memory strategies results 
 
The procedure was repeated for the memory strategies variable and the regression 
equation was significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.023 F = (11, 2038) = 5.300, p < 0.001). The 
results confirmed the correlational analysis in that age accounted for a significant 
proportion of the variance for this dependent variable (β = 0.050, t = -2.113, p <0.05) 
and that the direction of the β value suggests that older people use fewer memory 
strategies. Number of years in education (β = 0.078, t = 3.397, p = 0.001), playing board 
games (β = 0.064, t = 2.711, p < 0.01) and playing a musical instrument (β = 0.052, t = 
2.284, p < 0.05) accounted for a significant proportion of the variance associated with 
this dependent variable. When the sample population was restricted to older adults the 
only predictor which accounted for a significant amount of the variance associated with 
memory strategies used was number of years in education (β = 0.087, t = 2.671, p < 
0.01). 
 
2.3.2.2.4   Regression analysis summary 
 
Overall, the regression analyses confirm that age is associated with a decrease in 
confidence in overall cognitive ability and a decrease in the use of strategies to aid 
memory. However the results do not support Zelinski & Gilewski (2004) in that age 
was not associated with a significant decrease in MemSE. For the whole sample 
population the regression analysis indicates that cryptic and general knowledge 
crosswords have a significant impact on confidence in cognitive functioning (i.e. 
cognitive strength) and MemSE, but not use of memory strategies. The effects of both 
types of crosswords on the dependent variables appear to be reduced in old age. 
 -97- 
Therefore, there is some support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis but not for the use-
dependency theory.  
 
2.3.2.3 ANOVA analysis 
 
Jopp & Hertzog (2009) have provided strong evidence that the relationship between 
cognitive activity and self-reported cognitive functioning can be mediated by a number 
of factors, including a measure of cognitive reserve. Christensen & Mackinnon (1993) 
have shown that participants with a differing number of years in education appear to 
show a different relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning. 
Wilson et al. (2007) have argued that education is an objective measure of cognitive 
reserve, therefore it was necessary to use ANOVA analysis to investigate whether the 
relationship between self-reported cognitive activity and cognitive functioning was 
significantly different for those who differed on the number of years in education. 
Winder (unpublished) has also suggested that cryptic crossword completion rate may 
have a significant impact on the relationship between cryptic crossword frequency and 
self-reported cognitive functioning. Therefore a series of three-way ANOVAs were 
used to investigate whether mediating factors affected the relationship between self-
reported cognitive activity and self-reported cognitive functioning. ANOVAs were used 
because regression analysis could not take mediating factors into account while 
maintaining the variance of effects of single factors. Only the results of three-way 
ANOVAs are presented here, unless the results of the two-way ANOVAs (activity X 
age) contradict the partial correlation and regression analysis.  
 
The between-subjects factor of median education groups was included with median 
cryptic crossword frequency and median age in a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA for the dependent 
variable of MemSE. Of note was the significant three-way interaction between all three 
factors on MemSE (F (1, 2042) = 5.826, p < 0.05, η² = 0.003). Figure 2.1 shows that 
there is very little difference between younger and older participants‘ MemSE when 
they do not attempt cryptic crosswords frequently or when they attempt cryptic 
crosswords frequently and have fewer number of years in education. However for 
participants who attempt cryptic crosswords frequently and have a higher number of 
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years in education the results show that younger participants have a high MemSE while 
older participants have a low MemSE.  
 
 
 
There was no significant three-way ANOVA involving median cryptic crosswords, 
median age and median education for the other dependent variable. There were also no 
significant three-way interactions for any of the dependent variables when median 
education was substituted for median cryptic crossword completion rate. Furthermore, 
there was no evidence of significantly fewer interactions with either median education 
or median crossword completion rate for the factors relating to quick, general 
knowledge or total crosswords (and total cognitive) activity for any of the dependent 
variables. In summary, as in Study One the only support for the use-dependency theory 
came from the analysis of reported cryptic crossword frequency. The results suggested 
that older adults who attempt more cryptic crosswords and have a higher number of 
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Figure 2.1. Significant three-way interaction between number of years in 
education, cryptic crossword frequency and age, on memory self-efficacy 
(MemSE). H = high, L = low, C = cryptic crossword frequency and E = number 
of years in education.  
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years in education have a more realistic view of their memory ability than older adults 
who either do not attempt cryptic crosswords as frequently and/or have fewer years in 
education.  
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
 
Based on the findings of Study One the aim of Study Two was to investigate whether 
specific crossword frequency had a significant affect on self-reported metacognition and 
whether this relationship differed when comparing younger and older participants. 
Study Two also investigated whether total crossword frequency and total cognitive 
activity frequency affected reported metacognition in the whole (larger) sample 
population and whether this differed in younger and older participants.  
 
Similar to the result of Study One and Rabbitt et al. (1995) there is no evidence of a 
negative relationship between age and MemSE. This is not supportive of previous 
studies such as Zelinski & Gilewski (2004) or Bandura (1989). However, there is clear 
evidence that confidence in overall cognitive ability (measured by cognitive strength) 
and metacognition (measured by the reported use of memory strategies) declines with 
age. This supports research which has indicated that metacognition declines in healthy 
aging (e.g. Vukman, 2005; Souchay & Isingrini, 2004). The lack of a relationship 
between cognitive confidence and age in Study One could have been explained by the 
relatively small sample population; however that cannot be the case in Study Two. It is 
possible that as the majority of participants were recruited from the internet the sample 
population was unrepresentative of older adults; that is, older adults who use the 
internet typically have a higher level of cognitive functioning and a high level of 
confidence in their memory ability because of the relatively demanding task (Salthouse, 
2006; Salthouse et al., 2002). 
 
The results supported the cognitive reserve hypothesis in that the frequency of 
attempting all three types of crosswords was positively related to self-reported opinions 
of MemSE and overall cognitive confidence. However, there was no evidence that any 
crossword promoted the reported use of strategies to aid memory. The results were 
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mirrored for the construct of combined total crossword frequency. Cognitive strength 
and MemSE were positively associated with a higher reported level of total cognitive 
activity, as well as the reported use of memory strategies. This indicates that individuals 
who attempt a large variation of cognitive activities also report using more strategies to 
promote their own memory, supporting the view of Cavallini et al. (2003). Thus, 
attempting crosswords appear to promote the monitoring component in the Nelson & 
Narens‘ (1990) theory, whereas attempting a larger variety of cognitive activities 
appears to promote both the monitoring and the control pathways of the model (see 
Figure 1.1).  
 
Regarding specific crossword frequency, there was a lack of support for the use-
dependency theory with regards to quick and general knowledge crosswords. 
Specifically, there was no evidence that older adults who attempted more quick or 
general knowledge crosswords reported a higher confidence in their cognitive/memory 
ability or reported using more memory strategies. However both types of crossword 
were significantly related to a higher level of cognitive strength and MemSE (across the 
whole sample population), which supports the cognitive reserve hypothesis.  
 
There was, however, support for the use-dependency theory with regards to the 
relationship between cryptic crossword frequency and both cognitive strength and 
MemSE. This was the case only when cryptic crossword completion rates or the number 
of years in education were taken into account in the analysis. Of particular note was 
that, when controlling for cryptic crossword completion rate, older adults who 
attempted no cryptic crosswords had a significantly higher cognitive strength score than 
younger adults who also did not attempt cryptic crosswords. However, the results were 
reversed for individuals who attempted cryptic crosswords every day, that is, older 
adults have a significantly lower cognitive strength than younger adults
6
. This supports 
the results of Study One in that cryptic crosswords promote self-testing which in turn 
promotes metacognitive awareness (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2007; Dunlosky et al., 2003).  
                                               
6
 However, this result must be taken with a note of caution because it is unclear how participants who do 
not attempt any cryptic crosswords can report a completion rate of such crosswords. One possibility is 
that participants are hypothesising/estimating their ability to complete such crosswords, this theory was 
investigated in Studies Three and Four (see Sections 2.4 and 2.5). 
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The result of self-reported cryptic crossword frequency also supports Jopp & Hertzog 
(2007) and Christensen & MacKinnon (1993) with regards to the mediating effects of 
education on the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive decline. Figure 
2.1 shows that a combination of frequently attempting cryptic crosswords and a greater 
number of years in education may enable older adults to form a more realistic opinion 
of their memory ability. Not only does this show support for the use-dependency theory 
(e.g. Wilson et al., 2002) but also the cognitive reserve hypothesis (e.g. Mortimer et al., 
2003) because younger adults who attempt cryptic crosswords frequently reported the 
highest MemSE of the four sub-samples. A high level of education also appears to 
bolster MemSE when there is a lower level of cryptic crossword frequency which 
supports Wilson et al. (2009) and Christensen & Mackinnon‘s (1993) view that 
education can act as a protection against cognitive decline associated with healthy 
aging. It is the case that adults who spend a longer period in education develop skills to 
aid memory functioning i.e. metacognition (e.g. Romainville, 1994) and this is 
supported from the results which show a positive relationship between number of years 
in education and all three dependent variables.  
 
Although the results (from the memory strategies dependent variable) do not indicate 
that cryptic crosswords promote the control pathway in the metacognition model (e.g. 
Nelson & Narens, 1990) it is possible that the memory strategies questionnaire was 
inappropriate to investigate this relationship. For example, the memory strategies 
questionnaire (Troyer & Rich, 2002) had a large number of questions which focused on 
strategies for prospective memories and many of these strategies used external aids. 
According to Hambrick et al. (1999) and Nickerson (1977) cryptic crosswords promote 
introspection and abstract thinking (e.g. Forshaw, unpublished) which have both been 
linked to executive functioning and metacognitive ability (e.g. Souchay & Isingrini, 
2004; Kimball & Holyoak, 2000; Rebok & Balcerak, 1989). Therefore it is likely that a 
more direct investigation of the relationship between undertaking cryptic crosswords 
and the self-perceived impact on metacognition may produce more illuminating results 
(see Study Three, Section 2.4). 
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In conclusion, there was support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis, in that, 
participants who attempted more crosswords and overall cognitive activities reported a 
higher level of confidence in their cognitive abilities. The results also indicated that 
taking part in all three types of crosswords promotes the monitoring function/pathway 
of metacognition. However there was little evidence to support the use-dependency 
theory other than the relationship between cryptic crossword frequency and confidence 
in cognitive and MemSE, which differed across the lifespan. In support of Study One, 
the results showed that when controlling for cryptic crossword completion rates, older 
adults who never attempted cryptic crosswords had a higher level of confidence in their 
cognitive abilities than younger participants who also never attempted cryptic 
crosswords. However, those who attempted cryptic crosswords every day showed a 
more realistic view in that older adults reported a significantly lower cognitive strength 
than younger adults who also regularly attempt cryptic crosswords. There was no 
evidence that undertaking cryptic crosswords promoted the control aspect of 
metacognition, however this could be due to the questionnaire used. Therefore, Study 
Three investigated whether participants own opinions of the effect on cognitive abilities 
of attempting crosswords regularly differed across the lifespan. 
 
2.4 Study Three: The relationship between age, attempting crosswords, MemSE 
and beliefs about the impact of cryptic and general knowledge crosswords. 
 
Studies One and Two suggested that the frequency of attempting cryptic crosswords had 
a larger impact on self-reported cognitive functioning than the frequency of attempting 
quick and general knowledge crosswords. However, Hambrick et al. (1999) also 
indicated that when using objective measurements of cognitive functioning, general 
knowledge crosswords appear to have a significant relationship with a number of 
cognitive abilities including abstract thinking and problem solving
7
. The aim of Study 
Three was to investigate whether taking part in cryptic or general knowledge 
crosswords had a relationship with more direct measures of MemSE and to assess 
                                               
7
 Unfortunately, Hambrick et al. (1999) did not investigate the relationship between cryptic crossword 
ability and cognitive ability/functioning, but speculated that the relationship between abstract thinking 
and problem solving would be significantly greater when investigating proficiency of solving cryptic 
crosswords.  
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participants‘ opinions of the impact of cryptic and general knowledge crosswords on 
cognitive functioning. As with the two previous studies, Study Three also investigated 
whether there was a difference in the results when comparing younger and older 
participants.  
 
Although Studies One and Two have used self-report measures which have been shown 
to be highly reliable at detecting changes in cognition in healthy aging (e.g. Troyer & 
Rich, 2003), these questionnaires have focused on a number of different cognitive 
domains (e.g. working memory, episodic memory, perspective memory and semantic 
memory). Evidence from both subjective (e.g. Bandura, 1989; Berry, West & Dennehy, 
1989) and objective (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996; Craik, 1977; Erber, 1974 and 
Studies Five and Six, see Chapter Three) have suggested that the effect of healthy aging 
is more apparent on the episodic memory system. Therefore, it is likely that support for 
the use-dependency or cognitive reserve hypothesis should be more apparent when 
focusing on episodic memory (see Shadish et al., 2002 and Chapter One for 
justification).  
 
2.4.1 Method 
 
2.4.1.1 Participants 
 
An increased effort was made to recruit (particularly older) participants from the local 
community, not just the internet. Therefore, paper copies of the questionnaire were 
circulated in the local community and using various psychology participant pools for 
older adults. The sample population was 1,324 with an age range of 18 – 95. The mean 
age was 49.77 (SD = 17.36) and the mean number of years in education was 18.10 (SD 
= 3.3, range = 8 – 32). As in Studies One and Two, two age groups were created to 
facilitate ANOVA analysis. First, two groups were created based on a median split. 
Second, age groups were created based on 20% cumulative frequency of the total age 
range. Values were group 1 = ages 18 – 30, 2 = 31 – 47, 3 = 48 – 56, 4 = 57 – 65 and 5 
= 66 – 95. A factor representing a high and low education group was also created based 
on the median of total number of years in education.  
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2.4.1.2 Cognitive activity measures 
 
The cognitive activity measures were identical to those used in Study Two. For the 
three specific types of crosswords the means were 0.89 for cryptic (representing roughly 
less than once a month), 2.77 for general knowledge (representing between several 
times a month and several times a week) and 2.39 for quick crosswords (representing 
several times a month to several times a week). The mean for total crossword frequency 
was 6.05 (SD = 2.81) and the mean for total cognitive activity was 14.76 (SD = 4.61). 
Due to the length of the questionnaire specific crossword completion rate questions 
were omitted.  
 
2.4.1.3 Self-reported cognitive functioning measures 
 
The questionnaire took three measures of MemSE. First, a shortened version of Zelinski 
& Gilewski‘s (2004) MemSE questionnaire was used. Two other measures focused 
specifically on episodic memory. The first was termed Episodic Memory (EM) Prime 
Difference; this was calculated by subtracting participants‘ current ratings of their EM 
to ratings when they regarded themselves as being in their prime. The second measure 
was termed EM Total and was a composite of three questions specifically focusing on 
episodic memory functioning (based on Berry, West & Dennehy, 1989).  
 
Two other sections of the questionnaire investigated participants‘ opinions of the 
cognitive benefits of attempting cryptic or general knowledge crosswords. Varimax 
rotational factor analysis was used to identify two constructs for each type of crossword. 
The first factor suggested questions which related to increasing mental awareness 
through undertaking each type of crossword, therefore these factors were termed 
Cryptic Awareness and General Knowledge Awareness respectively. A second factor 
was identified which contained questions relating to the perceived mental benefits of 
attempting each type of crossword, therefore these were termed Cryptic Mental Benefits 
and General Knowledge Mental Benefits respectively. The full questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix Three. 
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2.4.1.4 Design and Procedure 
 
The design and procedure was identical to that used in Studies One and Two.  
 
2.4.2 Results 
 
The analysis was three-fold; first correlations and partial correlations were used to 
highlight potential relationship between factors. Second, regression analysis was used in 
line with previous research. Finally ANOVA analysis was used to take into account 
possible mediating factors which had been identified in Studies One and Two and by 
previous research (see Chapter One).  
 
2.4.2.1 Correlational Analysis 
 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the correlational relationship between the factors. The tables 
have been separated on the basis of the dependent variables. Table 2.3 shows the 
correlations between the activity variable, age, number of years in education and the 
three dependent variables associated with memory self-efficacy, while Table 2.4 shows 
the same independent variables but the dependent variables are those associated with 
self-reported benefits of attempting cryptic or general knowledge crosswords. 
 
Table 2.3 confirms significant negative correlations with age, MemSE and EM Total, 
and significant positive correlations between age and EM Prime Difference. All these 
correlations are supportive of previous research (e.g. Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004) in that 
participants‘ opinions of their own memory abilities declined with age. The results 
showed a small but significant correlation between quick crossword frequency and EM 
Prime Difference, cryptic crossword frequency and EM Total, and general knowledge 
crossword frequency and EM Prime Difference (see Table 2.3). There was also a 
significant correlation between total cognitive activity and both MemSE and EM Total. 
However, there was no significant correlation between total cognitive activity and EM 
Prime Difference.  
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Table 2.3. Correlation coefficients between MemSE, EM Prime Difference and EM 
Total and age, number of years in education and the frequency of self-reported 
cognitive activities. 
 
Memory Self- 
Efficacy 
Episodic Memory 
Prime Difference 
Episodic Memory 
Total 
Age -0.187** 0.279** -0.301** 
Years in education 0.086** -0.172** 0.109* 
Quick crosswords -0.005 0.066* 0.021 
Cryptic crosswords 0.010 -0.014 0.061* 
GK crosswords -0.016 0.078** -0.040 
Reading 0.080** 0.012 0.005 
Playing cards 0.056* 0.004 0.053 
Doing quizzes 0.087** 0.004 0.143** 
Board games 0.077** -0.055* 0.161** 
Musical instruments 0.082** -0.137** 0.105** 
Foreign language 0.081** -0.100** 0.127** 
Total crossword -0.006 0.069* 0.021 
Total cognitive 0.100** -0.023 0.148** 
*Significant to p < 0.05 (Bonferroni corrected) 
**Significant to p < 0.01 (Bonferroni corrected) 
 
Table 2.4 indicates that cryptic crossword frequency is positively related to the two 
dependent variables of Cryptic Awareness and Cryptic Mental Benefits. This suggests 
that participants who attempt more cryptic crosswords believe that cryptic crosswords 
promote cognitive awareness and cognitive ability (mental benefits). There is a similar 
relationship between the frequency of undertaking general knowledge crosswords and 
GK Awareness and GK Mental Benefits. That is, participants who attempt more general 
knowledge crosswords believe that such crosswords promote cognitive functioning and 
cognitive awareness. There is also a positive relationship between the frequency of 
attempting quick crosswords and the two GK dependent variables but not the two 
Cryptic dependent variables. This is likely to be due to the similarities between general 
knowledge and quick crosswords. The frequency of median is significantly positively 
correlated with Cryptic Awareness, GK Awareness and GK Mental Benefit. Cryptic 
Awareness is also positively correlated with the frequency of playing musical 
instruments. GK Mental Benefits is positively associated with a number of other 
cognitive activities which appear to require crystallized intelligence (e.g. Wilson et al., 
2005).  
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Table 2.4. Correlation coefficients between the two Cryptic and GK dependent 
variables and age, number of years in education and the frequency of self-reported 
cognitive activities. 
 
Cryptic 
Awareness 
Cryptic 
Mental 
Benefits 
GK 
Awareness 
GK Mental 
Benefits 
Age -0.022 0.025 0.069* 0.104** 
Years in education 0.035 -0.014 0.056* -0.138** 
Quick crosswords 0.028 0.043 0.085** 0.257** 
Cryptic crosswords 0.458** 0.172** -0.025 -0.015 
GK crosswords -0.047 0.018 0.224** 0.417** 
Reading 0.079* 0.050 0.094** 0.125** 
Playing cards 0.011 0.039 -0.044 0.126** 
Doing quizzes -0.018 0.002 0.008 0.171** 
Board games 0.031 0.007 0.002 0.061* 
Musical instruments 0.103** 0.013 0.047 0.033 
Foreign language 0.059 0.052 0.009 0.022 
Total crossword 0.217** 0.114** 0.141** 0.335** 
Total cognitive 0.194** 0.108** 0.107** 0.325** 
*Significant to p < 0.05 (Bonferroni corrected) 
**Significant to p < 0.01 (Bonferroni corrected) 
 
Repeating the analysis of Studies One and Two, the sample was split on the basis of 
median age and the correlations were repeated. Supporting Studies One and Two, older 
participants showed a significant positive correlation between cryptic crossword 
frequency and EM Total (r (653) = 0.091, p < 0.05), which was not the case in younger 
participants (r = 0.057). This suggests that older adults who attempt more cryptic 
crosswords report a higher episodic memory self-efficacy. The results also showed a 
significant correlation between the number of years in education and both EM Prime 
Difference (r (653) = -0.222, p < 0.001) and EM Total (r (653) = 0.162, p < 0.001) for 
older participants which was also not evident in the younger sub-sample (r = -0.064 and 
r = 0.002, respectively). Both correlations indicate that older adults who have a higher 
number of years in education report a higher confidence in their episodic memory 
ability. The results did not show any other noteworthy findings when the sample 
population was separated into median age groups compared to correlations reported in 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5.  
 
Overall, the correlational analysis confirms the results of Study Two in that the 
frequency of attempting cryptic crosswords is significantly positively associated with 
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confidence in individuals‘ memory abilities, specifically episodic memory ability. The 
result also showed that this relationship is only significant in the older adult sample 
population and not for younger participants. The results confirmed that individuals who 
attempt more cryptic crosswords believe that such crosswords have a positive benefit 
for cognitive awareness and cognitive functioning. A similar relationship is also found 
for general knowledge crossword frequency and the two general knowledge dependent 
variables. However, the correlational analysis does not indicate that the beliefs that 
attempting cryptic or general knowledge crosswords promote cognitive 
awareness/functioning are different between younger and older adults. Finally, in 
support of both previous studies, total cognitive activity is significantly positively 
correlated with MemSE and own measure of episodic memory self-efficacy (i.e. EM 
Total).  
 
2.4.2.2 Regression analysis 
 
As is Studies One and Two, regression analysis was used to extend the correlational 
analysis. Once again, for each dependent variable only key results are reported.  
 
2.4.2.2.1   MemSE results 
 
The regression equation was significant for MemSE (adjusted R
2
 = 0.032, F (11, 1312) 
= 5.009, p < 0.001). Age accounts for a significant amount of the variance associated 
with MemSE (β = -0.187, t = -6.911, p< 0.01). Other predictors of MemSE included 
number of years in education (β = 0.074, t = 2.646, p < 0.01), reading (β = 0.066, t = 
2.382, p < 0.05), doing quizzes (β = 0.066, t = 2.251, p < 0.05) and playing a musical 
instrument (β = 0.057, t = 2.041, p < 0.05). When age was excluded from the regression 
analysis, doing quizzes (t = 1.757) and playing a musical instrument (t = 1.742) did not 
account for a significant proportion of the variance associated with MemSE. 
Confirming the correlational results the regression analysis did not show that the 
frequency of attempting any of the three types of crosswords accounted for a significant 
proportion of MemSE. The results indicate that the predictors of age, doing quizzes and 
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playing a musical instrument share a significant amount of the variance associated with 
MemSE.  
 
The sample population was separated on the basis of median age and the regression 
analysis was repeated. For older adults, the predictors of number of years in education (t 
= 1.896), doing quizzes (t = 0.246) and playing a musical instrument (t = 1.693) became 
non-significant. This was not the case for the younger adult sample population. Once 
again, none of the three specific crossword frequencies were significant predictors of 
the variance associated with MemSE for younger or older participants. 
 
2.4.2.2.2   EM Prime Difference results 
 
The regression equation accounted for a significant proportion of the variance 
associated with EM Prime Difference (adjusted R
2
 = 0.100, F (11, 1312) = 14.427, p < 
0.001). Age (β = 0.255, t = 8.754, p < 0.001), number of years in education (β = -0.151, 
t = -5.492, p < 0.001) and playing a musical instrument (β = -0.112, t = -4.024, p < 
0.001) were significant predictors of EM Prime Difference variance. Cryptic crossword 
frequency also accounted for a borderline significant proportion of the variance 
associated with EM Prime Difference (β = -0.050, t = -1.849, p = 0.065). When age was 
not included in the regression analysis, cryptic crossword frequency did not account for 
a significant proportion of EM Prime Difference (t = -1.523). When age was excluded 
from the regression analysis, speaking a foreign language (β = -0.084, t = -2.494, p < 
0.05) and playing board games (β = -0.065, t = -1.985, p < 0.05) also accounted for a 
significant proportion of EM Prime Difference. The results were identical, in terms of 
significance, when the regression analysis was repeated for younger and older 
participants. 
 
2.4.2.2.3   EM Total results 
 
Once again, the regression equation for EM Total was significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.123, 
F (11, 1312) = 17.860, p < 0.001). Age (β = -0.282, t = -9.815, p < 0.001), number of 
years in education (β = 0.100, t = 3.645, p < 0.001), doing quizzes (β = 0.109, t = 3.817, 
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p < 0.001), playing a musical instrument (β = 0.061, t = 2.202, p < 0.05), speaking a 
foreign language (β = 0.081, t = 2.935, p < 0.01) and cryptic crossword frequency (β  = 
0.075, t = 2.820, p = 0.005) all accounted for a significant proportion of the variance 
associated with EM Total. Supporting the view that age and the frequency of attempting 
cryptic crosswords share variance associated with EM Total, the predictor of cryptic 
crossword frequency (t = 0.868) was not significant when age was excluded from the 
regression analysis. The predictor of playing a musical instrument also because non-
significant (t = 1.479) when age was excluded. 
 
When repeating the regression analysis on older participants, cryptic crossword 
frequency remained a significant predictor (β = 0.085, t = 2.153, p < 0.05), which was 
not the case in the younger sample population (t = 0.430). This supports Studies One 
and Two, and the correlational analysis, in that older adults appear to believe that 
undertaking cryptic crosswords frequently enhances the awareness or functioning of 
episodic memory. The results also show that for older adults, playing board games was 
a significant predictor of the variance associated with EM Total (β = 0.091, t = 2.234, p 
< 0.05), but playing a musical instrument (t = 0.547) and practising a foreign language 
(t = 1.043) did not significantly predict the variance associated with this dependent 
variable. 
 
2.4.2.2.4   Cryptic Awareness results 
 
The regression equation for Cryptic Awareness was significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.217, F 
(11, 693) = 18.780, p < 0.001). Age did not account for a significant amount of the 
variance associated with this dependent variable (t = 1.665). As expected, cryptic 
crossword frequency was a significant predictor of Cryptic Awareness (β = 0.463, t = 
13.558, p < 0.001). The only other cognitive activity which was associated with a 
significant amount of the variance of Cryptic Awareness was playing a musical 
instrument (β = 0.077, t = 2.212, p < 0.05), however when age was excluded from the 
regression analysis this predictor was not significant (t = 1.722). 
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For older adults, number of years in education was still a significant predictor of the 
variance associated with Cryptic Awareness (β = 0.126, t = 2.578, p = 0.01), however 
this was not the case for the younger sample population (t = -1.116). This indicates that 
older adults who have a higher number of years in education feel that cryptic crossword 
frequency is positively associated with the belief that cryptic crosswords promote 
cognitive awareness, but the relationship is reversed in younger adults, that is, younger 
adults with fewer years in education feel that cryptic crosswords promote cognitive 
awareness. For younger adults, playing a musical instrument was not a significant 
predictor of this dependent variable (t = 0.172).  
 
2.4.2.2.5   Cryptic Mental Benefit results 
 
The regression equation for Cryptic Mental Benefits was significant (adjusted R
2
 = 
0.022, F (11, 760) = 2.559, p < 0.005). Age did not account for a significant amount of 
the variance associated with Cryptic Mental Benefits. The only predictor to account for 
a significant proportion of the variance associated with Cryptic Mental Benefits was 
cryptic crossword frequency (β = 0.463, t = 13.558, p < 0.001). The regression equation 
did not change in terms of overall significance or significance of predictors when age 
was excluded. The results were identical when the sample population was restricted to 
older adults.  
 
2.4.2.2.6   GK Awareness results 
 
The regression equation for GK Awareness was significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.022, F (11, 
760) = 7.959). Age did not account for a significant proportion of the variance 
associated with GK Awareness (t = 0.368)
8
. Significant predictors were general 
knowledge crossword frequency (β = 0.219, t = 7.451, p < 0.001), number of years in 
education (β = 0.058, t = 2.054, p < 0.05), reading (β = 0.063, t = 2.243, p < 0.05) and 
playing cards (β = -0.076, t = -2.569, p = 0.01). When age was excluded from the 
                                               
8
 When the predictor of age was entered in the regression analysis alone it accounted for a significant 
amount of the variance associated with GK Awareness (β = 0.069, t = 2.411, p < 0.05). This indicates that 
the predictors of age, general knowledge crossword frequency, reading, playing cards and the number of 
years in education share a proportion of the variance associated with GK Awareness. 
 -112- 
analysis, reading did not account for a significant proportion of the variance for this 
dependent variable (t = 1.425). When the sample population was split on the basis of 
median age and the regression analysis was repeated, the only predictor which had a 
drop in significance for older adults was playing cards (t = 1.160). The significance 
levels for all other predictors were maintained.  
 
2.4.2.2.7   GK Mental Benefits results 
 
For the GK Mental Benefits dependent variable the regression equation was significant 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.220, F (11, 1235) = 32.897, p < 0.001). When age was entered before 
the other predictors it accounted for a significant proportion of the variance associated 
with GK Mental Benefits (β = 0.104, t = 3.706, p < 0.001), however it was not a 
significant predictor when number of years in education and the other cognitive 
activities were included in the regression model (t = 0.923). This indicates that age and 
number of years in education and/or cognitive activities share a significant amount of 
the variance associated with GK Mental Benefits. Significant predictors of variance 
were number of years in education (β = -0.104, t = -4.159, p < 0.01), quick crossword 
frequency (β = 0.122, t = 4.517, p < 0.01), general knowledge crossword frequency (β = 
0.356, t = 13.255, p < 0.001), reading (β = 0.053, t = 2.078, p < 0.05), doing quizzes (β 
= 0.091, t = 3.393, p < 0.05) and cryptic crossword frequency (β = -0.050, t = -1.952, p 
= 0.05). Individuals who attempt more cryptic crosswords and have a higher number of 
years in education appear not to believe that taking part in general knowledge 
crosswords promotes cognitive functioning. When age was excluded from the analysis 
there was no difference in the significance of predictors. When restricting the sample 
population to older adults the predictor of cryptic crossword frequency was not 
significant (t = -1.406), all other predictors had the same significance level. 
 
2.4.2.2.8   Regression analysis summary 
 
The regression results supported the correlational results in that older adults apparently 
reported a lower MemSE than younger adults. Unlike Studies One and Two, there was 
no evidence that cryptic, quick or general knowledge crossword frequency accounted 
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for a significant proportion of the variance associated with MemSE, which supports the 
correlational results. As expected, age accounted for a large proportion of the variance 
associated with EM Prime Difference. Cryptic crossword frequency also had a 
significant negative β value which indicates that individuals who attempt more cryptic 
crosswords believe that attempting such crosswords reduces the effects of age on 
episodic memory, however this was not the case when the sample population was 
restricted to only older participants. There was also no suggestion that participants felt 
that attempting general knowledge crosswords frequently reduced the episodic memory 
difference from their current age compared to when they were in their prime.  
 
Regarding EM Total, age significantly accounted for a proportion of the variance 
associated with the dependent variable. This was also the case for a number of other 
cognitive activities including cryptic crossword frequency, but not general knowledge 
or quick crossword frequency. The direction of the β value for cryptic crossword 
frequency suggested that cryptic crossword frequency was positively associated with 
EM Total, supporting a correlational result and the results of Study Two. Interestingly, 
cryptic crossword frequency accounted for a significant amount of the variance 
associated with EM Total when the sample was restricted to older adults but this was 
not the case in the younger sample population. Once again, this supports previous 
results in that older adults appear to believe that cryptic crossword frequency has a 
larger impact on episodic memory functioning than younger adults. 
 
As shown in the correlational analysis, cryptic crossword frequency and general 
knowledge crossword frequency were significant predictors of the two cryptic 
crossword dependent variables and the two GK dependent variables respectively. Older 
adults, compared to younger adults, appeared to have a higher association between 
cryptic crossword frequency and the belief that cryptic crosswords promote mental 
awareness. There was no difference for the Cryptic Mental Benefits measure. The 
results support Studies One and Two, and the correlational analysis of the current 
Study, in that older adults, who attempt more cryptic crosswords, believe that 
attempting cryptic crosswords promotes cognitive awareness. This is not the case for 
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the two general knowledge crossword dependent variables (i.e. GK Awareness and GK 
Mental Benefits).  
 
2.4.2.3 ANOVA analysis 
 
The two-way (activity X age) ANOVA analysis supported the findings of both the 
correlational and regression analysis, particularly regarding the effects of cryptic 
crosswords on episodic memory. The factor of median education was included in the 
analysis for each dependent variable and each cognitive activity factor. There was only 
one significant three-way ANOVA which was between median total cognitive activity, 
median age and median education on MemSE (F (1, 1314) = 8.997, p < 0.005, η² = 
0.007). 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the three-way interaction between median education, median age 
and median total cognitive activity. Individuals with a low level of total cognitive 
activity and fewer years in education demonstrate the lowest MemSE score, regardless 
of age. The figure also demonstrates that older adults who have a greater number of 
years in education and a high level of total cognitive activity actually have a higher 
MemSE than younger adults with the same education background and level of cognitive 
activity. For younger adults, there does not appear to be a large difference in MemSE 
between those with high total cognitive activity and low educational background, or 
those with low total cognitive activity and a greater number of years in education. 
However, the results suggest that higher levels of total cognitive activity can bolster 
MemSE for older adults who have fewer years in education. For older adults, there is 
good support for the use-dependency theory but a lack of support for the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis. That is, individuals with a greater number of years in education and 
a low total cognitive activity demonstrate a low MemSE which is almost identical to 
older adults with fewer years in education and low total cognitive activity.  
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2.4.3 Discussion 
 
One aim was to recruit a sample population which was more representative of the 
general population. The results support previous research (e.g. West et al., 2008; 
Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004; Cavallini et al., 2003; Bandura, 1989) with regards to the 
fact that older adults reported significantly lower MemSE and EM Total scores, and 
significantly higher EM Prime Difference scores. It is probable that this is due to the 
increase in sampling of older adults using the pen and paper method of testing; and not 
relying on internet sampling. This is critical because older adults, compared to younger 
adults, tend to require a greater degree of confidence in their cognitive abilities to use 
the internet and that using the internet may also have a reciprocal effect on MemSE as 
older adults regarded as very cognitively demanding (e.g. Salthouse, 2006).  
 
The second aim of Study Three was to investigate the relationship between age and 
crossword frequency on more direct measures of self-reported cognitive functioning. 
Studies One and Two used reliable questionnaires which assessed self-reported 
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Figure 2.2. Significant three-way interaction between number of years in 
education, total cognitive activity and age, on memory self-efficacy (MemSE). 
H = high, L = low, TCA = total cognitive activity and E = number of years in 
education.  
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cognitive and metacognitive functioning across a number of cognitive domains (e.g. 
working memory, episodic memory and perspective memory). Empirical research has 
shown that older adults report an increase in deficits in episodic memory (e.g. West et 
al., 2008; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004; Berry et al., 1989), which is supported by 
objective measures (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996; see Chapter Three). Therefore, as 
discussed in Chapter One, evidence for the use-dependency theory and cognitive 
reserve hypothesis should be more apparent in cognitive domains that show both 
subjective and objective declines in healthy aging, specifically episodic memory.  
 
With regard to this aim, there was support from the correlational, regression and 
ANOVA analysis for the cognitive reserve hypothesis. The results showed that 
individuals who attempted more cognitive activities (in particular cryptic and general 
knowledge crosswords) reported significantly higher levels of cognitive functioning. 
The composite of total cognitive activity indicated that over the whole sample 
population, those who attempted more cognitive activities also reported a higher level 
of confidence in their cognitive abilities. However, the ANOVA analysis indicated that 
cryptic crosswords were reliably associated with a higher rating of cognitive abilities, 
which was not the case for general knowledge, quick or total crossword frequency. This 
supports the results of Studies One and Two, in that cryptic crossword frequency has a 
larger impact on cognitive awareness than general knowledge or quick crossword 
frequency, as suggested by Hambrick et al. (1999) and Nickerson (1977). 
 
There was also a significant amount of support for the use-dependency theory, 
particularly with regards to cryptic crosswords and total cognitive activity. The results 
show that older participants who attempt more cryptic crosswords had a higher EM 
Total score than those who attempt fewer cryptic crosswords. This relationship was not 
evident in the younger sample population. The ANOVA results show that older adults 
who have fewer number of years in education but attempt more cognitive activities have 
a higher MemSE than older adults who either have fewer years in education and attempt 
fewer cognitive activities or have an equal number of years in education and attempt 
less cognitive activities. These results support those of Christensen & Mackinnon 
(1989) and those of Study Eight, whereby cognitive activity appears to mediate 
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cognitive decline/functioning for older adults with fewer years in education. To clarify, 
previous research such as Wilson et al. (2009) has indicated that a greater number of 
years in education can attenuate cognitive decline in later life. However, an increase in 
cognitive activity in mid to later life for those individuals with fewer years in education 
can also counteract the healthy aging process (e.g. Christensen & Mackinnon, 1993; 
Study Eight). 
 
The final aim of Study Three was to investigate the subjective beliefs that attempting 
cryptic or general knowledge crosswords promoted cognitive awareness and cognitive 
functioning. As expected, individuals who attempted more cryptic or general knowledge 
crosswords believed that such crosswords promoted cognitive awareness and cognitive 
functioning. However, there was only evidence of a dissociation between younger and 
older adults for the belief that cryptic crosswords promoted cognitive awareness. There 
is evidence that adults aged between 48 and 56 show the highest belief that both cryptic 
and general knowledge crosswords promote cognitive awareness, but not cognitive 
functioning. However, the beliefs that cryptic crosswords promote cognitive awareness 
within the older sample population is apparent in the correlational, regression and 
ANOVA analysis, but this is not the case with general knowledge crosswords. 
Therefore, the results of Studies One and Two are supported, in that, the results show 
that older adults, to a greater degree than younger adults, who attempt more cryptic 
crosswords believe that such crosswords promote cognitive awareness.  
 
The result of the correlational and regression analysis supports the findings of Study 
Two, in that attempting cryptic crosswords frequently appears to promote the 
monitoring pathway in Nelson & Narens‘ (1990) model of metacognition. Not only is 
there a direct reliable relationship between cryptic crossword frequency and the cryptic 
awareness dependent variable, but also that this relationship is more apparent in older 
adults. This adds support to the findings of Studies One and Two. In line with Dunlosky 
et al. (2007; 2003), the process of self-testing (required when solving cryptic 
crosswords; Forshaw, unpublished) seems to promote the awareness of cognitive 
functioning to a greater degree in older adults than younger adults.  
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Although there was evidence that cryptic crosswords promoted the control pathway in 
the metacognition model of Nelson & Narens (1990), there was no dissociation between 
this belief in younger and older adults. Specifically, participants who attempted more 
cryptic crosswords believed that such crosswords promoted cognitive functioning 
(measured by the Cryptic Mental Benefits dependent variable, which can be assumed to 
be a representation of the control pathway with regards to metacognition). However, 
there was no evidence of an increase in this belief for older adults compared to younger 
adults. Therefore, overall the results suggest that, although cryptic crosswords increase 
the awareness of cognitive functioning in older adults, there is no evidence that these 
individuals use the increasing awareness/monitoring to promote their cognitive 
functioning/control pathway. However, once again, it must be acknowledged that these 
are self-reported beliefs of participants and may not be representative of actual 
cognitive functioning (e.g. Rabbitt et al., 1995); this was investigated in Study Eight. 
 
Even though the relationship between cryptic crossword frequency and self-reported 
metacognition is evident in older more than younger adults, this is not the case for the 
relationship between general knowledge crossword frequency and self-reported 
metacognition. The results show that over the entire sample population, those who 
attempt more general knowledge crosswords believe that such crosswords promote 
cognitive awareness and cognitive functioning. However, this belief is not significantly 
greater in the older compared to the younger sample population. Therefore, the results 
support the original hypothesis and the research by Forshaw (unpublished), Hambrick et 
al. (1999) and Nickerson (1977), which suggests that cryptic crosswords provide an 
opportunity for older adults to increase their metacognitive abilities. This is not the case 
with regards to general knowledge crosswords, suggesting that cryptic crosswords are 
unique and may provide a cognitive activity which could be used as an intervention to 
counteract healthy aging (see Chapter Five).  
 
In conclusion, the results show that older adults report a significantly lower self-
reported MemSE and evaluation of their own episodic memory functioning. The results 
also suggest that individuals who attempt more cryptic and general knowledge 
crosswords believe that such crosswords promote cognitive awareness and cognitive 
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functioning. There is support for the use-dependency theory and for the results in 
Studies One and Two that suggest older adults who attempt cryptic crosswords show an 
increased belief that such crosswords promote the monitoring pathway of the 
metacognition model of Nelson & Narens (1990). This relationship is not significant in 
younger adults or in the relationship between general knowledge crossword frequency 
and the belief that general knowledge crosswords promote cognitive awareness more in 
older compared to younger adults. There is also evidence that older adults, but not 
younger adults, who attempt more cryptic crosswords have a higher confidence in their 
episodic memory ability than those who do not attempt cryptic crosswords frequently.  
 
To follow on from Study Three, it was necessary to investigate whether individuals who 
attempted cryptic crosswords frequently also felt that cryptic crossword clues were 
easier to solve than those who do not attempt cryptic crosswords frequently. Also, 
whether the relationship between perceived cryptic clue solving and/or actual cryptic 
clue solving is different in younger and older adults. Furthermore, the relationship 
between the perceived ability (and the actual ability) of solving cryptic crossword clues 
and self-reported evaluations of participants own memory needed investigating. It is 
likely with the results of Studies One, Two and Three that older adults, in particular, 
who felt that cryptic crossword clues were relatively easy to solve may have a different 
MemSE (or episodic MemSE) evaluation to individuals who felt that such clues were 
more difficult to solve. Finally, it is possible that individuals who gave up attempting 
cryptic crosswords may have done so due to a decrease in perceived cognitive 
functioning. Therefore, Study Four and Study Four (a) investigated these relationships.  
 
2.5 Study Four: The relationship between age, attempting cryptic crosswords, 
MemSE and the beliefs of solving cryptic crossword clues. 
 
Study Three indicated that individuals who attempted more cryptic crosswords believed 
that such crosswords promoted cognitive awareness and cognitive functioning. 
Furthermore, the belief that cryptic crosswords promoted cognitive awareness was more 
evident in older adults than younger adults. However, it is necessary to investigate 
whether individuals who believe that cryptic clues are easier to solve also demonstrate a 
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higher MemSE and episodic MemSE. According to Studies Two and Three, individuals 
who attempt more cryptic crosswords appear to have more confidence in their memory 
ability, however it is not clear whether these individuals actually believe that cryptic 
crosswords are easier to solve than individuals who do not attempt such crosswords. 
Furthermore, Studies One, Two and Three have indicated that the frequency of 
attempting cryptic crosswords has a larger impact on older adults than younger adults; 
therefore it was of interest to investigate whether the relationship between perceived 
cryptic clue difficulty and MemSE/episodic MemSE was different between younger and 
older participants. Previous studies had indicated that cryptic completion rate was a 
mediating factor, therefore Study Four considered this in the relationship between 
MemSE, cryptic crossword frequency and perceived cryptic crossword clue difficulty.  
 
One possibility for the relationship found in Studies Two and Three in particular (that 
is, that older adults who attempt more cryptic crosswords appear to have a higher 
confidence in their memory ability or apparent improved cognitive awareness) is 
because older adults who feel that their cognitive abilities are declining gave up 
attempting cryptic crosswords. Therefore, Study Four investigated whether there was a 
difference in perceived cryptic clue difficulty between individuals who regularly 
attempt cryptic crosswords, never attempt cryptic crosswords or who have given up 
attempting such crosswords. The Study also investigated reasons why individuals gave 
up attempting crosswords. 
2.5.1 Method 
 
2.5.1.1 Participants 
 
Study Four recruited 366 participants with a mean age of 38.40 (SD = 23.44). The 
entire sample population had a mean number of year in education of 15.09 (SD = 2.66). 
The majority of participants aged under 25 were recruited from the internet, mainly the 
student participant pool, however the over 80% of participants aged over 45 were 
recruited using pen and paper sampling techniques.  
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2.5.1.2 Cognitive activity measures 
 
As in the previous three studies the frequency of participating in each type of crossword 
was measured on a five point Likert scale. Participants were also asked on a three point 
Likert scale whether they had given up a specific crossword, never attempted a specific 
crossword on a regular basis or still attempted the specific crossword. A four point 
Likert scale was used to measure what percentage of the participants‘ life had been 
spent attempting specific crosswords on a regular basis, there was also an option for 
those who never attempted such crosswords. These were 0 – 25%, 26 – 50%, 51 – 75%, 
76 – 100% and not applicable/never attempted. Participants were also asked to report 
reasons why they may have given up attempting each type of crossword. The list of 
reasons can be found with the whole questionnaire in Appendix Four.  
 
2.5.1.3 Self-reported cognitive functioning and cryptic crosswords clues difficulty 
measures 
 
The cognitive functioning measures were identical to those used in Study Three (see 
Section 2.4.1.3); these included Episodic Memory Prime Difference (EM Prime 
Difference), Episodic Memory Total (EM Total) and overall Memory Self-efficacy 
(MemSE). A second measure asked participants to rate the difficulty of ten cryptic 
crossword clues which varied in difficulty according to the compiler. This used a five 
point Likert scale ranging from Very Difficult, Fairly Difficult, Moderate, Fairly Easy 
and Very Easy.  
 
2.5.1.4 Design and procedure 
 
The design and procedure was identical to that of the previous three studies with the 
exception of omitting regression analysis. However, the sample was heavily skewed in 
terms of age therefore it was not possible to produce median age groups. Thus, artificial 
age groups were created based on previous research (e.g. Wilson et al., 2005); these 
were 18 – 38 (mean age = 20.26, SD = 3.92, mean number of years in education = 
14.96, SD = 2.05), 39 – 59 (mean age = 51.98, SD = 5.52, mean number of years in 
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education = 16.24, SD = 2.95) and 60 – 90 (mean age = 70.83, SD = 7.43, mean number 
of years in education = 14.89, SD = 3.46).  
 
A total of the perceived difficulty in solving each cryptic crosswords clue was 
calculated. This factor was used as both a dependent variable and a covariate throughout 
correlational and ANOVA analysis. Perceived cryptic crossword solving difficulty was 
also used as a dependent variable to investigate whether there was any interaction 
between age and cryptic crossword frequency on the perceived difficulty of cryptic 
crossword clues. As the results of the previous three studies indicated that cryptic 
crosswords have a larger effect on self-reported cognitive functioning, only the results 
of cryptic crosswords frequency, percentage attempted and stated of attempting/given 
up are reported. 
 
2.5.2 Results 
 
2.5.2.1 Correlational analysis 
 
Table 2.5 shows the overall correlation matrix with the demographic factors and the 
four dependent variables. Supporting previous research (e.g. Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004; 
Berry et al., 1989; Studies Two and Three) there is a significant negative relationship 
between age and EM Total and MemSE, there is also a positive significant correlation 
between age and EM Prime Difference. The results also show that older adults who 
have attempted cryptic crosswords for a longer period of their lives believe that the 
cryptic crossword clues were easier to solve (see Table 2.5). This could have been due 
to the significantly positive correlation between age and cryptic crossword frequency (r 
(363) = 0.458, p < 0.001).  
 
As expected, Cryptic Solve Total was significantly positively correlated with cryptic 
crossword frequency and the proportion of participants‘ life spent attempting cryptic 
crosswords (cryptic proportion; see Table 2.5). The results also showed that Cryptic 
Solve Total was not significantly correlated with either MemSE, EM Prime Difference 
or EM total. This indicates that participants who believed that the sample of cryptic 
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crossword clues were easier to solve did not show significantly higher self-reported 
memory evaluations.  
 
Table 2.5. Correlations between age, age group, number of years in education, 
cryptic crossword frequency, percentage of life spent attempting cryptic 
crosswords (cryptic proportion) and the four dependent variables. 
 
Memory 
Self-
efficacy 
EM Prime 
Difference 
EM Total 
Cryptic 
Solve Total 
Age -0.178** 0.419** -0.438** 0.347** 
Age group -0.179** 0.394** -0.432** 0.231* 
Number of years in education 0.060 -0.115* 0.024 0.234** 
Cryptic crossword frequency -0.027 0.173** -0.095 0.760** 
Cryptic proportion -0.029 0.138 -0.022 0.719** 
* Significant to p < 0.05 (Bonferroni corrected) 
** Significant to p < 0.01 (Bonferroni corrected) 
 
The sample population was separated on the basis of age groups and the correlational 
analysis was repeated. The total number of reasons participants gave for giving up 
cryptic crosswords was also included in the analysis (termed Cryptic Reasons Total). In 
the overall sample population, there was no significant correlation between Cryptic 
Reasons Total and EM Prime Difference (r = 0.045), EM Total (r = -0.014) or MemSE 
(r = -0.088). In the youngest sample population these correlations were repeated, that is, 
none were significant, however in the 39 – 59 age group there was a significant 
correlation between Cryptic Reasons Total and EM Prime Difference (r (35) = 0.406, p 
< 0.01)
9
. In the oldest age group, there were no significant correlations between Cryptic 
Reasons Total and any of the self-reported memory functioning variables. 
 
For the youngest age group there was also a positive correlation between age and 
Cryptic Solve Total (r (172) = 0.272, p < 0.001), which indicates that older adults 
within the youngest age group feel that cryptic crosswords are easier to solve. For the 
middle-aged group, the correlation between age and all four dependent variables were 
not significant. However, for the oldest age group the results confirmed a significant 
correlation between age and EM Prime Difference (r (75) = 0.325, p = 0.001), EM Total 
                                               
9 However, it is likely that this result is a statistical anomaly as only two people in the middle-aged group 
gave up attempting cryptic crosswords. 
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(r (75) = -0.211, p < 0.05) and MemSE (r (75) = -0.209, p < 0.05), however there was 
no significant correlation between Cryptic Solve Total and age (r = 0.025). The results 
confirmed those of Glisky & Glisky (1999) in that there is a larger variation of 
perceived memory functioning in older adults, which also supports Rabbitt et al. (1995). 
 
The data was also separated on the basis of whether participants had given up cryptic 
crosswords, not given up cryptic crosswords or never attempted such crosswords. The 
results provide good support for the use-dependency theory in that for individuals who 
had given up cryptic crosswords the correlation between age and EM Prime Difference 
(r (22) = 0.639, p = 0.001), and the correlation between age and EM Total (r (22) = -
0.664, p = 0.001) was larger than the correlations between age and EM Prime 
Difference (r (60) = 0.408, p = 0.01) and age and EM Total (r (60) = -0.456, p < 0.01) 
for individuals who were still attempting such crosswords. The correlation between age 
and EM Prime Difference and EM Total for those still attempting cryptic crosswords 
were also larger than for individuals who had never attempted such crosswords (r (200) 
= 0.293, p < 0.01 and r (200) = -0.418, p < 0.01, respectively). This relationship is more 
apparent when comparing the correlations between age group and EM Prime Difference 
which show a highly significant correlation for those who have given up cryptic 
crosswords (r (22) = 0.629, p = 0.002) compared to those who still attempt cryptic 
crosswords (r = 0.247, n.s.). Finally, those who had given up cryptic crosswords had a 
borderline significantly negative correlation between cryptic crossword frequency and 
EM Total (r (22) = -0.399, p = 0.066) which was not apparent in the sample who still 
attempted cryptic crosswords (r = 0.155, n.s).  
 
Overall, the correlational results support the use-dependency theory in that participants 
who have given up attempting cryptic crosswords show larger correlation coefficients 
between age and both EM Prime Difference and EM Total than participants who either 
never attempt such crosswords or still attempt cryptic crosswords, this is more apparent 
when comparing the age group means. However, there is a lack of support for the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis in that cryptic crossword frequency and the proportion of 
participants‘ life spent attempting cryptic crosswords were not significantly correlated 
with either EM Prime Difference or EM Total. However they were significantly 
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correlated with MemSE (see Table 2.5). Finally, the results support those of Studies 
Two and Three (e.g. Sunderland et al., 1986) in that older adults show a larger variation 
in self-reported cognitive functioning measures than younger adults.  
 
2.5.2.2 ANOVA analysis 
 
As in Studies One, Two and Three, ANOVA analysis was used to investigate the impact 
and interactions of age and cryptic crossword frequency on the four dependent 
variables. ANOVA analysis was also used to investigate the main effects and 
interactions of age and cryptic status (i.e. whether participants had given up attempting 
cryptic crosswords, never attempted cryptic crosswords or still attempted cryptic 
crosswords). The median age factor used previously could not be used due to the skew 
of age in the sample population; therefore the factor of age group (described in Section 
2.5.1.4) replaced median age.  
 
2.5.2.2.1   Cryptic crossword frequency results 
 
A two-way ANOVA investigated the relationship between age group and median 
cryptic crossword frequency (3 X 2) on EM Prime Difference. There was the expected 
significant main effect of age group on EM Prime Difference supporting the 
correlational analysis (F (2, 359) = 10.000, p < 0.001, η² = 0.053). Older participants 
showed a 221.71% higher EM Prime Difference than younger adults. There was no 
significant main effect of median cryptic crossword frequency on this dependent 
variable (F = 1.419). However, there was a significant interaction between the two 
factors on EM Prime Difference (F (2, 359) = 3.650, p < 0.05, η² = 0.020).  
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the significant two-way interaction between age group and median 
cryptic frequency on EM Prime Difference. The figure shows that for the youngest and 
oldest age group, there is relatively no difference between those who attempt cryptic 
crosswords regularly or infrequently. However, for the middle aged group, the results 
show that those who attempt fewer cryptic crosswords show a larger EM Prime 
Difference than those who regularly attempt cryptic crosswords. These results support 
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those in Study Three that suggest that the frequency of attempting cryptic crosswords 
may have a larger impact on individuals who can be classed as middle aged, compared 
to younger or older adults. 
 
Controlling for the number of years in education did not change the significance levels 
of the original ANOVA. However, controlling for cryptic proportion produced a 
significant main effect of median cryptic crossword frequency on EM Prime Difference 
(F (1, 77) = 4.656, p < 0.05, η² = 0.057). The marginal means confirm that participants 
who attempted more cryptic crosswords had a 206.46% lower EM Prime Difference 
compared to those who attempted fewer cryptic crosswords. The results confirmed the 
original findings with regards to age group but the interaction between the two factors 
on EM Prime Difference was not significant (F = 1.481). The covariate of Cryptic Solve 
Total was included in the original ANOVA; the results were identical to those reported 
above.  
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Figure 2.3. Significant two-way interaction between age group and median 
cryptic crossword frequency on Episodic Memory Prime Difference (EM Prime 
Difference).  
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The original ANOVA was repeated for the dependent variable of EM Total. The results 
confirmed a significant main effect of age group on EM Total (F (2, 359) = 16.397, p < 
0.001, η² = 0.084). The marginal means showed that the youngest age group had a 
28.61% higher EM Total than oldest age group. There was no significant main effect of 
median cryptic crossword frequency on EM Total (F = 0.487) and there was also no 
significant two-way interaction between both factors (F = 0.166). Controlling for 
number of years in education and Cryptic Solve Total (in separate ANCOVAs) did not 
produce different results from the original ANOVA. However, controlling for cryptic 
proportion reduced the significance of the main effect of age group on EM Total to a 
non-significant level (F = 2.656). No other noteworthy results were found.  
 
Age group and median cryptic crossword frequency were entered into a 3 X 2 ANOVA 
with the dependent variable of MemSE. There was no significant main effect of age 
group (F = 1.982) or median cryptic crossword frequency (F = 1.515) on MemSE. 
There was also no significant two-way interaction for this dependent variable (F = 
0.175). Controlling for the number of years in full time education or Cryptic Solve 
Total, did not influence the results of the original ANOVA.  
 
However, when controlling for cryptic proportion, the results showed a significant two-
way interaction between median cryptic crossword frequency and age group (F (2, 76) = 
6.323, p < 0.005, η² = 0.143). Similar to the EM Prime Difference results, Figure 2.4 
shows that participants who regularly attempt cryptic crosswords between the ages of 
39 – 59 show a significantly higher MemSE that those who do not attempt such 
crosswords. There is no apparent difference for the other two age groups with regards to 
MemSE for those who regularly attempt or do not attempt cryptic crosswords. The 
covariate did not change the significance of the main effects of either factor. 
 
A further 3 X 2 ANOVA investigated the influence of age group and median cryptic 
crossword frequency on the dependent variable of Cryptic Solve Total. The results 
showed a significant main effect of age group (F (2, 388) = 3.700, p < 0.05, η² = 0.021). 
The marginal means indicated that the reported belief of the cryptic crossword clues 
difficulty was 14.37% lower in younger adults than older adults. However, for the 
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middle age group, the Cryptic Solve Total was 12.05% higher than the younger group 
and 27.99% higher than the older group. The results also confirmed a significant main 
effect of median cryptic crossword frequency on Cryptic Solve Total (F (1, 338) = 
220.733, p < 0.001, η² = 0.395). The marginal means confirmed that participants who 
attempted more cryptic crosswords had a Cryptic Solve Total which was 334.76% 
higher than those who attempted fewer cryptic crosswords. There was no significant 
interaction between the two factors for this dependent variable (F = 1.421). 
 
 
 
In summary, the results confirm the findings in Studies One, Two and Three, in that 
older adults report a significantly lower self-efficacy in both overall memory ability and 
specifically episodic memory. The results also show that when taking into account the 
percentage of ones lifespan spent attempting cryptic crosswords, there is evidence of a 
two-way interaction between age group and cryptic crossword frequency for both EM 
Prime Difference and overall MemSE. The results support the findings from Study 
Three and indicate that cryptic crossword frequency has a larger impact on 
episodic/memory self-efficacy of middle-aged individuals than younger and older 
adults. The results show that participants in the age group of 39 – 59 report a higher 
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Figure 2.4. Significant two-way interaction between age group and median 
cryptic crossword frequency on Memory Self-Efficacy (MemSE).  
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confidence in their memory abilities than those who do not attempt as many cryptic 
crosswords. However, this finding was not repeated when covariates were excluded 
from the analysis. This indicates that the proportion of time (over ones life) spent 
attempting cryptic crosswords, mediates the relationship between cryptic crossword 
frequency and memory self-efficacy at specific ages across the lifespan.  
 
2.5.2.2.2   Cryptic status results 
 
A number of different ANOVAs were used to investigate the relationship between 
cryptic status (i.e. whether participants had given up attempting cryptic crosswords, 
never attempted cryptic crosswords or were still attempting cryptic crosswords) and age 
(i.e. age groups) on the four dependent variables. The first group of ANOVAs used a 3 
(age group) X 3 (cryptic status) design, then a combination of 3 X 2 ANOVAs (age 
group X still attempting versus never attempted, or youngest age group versus oldest 
age group X cryptic status) were used. Finally, 2 X 2 ANOVAs (youngest versus oldest 
age group X given up attempting cryptic crosswords versus still attempting cryptic 
crosswords) were used for each dependent variable. The covariates of number of years 
in education and cryptic proportion were included for each dependent variable 
separately. Furthermore, the covariate of cryptic solve total was also included for the 
first three dependent variables (i.e. EM Prime Difference, EM Total and MemSE) but 
obviously not when Cryptic Solve Total was a dependent variable. Only key results are 
reported.  
 
Regarding the dependent variable of EM Prime Difference, a 3 X 3 ANOVA confirmed 
the significant main effect of age group (F (2, 273) = 12.007, p < 0.001, η² = 0.081); the 
results support those in Section 2.5.2.2.1. There was also a significant main effect of 
cryptic status on EM Prime Difference (F (2, 273) = 3.305, p < 0.05, η² = 0.024). The 
marginal means showed that those who had given up attempting cryptic crosswords had 
a 79.85% higher EM Prime Difference than those who still attempted cryptic 
crosswords. Furthermore, those who had given up such crosswords had a 93.75% higher 
EM Prime Difference compared to those who never attempted such crosswords, 
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however the difference in EM Prime Difference of those who never attempted cryptic 
crosswords and who still attempted cryptic crosswords was only 7.17%.  
 
 
 
 
There was also a borderline two-way interaction between the two factors (F (4, 273) = 
2.254, p = 0.06, η² = 0.032). Figure 2.5 illustrates that there is little difference between 
the EM Prime Difference of participants who either still attempt cryptic crosswords or 
who had never attempted cryptic crosswords; for these two groups of participants, there 
is only a slight increase in EM Prime Difference when comparing the youngest to oldest 
group. However, for participants who had reported giving up attempting cryptic 
crosswords, the figure shows that EM Prime Difference is much higher for the middle-
aged and especially the oldest age group compared to either the youngest group who 
have given up cryptic crosswords or the other two older subsamples. This supports the 
correlational analysis and indicates that older participants may give up attempting 
cryptic crosswords due to a drop in the confidence of their cognitive abilities. Of note, 
is that when controlling for Cryptic Solve Total, the interaction increased in 
significance (F (4, 254) = 3.204, p < 0.05, η² = 0.048). This indicates that participants‘ 
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Figure 2.5. Significant two-way interaction between age group and cryptic 
status on mean episodic memory (EM) Prime Difference. 
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beliefs of the difficulty of the cryptic crossword clues presented in the questionnaire 
mediated their reported episodic memory functioning.  
 
For the same dependent variable of EM Prime Difference, a 2 X 2 (age group X cryptic 
status) ANOVA compared participants who were in the youngest and oldest age groups 
and who still attempted or had given up attempting cryptic crosswords. Once again, 
when controlling for cryptic solve total the results of the ANOVAs showed a significant 
two-way interaction (F (1, 46) = 3.791, p = 0.058, η² = 0.076). The difference in EM 
Prime Difference between younger and older adults who still attempt cryptic 
crosswords was 84.41%; however for individuals who had given up attempting cryptic 
crosswords, the difference between younger and older adults was 1074.93%. This adds 
further support to the view that older adults who have given up cryptic crosswords have 
done so due to the fact that attempting such crosswords reduces their memory self-
efficacy and potentially makes them more aware of their current cognitive abilities (i.e. 
cognitive decline). An alternate explanation would be that older adults gave up 
attempting such crosswords due to losing the cognitive ability to do so, but as the 
interaction is only evident when controlling for Cryptic Solve Total the results suggest 
that attempting cryptic crosswords promotes awareness, which supports the results of 
Studies Two and Three.
10
 Unfortunately it was not possible to investigate the 
relationship between median Cryptic Solve Total, age group (young versus old) and 
cryptic status (still attempting versus given up) due to the relatively small sample 
population. 
 
A 3 X 3 (cryptic status X age group) ANOVA showed no significant main effect of 
cryptic status on EM Total (F = 2.446). The results confirmed the significant main 
effect of age group on EM Total (F (2, 272) = 21.232, p < 0.001, η² = 0.135); as 
reported previously, younger participants reported a higher EM Total than older 
participants. There was no significant two-way interaction between the two factors on 
EM Total (F = 0.833). This result was maintained when all covariates were included in 
the ANOVAs separately.  
                                               
10 The main effect of age group on EM Prime Difference was maintained (F (1, 46) = 12.007, p = 0.001, 
η² = 0.207) in this analysis, however there was no significant main effect of cryptic status (F = 0.291). 
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Of note was the result of a 2 X 2 (cryptic status; still attempting versus given up X age 
group; youngest versus oldest) ANOVA on EM Total when cryptic proportion was 
included as a covariate. There was no significant main effect of either cryptic status (F = 
0.907) or age group (F = 2.609), but there was a significant two-way interaction 
between the two factors on EM Total (F (1, 26) = 5.970, p < 0.05, η² = 0.184). The 
marginal means showed that compared to older adults, younger adults who had given up 
attempting cryptic crosswords had an EM Total which was 77.06% higher, however 
older adults compared to younger adults who still attempted cryptic crosswords had an 
EM Total which was 9.03% higher. Not only does this indicate that attempting cryptic 
crosswords regularly in old age can boost episodic memory self-efficacy, but the result 
also supports the view that older adults who find cryptic crosswords difficult give up 
attempting such crosswords potentially due to a drop in memory self-efficacy. Once 
again, this relationship was only evident when controlling for perceived difficulty of the 
cryptic clues percentage in the questionnaire, which may have encouraged older adults 
to re-evaluate their current cognitive functioning. No other noteworthy results were 
found for this dependent variable when including the other covariates in the analysis.  
 
The original 3 X 3 (age group X cryptic status) ANOVA was repeated for the dependent 
variable of MemSE. There was no significant main effect of either age group (F = 
1.882) or cryptic status (F = 2.623) on MemSE. Furthermore, there was no significant 
two-way interaction between the two factors for this dependent variable (F = 0.280). 
Controlling for number of years in education and cryptic solve total did not influence 
the results of the original ANOVA. However, the covariate of cryptic proportion 
produced a significant two-way interaction between age group and cryptic status on 
MemSE (F (4, 64) = 2.710, p < 0.05, η² = 0.145).  
 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the relationship between the two factors; younger adults who still 
attempt cryptic crosswords show the lowest MemSE of all subgroups, however younger 
adults who have never attempted cryptic crosswords show the highest MemSE. For 
individuals who have either never attempted cryptic crosswords or have given up 
cryptic crosswords, there is little difference for the youngest group and middle-aged 
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group. The middle-aged subsample who still attempt cryptic crosswords showed a 
markedly higher MemSE compared to the other two middle-aged groups. Also, 
regarding the oldest group, the results support those shown in the EM Prime Difference 
analysis, that is that those who have given up cryptic crosswords show the lowest 
MemSE for that age group followed by those who have never attempted such 
crosswords and the highest MemSE for older adults is reported by those who still 
attempt cryptic crosswords. Once again, the results indicate that older adults who have 
given up cryptic crosswords, may have done so due to a lack of confidence in their 
cognitive abilities, especially since the cryptic crossword clues were presented before 
the MemSE questions which may have encouraged older adults to re-evaluate their 
current cognitive functions.
11
 
 
 
 
 
A 2 X 2 (age group; youngest versus oldest X cryptic status; still attempting versus give 
up) ANOVA showed no significant main effect of either age group (F = 1.844) or 
                                               
11 These results were supported in a 2 X 3 ANOVA where the middle-aged group was omitted (F (2, 56) 
= 5.124, p < 0.01, η² = 0.155), however, once again this was only significant when cryptic percentage was 
included as a covariate. 
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Figure 2.6. Significant two-way interaction between age group and cryptic 
status on mean memory self-efficacy (MemSE) when controlling for cryptic 
percentage. 
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cryptic status (F = 2.063) on MemSE. There was also no significant interaction between 
the two factors on MemSE (F = 0.013). However, when cryptic proportion was entered 
as a covariate, the results showed a highly significant two-way interaction on MemSE 
(F (1, 27) = 10.025, p < 0.005, η² = 0.271), but the main effect of age group (F = 3.982) 
and cryptic status (F = 0.498) remained non-significant. The interaction showed that the 
mean MemSE for younger adults who had given up cryptic crosswords was 24.96% 
higher than older adults who had also given up cryptic crosswords. However, the 
pattern was reversed for individuals who still attempted cryptic crosswords; older adults 
had a 296.22% higher MemSE than younger adults who also still attempted cryptic 
crosswords. As with the results from EM Prime Difference, this indicates that 
completing cryptic crosswords influences participants opinions of their own memory 
ability and may be a mediating factor for why certain people give up attempting such 
crosswords. No other results of note were found for this dependent variable. 
 
The final set of ANOVAs used Cryptic Solve Total (i.e. the perceived ease of solving 
ten cryptic crossword clues) as a dependent variable. A 3 X 3 (age group X cryptic 
status) ANOVA showed a significant main effect of cryptic status on Cryptic Solve 
Total (F (2, 255) = 86.337, p < 0.001, η² = 0.404). As expected, those who had never 
attempted cryptic crosswords perceived the clues as 325.37% more difficult than those 
who still attempt cryptic crosswords. Participants who had given up such crosswords 
perceived the clues to be 132.30% more difficult than those who still attempt cryptic 
crosswords and 83.11% easier than those who have never attempted cryptic crosswords. 
There was no significant main effect of age group (F = 1.688) and no significant two-
way interaction (F = 1.254) for this dependent variable. The only covariate which 
influenced the significance was cryptic proportion. The results of the 3 X 3 ANOVA 
showed a significant main effect of age group on Cryptic Solve Total (F (2, 59) = 9.321, 
p < 0.001, η² = 0.240). The marginal means are reported in Section 2.5.2.2.1. The 
significant main effect of cryptic status was maintained. There was also a significant 
two-way interaction on this dependent variable (F (4, 59) = 3.161, p < 0.05, η² = 0.175). 
The marginal means are not particularly interesting; the interaction appears to have been 
produced as there is relatively no difference between cryptic status for the middle-aged 
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group on Cryptic Solve Total. When the middle-aged group is excluded from the 
analysis, no significant results are found, even when covariates were included.  
 
In conclusion, the results confirm that older adults, compared to younger adults, who 
have given up cryptic crosswords tend to have a significantly lower confidence level in 
their episodic memory than those who still attempt cryptic crosswords. These results 
support the view that older adults who have given up cryptic crosswords have done so 
due to a drop in their current memory self-efficacy. These results support the 
correlational analysis in the current study and the views/results of Studies One, Two and 
Three. The interactions between cryptic status and age group become more apparent 
when controlling for reported ability to solve cryptic crosswords in the past (i.e. cryptic 
proportion). This was also the case for the dependent variable of overall MemSE, that is 
older adults reported a higher MemSE when still attempting cryptic crosswords than 
those who had given up attempting such crosswords, however this relationship was 
reversed for the younger sample population. Taken together, these results indicate that 
the perceived ability of solving cryptic crosswords (either across the lifespan as 
measured by cryptic proportion or during the questionnaire, as measured by Cryptic 
Solve Total) mediates the relationship between age and perceived memory ability.  
 
2.5.2.3 Reasons for giving up cryptic crosswords results 
 
As stated in Section 2.5.1.2, participants were asked to indicate reasons why they had 
given up undertaking cryptic crosswords. Two constructs were produced, one 
representing the total number of reasons given (total reasons) and one representing the 
reason relating to cognitive abilities associated with attempting cryptic crosswords 
(mental reasons). The overall correlational analysis appeared to support the construct 
validity of both variables. That is, total reasons was significantly negatively correlated 
with cryptic crossword frequency (r (363) = -0.101, p = 0.05) and cryptic proportion (r 
(84) = -0.423, p < 0.001). Mental reasons were also significantly correlated with cryptic 
crossword frequency (r (363) = -0.104, p < 0.05) and cryptic proportion (r (84) = -
0.389, p < 0.001). However, there was no correlation between age and either total 
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reasons (r = -0.038) or mental reasons (r = -0.043). This indicates that older adults do 
not report more reasons for giving up cryptic crosswords than younger adults. 
 
The results in Studies Three and Four indicated that cryptic crosswords had a larger 
impact on subjective memory ratings of older compared to younger adults. Therefore, 
the correlations were repeated for the youngest and oldest age groups. There was no 
significant correlations between cryptic crossword frequency (r = 0.123) or cryptic 
proportion (r = 0.138) with total reasons. This was also the case for mental reasons, 
there was no significant correlation between either cryptic crossword frequency (r = 
0.091) or cryptic proportion (r = 0.049) for the youngest participant group. However for 
the oldest subgroup, the results showed a significant correlation between cryptic 
crossword frequency (r (102) = -0.240, p = 0.015) and cryptic proportion (r (34) = -
0.579, p < 0.001) with total reasons. The results also showed significant correlations 
between mental reasons with both cryptic crossword frequency (r (102) = -0.259, p < 
0.01) and cryptic proportion (r (34) = -0.524, p < 0.001). Although both of these 
correlations indicate that older people reported more total reasons and mental reasons 
for not taking part in cryptic crosswords, t-tests did not confirm a significant difference 
in the number of reasons reported between younger and older adults for either total 
reasons (t = 0.778) or mental reasons (t = 0.196). ANOVA analysis including cryptic 
crossword frequency, median cryptic crossword frequency and cryptic proportion with 
the youngest and oldest age group did not produce any results of note for either 
dependent variables.  
 
To summarise, the results confirmed a negative relationship between cryptic crossword 
frequency and the number of reasons participants gave for giving up such crosswords. 
There were also significant negative correlations between the reported number of 
reasons for giving up cryptic crosswords and the proportion of such crosswords 
completed in the past. The correlational analysis indicated that both of these 
relationships were more evident in older than younger adults, indicating that older 
adults give up attempting cryptic crosswords due to a drop in confidence in their 
memory ability. However, these results were not supported with t-test and ANOVA 
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analysis, possibly due to the relatively small sample size of participants who had given 
up attempting cryptic crosswords.  
 
2.5.3 Discussion 
 
Study Four had three main aims based on Studies One, Two and Three; first, to 
replicate the findings with regards to the relationship between age, cryptic crossword 
frequency and self-reported cognitive ability. Second, to investigate whether there was a 
direct relationship between reported cryptic crossword ability and perceived difficulty 
of solving a sample of cryptic crossword clues, also leading on from Study Three, to 
examine whether there was a difference in terms of age groups with this relationship. 
The final aim was to investigate whether there was a difference between younger and 
older adults who had given up attempting cryptic crosswords or still attempted such 
crosswords with regards to their confidence in their mental abilities. This aim also 
analysed whether there was a difference in reported reasons, between younger and older 
participants, as to why they had given up cryptic crossword participation.  
 
In brief, the results support previous research (e.g. Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004; Bandura, 
1989) in that older adults report a significantly lower MemSE in both overall memory 
and episodic memory than younger adults. There is also evidence supporting Study 
Three, in that middle-aged adults who attempt more cryptic crosswords report a higher 
confidence in episodic memory and overall MemSE than the other two subgroups of 
participants. This became more apparent when the covariate of cryptic proportion was 
included in the analysis, which indicates that the proportion of ones life spent 
attempting cryptic crosswords mediates the relationship between cryptic crossword 
frequency and memory self-efficacy more for middle-aged and older adults than for 
younger adults.  
 
There was strong support for the view that adults who attempted more cryptic 
crosswords believed that the sample cryptic crossword clues were easier to solve than 
those who attempted less cryptic crosswords. Once again, when taking into account 
cryptic proportion, the results showed that the relationship between cryptic crossword 
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frequency and perceived ability to solve cryptic crossword clues was more apparent in 
older than younger adults. Supporting the view of Bandura (1989), these results can 
suggest that older adults who attempted more cryptic crosswords over the lifespan will 
do so because they view the crossword clues as relatively easy which promotes their 
MemSE. This also fits in with the view of Nelson & Narens (1990), in that the meta-
level (of metacognition) is relying on feedback from the object-level (i.e. the monitoring 
pathway). Therefore, if older adults are successfully completing cryptic crosswords (by 
checking the results or completing the crosswords at the object-level) the monitoring 
feedback will bolster the meta-level. Therefore, as there is evidence that the perceived 
ability to solve cryptic crosswords is significantly positively related to cryptic 
crossword frequency (especially in older adults) the results support the view that cryptic 
crosswords can act as an aid to bolster metacognition and cognitive awareness in older 
adults. Study Three indicated that older adults believed that cryptic crosswords 
promoted cognitive awareness and the results of Study Four support that subjective 
opinion.  
 
The most interesting finding in Study Four was the relationship between participants 
who had never attempted cryptic crosswords, given up attempting cryptic crosswords or 
who were still attempting such crosswords. Supporting the results of Study Three, the 
analysis confirmed that older adults who still attempted cryptic crosswords had a higher 
episodic and overall MemSE than either those who had never attempted cryptic 
crosswords or who had given up attempting such crosswords. This relationship became 
more apparent when taking into account either the proportion of life spent attempting 
such crosswords or the perceived difficulty of the crossword clues presented in the 
questionnaire.  
 
These results support the view of Berry et al. (1989) and Bandura (1989) that older 
adults will only take part in cognitively stimulating activities when they feel confident 
in their ability to complete such an activity. Of note was the fact that participants were 
asked to rate the cryptic crossword clues (in terms of difficulty) before reporting 
episodic MemSE and overall MemSE. For younger adults, there was no evidence that 
the perceived ability of solving the cryptic clues had any effect on their evaluations of 
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their own episodic memory in relation to their cryptic status (i.e. whether they still 
attempted, never attempted or had given up cryptic crosswords). However, the results 
for older adults showed that episodic memory self-efficacy was significantly lower for 
those who had never attempted or given up cryptic crosswords compared to those who 
still attempted such crosswords when the perceived ability to solve the sample clues 
was taken into account. This suggests that reading/attempting the cryptic clues forced 
older adults to re-evaluate their current cognitive functioning which, in turn, impacted 
on their current episodic MemSE.  
 
This was also the case when the covariate of cryptic proportion was taken into account 
(i.e. the proportion of participants‘ life spent attempting cryptic crosswords). Older 
adults, who had given up attempting cryptic crosswords showed a significantly lower 
episodic and overall MemSE than those who still attempted cryptic crosswords. 
However for younger adults, this relationship was marginally reversed. This supports 
the view that older adults will give up attempting cryptic crosswords because the 
decrease in the ability to solve such crosswords reduces their confidence in their 
cognitive abilities. The relationship between cognitive confidence and cryptic status in 
younger adults is unclear; one possibility is that younger adults who have a lower 
MemSE may have started attempting cryptic crosswords in an attempt to promote their 
cognitive abilities.  
 
The correlational analysis also showed that the relationship between the number of 
reasons for giving up cryptic crosswords and the frequency of attempting cryptic 
crosswords was significant in older but not younger adults. This was the case for overall 
total number of reasons and also reasons pertaining specifically to cognitive abilities. 
Unfortunately, due to the relatively small sample size of older adults who had given up 
cryptic crosswords, further statistical analysis did not illuminate a difference in the 
reasons for giving up such crosswords compared to younger adults. Overall, the results 
of the analysis for the third aim of Study Four indicate that older adults give up cryptic 
crosswords due to a drop in confidence in their cognitive ability. In line with the 
metacognition model of Nelson & Narens (1990), the results suggest that when older 
adults are unable/less able to complete cryptic crosswords this affects the monitoring 
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feedback pathway between the object- and meta-level. The result is a decrease in the 
meta-level. Therefore, it is logical to assume that as the meta-level (i.e. MemSE) 
decreases older adults choose to give up attempting such tasks as the control  pathway 
appears to be unable to adapt to the demands at the object-level (supporting the 
conclusions of Studies Two and Three). 
 
It must be acknowledged that the assessment of the difficulty of solving cryptic clues 
only measured participants‘ beliefs about the clues and not the actual ability to solve the 
clues. Furthermore, it is important to analyse whether the relationship between self-
reported episodic memory and cryptic crossword ability is dependent upon whether the 
participants attempt the crossword clues before or after undertaking an episodic MemSE 
task. Therefore, Study Four (a) investigated whether there was a difference in terms of 
episodic MemSE for older people who attempted to solve cryptic crossword clues 
before taking part in a MemSE evaluation compared to those who completed the 
MemSE evaluation first. 
 
2.6 Study Four (a): The relationship between attempting cryptic crosswords, 
episodic MemSE and the ability to solve cryptic crossword clues. 
 
The results of Study Four indicated that older adults who had given up attempting 
cryptic crosswords had a significantly lower confidence in their episodic memory 
ability than those who still attempted cryptic crosswords. This became more apparent 
when taking into account the proportion of participants‘ life spent attempting cryptic 
crosswords and the perceived ability to solve a sample of cryptic crossword clues. The 
design of the questionnaire in Study Four required participants to evaluate the cryptic 
crossword clues before estimating their MemSE. The results indicated that participants 
who found the crossword clues difficult to solve reported a significantly lower MemSE 
than those who regarded the clues easier to solve. However, this was more apparent in 
older than younger adults.  
 
Therefore, Study Four (a) investigated whether there was a difference in MemSE when 
individuals attempted cryptic crossword clues before or after evaluating their memory 
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functioning. According to the previous studies, it is likely that individuals who 
attempted the cryptic clues before reporting their MemSE would report a lower MemSE 
as attempting to solve the clues would encourage re-evaluation of their cognitive 
functioning. This was hypothesised to be significant because the sample population was 
restricted to older adults who report a greater deficit in cognitive (specifically episodic 
memory) functioning (e.g. Berry, West, Hastings, Lee, & Cavanaugh, 2010; Zelinski & 
Gilewski, 2004; and Studies Two and Three) and who showed a greater impact of 
perceived difficulty of solving cryptic crossword clues on self-reported 
memory/cognitive functioning (see Study Four).  
 
2.6.1 Method 
 
2.6.1.1 Participants 
 
The sample consisted of 71 participants with a mean age of 70.54 (range = 60 – 86, SD 
= 6.572). The overall sample had a mean number of years in education of 14.85 (SD = 
3.790). The sample was separated on the basis of whether the participants attempted the 
cryptic clues before (version 1) or after (version 2) the episodic MemSE questions. The 
mean age of participants in version 1 and version 2 were 70.18 (SD = 5.992) and 70.86 
(SD = 7.130) respectively. There was no significant difference in either age (t = -0.438) 
or number of years in education (t = -0.938) between the two subsamples. All 
participants were sampled using the pen and paper method due to possible confounds 
when recruiting older adults via the internet (see Studies Two and Three for discussion).  
 
2.6.1.2 Cognitive activity measures 
 
Cryptic crossword frequency was measured using a Likert scale as with Studies One, 
Two, Three and Four. Participants were also required to report the proportion of ones 
life spent attempting cryptic crosswords on a five point Likert scale. Finally, 
participants were asked to report how much effort was required when they complete a 
cryptic crossword; this also used a five point Likert scale. For the cryptic proportion 
(i.e. the proportion of participants life spent attempting cryptic crosswords) and the 
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cryptic effort (i.e. how much effort is required when completing a cryptic crossword) 
measures the values on Likert scale where: 1 = 0 – 25%, 2 = 26 – 50%, 3 = 51 – 75%, 4 
= 76 – 100% and 5 = not applicable (categorised as missing data as some participants 
had never attempted cryptic crosswords). Although general knowledge and quick 
crosswords were measured in addition to cryptic crosswords, this data was not included 
in the analysis due to the results of the previous four studies. 
 
2.6.1.3 Measures of self-reported episodic memory functioning and cryptic crossword 
clue solution ability 
 
Episodic MemSE was assessed using the same questions presented in Studies Three and 
Four; however a Likert scale was not used, that is participants were required to fill in 
the actual percentages in correspondence to the question (see Appendix Five for full 
questionnaire). Two variables representing episodic MemSE were created; first, EM 
Prime Difference which subtracted participants reported ability (illustrated in a 
percentage) to recall a list of fifteen words at their current age, from the same question 
but when they regarded themselves as in their prime. Mean EM Total was created by 
calculating a mean from three questions which assess episodic memory self-efficacy at 
participants‘ current age.  
 
Ten cryptic crossword clues were presented, which varied in difficulty. A space was 
provided with the appropriate number of letters (blank spaces) for participants to write 
the solution. If participants correctly solved the clue, they received a score of 1, but if 
they solved the clue incorrectly or did not solve it at all they received a score of 0. A 
total was calculated and this variable was entitled Cryptic Solve Total.  
 
2.6.1.4 Design and procedure 
 
As mentioned, two versions of the questionnaire were used. Therefore, a between-
subjects design was used, essentially to compare the episodic MemSE dependent 
variables between version 1 and version 2 of the questionnaire. This first used 
correlational analysis and t-tests. Second, ANOVA analysis was used to investigate any 
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relationship between cryptic crossword frequency, cryptic proportion, cryptic effort, 
cryptic solve total and number of years in education, and the two episodic MemSE 
dependent variables. The procedure was identical to that of the previous four studies, 
however, critically, participants were told to complete the questionnaire in the order it 
was presented and not to read through it before completing it. This was important 
because the aim of the study was to investigate whether attempting cryptic clues before 
or after undertaking an episodic MemSE test, influenced participants episodic MemSE.  
 
2.6.2 Results 
 
2.6.2.1 Correlational analysis 
 
For the whole sample population, there was a significant positive correlation
12
 between 
age and EM Prime Difference (r (71) = 0.276, p < 0.05), however there was no 
significant correlation between age and Mean EM Total (r = -0.119). There was the 
expected significantly positive correlation between cryptic frequency and Cryptic Solve 
Total (r (71) = 0.709, p < 0.001) and a significantly negative correlation between cryptic 
effort and Cryptic Solve Total (r (16) = -0.536, p < 0.05). It must be acknowledged that 
the sample size for those who reported cryptic effort values is relatively low, but the 
results confirm the hypothesis that participants who needed to put in more effort when 
solving cryptic clues were worse at solving such clues. There was no significant 
correlation between cryptic proportion and Cryptic Solve Total (r = 0.337) or cryptic 
proportion and EM Prime Difference (r = -0.232), but there was a borderline significant 
correlation between cryptic proportion and Mean EM Total (r (19) = 0.430, p = 0.066).  
 
The correlational analysis was repeated for the two subsamples (i.e. version 1 and 
version 2 of the questionnaire). For participants undertaking version 1 (i.e. completing 
the episodic MemSE test before attempting the cryptic clues) the only significant 
correlation was between cryptic crossword frequency and Cryptic Solve Total (r (34) = 
0.665, p < 0.001). However, for participants who attempted the cryptic clues before 
                                               
12 All correlations reported have been Bonferroni corrected. 
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completing the episodic MemSE test (i.e. version 2) there were a number of significant 
correlations.  
 
First, there was a significantly positive correlation between age and EM Prime 
Difference (r (37) = 0.341, p < 0.05); this indicates that in comparison to participants 
who attempted version 1, participants who attempted the cryptic crossword clues before 
the episodic MemSE test became more aware of the difference between their current 
episodic memory functioning compared to their episodic memory functioning when 
they were in their prime. Second, there was also a significantly negative correlation 
between EM Prime Difference and Cryptic Solve Total (r (37) = -0.350, p < 0.05). The 
correlations suggest that those who were less able to solve the cryptic clues reported a 
higher difference between their current episodic memory functioning compared to when 
they regarded themselves as in their prime.  
 
Furthermore, there were borderline and significant correlations between cryptic 
proportion and both EM Prime Difference (r (12) = -0.561, p = 0.056) and Mean EM 
Total (r (12) = 0.603, p < 0.05). As these correlations were not apparent in the version 1 
subsample, the results indicate that attempting more cryptic crosswords over the 
lifespan mediates older adults opinions of their cognitive functioning when evaluating 
their functioning after, but not before, attempting cryptic crosswords. Although not 
significant, the results show that the relationship between cryptic effort and EM Prime 
Difference was negative (r = -0.241) for participants who attempted version 1, but 
positive (r = 0.304) for participants who attempted version 2 of the questionnaire. The 
relationship was also replicated for the Mean EM Total variable, that is for version 1 
participants showed a positive relationship with cryptic effort (r = 0.347) but for version 
2 the relationship was negative (r = -0.271). 
 
In conclusion, the correlational analysis showed that participants who completed an 
episodic memory self-efficacy test after attempting the cryptic crossword clues reported 
a significantly lower episodic MemSE in relation to age, the ability to solve cryptic 
crosswords and the amount of effort taken when solving such crosswords. There was 
also a positive relationship between the proportion of lifespan spent attempting cryptic 
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crosswords and episodic MemSE. The results support Studies One through Four which 
suggest that attempting cryptic crosswords promotes cognitive awareness in older 
adults.  
 
2.6.2.2 T-test analysis 
 
Two t-tests were used to examine the difference in terms of EM Prime Difference and 
Mean EM Total for those who attempted the cryptic clues before or after the two 
episodic MemSE tests. The results showed no significant difference between 
participants who attempted version 1 compared to version 2 of the questionnaire for 
either EM Prime Difference (t = -0.636) or Mean EM Total (t = 0.492). The lack of 
significant difference in both sample populations is probably indicative of the relatively 
small sample population.  
 
2.6.2.3 ANOVA analysis 
 
For both EM Prime Difference and Mean EM Total, 2 X 2 ANOVAs were used to 
investigate the main effects and interactions of the factor of version and other factors 
measured in the questionnaire. Therefore, 2-level (high versus low) were created for 
cryptic solve total, cryptic crossword frequency, cryptic proportion, cryptic effort and 
education based on median splits. Only results of note are reported, even though 
covariates were included in all ANOVAs.  
 
2.6.2.3.1   EM Prime Difference results 
 
There was no significant main effect on median cryptic solve total (F = 1.905) or 
version (F = 0.023) on EM Prime Difference. However, there was a significant two-way 
interaction for this dependent variable (F (1, 67) = 7.401, p < 0.01, η² = 0.099). The 
marginal means (see Figure 2.7) showed that participants who had a higher cryptic 
solve total reported a 31.31% higher EM Prime Difference when undertaking the 
episodic MemSE test before attempting the cryptic clues than those who had a lower 
cryptic solve total. However, the pattern was reversed for participants who attempted 
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the cryptic clues before doing the episodic MemSE test; that is, those who solved more 
of the cryptic clues had a 57.33% lower EM Prime Difference compared to those who 
solved fewer of the cryptic clues. These results support the correlational analysis 
results; that is they suggest that being able to solve more clues before evaluating ones 
memory boosts episodic MemSE. As apparent in Figure 2.7, the version of the 
questionnaire appears to have a larger impact than the ability to solve the cryptic clues. 
The results were maintained when covariates were included separately in the analysis.  
 
 
 
When the factor of version was included in an ANOVA with median cryptic crossword 
frequency, there was no significant main effect of either version (F = 0.029) or median 
cryptic crossword frequency (F = 0.170) for this dependent variable. Furthermore, there 
was no significant two-way interaction between the two factors (F = 1.998). This was 
also the case for the version X cryptic proportion ANOVA (main effect of version: F = 
1.751, main effect of cryptic proportion: F = 0.133 and interaction: F = 1.742), version 
X median cryptic effort (version: F = 0.324, median cryptic effort: F = 0.036 and 
interaction: F = 0.117) and version X median education (version: F = 0.198, median 
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Figure 2.7. Significant two-way interaction between version and median cryptic 
solve total on Episodic Memory Prime Difference (EM Prime Difference).  
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education: F = 1.690 and interaction: F = 0.277). The inclusion of covariates did not 
change the significance of the results for any of the above ANOVAs. 
 
Overall, the results did not show that cryptic crossword frequency, the proportion of 
ones life spent attempting cryptic crosswords, the amount of effort required when 
completing such crosswords or the number of years in education had any affect on 
ratings of EM Prime Difference. Furthermore, none of these factors appeared to interact 
with the factor of version, that is, these demographic/background factors did not 
produce a significantly different episodic memory evaluation when taking into account 
whether participants attempted the episodic MemSE test before or after attempting the 
cryptic clues. However, the ability to solve the cryptic clues had an influence on 
episodic MemSE when taking into account which version of the questionnaire 
participants attempted. The results show that being more able to complete the cryptic 
clues before attempting the MemSE questionnaire boosts episodic memory evaluation. 
However, the difference in episodic MemSE for those who attempted the cryptic clues 
after the MemSE test was much smaller and in the opposite direction. So, it can be 
concluded that attempting cryptic clues before taking an episodic MemSE test can have 
a significant influence depending on the ability to solve the clues.  
 
2.6.3 Mean EM Total results 
 
The analysis was repeated for the dependent variable of Mean EM Total. A 2 X 2 
ANOVA showed no significant main effect of version (F = 0.091) on Mean EM Total. 
However, there was a significant main effect of median cryptic solve total on this 
dependent variable (F (1, 67) = 5.546, p < 0.05, η² = 0.076). The marginal means 
showed that participants who were more capable of solving the cryptic clues had a 
13.82% higher average Mean EM Total than those who were less able to solve the 
cryptic clues. There was no significant two-way interaction (F = 1.003). However, when 
including cryptic crossword frequency in a three-way ANOVA, the results showed a 
significant two-way interaction between version and median cryptic solve total on this 
dependent variable (F (1, 57) = 4.130, p < 0.05, η² = 0.068). The marginal means 
showed that although participants who were more capable had a higher Mean EM Total 
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in both groups (compared to those who had a lower cryptic solve total score), the Mean 
EM Total was 15.09% higher, on average, when participants attempted the cryptic clues 
before the episodic MemSE test. 
 
A two-way ANOVA with version and median cryptic proportion did not produce any 
significant main effects or two-way interactions for Mean EM Total (version: F = 1.109, 
median cryptic proportion: F = 0.972 and interaction: F = 1.165). The only noteworthy 
result was when median cryptic solve total was included in a three-way ANOVA. The 
results showed a significant main effect of median cryptic proportion on Mean EM 
Total (F (1, 64) = 3.938, p = 0.05, η² = 0.058). On average, participants who had 
attempted cryptic crosswords for a larger proportion of their lives had a 21.66% higher 
Mean EM Total than those who had attempted such crosswords for a smaller proportion 
of their lives.  
 
The ANOVAs involving version X median cryptic crossword frequency (version: F = 
0.169, median cryptic crossword frequency: F = 0.272 and interaction: F = 0.006), 
version X median cryptic effort (version: F = 0.881, median cryptic effort: F = 0.278 
and interaction: F = 0.679) and version X median education (version: F = 0.198, median 
education: F = 1.690 and interaction: F = 0.277) supported the correlational results and 
did not provide any findings of note. This was also the case when covariates were 
included in the analysis.  
 
In summary, the results support the correlational analysis and those of the EM Prime 
Difference ANOVAs; that is, the ability to solve the cryptic clues had a significant 
impact on episodic MemSE, particularly when participants attempted the clues before 
doing the MemSE test. Unlike the EM Prime Difference ANOVA, but supporting the 
correlational analysis, the results suggest that participants who had attempted cryptic 
crosswords for a larger proportion of their lives had a significantly higher confidence in 
their episodic memory functioning than those who attempted such crosswords for a 
smaller proportion of their lives. The results do not indicate that either the number of 
years in education or the amount of effort required to complete cryptic crosswords had 
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an influence on episodic MemSE when taking into account which version of the 
questionnaire participants completed.  
 
2.6.4 Discussion 
 
The primary aim of Study Four (a) was to investigate whether participants evaluated 
their episodic memory differently if they attempted cryptic crossword clues before, 
compared to after, undertaking a MemSE test. Based on Studies One through Four, it 
was hypothesised that attempting cryptic clues would force older adults to re-evaluate 
their current cognitive functioning. A secondary aim was to investigate whether 
demographic factors related to cryptic crossword history and/or the number of years in 
education had any effect on the primary aim. Studies Three and Four in particular 
suggested that the perceived ability of solving cryptic crosswords had a direct and 
indirect (in combination with cryptic crossword frequency) affect on metacognition and 
MemSE (particularly in relation to episodic memory). However, it was unclear as to 
whether this relationship was also in existence when measuring actual cryptic 
crossword ability.  
 
First, the overall correlations showed that, even in a sample restricted to adults aged 
over 60, episodic MemSE declined with age. This supports previous research (e.g. 
Berry et al., 2010; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004; Bandura, 1989 and Studies One through 
Four) which is also supported with objective research (e.g. Mitrushina et al., 1991). The 
results did not show any significant correlations between cryptic crossword frequency 
and episodic MemSE which were apparent in Studies Two and Three in particular; 
however this could be due to the sample population being restricted to older adults. 
Finally, regarding overall correlations, there were significantly positive correlations 
between cryptic frequency and the ability to solve the cryptic clues and the proportion 
of participants‘ lifespan spent attempting cryptic crosswords and overall episodic 
MemSE.
13
 
 
                                               
13 There was also a significantly negative correlation between the amount of effort participants reported 
while completing a cryptic crossword and their overall cryptic clue solution total.  
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Regarding the primary aim, there was strong support that participants who attempted 
the cryptic crossword clues before the episodic MemSE test re-evaluated their current 
cognitive functioning. For example, there was no significant correlation between age 
and EM Prime Difference for those who undertook the MemSE test before attempting 
the cryptic clues, but for participants attempting the cryptic clues first, the results show 
a significant positive correlation between age and EM Prime Difference. The results 
also showed that participants who attempted more cryptic crosswords throughout their 
lives, also reported a significantly negative correlation with EM Prime Difference and a 
significantly positive correlation with overall episodic MemSE, but only when they 
attempted the cryptic crosswords before doing the MemSE test. Although not 
significant, the results also indicated that participants who reported putting more effort 
in to complete a cryptic crossword, had a lower episodic MemSE if they attempted the 
cryptic clues before in comparison to participants who completed the MemSE test first. 
These results support those discussed in Studies One through Four, that attempting 
cryptic crosswords promotes the monitoring feedback identified by Nelson & Narens 
(1990). Self-testing, which is associated with solving cryptic clues (e.g. Forshaw, 
unpublished; Nickerson, 1977), has also been shown to increase older adults‘ awareness 
of their episodic memory (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2007; Dunlosky et al., 2003).  
 
Analysis using t-tests and ANOVAs did not confirm a main/similar effect of version on 
either measures of episodic MemSE. It is likely that this is due to the relatively small 
sample size which reduced the power of the t-tests in particular. Furthermore, the use of 
the ANOVA analysis was specifically aimed at investigating the possible interaction or 
mediation of other variables associated with cognition and cryptic crosswords (e.g. 
frequency or the ability to solve the sample clues).  
 
Participants who attempted the episodic MemSE test before trying to solve the cryptic 
clues showed a relatively small difference in terms of episodic memory evaluation when 
the results compared participants who were more able to solve the cryptic clues than 
those who were less able. However, when undertaking the episodic MemSE test after 
attempting the cryptic clues, the results showed that those who were more able to solve 
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the clues had a much higher level of confidence in their MemSE than those who were 
less able to solve the clues.  
 
Furthermore, the results showed that participants who were more capable of solving the 
cryptic clues reported a higher overall mean episodic MemSE than those who solved 
fewer clues. This relationship became more evident when taking into account both the 
reported cryptic crossword frequency and the version of the questionnaire which 
participants completed. The results showed that the relationship between the ability to 
solve the cryptic clues and episodic MemSE was greater when participants attempted 
the cryptic clues before doing the MemSE test.  
 
In conclusion, the results support the view that attempting cryptic crosswords promotes 
the awareness of one‘s episodic memory functioning. Following on from Study Four, 
the results showed that the actual ability to solve cryptic crosswords encourages older 
adults to re-evaluate their assessment of their own cognitive abilities. This supports the 
view that cryptic crosswords promote the monitoring pathway in the model of 
metacognition (e.g. Nelson & Narens, 1990; see Figure 1.1). The assumption is that 
when older adults are more able to complete the cryptic crossword clues, the monitoring 
pathway boosts the meta-level (i.e. MemSE). This supports the view of West et al. 
(2008) and Bandura (1989) such that receiving positive feedback can promote MemSE. 
However, the opposite also appears to be true; that is, if a participant is less able to 
complete cryptic clues, they re-evaluate their metacognition through the monitoring 
pathway which affects the meta-level in the metacognition model (see Figure 1.1). This 
supports the view of Jopp & Hertzog (2007) who suggest that cognitive decline reduces 
participants‘ ability to undertake certain cognitive activities and therefore through 
feedback to the MemSE system such participants choose to give up attempting such 
activities (see Chapter Six for further discussion).  
 
2.7 General Discussion 
 
Previous research that has used self-report measures of cognitive activities have failed 
to discriminate between different types of crosswords when taking measures of 
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crossword frequency (e.g. Jopp & Hertzog, 2007; see Chapter One and Chapter 2.1). 
However, there is a difference in the cognitive functioning required to solve a cryptic 
crossword compared to either a general knowledge or quick crossword (e.g. Forshaw, 
unpublished; Nickerson, 1977). The act of solving a cryptic crossword involves solving 
two parts of the clue and ensuring that they both match each other to provide the 
solution. This requires cryptic crossword solvers to repeatedly self-test, which has been 
shown to increase episodic memory performance and awareness in older adults (e.g. 
Dunlosky et al., 2007).  
 
2.7.1 Summary of Study One 
 
The results of Study One showed that there was no dissociation in terms of reported 
number of cognitive failures between younger and older adults who attempt quick or 
general knowledge crosswords frequently or infrequently. However, the results showed 
that with regard to cryptic crosswords, older adults who attempt more of this type of 
crossword report more cognitive failures than those who attempt fewer cryptic 
crosswords. Initially, this did not appear to support the use-dependency theory as 
crossword participation in older adults has been positively associated with cognitive 
functioning (e.g. Hertzog et al., 2009; Verghese et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 1999). 
However, self-testing has been shown to promote metacognition (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 
2007) and therefore it is possible that older adults who attempt more cryptic crosswords 
have more awareness of their cognitive abilities and cognitive failures (i.e. 
metacognition) than those who do not attempt as many cryptic crosswords. 
Furthermore, Rabbitt et al. (1995) postulated that the reason why their research did not 
show a significant increase of cognitive failures as a product of age may be because 
older adults undertake fewer cognitively demanding activities and therefore are not 
aware of their decline in cognitive functioning.  
 
2.7.2 Summary of Study Two 
 
Study Two used a reliable metacognition questionnaire (Troyer & Rich, 2002) to 
investigate the frequency of taking part in each type of crossword, self-reported 
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cognitive awareness and strategies used to aid memory. The results supported those of 
Jopp & Hertzog (2007), for example, such that participants who attempted more cryptic, 
quick and general knowledge crosswords had more confidence in their cognitive 
abilities. This suggested that taking part in crosswords promoted the meta-level of 
metacognition through promoting the monitoring pathway between the object-level and 
meta-level (see Figure 1.1; Nelson & Narens, 1990). However, there was no evidence 
that for quick or general knowledge crosswords metacognitive awareness was promoted 
to a greater degree in older adults than in younger adults. 
 
With regards to cryptic crosswords, when taking into account cryptic crossword 
completion rates, there was evidence to support the conclusion of Study One. 
Specifically, older adults who attempted fewer cryptic crosswords had a significantly 
higher confidence in their cognitive functioning than younger adults, which is converse 
to studies that have investigated the relationship of metacognition/MemSE and age (e.g. 
West et al., 2008; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004; Bandura, 1989). However, participants 
who attempted more cryptic crosswords showed the expected lower confidence in their 
cognitive abilities for older compared to younger adults. Although not significant, the 
results indicated that older adults who completed a larger proportion of cryptic 
crosswords and a higher frequency of such crosswords showed more confidence in their 
cognitive abilities than those who reported a lower completion rate and participated in 
fewer cryptic crosswords. This supports the view of Hertzog (2009), which states that 
older adults will only undertake activities which boost their MemSE/confidence. So, it 
is possible that participants who did not complete a good proportion of cryptic 
crosswords gave up attempting such crosswords in order to preserve their MemSE (see 
Study Four and Four (a)).  
 
Once again, the results support the view that attempting cryptic crosswords promotes 
the monitoring feedback and enables older adults to maintain a realistic view of their 
cognitive ability (i.e. the meta-level). However, there was no evidence that undertaking 
any type of crossword promoted the control pathway in Nelson & Narens‘ (1990) 
model. To clarify, there was no direct relationship between any specific or total 
crossword frequency and the reported use of memory strategies. Furthermore, this was 
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the case for the whole sample population and also, critically, for the older participants. 
These results suggest that even though attempting cryptic crosswords, in particular, 
promote the cognitive awareness of older adults, there is no evidence that older adults 
use this enhanced awareness to adapt their strategies to enhance their cognitive 
performance. However, it must be acknowledged that the memory strategies 
questionnaire of Troyer & Rich (2002) focused on prospective memory using external 
aids to enhance memory functioning. Objective research has shown that episodic 
memory shows the greatest decline in healthy aging (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996) 
and that attempting cryptic crosswords promotes self-testing (e.g. Forshaw, 
unpublished). Therefore, it is possible that cryptic crosswords may promote internal 
aspects of the control pathway that were not measured in the Troyer & Rich (2002) 
memory strategies questionnaire.  
 
2.7.3 Summary of Study Three 
 
One question which remained unanswered after Study Two was whether adults (in 
particular older adults) were aware of the potential benefits of attempting cryptic 
crosswords. Therefore, Study Three used a more direct approach to investigate whether 
participants felt that attempting cryptic or general knowledge crosswords promoted 
certain aspects of their cognitive functioning. Using factor analysis two themes 
appeared which arguably mapped onto the relationship between attempting cryptic and 
general knowledge crosswords to promote the control or monitoring pathways of 
metacognition.  
 
The overall sample population believed that both cryptic and general knowledge 
crosswords promoted both the control and monitoring pathways. However, there was no 
difference in this belief between younger and older adults, with regards to the control 
pathway, which does not provide support for the use-dependency theory. Conversely, 
when controlling for cryptic crossword completion rate there was evidence that middle 
aged and older adults had a stronger belief that cryptic crossword participation 
promoted cognitive awareness (i.e. the monitoring pathway) more than younger adults.  
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These results support the research by Christensen & MacKinnon (1993) which 
suggested that adults in middle age and old age undertake cognitively stimulating 
activities with the primary aim to stave off cognitive decline and dementia (e.g. Wilson 
et al., 2007). Their results also suggested that a high level of cognitive activity in mid-
life can reduce cognitive decline and the development of dementia. Participants who 
show a lower level of cognitive activity in mid-life also show an increased risk of 
developing dementia. Christensen & MacKinnon (1993) used objective measures of 
cognitive functioning and self-report measures of cognitive activity, but Study Three‘s 
results seem to indicate that a higher level of cognitive stimulation (e.g. doing cryptic 
and general knowledge crosswords) also promotes subjective measures of cognitive 
functioning. However, as noted by Christensen and MacKinnon (1993) caution is 
needed when using cross-sectional data for adults in middle age because it is difficult to 
rule out the possibility of preclinical dementia.  
 
Hambrick et al. (1999) showed that there was no significant difference between younger 
and older adults in terms of fluid intelligence based on crossword proficiency. Souchay 
& Isingrini (2004) among others, have shown a relationship exists between fluid 
intelligence, executive functioning and metacognition. The results of Study Three do 
not support those of Hambrick et al. (1999) as older adults in Study Three report a 
greater belief that cryptic crosswords promote cognitive awareness than younger adults. 
Hambrick et al. (1999) did not take into account self-reported measures of cognitive 
function such as those in Studies One, Two and Three; therefore it is possible that the 
results of Hambrick et al. (1999) were only tapping into the control pathway of 
metacognition and not the monitoring pathway. Study Eight (Chapter Five) investigated 
whether attempting cryptic crosswords and the completion rate of attempting cryptic 
crosswords had a differential effect on objective compared to subjective measures of 
cognition.  
 
However, none of the crosswords which Hambrick et al. (1999) used could be truly 
described as a pure cryptic crossword. This is important because there appears to be a 
cultural difference in the compilation of crosswords between the UK and USA. This 
must be taken into account when considering the results of Studies Two and Three as 
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many participants were recruited from the internet, from sites which advertised 
crosswords but were accessible to UK and North American servers. Unfortunately it 
was not possible to distinguish between the nationalities of the participants. Even 
though some participants from the USA contacted the researchers to clarify the 
definition of each type of crossword, it has recently come to light that even general 
knowledge crosswords in the USA are different to those in the UK. Therefore, for 
subsequent studies only participants from the UK were recruited to eliminate possible 
confounds.  
 
In summary, Study Three supported the hypothesis that older adults are conscious (or at 
least believe) that undertaking cryptic crosswords promotes cognitive awareness. 
However the results did not show that with this enhanced awareness older adults 
believed that they could use it to promote their actual cognitive functioning. Following 
on from Study Three it was of interest to assess the relationship between MemSE and 
episodic MemSE, and the perceived difficulty of solving a selection of cryptic clues. 
Therefore Study Four investigated this relationship while taking into account cryptic 
frequency. A further question which arose from Study Two and Three was whether 
older adults had given up attempting cryptic crosswords due to a decline in their 
cognitive abilities. Therefore one of the main aims of Study Four was to investigate 
whether there was a difference in terms of self-reported cognitive functioning between 
participants who still attempted cryptic crosswords, never attempted cryptic crosswords 
or had given up cryptic crosswords.  
 
2.7.4 Summary of Studies Four and Four (a) 
 
The results show that perceived cryptic clue difficulty had a significant impact on 
MemSE, particularly relating to episodic memory. The results suggested that 
individuals who regarded the cryptic clues as easier to solve had a higher episodic 
MemSE that those who believed the clues to be more difficult. This relationship was 
more evident in older than younger adults suggesting that attempting cryptic clues have 
a direct impact on the monitoring pathway and affects the meta-level of metacognition. 
Once again, this does not support the view of Hambrick et al. (1999); the results 
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indicate that older adults, in particular, take into account their ability to solve cryptic 
crosswords, and in turn this appears to affect the confidence in older adults‘ evaluations 
of their own memory ability. It must be pointed out that Hambrick et al. (1999) did not 
take into account previous cryptic crossword frequency and asked participants to 
attempt a number of different crosswords.  
 
Furthermore, older adults who had given up attempting cryptic crosswords reported a 
significantly lower evaluation of their MemSE than older adults who still attempted 
cryptic crosswords. This relationship was not replicated for younger adults. One 
characteristic of the questionnaire was that participants rated the clues before taking the 
MemSE tests. It is possible that this had an effect on the older adults and encouraged 
them to re-evaluate their cognitive functioning. As MemSE declines with age (e.g. West 
et al., 2008) it was expected that older adults who had given up attempting cryptic 
crosswords would report more reasons for doing so than younger adults, especially 
based on the evidence that such crosswords encouraged older adults to re-evaluate their 
cognitive functioning more than younger adults. The correlational analysis supported 
this view; that is there was a positive relationship between the number of reasons given 
for giving up cryptic crosswords and the age of the participants. This was the case for 
reasons which pertained to cognitive functioning and reasons which pertained to other 
difficulties as well as cognition (e.g. physical ability, social influences and a lack of 
access to such crosswords). The effects of potential mediating factors of the impact of 
attempting cryptic crosswords on subjective and objective measures of cognitive 
functioning were explored in Chapter Five. 
 
In line with the notion that self-testing has a greater effect on older than younger adults 
(e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2007), one reason why the relationship between cryptic crossword 
frequency, perceived clue difficulty, age and MemSE was apparent may have been the 
order of the questionnaire. That is, participants attempted the cryptic clues before 
undertaking the two MemSE evaluations. So, based on Studies One, Two and Three the 
results of Study Four suggest that the design of the questionnaire had a direct influence 
on the results for older adults but not younger adults. 
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Therefore Study Four (a) investigated whether the order of attempting cryptic clues and 
undertaking a MemSE test had a direct impact on older adults MemSE. The results 
supported those of Dunlosky et al. (2007) and showed that older adults who attempted 
the MemSE test after attempting ten cryptic clues had a significantly lower evaluation 
than older participants who did the MemSE test first. This provides strong evidence that 
attempting cryptic crosswords (at the object-level) influences the meta-level through the 
monitoring pathway.  
 
Actual cryptic clue solving ability and not perceived clue solving ability was used in 
Study Four (a). The results showed that the relationship between the order in which 
participants attempted the questionnaire and their episodic MemSE was mediated by 
factors such as cryptic crossword frequency, the proportion of ones life spent attempting 
cryptic crosswords and the actual ability to solve the sample clues (but only for 
participants who attempted the clues before the MemSE evaluations). Not only do these 
results show that cryptic crosswords may provide a technique to encourage older adults 
to form a more realistic view of their cognitive ability but it also supports the notion that 
older adults show a large amount of heterogeneity and that mediating factors have a 
larger impact on an older sample population compared to a younger sample group (e.g. 
Glisky & Glisky, 1999).  
 
2.7.5 Overall summary and conclusion 
 
One theme that is evident throughout this chapter is that older adults who attempt 
cryptic crosswords appear to be more aware of their cognitive functioning than older 
adults who do not attempt such crosswords. As discussed, it is likely that attempting 
such crosswords has a direct impact on the metacognition and enables older adults to be 
more aware of their current level of cognitive functioning. In line with Hertzog (2009) 
there is evidence that older adults give up attempting cryptic crosswords because 
attempting such crosswords cause some older adults to lose confidence in their overall 
memory ability. However, the drop in confidence is likely to be due to effect that older 
adults have lost the cognitive abilities to complete the specific activity (e.g. Jopp & 
Hertzog, 2007). Therefore, contrary to the recommendations of West et al. (2008) or 
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Bandura (1989) it can be argued that a boost in MemSE is inappropriate for some older 
adults. This concept is explored further in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
Taking into account the view of Nelson & Narens (1990), adults need a realistic 
awareness of their cognitive functioning (meta-level) to ensure that they exert adequate 
cognitive effort for future cognitive tasks. Therefore, boosting an individual‘s MemSE 
may be detrimental to their overall cognitive functioning as their meta-level of 
metacognition will be out of sync with reality (i.e. the object-level). In turn, this will not 
allow healthy metacognitive functioning and may be more detrimental to 
MemSE/metacognition in the long term when individuals continually fail to function 
adequately.  
 
In conclusion, the results suggest that cryptic crosswords enable older adults to produce 
a realistic meta-level (MemSE) through the process of self testing (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 
2007; Forshaw, unpublished). Previous research which has investigated the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis or use-dependency theory has potentially missed the apparent value 
of cryptic crosswords due to measuring overall crossword frequency and not specific 
crossword frequency (e.g. Jopp & Hertzog, 2007). Furthermore, other factors (e.g. 
crossword completion rate, ability to solve crossword clues, proportion of one‘s life 
spent attempting specific crosswords) have been shown to mediate the relationship 
between self-reported cognitive activity and self-reported cognitive functioning. The 
assumption that an increase in cognitive activity must be related to an increase in 
cognitive functioning (Wilson et al., 2007) is questionable, due to the fact that older 
adults who attempt more cryptic crosswords show a lower MemSE. Furthermore, there 
is evidence that the order of presentation of questionnaires or cognitive assessments can 
be mediated by other factors in the questionnaire (e.g. cognitive activities which 
encourage older adults to self-test). Therefore, the results of this chapter not only 
question the cognitive activity measures used in previous research, but also suggest that 
cryptic crosswords may provide an intervention activity to promote metacognition in 
older adults (see Study Eight, Chapter Five).   
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 TESTING THE COGNITIVE RESERVE HYPOTHESIS: THE EFFECTS OF 
WORD FREQUENCY AND AGE OF ACQUISITION ON RECALL, 
CONSOLIDATION AND ENCODING IN YOUNGER AND OLDER ADULTS 
 
3.1 Background 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
The use-it-or-lose-it theory can be regarded as an umbrella term, which covers the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis and the use-dependency theory. Chapter One reviews both 
theories and there is a significant amount of empirical evidence in support of each 
theory (e.g. Wilson et al., 2002). However, there are questions over the research 
techniques which have been used to investigate each theory. One criticism of the 
methodology used to investigate both approaches is that studies have used a between-
subjects technique, which compares older adults who are relatively cognitively active or 
inactive (e.g. Verghese et al., 2003; Christensen & McKinnon, 1993). This means that 
the evidence used to support either the use-dependency theory or cognitive reserve 
hypothesis may be a product of other demographic factors which mediate both cognitive 
ability and leisure or vocational activities (e.g. Schooler & Mulatu, 2001). Therefore, it 
is almost impossible, when using a within-subjects technique, to identify whether an 
increase in cognitive activity can be protective of cognitive decline associated with 
healthy aging.  
 
An ideal experiment to investigate the cognitive reserve hypothesis would match 
participants on the basis of demographic factors and manipulate only one factor; 
specifically current level of cognitive activity. However this is not possible, that is, it is 
impossible to find two individuals who have the same demographic variables which are 
outlined in Chapters One and Two, but who differ on levels of cognitive activity. It is 
also the case that some research theorises that a higher number of years in education 
(which has been regarded as a hallmark of a greater amount of cognitive reserve, e.g. 
Mortimer et al., 2003), can have effects on other demographic factors which can have a 
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mediating effect on cognitive functioning, for example healthcare or lifestyle. As 
reported by Schooler & Mulatu (2001) individuals who have a higher level of 
educational attainment tend to have a higher earning capacity and better access to 
healthcare. These individuals also report undertaking more cognitively stimulating 
leisure activities. 
 
Therefore it is necessary to find a cognitive construct which can be investigated using a 
within-subjects technique to examine whether regular use of part of this construct 
increases its availability in memory compared to another part of the constructs which is 
activated less frequently. Language was chosen because there are a number of factors 
which can be manipulated with regards to the study of words, specifically word 
frequency and age of acquisition (AoA). Therefore the aim of Studies Five and Six was 
to use a within-subjects technique to investigate whether either manipulations in word 
frequency or AoA could be used as an analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis (see 
Section 4.13 and 4.14 for explanation).  
 
3.1.2 The effects of age on episodic memory 
 
Chapter One and Two reviewed the research with regard to episodic memory loss and 
aging. There is a consensus within cognitive psychology that healthy aging results in a 
significant loss in episodic memory capacity (e.g. Craik, 1977). Throughout the decades 
research has suggested possible explanations for this age-related deficit in episodic 
memory. It is accepted that older adults show a deficit in both encoding and 
consolidation/retrieval (e.g. Bleeker et al., 1988; Craik, 1977; Gordon & Clark, 1974 
and Erber, 1974). The use of a multi-trial technique, which is explained in Section 
3.2.1.3, has shown that older adults show deficits in both encoding and consolidation 
compared to younger adults (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996). There is also evidence, 
from savings scores, that younger adults retain/retrieve words significantly better than 
older adults over a longer time period (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996).   
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3.1.3 The cognitive reserve hypothesis versus the use-dependency theory 
 
Chapter One differentiated the cognitive reserve hypothesis and the use-dependency 
theory. In brief, the cognitive reserve hypothesis predicts that a person can build up a 
cognitive reserve when the brain is at its most plastic, that is, at a relatively younger 
age. The hypothesis dictates that this reserve can then act in a compensatory way during 
older age when the person inevitably suffers cognitive decline, which can either be due 
to healthy aging or pathology, for example, dementia (Katzman, 1993). The use-
dependency theory agrees that cognitive activity can produce a significant amount of 
reserve when a person is cognitively active at a relatively young age. However the use-
dependency theory states that cognitive plasticity does not only exist at a younger age 
but also persists throughout the lifespan (Salthouse, 1991). 
 
For a within-subjects technique to produce an analogy of the use-dependency theory 
phenomenon one would have to match an inherent activity which would then have to be 
separated in terms of being regularly activated or not being activated as often, this 
approach is covered in Chapter Five. However, Chapter Four focuses on an analogy of 
the cognitive reserve hypothesis. An analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis can 
compare aspects of a cognitive system which has been activated often or which has 
been relatively inactive. A good example of this is the phenomenon of word frequency 
in language; words which have a high-frequency rating in a specific language will have 
their specific cognitive representation
14
 activated quite often, however words which 
have a low-frequency rating in the same language will not have their cognitive 
representation activated as often. This can be viewed as a example of the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis in that certain cognitive representations are more highly activated 
that others. 
 
 The phenomenon of AoA in the field of language is another example of how one can 
draw an analogy to the cognitive reserve hypothesis but also use a within-subjects 
                                               
14
 According to Li (2009) and Elman (2009) it is impossible to differentiate between lexical, semantic, 
phonological, grammatical and episodic information of words stored in cognitive representations. That is, 
when an individual stores a specific word (especially a noun) or the above constructs interact when the 
word is presented. 
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technique. The cognitive reserve hypothesis highlights the fact that cognitive/neuronal 
networks are more plastic at a younger age (e.g. Li, 2009), therefore the hypothesis 
predicts that cognitive activity at a younger age will have a more long-term effect on the 
amount of cognitive reserve a person has (e.g. Wilson et al., 2005). A logical 
continuation of this would predict that words or information which is acquired at an 
earlier age will receive more cognitive activity and thus will be stored in more 
interconnected cognitive networks than words learnt at a later age. This has been 
supported by using connectionist modelling (Ellis & Lambon-Ralph, 2000) and in the 
study of verbal fluency of participants with dementia (Forbes-McKay et al., 2005).  
 
The pioneering research from Ellis & Lambon-Ralph (2000) is still regarded by many to 
be the best description of how age-critical learning affects the construction and 
integration of cognitive representations in the brain (Johnston & Barry, 2006). This 
work has been bolstered by further connectionist modelling (e.g. Steyvers & 
Tenenbaum, 2005). There is also evidence from investigations of long-term potentiation 
(LTP) in vivo studies and studies which have attempted to model LTP using 
computational techniques (e.g. Thomas, Watabe, Moody, Makhinson & O‘Dell, 1998; 
Blum & Abbott, 1996). All the research indicates that not only does neuronal plasticity 
decrease with age but also that cognitive/neuronal representations acquired earlier in 
life are stored in closer associated cognitive/neuronal networks than information 
acquired later in life. The biological research has also indicated that neurogenesis 
reduces with age, particularly when older adults show sleep abnormalities (e.g. 
Kudrimoti, Barnes & McNaughton, 1999), which is a common symptom of both 
healthy and pathological aging (e.g. Mirmiran et al., 1992). 
 
Therefore, the study of language seems to provide the opportunity, using a within-
subjects technique, to produce an analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis. By 
manipulating word frequency and AoA of to-be-remembered words Studies Five and 
Six will investigate the cognitive reserve hypothesis while eliminating the effects of 
demographic factors or individual differences, which have arguably had a large impact 
on previous research that has been deemed to provide support for the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis.  
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3.1.4 The effects of word frequency and AoA on reading latencies and memory 
 
A number of studies have investigated naming and reading latencies for words which 
differ in terms of AoA and word frequency (e.g. Morrison, Hirsh, Chappell & Ellis, 
2002; Morrison & Ellis, 2000; Taylor, 1998; Guttentag & Carroll, 1994; Brown & 
Watson, 1987; Carroll & White, 1973). The results have shown that high-frequency 
words are read significantly faster than low-frequency words in individuals who do not 
have psychological impairment and in individuals who are suffering from dementia 
(e.g. Taylor, 1998). Furthermore, a number of results have shown that words acquired at 
an earlier age are read faster than words acquired at a later age in healthy adults (e.g. 
Morrison & Ellis, 2000).  
 
Taking into account the reading latency studies it is logical to assume that early-
acquired words (compared to later-acquired words) and high-frequency (compared to 
low-frequency) words are stored in more interconnected cognitive representations (e.g. 
Li, 2009; Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2006). Therefore, studies that have investigated recall 
of words which differ in terms of frequency or AoA should show a recall advantage for 
high-frequency and early-acquired words over low-frequency and later-acquired words.  
Several studies, using a pure-list technique, have confirmed that high-frequency words 
are recalled significantly better than low-frequency words (e.g. Ward, Woodward, 
Stevens & Stinson, 2003; Watkins, LeCompte & Kim, 2000; Tan & Ward, 2000; 
DeLosh & McDaniel, 1996; Gregg, 1976; Postman, 1970; Sumby, 1963; Murdock, 
1960; Deese, 1960; Hall, 1954). However there is little evidence of a recall advantage 
for early-acquired words over later-acquired words, especially when using a pure-list 
technique (e.g. Dewhurst, Hitch & Barry, 1998; Coltheart & Winograd, 1986; Morris, 
1981)
15
. 
 
Research investigating recall of words that differ in either word frequency or AoA, 
generally uses one of two techniques; either the study of pure-lists or mixed-lists of 
words. A pure-list technique will involve participants studying word lists which contain 
                                               
15 However, it must be acknowledged that the recall advantage of high-frequency words is eliminated 
when using a mixed-list technique (e.g. Ward et al., 2003). 
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solely high- or low-frequency words (or early- versus later-acquired words). In the past, 
these techniques have generally used a between-subjects design (e.g. Postman, 1970). 
Alternatively researchers have used a mixed-lists, within-subjects technique where 
participants are shown a study list which contains an equal number of high- and low-
frequency (or early- and later-acquired words).  
 
If the manipulation of either word frequency or AoA is to be used as an analogy of the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis then a within-subject technique must be used. However, 
previous research dictates that a pure-list technique must also be utilised (e.g. Tan & 
Ward, 2000). The main reason for this is because the cognitive reserve hypothesis will 
be best represented by using pure-lists of words which differ in either word frequency 
or AoA. The cognitive reserve hypothesis predicts that individuals who are more 
cognitively active will build up a greater cognitive reserve than those who are relatively 
less cognitively active; that is, autopsy results have shown that individuals who report 
undertaking more cognitive activities throughout their lifespan show a greater density of 
white- and grey-matter in the brain (e.g. Mortimer et al., 2003), this is also the case in 
animal research where rodents have been exposed to a more enriched environment 
throughout life (e.g. Nilsson et al., 1999). These results confirm the hypothesis that 
increased cognitive activity results in more interconnected cognitive/neuronal 
networks/representations (e.g. Salthouse, 2006; Alexander et al., 1997). Therefore, to 
extend the phenomenon of word type to the analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis 
a study must compare a single group of words which have been regularly activated to a 
separate group of words which have been activated to a significantly lesser degree i.e. 
pure-list of high- versus low-frequency or early-acquired versus late-acquired words.  
 
To use the manipulation of word frequency and AoA as an analogy of the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis pure-lists must also be used if the inter-item association theory of the 
recall advantage of high- over low-frequency words is accepted (e.g. Tan & Ward, 
2000; Watkins et al., 2000).  Similar to the cognitive reserve hypothesis which predicts 
that cognitive representations will be more interconnected if individuals have been more 
cognitively active at a younger age, the inter-item association theory states that 
cognitive representation of high-frequency words will be more interconnected than 
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representations of low-frequency words (e.g. Tulving & Patkau, 1962). There is also 
evidence from modelling studies and neuroimaging studies which suggest that words 
which are acquired at an earlier age are stored in more interconnected networks (e.g. Li, 
2009). Furthermore, research investigating individuals with brain damage, semantic 
dementia, temporal lobe lobotomies and deep dyslexia have also showed that early-
acquired words are preserved better than later-acquired words (e.g. Barry & Gerhand, 
2003; Kremin et al., 2001; Bell, Davies, Hermann & Walters, 2000; Lambon-Ralph, 
Graham, Ellis & Hodges, 1998). Therefore in line with the cognitive reserve hypothesis, 
it is expected that the cognitive representation of high-frequency and early-acquired 
words to have more protection against cognitive atrophy, associated with healthy aging, 
than low-frequency or later-acquired words (e.g. Ellis and Lambon-Ralph, 2000). 
 
The fact that the recall advantage of high-frequency words over low-frequency words is 
eliminated when using mixed-lists (e.g. Ward et al., 2003; Peters, 1937) supports the 
inter-item association theory. This is based on two aspects of the methodology used in 
the study of word frequency and recall. First, mixed-lists tend to use half the number of 
high- and low-frequency words compared to pure-lists (e.g. Ward et al., 2003). Thus, 
the number of possible inter-item associations for the high-frequency words in the 
mixed-list condition is halved compared to the pure-list condition. Second, researchers 
have tended not to control for study time for the individual words in mixed-lists, 
therefore high-frequency words do not receive as much processing time because they 
are read faster than low-frequency words (e.g. Morrison & Ellis, 2000). This is 
supported by research by Watkins et al. (2000) which showed that there was evidence 
of a recall advantage for high-frequency words when using a mixed-list technique if 
study time was equal for high- and low-frequency words.  
 
There is a lack of support for the inter-item association theory for recall benefits of 
early- compared to later-acquired words. For example, Dewhurst et al. (1998) found 
that there was no difference in terms of recall between words which differed in AoA 
when using a mixed-list technique. However, Dewhurst et al. (1998) also did not control 
for processing time at study, this has been shown to be important in studies focusing on 
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word frequency. For example, Watkins et al. (2000) showed how the recall advantage 
for high-frequency words is restored in mixed-lists when study time is controlled for.  
 
Furthermore, classification of early-acquired words does not match the classification of 
AoA of words in studies which have investigated reading latencies. Dewhurst et al. 
(1998) classified early-acquired words as having a mean learning age of 66 months, 
whereas naming latency studies have used a mean age of 26.2 months. In fact, Morrison 
et al.‘s (2002) late acquired words had a mean age 64.8 months which was more closely 
associated with Dewhurst et al‘s (1998) early-acquired words classification. This is 
significant as Li (2009) demonstrated that there is a large increase in language 
acquisition at the early stages of life, specifically when a child starts to speak which is 
typically between 18 and 24 months of age. Therefore Dewhurst et al‘s (1998) 
classification of early-acquired words did not match the research findings of both 
computer modelling and behavioural studies (e.g. Li, 2009).  
 
Although other research has shown that there is no significant difference in terms of 
recall between early- and later-acquired words (e.g. Coltheart & Winograd, 1986: 
Morris, 1981), there is a question over the methodology used to classify AoA of the 
stimulus. Dewhurst et al. (1998) and the above mentioned research employed the tactic 
of calculating AoA on adult‘s estimates of their age when they learnt specific words 
(e.g. Gilhooly & Logie, 1980), whereas reading latency studies have used children‘s 
ability to name pictures as a more objective measurement of AoA (Morrison et al., 
1997). Therefore, it is necessary to match the AoA measurements used in reading 
latency studies when investigating the impact of AoA on recall. This is supported by the 
view of Johnston & Barry (2006) and Zevin & Seidenberg (2002) who indicate that in 
the absence of frequency trajectory measurements objective measures of AoA (such as 
Morrison et al., 1997) should be used instead of adults‘ estimates of AoA. 
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3.1.5 Aims and Objectives 
 
Due to the fact that both word frequency (Sumby, 1963) and age (Dunlosky & 
Salthouse, 1996) appear to show a greater impact on episodic memory, compared to 
working or semantic memory, it is logical to investigate the effect of word frequency 
and AoA on episodic memory. Furthermore, it is a logical continuation of the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis to focus on episodic memory if stimulus characteristics (specifically 
word frequency and AoA) are to be used as an analogy of this hypothesis. 
 
Unlike Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) this research will focus on episodic memory, so 
the words used in the study phase will be presented in a random order for each trial. 
Furthermore, a distracter task will be used before each recall trial. The reason for 
focusing on episodic memory is that age takes a large toll on episodic memory 
compared to any other memory system (e.g. Allen, Sliwinski & Bowie, 2002). 
Therefore it is logical to assume that a cognitive reserve will provide greater protection, 
against healthy aging, for the episodic memory system rather than any other cognitive 
domain. 
 
The use of a multi-trial technique will enable analysis of recall, encoding, consolidation 
and savings. There has been no consensus as to whether stimulus characteristics, such 
as word frequency or AoA, have a larger effect on encoding or consolidation. For 
example, Postman (1970) showed that word frequency had a significantly larger effect 
on consolidation as opposed to encoding. However, both Balota & Neely (1980) and 
DeLosh & McDaniel (1996) believed that the recall advantage of high-frequency over 
low-frequency words was due to superior encoding of high-frequency words. There has 
been no investigation of the effects of AoA on encoding or consolidation.  
 
To summarise, Studies Five and Six will use a multi-trial technique to see if word 
frequency or AoA can be used as an analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis. As age 
takes a larger toll on episodic memory it is logical to assume that older adults will show 
a significantly greater  memory deficit for low-frequency and later-acquired words than 
high-frequency and earlier-acquired words compared to younger adults. A multi-trial 
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technique will allow this investigation to differentiate between encoding and 
consolidation, not just overall recall. Furthermore the measure of savings will also 
enable the study to investigate retrieval over a longer period of time.  
 
3.2 Study Five: Word frequency as an analogy of the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis.  
 
Study Five used a manipulation of stimulus characteristics, specifically word frequency, 
as an analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis. Section 3.2.1.3 describes the exact 
intertrial technique used to discriminate between encoding, consolidation and retrieval. 
The study investigated the effect of word frequency on recall, encoding, consolidation 
and retrieval/retention in younger and older adults.  
 
3.2.1 Method 
 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
 
Two samples of participants were tested. The younger sample consisted of 20 
participants with a mean age of 25.7 (SD = 9.83), who had a mean number of years in 
full time education of 15.55 (SD = 3.32). The older sample population consisted of 22 
participants with a mean age of 75.64 (SD =7.44) and a mean number of years of 
education of 12 (SD =2.94). The two sample groups were significantly different on the 
basis of number of years in education, with the older adults having received 
significantly less education (t = 3.654, df = 38.225, p=0.001). All older adults undertook 
the mini-mental state examination (Folstein, Folstein and McHugh, 1975); all scored 
over 27/30 indicating absence of cognitive impairment. All participants gave informed 
consent.  
 
3.2.1.2 Stimuli 
 
Stimulus words were taken from the Celex Lexical database (1993) and were chosen on 
the basis of wordform frequency. Two pure word lists consisting of 30 words were 
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created (see Appendix Six); the low-frequency words (e.g. windmill, cannon) had a 
mean overall frequency per million of 10.77 (SD = 14.771) and the high-frequency 
words (e.g. jumper, cigarette) had a mean of 88.93 (SD = 123.016). The word lists were 
significantly different in terms of frequency (t = 3.456, df = 29.836, p < 0.001). A third 
word list was used as a practice list. The two experimental word lists were matched on 
the basis of starting letter, number of syllables and imageability (all concrete nouns). 
Unfortunately the word lists were not matched on the basis of AoA, therefore item 
analysis was conducted to investigate the impact of word frequency, AoA, frequency 
trajectory and imageability on recall. The word lists were presented 10 words at a time 
using size 24 Arial type font and participants were required to rate each word for 
pleasantness on a scale of 1 to 7 to ensure each word was processed (see Roediger III & 
Gallo, cited in Naveh-Benjamin, Moscovitch & Roediger III, 2002). Feigenbaum & 
Simon (1962) emphasised the need to use a rating system to ensure that participants pay 
attention to each study item.  
 
3.2.1.3 Dependant Variables 
 
Four dependant variables were measured in Study Five, which were Intertrial Recall 
(ITR), Intertrial Consolidation (ITC), Intertrial Encoding (ITE) and Saving Scores (as a 
measure of retention/retrieval). Section 3.2.1.4 describes the design and procedure, this 
was similar to the intertrial technique used by Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996). ITR was a 
measure of recall across the five initial consecutive trials in each experimental 
condition. There was a possible range of recall scores of 0 to 30. Unlike previous 
research (e.g. Mitrushina et al., 1991) thirty words were used to reduce the possibility of 
ceiling effects. 
 
ITE was calculated in an identical way to gained access described by Dunlosky & 
Salthouse (1996) with the section that ITE (or gained access) was calculated for the first 
trial. ITE is calculated by counting the number of ways which have been acquired 
between trial n and trial n+1. This is then calculated as a proportion of the number of 
words available that could be acquired. These are calculated as a percentage to remove 
scaling effects. Unlike Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) ITE was calculated for the first 
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trial due to the fact that the recall of this trial can only be attributed to encoding and not 
consolidation from the previous trial (Tulving & Arbuckle, 1963). 
 
ITC was calculated by subtracting lost access from 100. Lost access is the number of 
words that a participant fails to recall on trial n + 1 compared to trial n. This is then 
calculated as a proportion of the number of words recalled on trial n. Dunlosky & 
Salthouse (1996) described how lost access could be viewed as an inverse 
representation of consolidation. Due to the fact that lost access was also calculated as a 
percentage it was possible to subtract this figure from 100 to give a direct representation 
of the level of consolidation for each trial, however, it was not possible to calculate a 
consolidation score for trial five. There have been discussions as to whether lost access 
represents consolidation or retrieval (e.g. Woodard et al., 1999). However, the view 
must be taken that retrieval can only occur if an item was consolidated, but it is possible 
that an item could be consolidated but not retrieved. Therefore it is appropriate to view 
lost access as a more accurate representation of consolidation rather than retrieval.  
 
Saving Scores were calculated by comparing the number of words which were recalled 
on the one week delay trial to the number of words recalled on the final trial (trial five 
on the initial intertrial technique). Once again these were calculated as proportions to 
remove scaling effects. It is difficult to discriminate between whether this figure 
represents retrieval or advanced consolidation, however as acknowledged by Woodard 
et al. (1999) it is likely that all words recalled on the final trial (i.e. trial five) would 
have been consolidated, therefore it is logical to assume that the process involved one 
week later requires effortful retrieval. However, from here on the saving scores will be 
deemed to represent either retrieval or long-term retention (see Woodard et al., 1999 or 
Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996 for further discussion). 
 
3.2.1.4 Design and Procedure 
 
Section 3.2.1.3 defines recall, encoding, consolidation and retrieval/retention as used in 
this type of intertrial technique. The study used a mixed design where all participants 
were exposed to both high- and low-frequency words. Participants filled in a general 
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information sheet, then proceeded to undertake the rating of the practice list of words. 
Participants received one minute to complete the rating of all 30 words, older adults 
received 50% extra study time to remove possible effects of cognition speed (see 
Naveh-Benjamin, Hussain, Guez & Bar-On, 2003 and Canestrari, 1963). After rating all 
30 words participants were required to undertake a standard five figure digit span task 
to clear working memory and avoid the recency effect. A free recall task then followed; 
once again younger participants were allotted 60 seconds while older participants were 
allotted 90 seconds.  
 
The study, distracter and free recall task was then repeated 5 times for the intertrial 
learning of the stimuli. Presentation of high- and low-frequency words always followed 
each other but were counterbalanced across each participant group. Once the five trials 
were completed participants were required to return one week later. The first task upon 
return was a delay recall task of all words encountered in the first intertrial task. 
Participants then repeated the five learning trials for the subsequent 30 words. At the 
beginning of each trial participants received the same instructions and were not 
informed that they were being presented with the same words. Participants were 
contacted one week later by phone and the second delayed recall task was performed. 
Due to the counterbalancing of the high- and low-frequency words there was an equal 
number of younger and older participants who did the delayed recall by phone for each 
word type. Debriefing then took place.   
 
3.2.2 Results 
 
3.2.2.1 Intertrial recall (ITR) 
 
A 2 X 5 X 2 (Age Group x Trial x Stimulus Characteristic i.e. word frequency) mixed 
ANOVA was used to investigate the impact of age, number of trials and word 
frequency on overall ITR. Figure 3.1 shows that the younger sample group appears to 
recall more words across the entire study. This was significant (F (1, 40) = 46.339, p < 
0.001, η² = 0.537). There was a significant main effect of trial on ITR (F (4, 160) = 
130.028, p < 0.001, η² = 0.765), in which mean recall increased across number of trials 
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(excluding the one week delayed recall). There was also a significant main effect of 
word frequency on ITR, specifically participants recall more high-frequency words (e.g. 
table, dog etc) than low-frequency words (e.g. helicopter, bear etc) (F (1, 40) = 13.660, 
p = 0.001, η² = 0.255). The marginal means show that on average 15.42% more high 
than low-frequency words were recalled.  
 
There was a significant interaction between trial and age group on ITR (F (4, 160) = 
13.052, p < 0.001, η² = 0.246); younger participants recalled increasingly more words 
across trials than older adults. The two-way interactions between word frequency and 
age, and word frequency and trial on ITR were both non-significant (F = 0.032 and F = 
0.970 respectively).  
 
 
The results showed a significant three-way interaction between trial, word frequency 
and age group on ITR (F (4, 160) = 2.776, p < 0.05, η² = 0.065). As Figure 3.1 
illustrates there was no difference in the recall of high- and low-frequency words across 
the five initial trials for younger participants. However, older adults appear to show a 
depressed rate of learning of low-frequency words compared to younger adults. This is 
not apparent for older people learning high-frequency words, in fact the figure shows 
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Figure 3.1. Mean intertrial recall (ITR) for younger and older adults studying 
high- and low-frequency words.  
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that older adults, compared to younger adults, show a steeper learning gradient for high-
frequency words, particularly across the final two to three trials. Therefore the results 
indicate that older adults have a superior recall advantage of high-frequency words 
compared to low-frequency words, across trials, which is not evident in younger 
participants. 
 
3.2.2.2 Intertrial consolidation (ITC) 
 
In line with Tulving (1964) and Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) intertrial encoding and 
consolidation were calculated on an item by item basis. ITC was analysed by using a 2 
X 4 X 2 (Age Group x Trial x Stimulus Characteristics) mixed ANOVA. Figure 3.2 
shows the ITC for younger and older participants studying high- and low-frequency 
words. 
 
The results show a significant main effect of age group on ITC (F (1, 40) = 14.479, p< 
0.001, η² = 0.266). As Figure 3.2 shows older participants have a lower ITC than 
younger participants. There was also a significant main effect of trial on ITC (F (1, 129) 
= 5.491, p< 0.001, η² = 0.121).  With the exception of trials 1-2, consolidation increased 
across trials. There was no significant main effect of word frequency on ITC (F = 
0.004). There was no significant interaction of either trial and word frequency (F = 
1.001), trial and age (F = 0.371) or word frequency and age (F = 1.526) on ITC. 
Furthermore, there was no significant three-way interaction between all the factors on 
ITC (F = 0.109).  
 
The results showed a significant three-way interaction between trial, word frequency 
and age group on ITR (F (4, 160) = 2.776, p < 0.05, η² = 0.065). As Figure 3.1 
illustrates there was no difference in the recall of high- and low-frequency words across 
the five initial trials for younger participants. However, older adults appear to show a 
depressed rate of learning of low-frequency words compared to younger adults. This is 
not apparent for older people learning high-frequency words, in fact the figure shows 
that older adults, compared to younger adults, show a steeper learning gradient for high-
frequency words, particularly across the final two to three trials. Therefore the results 
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indicate that older adults have a superior recall advantage of high-frequency words 
compared to low-frequency words, across trials, which is not evident in younger 
participants. 
 
 
 
3.2.2.3 Intertrial encoding (ITE) 
 
ITE analysis used a 2 X 5 X 2 (Age Group x Trial x Stimulus Characteristic) mixed 
ANOVA. Figure 3.3 shows the mean ITE for younger and older adults when studying 
high- and low-frequency words. The results showed a significant main effect on ITE of 
trial (F (4, 100) = 21.384, p < 0.001, η² = 0.348), age of participant (F (1, 40) = 47.310, 
p < 0.001, η² = 0.542) and word frequency (F (1, 40) = 19.542, p < 0.001, η² = 0.328). 
The results show that encoding increased across trial for all participants. The results 
also show that younger participants had a higher mean encoding than older participants. 
Marginal means also showed that participants had a 19.31% higher mean encoding for 
high-frequency words than low-frequency words.  
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Figure 3.2. Mean intertrial consolidation (ITC) for younger and older adults 
studying high- and low-frequency words.  
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There was a significant two-way interaction between trial and age on ITE (F (4, 160) = 
5.124, p = 0.001, η² = 0.114). As Figure 3.3 shows younger participants encoded a 
higher proportion of words across the five trials than older participants. There was no 
significant interaction between trial and word frequency (F = 0.913) or word frequency 
and age (F = 0.587) on ITE. Furthermore there was no significant three-way interaction 
between all factors on ITE (F = 1.405).  
 
 
 
3.2.2.4 Savings scores 
 
In line with Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) and Moulin et al. (2004) savings scores were 
calculated. The analysis used a 2 X 2 (Age Group x Stimulus Characteristics) mixed 
ANOVA to assess the impact of age of participant and word frequency on savings. The 
results showed no significant main effect of age (F =0.803) or word frequency (F 
=2.562) on savings. There was also no significant interaction between age and word 
frequency on savings (F =0.055). 
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Figure 3.3. Mean intertrial encoding (ITE) for younger and older adults studying 
high- and low-frequency words. 
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3.2.2.5 Item analysis 
 
Following the analysis by subject an item analysis was carried out, essentially with the 
data transposed in SPSS with each item being given an average score for the 
performance within each group (young and old).  From these item-by-item mean 
performance levels for each item and each trial (60 X 5 = 300 items) a number of new 
summary variables were created.  Slope calculates the rate at which items were learned 
across trials, with each item being given a slope value.  Mean recall was calculated for 
all trials and the mean recall of Trial 1 was considered as raw data. The strategy was to 
first replicate the subject analysis using ANOVAs, but to continue to a regression based 
item analysis which considered which factors influenced recall separately in each group.  
The main motivation for this analysis was to try and consider the confound of AoA on 
word factor (recall). 
 
Simple correlations of performance between groups show that the recall of the old 
group correlates strongly with the recall of the young group, r (60) = 0.694, p < 0.001.  
This suggests that the same words that were recalled well in the young group were also 
recalled well in the old group.  The slope values did not correlate with mean recall 
across all trials in either group (both, p > 0.78).  Interestingly, trial 1 performance did 
correlate with slope values in both groups, (Young r (60) = -0.713; old r (60) = -0.509, 
both p < 0.001), such that the items that were less well recalled on Trial 1 had steeper 
slope functions.   
 
3.2.2.5.1   ANOVA results 
 
Analysis A: For the Trial 1 performance, a 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA compared 
the recall performance for high- and low-frequency words for older and younger 
participants.  There was the expected significant main effect of age on recall (F (1, 58) = 
44.792, p < 0.001, η² = 0.436) with the young group outperforming the old.  There was 
no significant main effect of word frequency (F = 0.587), and no significant interaction, 
(F = 2.195). This indicates that on a single trial the recall advantage of high- over low-
frequency words is not apparent. Furthermore there is no evidence that, on the first trial, 
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younger and older adults show a significant difference in the recall of high- and low-
frequency words. 
 
Analysis B: For mean recall, a 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA compared mean recall 
across the five trials for high- and low-frequency words for younger and older adults. 
Once again there was the expected significant main effect of age on recall (F (1, 58) = 
292.791, p < 0.001, η² = 0.835). Similar to analysis A there was no significant main 
effect of word frequency on mean recall (F = 2.480) and no significant interaction 
between age group and word frequency (F = 0.030). The results support the view that 
mean recall is not significantly different for high- and low-frequency words and that 
there is no dissociation between the mean recall of both types of words between 
younger and older adults. 
 
Analysis C: To investigate the rate of recall across trial, the factor of slope was included 
in a 2 X 2 ANOVA with the factor of age group for the dependent variable of recall. 
Again, the analysis matched the above, with the exception that the interaction 
approached significance (F (1, 58) = 2.652, p = 0.1, η² = 0.044), suggesting that the rate 
of acquisition of items was somewhat different in the two groups according to materials, 
paralleling what was seen in the subjects‘ analysis. 
 
Analysis D: Correlational analysis was used to investigate the relationship between total 
recall for the younger and older group, slope for both age groups and stimulus 
characteristics of the items. Trial 1 was not included in the analysis due to the fact that it 
was negatively correlated with slope for both age groups. The results did not indicate a 
significant correlation between total recall and any stimulus characteristics for either 
age group. However, the results show a correlation which approaches significance for 
older adults slope and total word frequency (r (60) = 0.226, p = 0.08). This relationship 
was not significant in the younger sample population (r = -0.059). Furthermore there 
was a highly significant correlation between older adults slope and spoken word 
frequency (r (60) = 0.322, p = 0.01). Once again this was absent for the analysis of 
younger adults. No other stimulus characteristics significantly correlated with the slope 
of either younger or older adults. 
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3.2.2.5.2   Regression Analysis 
 
As mentioned in section 3.2.1.2 the word lists were unfortunately not matched on the 
basis of AoA. The above analysis suggests that word frequency has a larger impact than 
AoA for recall in older adults. This does not appear to be the case for the younger adults 
results. Therefore for completeness regression analysis was used to investigate the 
impact on different stimulus characteristics on both total recall and slope in younger and 
older adults. 
 
Table 3.1. A linear regression showing the effect of specific stimulus characteristics 
on the rate of acquisition of words in older adults. 
 β-values t-value 
Spoken frequency per million 0.594 2.455* 
Written frequency per million -0.250 -0.700 
AoA -0.340 -2.043* 
Frequency trajectory -0.167 -0.511 
Imageability -0.354 -2.479* 
*p < 0.05 
 
The analysis did not indicate that any stimulus characteristic accounted for a significant 
proportion of the total recall variants in younger and older adults. However, the 
regression analysis for slope supported the earlier result in that older adults appear to 
acquire high-frequency words at a greater rate over trial than low-frequency words. The 
regression equation for older adults was significant when all stimulus characteristics 
were included as predicted (adjusted R
2
 = 0.154, F (5, 59) = 3.148, p = 0.01). Table 3.1 
shows that (spoken) word frequency, AoA and imageability all account for a significant 
amount of the variants associated with slope in older adults. Furthermore the β-values 
indicate that word frequency has a larger affect on the rate at which older people 
acquire words than either imageability or AoA. This was not evident in the regression 
analysis for younger adults, that is, no stimulus characteristic predicted rate of 
acquisition for younger adults. 
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3.2.3 Discussion 
 
The results support the view of Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) in that older adults 
display a recall deficit which can be seen to be due to both encoding and consolidation 
difficulties. This supports the view that age-related shortfalls in episodic memory are 
caused by both encoding and consolidation deficits and not by an encoding deficit alone 
as suggested by Mitrushina et al. (1991).  
 
Although older adults showed significantly poorer recall, encoding and consolidation 
there was no evidence of an age-related deficit on the savings score. This suggests that 
the consolidation measure is tapping into a different cognitive construct to the saving 
scores. It is probable that the consolidation does not measure retrieval as much as 
consolidation but the savings scores rely more on the construct of retrieval as opposed 
to consolidation (e.g. Woodard et al., 1999). 
 
Due to the fact that the recall was restricted to episodic memory and study time was 
matched for high- and low-frequency words the results lend support to the inter-item 
association theory of the recall advantage of high- over low-frequency words (e.g. Tan 
& Ward, 2000). This is because storage of high-frequency words appear to be more 
interconnected than low-frequency words when episodic memory is investigated 
compared to working memory (e.g. Sumby, 1963). This supports the view of Ellis & 
Lambon-Ralph (2000) and Li (2009) who showed that cognitive networks are 
influenced by both word frequency and AoA. Hence, when words are encountered more 
frequently they are stored in more interconnected networks and previous research 
suggests that reactivating such cognitive representations also activates connected 
networks/representations (e.g. Kahana, 1996). It is also likely that this theory has been 
supported due to the use of pure-lists of words containing thirty words. Previous 
research such as Ward et al. (2003) used a lower number of words in both mixed-lists 
and pure-lists. Not only did this increase the chance of ceiling effects but it also reduced 
the number of possible inter-item associations for the high-frequency words.  
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Regarding the inter-item association theory it is interesting to note that the results 
suggested that the recall advantage of high-frequency words appear to be due to 
enhanced encoding of these words, compared to low-frequency words. There was no 
evidence that high-frequency words were consolidated more effectively than low-
frequency words. Taken with the reading and naming latency advantage of high- and 
low-frequency words the results support the view that high-frequency words are 
accessed faster (e.g. Watkins et al., 2000) and therefore can be encoded faster and at a 
greater depth than low-frequency words. Furthermore there was no evidence of a recall 
advantage on savings scores of high or low-frequency words. This indicates that word 
frequency does not influence long-term retention or retrieval.  
 
The ITR results present support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis in that older adults 
show a greater recall of high-frequency words, across the five initial trials, compared to 
low-frequency words. This is not evident in younger adults, that is, younger adults do 
not show a difference in recall rate of high- and low-frequency words across the five 
trials. Furthermore item analysis concludes that over the five trials (spoken) word 
frequency has a significant effect on recall for older but not younger adults. The item 
analysis also indicates a significant influence of AoA and imageability on recall for 
older adults. This influence of spoken word frequency, AoA and imageability was not 
apparent for the first trial which was used as a comparison in the item analysis. Overall 
the results support the view that words that are encountered more frequently are stored 
in more interconnected cognitive representations (e.g. Tan & Ward, 2000; Watkins et 
al., 2000).  
 
Furthermore the results support previous research which has investigated pathological 
aging which has shown that high-frequency words are afforded a greater amount of 
protection from cognitive/neuronal atrophy than low-frequency words (e.g. Taylor, 
1998). This suggests that there are similarities in how cognitive representations of 
words are lost in healthy aging and pathological aging. Interestingly, the ITE and ITC 
results did not show a dissociation between younger and older adults in the encoding or 
consolidation of high- and low-frequency words. Therefore it is logical to assume that 
cognitive activity, as defined by the cognitive reserve hypothesis, protects encoding and 
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consolidation at an equal level which was not detected significantly in this sample 
population. 
 
In conclusion, the results supported the view of Craik (1977) and Erber (1974) that age-
related deficits in episodic memory are produced by problems with both encoding and 
consolidation. However, there was no evidence for a long-term retrieval/retention 
deficit in older adults (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996). The results supported the 
inter-item association theory of word frequency and suggested that the recall advantage 
of high- over low-frequency words was due to more efficient encoding of high-
frequency words. There was no evidence that high-frequency words were consolidated 
or retained/retrieved better than low-frequency words. Finally, the results provide 
support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis, that is (compared to younger adults) older 
adults display a greater recall advantage across trials for high-frequency words than 
low-frequency words. This was supported with item analysis which shows that spoken 
word frequency, AoA and imageability all contribute to the rate at which older adults 
learn words as measured by slope values. This was not measured in the analysis of 
younger adults. The intertrial results were unable to ascertain whether this word 
frequency recall advantage, across trials, in older adults was due to an encoding or 
consolidation benefit of high-frequency over low-frequency words. It must be noted 
however that there was no support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis in terms of long-
term retention/retrieval (as measured by saving scored). That is, there was no 
dissociation in terms of retrieval of high- and low-frequency words between younger 
and older adults. 
 
3.3 Study Six: AoA as an analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis.  
 
As in Study Five, Study Six manipulated stimuli characteristics to produce an analogy 
of the cognitive reserve hypothesis. In the case of Study Six the stimuli characteristics 
which were manipulated was the AoA of the to-be-remembered words. The study 
therefore investigated the recall, encoding, consolidation and retention of early- and 
later-acquired words in younger and older adults.  
 
 -183- 
3.3.1 Method 
 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
 
The sample population consisted of two groups of participants separated on the basis of 
age. This was a different sample population to that used in Study Five. The younger 
group consisted of 19 participants with a mean age of 27.84 years (SD = 9.33). The 
group had a mean number of 14.74 years (SD = 2.81) in full time education. The older 
sample population consisted of 23 participants whose mean age was 70.22 years (SD = 
6.13). Their mean number of years in education was 14.30 (SD = 4.20). The two 
samples were significantly different on the basis of age (t = -16.99, df = 30.01, 
p<0.001), however there was no significant difference between the number of years in 
education (t = 0.40). All individuals in the older sample population undertook the Mini-
Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein and McHugh, 1975) and scored over 
28/30 indicating normal cognitive functioning. All participants gave informed consent.   
 
3.3.1.2 Stimuli 
 
The stimuli (see Appendix Seven) consisted of words which were taken from Morrison, 
Chappell & Ellis (1997).  The stimuli were separated on the basis of AoA and two pure 
word lists were formed, each containing thirty words. A further thirty words were taken 
from Morrison et al., (1997) to form a practice trial. The two experimental lists were 
termed ‗early‘ or ‗late‘ depending upon the mean AoA of the words. The early word list 
(e.g. clown, slide etc) had a mean AoA of 37.48 months (SD = 7.85) while the late word 
list (e.g. accordion, chisel etc) mean AoA was 76.64 months (SD = 14.12). There was a 
significant difference in terms of AoA between the two word lists (t = -13.28, df = 
45.37, p<0.001). The two experimental word lists were matched on the basis of starting 
letter, number of syllables and imageability (all concrete nouns). Unfortunately, the 
words were not matched on word frequency, just as in Study Five item analysis was 
completed (see section 3.3.2.5). The words were presented thirty per page in size 22 
Arial font and participants were required to rate each word for pleasantness on a scale 
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of 1 to 7. The order of presentation of early- and late-acquired words were 
counterbalanced in each participant group.  
 
3.3.1.3 Design and Procedure 
 
Study Six used an identical design and procedure to that of Study Five with the 
exception that words in each trial were presented on one sheet not three separate sheets 
as in Study Five. The dependent variables were identical to those in Study Five (see 
3.2.1.3 for details). 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 
3.3.2.1 Intertrial Recall (ITR) 
 
As in Study Five a 5 X 2 X 2 (trial X age group X stimulus characteristics i.e. AoA) 
ANOVA was used to analyse the result for this dependent variable. Figure 3.4 
illustrates the recall of younger and older participants studying early- and later-acquired 
words across the five initial trials and weekly delayed recall. There was a significant 
main effect of age in that younger participants recall more words than older participants 
(F (1, 40) = 3.933, p = 0.05, η² = 0.090). There was also a significant main effect of trial 
on ITR (F (4, 160) = 188.846, p < 0.001, η² = 0.824). These results confirm the findings 
of Study Five in that ITR increased over the five trials. There was also a significant 
main effect of AoA on ITR (F (1, 40) = 6.684, p = 0.01, η² = 0.143). Participants 
recalled 9.29% more early-acquired than later-acquired words. There was no significant 
two-way interactions of age of participants and AoA (F = 0.581), trial and age of 
participants (F = 0.372) or AoA and trial (F = 0.281) on ITR. Finally there was no 
significant three-way interaction between these three factors on ITR (F = 1.681).  
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3.3.2.2 Intertrial Consolidation (ITC) 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the mean consolidation across trials for younger and older adults 
studying early- and later-acquired words. A significant main effect of trial was observed 
on ITC (F (3, 120) = 5.765, p= 0.001, η² = 0.16). In line with previous research 
consolidation increased across trial. There was a borderline significant main effect of 
age on ITC (F (1, 40) = 3.933, p = 0.054, η² = 0.09). The marginal means indicated that 
the younger participants had a mean consolidation score which was 8.98% higher than 
older adults. There was no significant main effect of AoA on ITC (F = 1.313). For this 
dependant variable, there were no significant two-way interactions between either AoA 
and age (F = 0.002), AoA and trial (F = 1.294) or trial and age (F = 0.703). 
Furthermore, there was no significant three-way interaction between all three factors on 
ITC (F = 1.404).  
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Figure 3.4. Mean intertrial recall (ITR) for younger and older adults studying 
early- and later-acquired words.  
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3.3.2.3 Intertrial Encoding (ITE) 
 
The analyses showed a significant main effect of trial on ITE (F (4, 160) = 23.412, p < 
0.001, η² = 0.369). As Figure 3.6 demonstrates encoding increased across trial for all 
participants. There was also a significant main effect of AoA on ITE (F (1, 40) = 6.689, 
p < 0.05, η² = 0.143), overall participants had a 7.87% higher encoding score for words 
which were acquired at an earlier age than words acquired later. There was no 
significant main effect of age of participants on ITE (F = 0.754). There was no 
significant two-way interaction between either AoA and age (F = 0.155), AoA and trial 
(F = 0.260) or trial and age (F =0.819) on ITE. There was a significant three-way 
interaction between all three factors on ITE (F (4, 160) = 3.015, p < 0.05, η² = 0.070). 
As shown in Figure 3.6 older adults encode early-acquired words at a greater rate across 
trial than later-acquired words. This enhanced encoding of early-acquired words over 
later-acquired words is not evident in younger adults.  
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Figure 3.5. Mean intertrial consolidation (ITC) for younger and older adults 
studying early- and later-acquired words.  
 -187- 
 
 
3.3.2.4 Savings Scores 
 
The results show no significant main effect of age on savings (F =2.592). However 
there was a significant main effect of AoA on savings (F (1, 40) = 5.878, p<0.05, η² = 
0.128). Marginal means indicate that earlier-acquired words savings scores were 27% 
higher than words acquired later in age. There was no significant interaction between 
AoA and age on savings scores (F =0.711).  
 
3.3.2.5 Item analysis  
 
As in Study Five, following by subject analysis an item analysis was carried out (see 
3.2.2.5 for details of the technique used). All the variables covered in 3.2.2.5 were 
calculated for the data in Study Six. The main motivation for this was to consider the 
confound of word frequency on the word factor (recall).  
 
Simple correlations of performance between groups showed that the recall of the older 
adult group strongly correlates with the recall of the younger adult group, r (60) = 
0
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Figure 3.6. Mean intertrial encoding (ITE) for younger and older adults studying 
early- and later-acquired words 
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0.478, p < 0.001. This suggests that, as in Study Five, the same words in Study Six were 
recalled by younger and older adults. Once again, the correlations for younger (r (60) = 
-0.627, p<0.001) and older adults (r (60) = -0.405, p = 0.001) indicated that items which 
were less well recalled on trial one had a steeper slope value. 
 
3.3.2.5.1   ANOVA results 
 
Analysis A: As in section 3.2.2.5 a 2 X 2 ANOVA compared recall performance for 
early- and later-acquired words for younger and older participants. There was a 
significant main effect of age on mean recall (F (1, 58) = 5.185, p < 0.05, η² = 0.081). 
However there was no significant main effect of AoA (F = 0.849) nor a significant 
interaction between AoA and age group (F = 1.401). This indicates that over the whole 
study there is no difference in the type of words participants recall (i.e. early- versus 
later-acquired words) and that there is no dissociation between the type of words 
younger and older participants recall. 
 
Analysis B: The factor of slope and age group was included in a 2 X 2 ANOVA to 
investigate whether younger and older participants acquired early- and later-acquired 
words at a different rate over the five trials. The results showed no significant main 
effect of age group on slope (F = 0.845). There was also no significant main effect of 
AoA on slope value (F = 0.003). Finally there was no significant two way interaction 
between age of participants and AoA on slope value (F = 2.461). The results indicate 
that the rate of recall across trials was not significantly different for early- or later-
acquired words. The results indicate that neither younger or older participants recall 
words at a different rate across the five trials. The result also indicates that there is no 
difference, between younger and older participants, in the rate that they recall words 
that differ in AoA. This was supported by the correlational analysis which showed that 
neither younger slope values or older slope values were significantly correlated with the 
AoA variable (both p > 0.25).  
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3.3.2.5.2   Regression analysis 
 
As mentioned in section 3.3.1.2, the factor of word frequency was unfortunately not 
controlled for in the stimulus list. Therefore for completeness a regression analysis was 
used to investigate the impact of different stimulus characteristics on both total recall 
and slope in younger and older participants. The results showed no significant effect of 
any stimulus characteristics on either total mean recall or slope value in younger or 
older participants.  
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
 
The results did not show that older adults have an encoding deficit during the initial five 
trials. This is not supportive of Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) or Study Five, 
furthermore it is not supportive of Mitrushina et al. (1991) who found a significant 
deficit in encoding and not in consolidation. Furthermore the results did not show an 
age-related deficit in retention/retrieval as measured by the savings score. However the 
results confirmed that older adults had a significantly greater deficit in recall and 
consolidation than younger adults which supports the findings in Study Five and 
Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996). It is possible that the extra study and recall time that 
older adults received reduced the scale of the differences in the episodic memory of the 
older adults compared to the younger adults (e.g. Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2003).  
 
Unlike Dewhurst et al. (1998) the results showed a significant effect of AoA on recall, 
in that early-acquired words had a recall advantage over later-acquired words. This 
supports the view of a number of researchers (e.g. Li, 2009; Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 
2005; Ellis & Lambon-Ralph, 2000) that earlier-acquired words are stored in more 
interconnected cognitive representations than later-acquired words. This is similar to the 
inter-item association theory of word frequency as proposed by Tan & Ward (2000). 
The view that early-acquired words are stored in more interconnected cognitive 
representations than later-acquired words is supported by reading and naming latency 
studies which show that early-acquired words are read (and therefore accessed) faster 
than later-acquired words (e.g. Morrison et al., 2002).  
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Previous studies such as Dewhurst et al. (1998), Coltheart & Winograd (1986) and 
Morris (1981) have not shown a recall advantage of early- over later-acquired words. 
However, this is probably due to a number of methodological differences between 
previous research and the current study (Study Six). First, Dewhurst et al‘s (1998) 
classification of early-acquired words did not match those used in reading and naming 
latency studies. For example, Catling & Johnston (2009) suggest that studies which 
investigate AoA in memory and reading/naming latencies need to be matched on the 
basis of stimulus used. Therefore Study Six attempted to match the classification of 
early-acquired words to those used in naming and reading latency studies (e.g. Morrison 
et al., 2002).  
 
Second, all three studies which investigated AoA and recall used a classification of 
AoA which was based on adults‘ estimation of when they would have learnt such words 
(e.g. Gilhooly & Logie, 1980). This has been criticised as  potentially unreliable and 
subjective (e.g. Boning et al., 2009; Johnston & Barry, 2006; Zevin & Seidenberg, 
2002), thus this study used AoA measures which were devised from children‘s average 
age of being able to name pictures (Morrison et al., 1997), which are arguably more 
objective. Finally, the use of nouns, verbs and abstract concepts in the stimulus of 
Dewhurst et al‘s (1998) study may have masked the effect of AoA on recall. Elman 
(2009) and Li (2009) have demonstrated that nouns are stored in different cognitive 
structures to other types of words such as verbs and abstract concepts. Furthermore 
Gentner (1982) stated that English speaking children acquire nouns before other types 
of words. Therefore an AoA effect on recall is more likely to be apparent in nouns than 
other word types.  
The results indicated that the recall advantage of early- compared to later-acquired 
words was due to an encoding superiority of early-acquired words. There was no 
evidence that words which differed in terms of AoA were consolidated differently. 
Therefore, there was a dissociation between the memory processes which produced age-
related differences in recall (i.e. consolidation) and the memory processes which 
produced the recall differences between early- and later-acquired words (i.e. encoding). 
However, the item analysis did not support the ANOVA and did not show that older 
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adults acquired early- and later-acquired words at a different rate compared to younger 
adults. It is noteworthy that the results also showed an advantage of early- over later-
acquired words on the savings scores, which suggest that early-acquired words are 
retained/retrieved better than later-acquired words.  This is interesting, because previous 
research has suggested that savings scores can be viewed as a further measurement of 
consolidation, but these results indicate that savings scores are measuring a different 
cognitive process, which appears to be related to retrieval (e.g. Woodard et al., 1999).  
 
Neither the recall, consolidation nor savings scores provide evidence for the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis. That is, for all three measures there was no significant dissociation 
between younger and older adults when learning early- and later-acquired words. 
However, the encoding measure showed a dissociation, across trial, between younger 
and older adults learning words which differed in terms of AoA. There was no evidence 
that younger adults encoded early- and later-acquired words at a different rate across the 
study. However, it was evident that older adults encoded earlier-acquired words at a 
greater rate (across the five initials trials) than later-acquired words. Furthermore, it was 
apparent that older adults encoded earlier-acquired words at a greater rate than younger 
participants; there was no evidence for this with regards to later-acquired words. 
Therefore, in support of the cognitive reserve hypothesis, the results showed that early 
life experiences can preserve the encoding process in older adults.
16
 Although, it must 
be noted that such experiences do not appear to benefit consolidation, retrieval or 
overall recall in older adults compared to younger adults. 
 
In conclusion, the results show that younger adults recall and consolidate significantly 
more words than older adults. However, there is no evidence for an age-related deficit 
in either encoding or retention/retrieval. The results support the theory that early-
acquired words are stored as more interconnected cognitive representations than later-
acquired words due to the fact that an overall recall advantage of early- over later-
acquired words was found. This recall advantage appears to be because of enhanced 
encoding of early-acquired words. Although there is no evidence of a difference in 
consolidation of early- and later-acquired words there is a difference in the long-term 
                                               
16 However this was not supported when using item analysis to analyse the data. 
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retrieval/retention of such words in that early-acquired words are retained/retrieved 
significantly better than later-acquired words. The cognitive reserve hypothesis is not 
supported with the constructs of overall recall, consolidation or retrieval/retention. 
However, there is evidence that earlier experiences can protect the process of encoding 
from cognitive atrophy, associated with healthy aging. This is apparent due to the fact 
that older adults encode early-acquired words at a greater rate (across the initial five 
trials of the study) than younger adults and that this pattern is not repeated for later-
acquired words.  
 
3.4  General Discussion 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of the results of Study Five (word frequency) 
  Recall Consolidation Encoding Savings Score 
Age main 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Word 
frequency main 
effect 
Yes No Yes No 
Age X word 
frequency 
interaction 
No No No No 
Age X word 
frequency X 
trial interaction 
Yes No No No 
 
The aim of Studies Five and Six was to manipulate stimulus characteristics to produce 
an analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis while using a within subjects technique. 
Study Five manipulated the word frequency of to-be-remembered words while Study 
Six manipulated the AoA of such words. Each study measured the recall, consolidation, 
encoding and savings scores (retention/retrieval) for each word type in younger and 
older adults. Support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis would require older adults to 
show better learning of high-frequency (compared to low-frequency) and/or early-
acquired (compared to alter acquired) words, which was not evident in younger adults. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide a summary of the results for Studies Five and Six 
respectively.  
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Table 3.3 Summary of the results of Study Six (AoA) 
  Recall Consolidation Encoding Savings Score 
Age main 
effect 
Yes Yes No No 
AoA main 
effect 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Age X AoA 
interaction 
No No No No 
Age X AoA X 
trial interaction 
No No Yes No 
 
3.4.1 The effect of age on constructs of episodic memory. 
 
Both Studies Five and Six confirmed an age-related deficit in episodic memory, 
particularly in recall. This is supportive of a large number of theories and studies which 
have shown that older adults display a deficit in episodic memory (e.g. Craik, 1977). 
The use of the intertrial technique enables the exploration of the effects of 
consolidation, encoding and retention/retrieval (i.e. savings scores) in younger and older 
adults. In line with Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) Study Five confirmed that older adults 
showed problems with both encoding and consolidation. This is supportive of previous 
research which has suggested that the recall deficit of episodic memory is due to a 
reduction in both encoding and consolidation capabilities (e.g. Bleeker et al., 1988). 
However, unlike Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) there was no evidence of age deficits in 
longer term retention/retrieval. That is, there was no difference in the number of words 
younger and older participants recall as a proportion of the last trial when testing one 
week later. Therefore, the results suggest that longer term retrieval/retention is intact in 
older adults.  
 
Study Six confirmed that older adults showed a lower level of consolidation compared 
to younger adults. However, there was no evidence of an age-related encoding deficit of 
episodic memory. Neither younger nor older participants showed a significantly 
different level of encoding across the study period. This is contrary to Mitrushina et al. 
(1991) who used a multi-trial technique and found evidence of an encoding shortfall in 
older adults compared to younger adults. Mitrushina et al. (1991) concluded that age-
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related decline in memory was due to encoding deficits rather than consolidation or 
retrieval deficits. However, it must be acknowledged that the age range in Mitrushina et 
al. (1991) was markedly less than the age range in Study Six and in Dunlosky & 
Salthouse (1996), which also showed a consolidation deficit in older adults.
17
 
Furthermore, Mitrushina et al. (1991) did not calculate gained and lost access as 
percentages, therefore scaling effects may have masked actual age effects in 
consolidation. Study Six also confirms the findings of Study Five in that there was no 
evidence of age differences in long-term retention/retrieval.  
 
In summary, the results confirm that there is a deficit in episodic memory for older 
adults compared to younger adults. Compared to Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) and 
Mitrushina et al. (1991) Studies Five and Six used an extended study list, distracter task 
prior to recall and the random presentation of to-be-remembered words in study lists. 
These controls restricted the construct to episodic memory, to achieve the aim to match 
the most common reported age deficit in memory and ensure the analogy of the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis was preserved.  
 
3.4.2 The effects of stimulus characteristics on episodic memory 
 
As reported in Section 4.1.4 there is evidence for a recall advantage of high-frequency 
over low-frequency words when using a pure-list study technique (e.g. Ward et al., 
2003; Watkins et al., 2000; Tan & Ward, 2000). However, there was no evidence of a 
recall advantage of early- over later-acquired words in previous research (e.g. Dewhurst 
et al., 1998; Coltheart & Winograd, 1986; Morris, 1981). Study Five and Study Six 
provided evidence of a recall advantage of high- over low-frequency words and early- 
over late frequency words when recall was restricted to episodic memory. 
 
The results of Study Five support the inter-item association theory of the word 
frequency advantage in recall (e.g. Tan & Ward, 2000). The results also support the 
view of Sumby (1963) who believed that the recall effect of word frequency should be 
                                               
17 The age range of the sample population in Mitrushina et al. (1991) was 57 to 85 years, compared to 18 
to 94 in Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996), which closely matched the age range in Studies Fives and Six. 
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greatly apparent on episodic memory. As higher frequency words are read and 
processed faster than low-frequency words (e.g. Barry, Morrison & Ellis, 1997) it was 
important to control for study time during the learning stage. This meant that both word 
types received an equal amount of processing time and reduced the possibility that high-
frequency words received less study time (e.g. Watkins et al., 2000). Furthermore, the 
inter-item association is supported by using an extended study list which means that 
there are more available inter-item associations for high-frequency, compared to low-
frequency words. This has been highlighted as a problem in previous research which 
have compared a pure and mixed-list technique (e.g. Ward et al., 2003).  
 
The inter-item association theory of word frequency can be transferred to the 
investigation of AoA and recall. Connectionist models have demonstrated that earlier-
acquired words are stored in more interconnected networks than later-acquired words 
(e.g. Li, 2009; Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005; Ellis & Lambon-Ralph, 2002), so 
activation of one early-acquired word is likely to trigger words which are closely 
associated with that word, that is other early-acquired words (e.g. Elman, 2009). Due to 
the fact that later-acquired words are believed to be stored in less interconnected 
networks (e.g. Li, 2009), activation of a later-acquired word is likely to trigger 
activation of fewer later-acquired words (in comparison to the initial activation of an 
early-acquired word). The results of Study Six support this view due to the fact that 
there was a significant recall advantage of early-acquired words over later-acquired 
words.  
 
The results from Study Six do not support previous research which has investigated the 
effects of AoA on recall (e.g. Dewhurst et al., 1998). A number of researchers (e.g. 
Johnston & Barry, 2006; Zevin & Seidenberg, 2002) have criticised the classification of 
early-acquired words in Dewhurst et al. (1998). The AoA of early-acquired words in 
studies which have investigated the effect of AoA on memory (e.g. Dewhurst et al., 
1998; Coltheart & Winograd, 1986; Morris, 1981) are unrepresentative of the 
classification used in studies which have investigated reading and naming latencies (e.g. 
Morrison et al., 2002; Morrison & Ellis, 2000). Therefore, the words which were 
deemed to represent early-acquired words in research conducted by Dewhurst et al. 
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(1998), Coltheart & Winograd (1986) and Morris (1981) were not acquired at the same 
age as the early-acquired words used in studies which investigated naming or reading 
latencies (e.g. Morrison et al., 2002; Morrison et al., 1997). This important, because 
connectionist models (e.g. Li, 2009) suggest that it is the very early-acquired words 
which demonstrate the heightened interconnectivity with one another.  
 
Furthermore, Dewhurst et al. (1998) and Morris (1981) have used AoA ratings which 
have been taken from adults estimations of what age they believe they learnt such words 
(e.g. Gilhooly & Logie, 1980). This is subjective and potentially unreliable according to 
Zevin & Seidenberg (2002); therefore it is arguably more objective to use ratings of 
mean ages of when children are able to name pictures of concrete nouns (i.e. Morrison 
et al., 1997).  
 
The result of Studies Five and Six also supports the theories of Coltheart & Winograd 
(1986). Coltheart & Winograd (1986) believed that imageability had a larger impact on 
episodic memory than AoA. Item analysis showed that imageability had a larger impact 
than AoA in Study Five. However, neither AoA nor imageability had a significant 
effect on recall in Study Six. Overall the results indicate that imageability has an equal, 
if not larger effect on recall than AoA. 
 
It must also be acknowledged that some previous research (e.g. Ward et al., 2003; 
Dewhurst et al., 1998) which has investigated the effect of word frequency or AoA has 
also tended to use a mixture of concrete nouns, abstract concepts (e.g. the word 
‗justice‘) adjectives, and verbs in the to-be-remembered word list. There is evidence 
that nouns are stored differently to other word types (e.g. Federmeier, Segal, Lambrozo 
& Kutas, 2000).  This is also supported by connectionist models (e.g. Li, 2009) which 
have shown that nouns are acquired earlier than other types of words and that early-
acquired nouns are therefore stored in tighter interconnected networks than words 
acquired later in life. This means that it is likely that the learning and retrieval of 
different word types will not be identical. For this reason, Studies Five and Six 
restricted the to-be-remembered word lists to contain only concrete nouns, to remove 
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the confound of other aspects of stimulus characteristics (i.e. type of word) and focus on 
the impact of word frequency and AoA.  
 
Studies Five and Six used an intertrial technique to investigate the consolidation, 
encoding and retention/retrieval of words that differ in word frequency and AoA. This 
technique has not been used to date and can indicate which cognitive construct is 
responsible for the recall advantage of high frequency and early-acquired words. Both 
Studies Five and Six suggest that the recall advantage of words which differ in terms of 
stimulus characteristics is due to a benefit in encoding and not consolidation. With 
regards to word frequency, this supports the view of Balota & Neely (1980) and 
DeLosh & McDaniel (1996) who argued that high-frequency words are encoded more 
efficiently than low-frequency words.
18
 The results are also in contrast to early research 
by Postman (1970) who stated that the word frequency effect, in free recall, was due to 
superior consolidation of high- over low-frequency words. However, it is likely that 
Postman (1970) did not find an effect on encoding of word frequency because gained 
access (representing encoding, see section 3.2.1.3) was not calculated, even though a 
multi-trial technique was used.  
 
It is interesting to note that there was no evidence that high- or low-frequency words 
were retained/retrieved differently. However, the results from Study Six showed that 
early-acquired words were retained/retrieved (as measured by savings scores) 
significantly better than later-acquired words. This suggests that there is a difference in 
terms of the cognitive constructs of consolidation (lost access, see section 3.2.1.3) and 
retention/retrieval (savings scores). The results did not show that stimulus 
characteristics affected consolidation of to-be-remembered words; however Study Six 
showed that stimulus characteristics (i.e. AoA) had a significant impact on the long-
term retention/retrieval of to-be-remembered words. Once again, this raises doubts over 
the conclusions of Coltheart & Winograd (1986) with regards to the impact of AoA on 
episodic memory.  
                                               
18
 DeLosh & McDaniels (1996) showed superior recall of high-frequency over low-frequency words and 
Balota & Neely (1980) showed that participants recalled more high-frequency than low-frequency words 
when expecting a recall and not a recognition test. The authors attribute this to superior encoding of high- 
compared to low-frequency words. 
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Both Studies Five and Six used item analysis to investigate the effects and potential 
confounds of stimulus characteristics on recall over the five initial trials. It is interesting 
that the analysis in both studies produced contrasting results; Study Five indicated that 
word frequency (particularly spoken), AoA and imageability all have a significant 
impact on recall across the five trials. The results of Study Six, however, did not 
confirm that any of the stimulus characteristics taken into account have any significant 
influence on recall over the five trials. Although Study Five indicated that word 
frequency had a larger impact on recall than AoA, which is contrary to the prediction of 
Carroll & White (1973), the results demonstrate how the effects of stimulus 
characteristics can have a large impact on the recall of words. Therefore it is important 
that future research takes stimulus characteristics into account when studying aspects of 
episodic memory.  
 
In conclusion, the results support the view that high-frequency and early-acquired 
words are stored in more interconnected cognitive networks than low-frequency and 
later-acquired words respectively. The methodological design used for Studies Five and 
Six means that the results support the view of the inter-item association theory of recall 
and word frequency. This theory can also be extended to the effect of AoA on recall. 
The benefit of using an intertrial technique is that the results indicated that the recall 
advantage of high-frequency and early-acquired words over low-frequency and later-
acquired words, is due to an encoding benefit and not a consolidation benefit. This has 
not been investigated in previous research and has support from the item analysis used 
in Study Five which suggests effects of both word frequency and AoA on the 
acquisition of words. This can be regarded as opposite to the effect of age on episodic 
memory because there was a clear benefit of consolidation for younger adults compared 
to older adults whereas the age-related effect on encoding was not evident in Study Six. 
The results also suggest that savings scores represent a different construct to 
consolidation (lost access, section 3.2.1.3). There was no evidence that word frequency 
affects long-term retention/retrieval however there was evidence that AoA affects this 
construct. This supports the view of Brysbaert & Ghyselinck (2006) and Morrison et al. 
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(2002) in that AoA and word frequency can have independent impacts on 
reading/naming latencies, and thus episodic memory.  
 
3.4.3 Evidence for the cognitive reserve hypothesis 
 
In brief, to produce evidence for the cognitive reserve hypothesis the results of Studies 
Five or Six would have to show a dissociation, in terms of learning, for words which 
differ in terms of either word frequency or AoA between younger and older adults. 
Specifically, older adults, compared to younger adults, should show enhanced recall, 
encoding, consolidation and/or retrieval/retention of high-frequency and/or early-
acquired words compared to low-frequency and/or later-acquired words respectively. 
According to the cognitive reserve hypothesis this is due to the theory that cognitive 
atrophy should show a larger effect on cognitive representations which are not as 
interconnected (i.e. low-frequency and later-acquired words) than those which have a 
greater number of inter-item association (i.e. high-frequency and early-acquired words). 
 
Study Five showed compelling support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis; there was a 
significant three way interaction between age group, word frequency and trial. The 
results showed that older adults recalled high-frequency words at a greater rate across 
the initial five trials compared to low-frequency words. This difference in rate of recall 
across the five initial trials between high- and low-frequency words was not evident in 
the younger participants. This result suggests that the regular activation of high-
frequency compared to low-frequency words across the lifespan produces a produces 
protection against cognitive atrophy associated with healthy aging. This support for the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis can be endorsed due to the fact that a within–subjects 
technique was used, which removed the impact of demographic factors which may have 
confounded previous research, which investigated cognitive reserve hypothesis using a 
between-subjects technique.  
 
The support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis was also apparent with the item 
analysis results in Study Five. The results showed that word frequency (specifically 
spoken word frequency) had a significant influence on the rate at which older adults 
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acquire words over the five trials. However, no stimulus characteristics significantly 
accounted for the variance of words acquired by younger adults over the study period. 
This supports the ANOVA result in that high-frequency words appear to be gained at a 
greater rate than low-frequency words in the older adult sample population but not in 
the younger adult sample population.  
 
The result of Study Five also indicated that healthy aging affected both consolidation 
and encoding of words in episodic memory (but not retention/retrieval). However, there 
was only evidence that word frequency affected the encoding of words (i.e. not 
consolidation or retention/retrieval). The intertrial technique did not indicate whether 
the protective influence of word frequency benefitted encoding or consolidation of 
high- compared to low-frequency words in older adults. It is possible that with a larger 
sample population the influence of word frequency on encoding and/or consolidation in 
older adults will become evident.  
 
The results from Study Six did not show a dissociation, in terms of recall, consolidation 
or retention/retrieval of words which differ in AoA between younger and older adults. 
This was also the case when the impact of trial was taken into account (see table 3.3). 
This indicates that there is no evidence for the cognitive reserve hypothesis in the 
constructs of recall, consolidation and retention/retrieval when using a manipulation of 
AoA of the to-be-remembered words with a within-subject technique. However, there 
was evidence that older adults encoded early-acquired words at a greater rate across 
trial than later-acquired words. This dissociation was not apparent in younger adults. 
This can be taken as support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis within the cognitive 
construct of encoding. Previous research has shown that healthy aging produces deficits 
in encoding (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse 1996) and the results from Study Six indicate 
that early life experiences can protect this construct from the effects of healthy aging. 
However, it must be acknowledged that even though early life experiences appear to 
benefit encoding in later life there is no evidence that these experiences protect overall 
recall from cognitive atrophy caused by healthy aging. Furthermore, item analysis did 
not produce support for the ANOVA data, that is, AoA did not appear to influence the 
acquisition of words across the five trials and this was also the case for younger adults. 
 -201- 
 
In summary, there was strong evidence from Study Five that activating a cognitive 
representation on a regular basis than a similar cognitive representation (i.e. a high- vs. 
low-frequency word) protects this construct from cognitive atrophy associated with 
healthy aging. This was shown to be the case with both subject analysis and item 
analysis, but only for the construct of recall. Study Six indicated that cognitive 
representations which are acquired earlier in life are protected from cognitive atrophy 
which affects the construct of encoding compared to cognitive representation acquired 
later in life (i.e. an early- vs. later-acquired word). Although it must be acknowledged 
that this was only evidenced with subject analysis and not item analysis. Furthermore, 
this apparent benefit in encoding of early- compared to later-acquired words did not 
show that early-acquired words were protected from cognitive atrophy when one 
measured overall recall, consolidation or long-term retention/retrieval compared to 
later-acquired words. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is strong evidence for the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis when controlling for demographic factors by using a 
within-subjects technique.  
 
3.4.4 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the results from Studies Five and Six confirm that older adults recall 
significantly fewer words when using the episodic memory system compared to 
younger adults. The results indicate that this age-related decline in episodic memory is 
largely due to a consolidation deficit in older adults. There is no evidence of an age-
related shortfall in retention/retrieval over longer periods of time. The results also show 
that stimulus characteristics produce differences in recall of to-be-remembered words 
which can be attributed to superior encoding of certain word types. Specifically, the 
results show that high-frequency and early-acquired words are encoded and recalled 
significantly more efficiently than low-frequency and later-acquired words. This 
supports the view of Tan & Ward (2000) and Ellis & Lambon-Ralph (2000) that high-
frequency and early-acquired words are stored in more interconnected cognitive 
representations/networks than low-frequency and later-acquired words respectively. The 
results do not show support for Dewhurst et al. (1998) who found that later-acquired 
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words were recalled more than early-acquired words. However, this is probably because 
of the stimuli and methodology used by Dewhurst et al. (1998) and not an accurate 
representation of the effect of AoA on recall. 
 
There was good support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis from the results of Study 
Five. That is, across the five initial trials older adults showed a greater rate of recall of 
high-frequency compared to low-frequency words, whereas the rate of recall of high- 
and low-frequency words in younger adults was not significantly different. This 
suggests that regular activation of a cognitive representation (i.e. high-frequency words) 
protects such cognitive representations from cognitive atrophy associated with healthy 
aging. This is supportive of previous research (e.g. Forbes-McKay et al. 2005; Taylor, 
1998) which shows that in verbal fluency tasks older adults tend to produce more early-
acquired and high-frequency words than late-acquired and low-frequency words. 
Unfortunately the intertrial technique did not illuminate whether the protective 
influence of word frequency benefitted the encoding or consolidation system of 
episodic memory in older adults. Study Six also produced support for the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis. The results showed that whereas younger adults did not encode 
early- or later-acquired words at a different rate across the study period, older adults 
showed a greater rate of encoding for early- compared to later-acquired words across 
the initial five trials. Once again, this provides some support for the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis, however the encoding benefit of early- over later-acquired words in older 
adults did not appear to benefit overall recall of such words. Overall, the within-subjects 
approach has provided good support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis by eliminating 
the mediating effects of demographic factors. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4 TESTING THE USE-DEPENDENCY THEORY: THE EFFECT OF 
POPULARITY ON RECALL, ENCODING AND CONSOLIDATION OF PROPER 
NAMES IN YOUNGER AND OLDER ADULTS 
 
4.1 Background 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 
The use-it-or-lose-it theory can be separated into the cognitive reserve hypothesis and 
the use-dependency theory. Previous research has used a number of different 
methodological techniques to investigate both theories (See Chapter One for a review). 
However, there still are a number of questions regarding whether techniques which 
have been used to provide evidence of both theories are appropriate (e.g. Shadish et al., 
2002). For example, numerous studies have used a self-report technique to measure 
cognitive activity (e.g. Wilson et al., 2003). Furthermore some research has used self-
report measures of cognitive functioning as outcome measures (e.g. Wilson et al., 
2005). This is true for questionnaire studies (as investigated in Studies One, Two, 
Three, Four and Four (a), see Chapter Two) and intervention techniques which have 
investigated the effects of training on MemSE (e.g. West et al., 2008; Study Eight, see 
Chapter Five). It can be argued that self-report measures of activity and self-report 
measures of cognitive functioning (e.g. MemSE) are unreliable (e.g. Rabbitt et al., 
1995; Sunderland et al., 1986). 
 
Of particular interests for the present study is the use of a between-subjects technique in 
previous research to investigate the use-dependency theory. Chapter One has reviewed 
previous research and the majority of cross-sectional and longitudinal studies which 
have investigated the use-dependency theory have employed a between-subject 
technique. Typically, this will involve comparing two groups of participants, one who 
are relatively cognitively active and one who are relatively cognitively inactive (e.g. 
Verghese et al., 2003; Hultsch et al., 1999). The problem with using a between-subjects 
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technique is that it is impossible to account for all the variance associated with 
comparing one individual to another. As discussed by Shadish et al. (2002), it is 
possible that there is a demographic factor which mediates both cognitive activity and 
cognitive functioning. Therefore a within-subjects technique is needed to eliminate the 
effects of individual differences when investigating the use-dependency theory. 
 
Chapter Three used a within-subjects technique to investigate the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis. This involved manipulating stimulus characteristics of to-be-remembered 
words to produce an analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis. Here a study is 
presented which aimed to replicate the use-dependency theory by manipulating stimulus 
characteristics of to-be-remembered words. One set of stimulus material where such a 
pattern can be observed is proper names. The cognitive construct of learning proper 
names is an ideal area to research the use-dependency theory. This is due to the fact that 
older adults report a significant memory deficit for proper names (e.g. Reese & Cherry, 
2004) and that empirical research has shown that older adults, compared to younger 
adults, display a greater learning deficit for proper names as opposed to concrete nouns 
(e.g. James, 2004). A logical continuum of this would predict that an increase in 
cognitive activity (i.e. a maintenance of popularity versus a decrease in popularity) in 
later life of certain proper names would increase the likelihood of such names being 
easier to relearn when encountered again.  
 
4.1.2 Using recall of proper names as an analogy of the use-dependency theory 
 
Chapter Three has explained the rationale of manipulating stimulus characteristics to 
produce an analogy of either the cognitive reserve hypothesis or use-dependency theory 
(see section 3.1.3). Briefly, for an analogy of the use-dependency theory participants 
must study words which have been matched for popularity and then half of these words 
must have shown a decrease in popularity, specifically for older adults. The reason for 
this is to produce use-dependency-like results, using a within-subjects design, there 
must be a decrease in cognitive activity in one part of a cognitive construct (i.e. proper 
names) while another part of the same construct remains to be activated frequently 
(even though both must have been matched on the basis of activity at an earlier point in 
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time). This is similar to the Node Structure Theory (NST; e.g. Cohen & Burke, 1993; 
MacKay, 1987), which describes how, in theory, older adults should find it easier to 
learn popular names compared to unpopular names. The NST states that names which 
are more popular will have a greater number of cognitive representations (representing 
semantic, episodic, visual and phonological information about people with that specific 
name) compared to names which are relatively unpopular (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007).  
 
4.1.3 Research into proper name recall and aging 
 
Subjective evidence has indicated that older adults report an increase in difficulty for 
recalling people‘s first name (e.g. Reese & Cherry, 2004).  This has been supported by 
objective measures of proper name recall across the lifespan (e.g. James & Fogler, 
2007; James, 2004; Crook & West, 1990; Cohen & Faulkner, 1986). A prominent 
theory, the NST (e.g. Cohen & Burke, 1993) proposes that this is because names, 
compared to other nouns, are not activated (in terms of their cognitive representations) 
as often as other nouns. Therefore the cognitive atrophy, associated with healthy and 
pathological aging, is more likely to affect proper names than other nouns that are more 
frequently activated.  
 
Taking the NST further researchers have investigated whether popular names are 
recalled more often than less popular names. The majority of research has confirmed 
that popular names are easier to recall when presented in pure-lists compared to less 
popular names (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007). The research also suggests that there is a 
recall advantage for popular, over unpopular names, when the names are presented in 
mixed-lists, providing that the lists contain an equal number of popular versus 
unpopular names (e.g. Valentine & Moore, 1995). 
 
Therefore, it would be logical to predict that older adults should show a recall 
advantage for popular over unpopular names. This was investigated by Jones & Rabbitt 
(1994) who tested participants who were either aged sixty to seventy years old or over 
seventy years old. The results confirmed that older adults showed a recall deficit for 
name learning; however there was no dissociation, in terms of recall, between popular 
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and unpopular names between the two age groups. It is possible that this was due to the 
use of first name and surname pairs to produce a cued recall test. It is also likely that 
there was an insufficient difference, in terms of age, between the two sample 
populations. Experiments which have investigated the effects of aging on memory have 
generally compared younger adults (aged under 40 years old) and older adults (aged 
over 60 years old), for example Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996). 
 
James & Fogler (2007) also investigated the effect of age and name popularity on recall. 
Once again a cued recall technique was used whereby participants had to learn face-
name pairs and recall the name of the person when presented with the face. Both 
younger and two groups of older adults (one group aged 65-74, and another group aged 
over 74 years old) recalled significantly more popular surnames than unpopular 
surnames. However the magnitude of the recall advantage of popular over unpopular 
names was not significantly greater in older adults, that is, there was no interaction 
between age group and name popularity. There could be two reasons for a lack of a 
dissociation; first the study did not focus solely on episodic memory. Research has 
shown that the recall of names has a larger impact on episodic memory compared to 
primary/short-term memory for older adults (Semenza et al., 1996). Second, Jones & 
Rabbitt (1994) demonstrate that older adults show a significantly greater recall deficit 
for first names as opposed to surnames. James & Fogler (2007) used surnames, so the 
potential magnitude of the affect of popularity on recall for older adults may have been 
attenuated.  
 
Research has also investigated whether age deficits in name recall can be reversed by 
using different mnemonic techniques. Yesavage, Rose & Bower (1983) demonstrated 
that age-related deficits in name recall were significantly reduced when older adults 
used semantic processing when studying to-be-remembered names. Recently, Troyer, 
Halfiger, Cadieux & Craik (2006) showed that older adults show a significant 
improvement in name recall when study techniques employ the levels of processing 
(LOP) philosophy. The results of Troyer et al. (2006) support those of Yesavage et al. 
(1983) in that name recall significantly increased when participants processed the name 
at a deeper, more semantic, LOP. Furthermore, Troyer et al. (2006) showed that 
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participants show an increase in name recall when they use an intentional learning 
technique as opposed to a semantic incidental study technique
19
. This is relevant to the 
present study because the results show that an increase in cognitive activity (i.e. a 
deeper LOP) results in improved recall for names. This is similar to the natural 
phenomenon of changes in popularity of such names. 
 
In summary, previous research has indicated that older adults show a recall deficit for 
proper names, compared to younger adults, to a greater degree than other words such as 
common nouns (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007). Furthermore the research has indicated that 
popular names are easier to recall than unpopular names (e.g. Valentine & Moore, 
1995). Intervention techniques have shown that both younger and older adults recall a 
greater number of names when they process the names at a deeper, more semantic, level 
(e.g. Troyer et al., 2006). However the results are inconclusive as to whether older 
adults display a greater deficit for recalling unpopular names versus popular names (e.g. 
Jones & Rabbitt, 1994).   
 
4.1.4 Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of Study Seven was to produce an analogy of the use-dependency theory using 
a within-subjects technique. The stimulus characteristics were first names and were 
manipulated on the basis of popularity (i.e. the number of babies registered with a 
specific name in a specific year). First names were chosen due to the fact that older 
adults appear to show a greater deficit in recall for first names, compared to surnames, 
than younger adults (Jones & Rabbitt, 1994).  
 
An analogy of the use-dependency theory dictates that cognitive representations (e.g. 
first names) that have been activated more often in later life will show less cognitive 
atrophy than cognitive representations that have been activated to a lesser degree in 
later life (even though both were activated to the same high level earlier in life). For this 
reason a free recall task must be used, therefore the study utilised a list of names as 
                                               
19 However, the results indicated that the intentional learning technique had a greater affect on younger 
adults compared to older adults when studying lists of surnames.  
 
 -208- 
opposed to face-name learning. This is because the use-dependency theory predicts that 
representations which are activated more often (e.g. the first name Thomas) will have 
more interconnected cognitive/neuronal networks than representations that have been 
activated less frequently (e.g. the first name Nigel). Therefore, face-name associations 
were not used due to the fact that the popular cognitive representation of names should 
activate similar representations which are more closely associated with one another 
compared to less popular cognitive representations. To clarify, if participants were 
presented with the name Thomas, according to the NST, all cognitive representations 
associated with that first name should be activated. Thus, when encountering a popular 
name (e.g. Thomas) there should be a greater degree of activation across 
cognitive/neuronal networks than when a less popular name is encountered (e.g. Cohen 
& Burke, 1993).  
 
Semenza et al. (1996) showed that age-related deficits in recalling proper names have a 
greater impact on episodic memory than working memory; that is, older adults 
compared to younger adults, showed a greater primacy than recency deficit. However, 
no research has investigated whether the recall advantage of popular over unpopular 
names relies on an encoding or a consolidation difference between the names. 
Therefore, the study used a multi-trial technique which investigated whether the 
hypothesised age-related deficit in name recall was due to an encoding, consolidation or 
retrieval (measured by saving scores) deficit in older adults. Finally, it was theorised 
that, based on the NST, older adults should show a greater degree of difficulty (in terms 
of recall, encoding, consolidation and/or retrieval) for relearning unpopular names 
versus popular names compared to younger adults. 
 
4.2 Method 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
 
Two groups of participants were tested separated on the basis of age. The younger 
group consisted of 22 participants with a mean age of 21.68 (SD = 4.13). The older 
sample consisted of 27 participants with a mean age of 72 (SD = 6.51). The younger 
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sample population had a mean number of years in full time education of 15.18 (SD = 
1.71) compared to the older adults with a mean number of years education of 14.63 (SD 
= 4.38). There was no significant difference in terms of total number of years in 
education between the two groups (t = 0.557). All older adults undertook the mini-
mental state examination (Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975); all scored over 27/30 
indicating absence of cognitive impairment. All participants were native to England or 
Wales and gave informed consent.  
 
4.2.2 Stimuli 
 
Stimulus names were taken from Merry (1997) who provided the top 100 names in 
England and Wales between 1944 and 1994 in ranked order. Two pure-lists of 30 first 
names were created on the basis of popularity (popular versus unpopular). The popular 
name list consisted of first names which were ranked in the top 100 in both 1944 and 
1994 (e.g. Thomas, Catherine). The list of unpopular names consisted of first names 
which were ranked in the top 100 in 1944 but not in 1994 (e.g. Nigel, Veronica). Any 
name ranked outside of the top 100 in 1994 was assigned a ranking of 101 as actual 
rankings for these names were not available (see Appendix 8 for full stimuli lists). A 
third list of 30 names was used as a practise list. 
 
As ranked values were used in selection of stimuli the Wilcoxon rank sum 
nonparametric test was used. The results satisfied the analogy of the use-dependency 
theory, that is there was no significant difference between the popularity of names in 
both lists according to the 1944 data (W = 891.50). However there was a significant 
difference between the popular and unpopular names in terms of ranked popularity in 
1994 (W (1) = 465, Z = -7.112, p < 0.001). The names were matched on length 
(syllables) and there was no significant difference between the popular and unpopular 
lists (t = 0.417). Both experimental name lists contain an equal number of male (N = 
21) and female (N = 9) names. The name lists were presented on one sheet in size 24 
Arial font. Participants were required to rate each name on a scale of 1-7 for 
pleasantness. This was to ensure that participants pay attention to each study item 
(Feigenbaum & Simon, 1962). 
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4.2.3 Design and Procedure 
 
The design and procedure was identical to that in Studies Five and Six. Briefly, the 
study used a mixed design and the dependant variables included in the ANOVAs were 
intertrial recall, intertrial encoding, intertrial consolidation and retention/retrieval (as 
measured by saving scores). Older adults received 50% extra study and recall time (e.g. 
Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2003). All participants were exposed to the popular and 
unpopular lists of names on five consecutive occasions. After completing the rating of 
the name list the participants received a standard five figure distracter task before a free 
recall task. Participants were contacted one week later for the delayed recall task. 
Presentation of popular and unpopular names were counterbalanced and separated by 
one week.  
 
4.3 Results 
 
In brief, the aims of the study were threefold; first, to replicate previous research (e.g. 
James, 2004) which showed a recall advantage of popular over unpopular names. 
Second, to investigate whether this recall advantage was due to superior encoding, 
consolidation and/or retrieval of popular compared to unpopular names. Finally, to 
investigate the relationship between aging and the recall, encoding, consolidation and 
retrieval of names which differ in popularity. The third aim was also to produce use-
dependency-like results and show a dissociation for recall of popular compared to 
unpopular names between younger and older participants. As in Studies Five and Six, 
mixed ANOVAs were used to investigate the impact of age, name popularity and 
number of trials on recall, encoding, consolidation and retrieval.  
 
4.3.1 Intertrial Recall (ITR) 
 
A 2 X 5 X 2 (Age Group x Trial x Stimulus Characteristic i.e. name popularity) mixed 
ANOVA was used to investigate the impact of age, number of trials and name 
popularity on overall intertrial recall (ITR). As Figure 4.1 illustrates recall of names 
increased across the five immediate recall trials, this increase was confirmed to be 
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significant (F (4, 188) = 81.470, p < 0.001, η² = 0.634). There was also a significant 
main effect of name popularity on ITR (F (1, 47) = 13.659, p = 0.001, η² = 0.225). As 
apparent in Figure 4.1 there is a recall advantage for popular names over unpopular 
names. The marginal means show that participants recalled 12.68% more popular than 
unpopular names. However there was no significant main effect of age group on ITR (F 
= 0.184). Unlike previous research (e.g. Jones & Rabbitt, 1994) there was no evidence 
of an age-related recall deficit for first names when comparing older adults to younger 
adults (see Figure 4.1). The results also showed no age difference between incidental 
recall (from the results of the practise list when participants were not aware of the recall 
task which followed) due to the fact that there was no significant difference between 
younger and older adults for name recall on the practise list (t = 1.779).  
 
 
 
In line with previous research (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007, Jones & Rabbitt, 1994) there 
was no significant interaction between age group and name popularity on ITR (F = 
0.092). Furthermore there was no significant two-way interaction between trial and age 
group (F = 0.250) nor name popularity and trial (F = 0.317) on ITR. Furthermore there 
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Figure 4.1. Mean Intertrial Recall (ITR) for younger and older participants 
studying popular and unpopular names.  
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was no significant three-way interaction between age group, name popularity and trial 
on ITR (F = 1.108).  
 
In summary, the results showed no significant difference in terms of recall between 
younger and older adults, which does not support the results of Studies Five and Six. In 
line with Studies Five and Six, there was a significant main effect of stimulus 
characteristics on recall but no two-way interaction between age and stimulus 
characteristics. Supporting Study Six‘s results, there was no three-way interaction 
between all factors on recall, which was evident in Study Five.  
 
4.3.2 Intertrial encoding (ITE) 
 
Analysis for ITE used a 2 X 5 X 2 (Age Group X Trial X Stimulus Characteristic i.e. 
name popularity) ANOVA, as noted in Chapter Three an encoding score was calculated 
for the first trial. The results showed a significant main effect of trial on ITE (F (4, 188) 
= 8.085, p < 0.001, η² = 0.147). Figure 4.2 confirms that ITE increases across trials with 
exception of trials 1-2. There was a main effect of name popularity on ITE (F (1, 47) = 
7.504, p = 0.01, η² = 0.134). The marginal means show that ITE is 12.34% higher for 
popular compared to unpopular names. There was no significant main effect of age 
group on ITE (F = 0.056).  
 
There was no significant two-way interaction between either name popularity and age 
group (F = 0.69), age group and trial (F = 0.231) or name popularity and trial (F = 
0.426) on ITE. Furthermore there was no significant three-way interaction between all 
three factors on this dependent variable (F = 1.434).  
 
To summarise, the results showed no significant main effects of age group on encoding. 
This supports the results of Study Six but not those of Study Five which showed that 
older adults had a significant deficit in encoding. Similar to Studies Five and Six, the 
present Study showed a significant effect of stimulus characteristics on encoding, but no 
two-way interaction with age. Mirroring the results of Study Five but not Study Six, 
there was no significant three-way interaction on encoding. 
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4.3.3 Intertrial Consolidation (ITC) 
 
ITC analysis used a 2 X 4 X 2 (Age Group X Trial X Stimulus Characteristics i.e. name 
popularity) ANOVA. The results showed a significant main effect of name popularity 
on ITC (F (1, 47) = 4.778, p < 0.05, η² = 0.092). The marginal means indicate that 
popular names had a 5.67% higher consolidation score than unpopular names. There 
was also a significant main effect of trial on ITC (F (3, 141) = 6.123, p = 0.001, η² = 
0.115). As illustrated in Figure 4.3 ITC increased across trials. Once again there was no 
significant main effect of age group, younger adults did not show a significant higher 
ITC than older adults (F = 0.119). There was no significant two-way interaction 
between either name popularity and age group (F = 0.088), trial and age group (F = 
0.162) or name popularity and trial (F = 0.569) on ITC. Finally, there was no significant 
three-way interaction between all three factors on ITC (F = 0.459). 
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Figure 4.2. Mean Intertrial Encoding (ITE) for younger and older participants 
studying popular and unpopular names. 
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In summary, the results do not support those of Studies Five and Six, in that younger 
participants did not show a significantly higher consolidation score than older 
participants. Furthermore, unlike Studies Five and Six, the results showed a significant 
main effect of stimulus characteristics on consolidation. There was neither a significant 
two-way interaction between age group and stimulus characteristics nor a significant 
three-way interaction between all factors on consolidation, which mirrors the results of 
Studies Five and Six. 
 
4.3.4 Saving Scores 
 
In line with previous research (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996; Chapter Three) saving 
scored were calculated as a measure of retrieval using a 2 X 2 X 2 (Age Group X Trial 
X Stimulus Characteristics i.e. name popularity) ANOVA. The results show a 
significant main effect of name popularity on saving scores (F (1, 47) = 7.304, p < 
0.001, η² = 0.134). Marginal means confirm that there was a retrieval advantage of 
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Figure 4.3. Mean Intertrial Consolidation (ITC) for younger and older 
participants studying popular and unpopular names.  
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17.71% for popular over unpopular names. There was also a significant main effect on 
trial on saving scores (F (1, 47) = 184.064, p < 0.001, η² = 0.797). Participants recalled 
more names on the final trial compared to the delayed recall trial. There was no 
significant main effect of age group on saving scores (F = 0.013). Finally there were no 
significant two-way or three-way interactions between all factors on saving scores. 
Overall, the results mirror those of Studies Five and Six with the exception that a main 
effect of stimulus characteristics on saving scores was found in the present study. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
The aim of Study Seven was to produce an analogy of the use-dependency theory while 
using a within-subjects design. The study investigated recall, encoding, consolidation 
and retrieval/retention of popular and unpopular first names in younger and older adults. 
Previous studies have shown that older adults have a significant age-related deficit in 
recalling proper names (e.g. James 2004). This age-related deficit appears to be greater 
for first names as opposed to surnames (e.g. Jones & Rabbitt, 1994) and more apparent 
for episodic memory rather than working memory (e.g. Semenza et al., 1996). Support 
for the use-dependency theory requires a dissociation between younger and older adults 
for recall, encoding, consolidation or retrieval/retention of popular compared to 
unpopular names. Previous research has not produced a great deal of support for this; 
however this could be due to methodological techniques or sample populations used in 
previous research (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007; Jones & Rabbitt, 1994). A summary of 
the results are shown in Table 4.1. 
 
There was no indication that older adults showed a deficit in either recall, encoding, 
consolidation or retrieval/retention for first names. This does not support the majority of 
previous research which has shown that older adults are significantly poorer at recalling 
names than younger adults (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007; Troyer et al., 2006; James, 
2004; Jones & Rabbitt, 1994; Cohen & Faulkner, 1986). James & Fogler (2007) and 
Yesavage et al. (1983) suggested that name recall can be increased when participants 
use a deeper LOP. Although James & Fogler (2007) did not show that older adults 
benefit more from a deeper LOP it is possible that the rating technique used in the 
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current study reduced age differences in recall of names. Anecdotally older adults 
reported using more semantic association techniques when studying the words than 
younger adults (e.g. older participants reported using organisational techniques such as 
names of Royals to aid recall). It is also possible that the extra study and recall time that 
older adults received reduced the age-related deficit across all dependent variables. 
Although James & Fogler (2007) increased study and recall time for older adults, this 
was only the case during the face-name task and not the free recall task. Therefore as 
shown by Naveh-Benjamin, Hussain, Guez & Bar-On (2003) it is possible that age-
related deficits in episodic memory recall are due to effects of processing speed rather 
than deficits in encoding, consolidation or retrieval.    
 
Table 4.1 Summary of results of Study Seven 
 Recall Consolidation Encoding Savings Score 
Age main effect No No No No 
Name popularity 
main effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age X name 
popularity 
interaction 
No No No No 
Age X name 
popularity X trial 
interaction 
No No No No 
 
The results from James & Fogler (2007) also showed that there was an age difference 
for intentional compared to incidental learning of proper names. James & Fogler (2007) 
reported that younger adults appeared to recall more names when using intentional 
learning versus incidental learning compared to older adults. The results from Study 
Seven did not show any age deficit when participants were using incidental learning 
(i.e. on the practise list, when participants were not aware of the free recall test which 
followed). Therefore the results suggest that there is no age-related difference for 
intentional or incidental learning of first names and that age-related deficits in proper 
name recall evident in previous research may have been due to the fact that studies did 
not control for older adults decrease in processing speed. Finally the results also do not 
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show that age-related deficits in name recall are apparent in first names or episodic 
memory as suggested by Jones & Rabbitt (1994) and Semenza et al. (1996). 
 
As shown in Table 4.1 the results confirm a recall advantage of popular over unpopular 
proper names, which supports previous research (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007; Valentine 
& Moore, 1995). As suggested by the Node Structure Theory (NST; e.g. Cohen & 
Burke, 1993; MacKay, 1987) the results suggest that the increase activation of popular 
compared to unpopular names makes it easier for individuals to relearn popular names 
as opposed to unpopular names. Similar to the inter-item association theory of the recall 
advantage of high-frequency over low-frequency words (e.g. Watkins et al., 2003; Tan 
& Ward, 2000) it is likely that cognitive representations/neuronal networks of popular 
names are more closely associated with one another than representation of unpopular 
names. Furthermore due to the fact that cognitive representations of unpopular names, 
by definition, are not activated as frequently as those of popular names it is logical to 
assume that popular names will be easier to recall when relearned. No previous research 
has investigated whether this recall advantage is due to an encoding, consolidation or 
retrieval/retention benefit of the popular names. The results of Study Seven indicate that 
the effect of name popularity influences all three cognitive constructs; even though 
there are suggestions that popularity has a larger impact on encoding compared to 
consolidation (see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). 
 
The results from the present study casts doubt on previous studies which have shown an 
age deficit in name recall (e.g. Semenza et al., 1996; Jones & Rabbitt, 1994). Studies 
which have investigated the relationship between age and facial recognition have 
indicated that older adults are poor at recognising younger faces, however this age-
related deficit is not apparent when the age of the participants matches that of the 
stimulus face to-be-recognised (e.g. Wright et al., 2008; Wright & Stroud, 2002). 
Therefore, taking into account research such as Piolino (2002) and Rubin, Rahhal & 
Poon (1998) it is possible that research which has shown age-related deficits in name 
recall and face-name recognition (e.g. Firestone, Turk-Browne & Ryan, 2007) may 
have been due to the stimulus characteristics used (i.e. the names attached to the faces). 
That is, results such as those found by Firestone et al. (2007), Semenza et al. (1996) and 
 -218- 
Jones & Rabbitt (1994) may have been caused by the fact that the names used were 
more popular for younger adults than the older adults.  
 
Finally, opposing both the NST and use-dependency theory there was no evidence that 
older adults show a recall advantage of popular over unpopular names to a greater 
degree than younger adults (supporting James & Fogler, 2007; Jones & Rabbitt, 1994). 
This was also the case for the other three cognitive constructs measured (i.e. encoding, 
consolidation and retrieval/retention; see Table 4.1). The use-dependency theory would 
predict that cognitive atrophy associated with healthy aging would take a larger toll on 
cognitive representations which are activated less frequently (i.e. unpopular names) than 
those representation activated more frequently (i.e. popular names). The recall, 
encoding, consolidation and retrieval/retention deficits of popular versus unpopular 
names were not greater for older adults compared to younger adults. Due to the fact that 
name popularity was matched for older adults at a younger age, the use-dependency 
theory would predict that the decreased activation of cognitive networks representing 
unpopular names in later life would result in a larger impact on healthy aging on such 
names compared to popular names. The results show that this was not the case, however 
this may be due to a lack of an over all age effect on name recall, encoding, 
consolidation and retrieval/retention. 
 
In conclusion, the result confirms that popular proper names were recalled better than 
unpopular names supporting previous research (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007; Valentine, 
Brennen & Brédart, 1996). However there was no evidence of an age-related deficit in 
overall proper name recall which is conversed to previous research (e.g. James & 
Fogler, 2007; Troyer et al., 2006; Jones & Rabbitt, 1994; Cohen & Faulkner, 1986). The 
use of a multi-trial technique has suggested that the recall advantage is arguably due to 
an encoding advantage of popular names, however there is evidence that compared to 
unpopular names, popular names are consolidated and retrieved easier. Furthermore the 
results did not show supporting evidence for the use-dependency theory or NST, in that, 
older adults did not show superior recall, encoding, consolidation and/or 
retrieval/retention for popular over unpopular names compared to younger adults. 
Therefore using a within-subjects technique suggests that there is a lack evidence for 
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the use-dependency theory and that it is possible that previous evidence for the use-
dependency theory can be attributed to methodological techniques or mediating 
demographic factors. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5 CRYPTIC CROSSWORD INTERVENTION 
 
5.1 Background 
 
5.1.1 Introduction 
 
Previous research has indicated that an increase in cognitive activity in later life can 
attenuate or reverse cognitive decline, which is a hallmark of healthy aging (see Chapter 
One for a review). Verghese et al. (2003) is one of a number of studies which have 
indicated that taking part in crosswords, amongst other cognitive activities, can 
attenuate decline in cognitive functioning (e.g. Salthouse, 2006; Wilson et al., 2002; 
Hultsch et al., 1999). Chapter Two has indicated through questionnaire techniques that 
there is a greater impact of cryptic crossword participation, compared to quick and in 
some cases general knowledge crossword participation, on self-report measures of 
memory functioning and cognitive awareness. Study One, in particular, indicated that 
attempting cryptic crosswords frequently can enable older adults to maintain a constant 
awareness of their cognitive functioning. Studies Two, Three, Four and Four (a) have 
also indicated that undertaking cryptic crosswords on a regular basis can promote 
metacognitive awareness and memory self-efficacy (MemSE) in adults throughout the 
lifespan (see Chapter Two). This is not supportive of Jopp & Hertzog (2007) who found  
no direct relationship between activities including doing crosswords and either self-
reported memory functioning or objective measures of cognitive functioning. 
 
Chapter Two has shown how demographic variables can mediate the impact of cryptic 
crosswords on perceived cognitive functioning. Previous research has not always 
confirmed the association between cognitive activity and cognitive decline across the 
whole sample population, for example, Christensen & Mackinnon (1993) showed that 
cognitive activity (including attempting crosswords) had a larger impact on cognitive 
function in adults with fewer years in full time education. The studies in Chapter Two 
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also demonstrate that factors such as the ability to complete cryptic crosswords can 
impact on perceived cognitive functioning.  
 
Interestingly, psychologists have attempted to use intervention techniques to promote 
cognitive functioning in older adults (see Chapter One for a comprehensive review). 
Some of these techniques have been based on the use-dependency theory (e.g. Tranter 
& Koutstaal, 2008), while others have focused on utilising mnemonic techniques to 
surpass the natural decline in cognitive functioning (e.g. Karbach & Kray, 2009; 
Draganski et al., 2006). The majority of these intervention studies have shown that 
training or an increase in cognitive stimulation can promote a variety of cognitive 
functioning in later life.  
 
Taking into account the findings of Chapter Two and previous research such as Karbach 
& Kray (2009) and Tranter & Koutstaal (2008) it would be of interest to investigate 
whether an increase in attempting cryptic crosswords would produce a change in 
cognitive functioning. Previous research has suggested that cryptic crosswords require 
people to utilise abstract thinking and certain problem solving techniques which have 
been used in cognitive training programmes (Forshaw, unpublished.; Cavallini et al., 
2003; Ball et al., 2002).  
 
Furthermore, previous research (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2007; Dunlosky et al., 2003) has 
shown that the process of self-testing can promote memory functioning in older adults 
as well as metacognitive awareness. Cryptic crossword solving requires a form of self-
testing due to the fact that a standard cryptic clue has two components which need to 
match in order to produce the solution (e.g. Hambrick et al., 1999; Nickerson, 1977; 
Foreshaw, unpublished). As cryptic crosswords appear to encourage self-testing and 
also appear to promote cognitive awareness through the monitoring pathway of 
metacognition (see Chapter Two) it is therefore a natural continuation of this line of 
research to use cryptic crosswords in an intervention-style study. Therefore an 
intervention technique was used to assess the impact of regularly attempting cryptic 
crosswords, on various cognitive functions.  
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5.1.2 Addressing issues of previous research 
 
Although many different cognitive functions show age-related decline research which 
has used an intervention technique has only focused on one or two specific dependent 
variables (e.g. Rebok & Balcerak, 1989). However recent research has indicated that an 
increase in cognitive activity can affect all age-related cognitive function (e.g. Tranter 
& Koutstaal, 2008; Willis et al., 2006; Ball et al., 2002), therefore this study took into 
account dependent variables which included MemSE, metacognition, verbal memory 
and episodic memory (recall, encoding and consolidation). 
 
There is an issue within the field of the cognitive reserve and use-dependency theories, 
which questions whether an intervention technique can be effective when implemented 
with older adults. For example, research has provided evidence that an increase in 
activity is required at a relatively early age if age-related cognitive decline is to be 
combated (e.g. Bruandet et al., 2008; Barnes et al., 2006; Hensch, 2005; Hensch, 2002; 
Mortimer et al., 2003; Friedland et al., 2001). However more recent evidence supports 
the view that an increase in current cognitive activity throughout the later years in life 
can be sufficient to attenuate or reverse decline in several age-related cognitive 
functions (e.g. Karbach & Kray, 2009; Tranter & Koutstaal, 2008; Sturman et al., 
2005). Therefore there is adequate evidence that intervention techniques aimed at older 
adults can have benefits in terms of cognitive functioning (e.g. Glisky & Glisky, 1999).  
 
A further issue which needs to be addressed concerns the measures used in studies 
which investigate the use-dependency theory and which use intervention techniques. 
The relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive decline has been investigated 
by using self-report measures of both activity and cognitive functioning (e.g. Wilson et 
al., 2005; Verghese et al., 2003). However, a number of researchers have shown that 
self-report measures can be unreliable, especially when the sample population is 
restricted to older adults (e.g. Rabbitt et al., 1995; Sunderland et al., 1986). Therefore 
one aim of this study was to investigate whether there are similarities between objective 
and subjective measurements of cognitive functioning.  
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Jopp & Hertzog (2007) have conducted cross-sectional research and used structural 
equation modelling to investigate the relationship between self-reported beliefs, 
measures of activity and cognitive functioning. Their conclusion acknowledged that 
cross-sectional methodologies could not determine causation, but activities have a direct 
effect on objective cognitive functioning and not on MemSE. The analysis was also in 
recognition that some older adults will attempt certain activities which they believe will 
promote cognitive functioning. Therefore Jopp & Hertzog (2007) suggested that an 
increase in cognitive activity should not affect self-reported cognitive functioning 
unless the activity has a beneficial effect on actual cognitive functioning.   However, 
this is not in support of Berry (1999) and the results of Study Four (a); that is, the 
results of studies in Chapter Two suggest that under taking certain cognitive activities 
promotes the monitoring feedback in the metacognition model of Nelson & Narens 
(1990). In turn, this suggests that attempting cryptic crosswords (specifically for older 
adults) forces the meta-level of metacognition to be reassessed, potentially 
independently of current cognitive functioning.  
 
One possibility of the results obtained by Jopp & Hertzog (2007) was the categorisation 
of activity measures in their study. That is, as with other studies (e.g. Hultsch et al., 
1999) there was no dissociation between different types of crosswords. Furthermore, the 
activity questionnaire took into account physical activities as well as self maintenance 
and cognitive activities associated with education (e.g. undertaking university classes).  
Although the distinction of activities were conducted with factor analysis it is likely that 
the paring of certain activities (e.g. attempting crosswords under the category of playing 
games) was inappropriate. The fact that Jopp & Hertzog (2007) used structural equation 
modelling but did not include the number of years in education as a potential mediating 
factor is also questionable, especially when they included activities such as attempting 
university courses as cognitive activities. Thus, it could be argued that the measures of 
activity (specifically cognitive activity) are unrepresentative in Jopp & Hertzog (2007) 
study, this is especially the case when taking into account measures of cognitive activity 
reported by Salthouse (2006). Salthouse (2006; Salthouse et al., 2002) have shown how 
attempting crosswords has been rated as one of the most cognitively intensive activities 
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and therefore arguably cryptic crosswords should not have been categorised in the 
factor that Jopp & Hertzog (2007) defined as 'games'.  
 
Furthermore the current study will take into account the actual completion rates of each 
cryptic crossword a participant attempts and ensure that the participants attempt cryptic 
crosswords for one hour per day. This will reduce the unreliability of self-report 
measures of cognitive activity. Even though previous research has attempted to measure 
the participation in activities such as crosswords (e.g. Barnes et al., 2006) there has not 
been an independent measure of crossword completion over a longitudinal period. 
Chapter Two has indicated that cryptic crossword completion ability can have an affect 
on self-reported memory functioning, however this needs to be verified by objective 
measures of completion rates.  
 
Previous research has been relatively inconclusive as to whether an intervention has a 
larger impact on either subjective or objective measurements of cognitive functioning. 
For example, in a meta-analysis of memory training interventions Floyd & Scogin 
(1997) concluded that interventions have a significantly larger effect on objective rather 
than subjective measurements of memory functioning. However, other research has 
shown a significant change in subjective measurements of memory without any 
evidence for a change in objective memory measurements (e.g. Rapp et al., 2002). 
Therefore this study will examine whether the current intervention technique produced 
a change in subjective and objective measures of cognitive functioning or showed a 
dissociation between the two dependent variable outcomes.  
 
The relationship between cognitive activity and self-reported or objective measures of 
cognitive functioning is relatively ambiguous in cross-sectional studies. For example, 
Jopp & Hertzog (2007) showed correlations between most cognitive activities (e.g. 
using technology, taking educational classes, playing games) and objective measures of 
overall cognitive function (e.g. verbal fluency), however only certain cognitive 
activities were significantly important to cognitive self-reported measures of memory 
functioning and metacognition. It is also apparent that the relationship between activity, 
self-referent beliefs and cognition is a complicated relationship. As discussed in Chapter 
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One and later, it is possible that the relationship between cognitive activity and 
cognitive functioning is mediated by MemSE, but alternatively it is possible that the 
relationship between MemSE and cognitive functioning is mediated by cognitive 
activities (e.g. Jopp & Hertzog, 2007; Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). Hertzog & Hultsch 
(2000) argued that current cognitive functioning determined the level of cognitive 
activity a person is comfortable to undertake. However, they also argue that some older 
adults will start attempting certain cognitive activities in the hope of maintaining their 
current level of cognition or attenuating future cognitive decline. Therefore Hertzog & 
Hultsch (2000) argue that self-reported cognitive functioning is a by-product of the two-
way relationship between cognitive activity and current cognitive functioning that is, if 
an individual is undertaking crosswords for example to enhance their current cognition 
then their MemSE could be relatively high because they are able to complete the 
crosswords or relatively low because they become more aware of their current cognitive 
failures. Conversely a person may have been attempting crosswords for sixty years and 
feel confident about their cognitive ability (i.e. have a high MemSE) but not realise that 
their cognitive functioning is deteriorating because they are not doing different 
cognitive activity which would challenge their cognitive functioning.  
 
The only way to assess the relationship between self-reported and objective measures of 
cognitive functioning with regard to activity is through a longitudinal intervention. 
Furthermore, the activity used to increase cognition in the intervention study must be an 
everyday activity that represents a common activity which all older adults can undertake 
independently of physical fitness (e.g. Wilson et al., 2007). Carlson et al. (2008) 
attempted to use an everyday activity in a longitudinal intervention for older adults to 
investigate the impact on memory and executive functioning. Unfortunately no 
measures of MemSE were taken which did not allow the analysis of the relationship 
between self-reported and objective measures of functioning. The results showed that 
the everyday activity (helping primary school children to read, reduce conflicts and 
organise a library) was only effective for a sub-sample of participants who had a low 
executive functioning at baseline. It is questionable how cognitively demanding the 
intervention was and it must be acknowledged that the activity involved a physical and 
social component which reduces its relevance to the use-dependency theory. Therefore 
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an intervention was needed which used a more cognitively demanding activity which 
did not have a physical or social activity component i.e. doing cryptic crosswords.    
 
Following on from Carlson et al. (2008) a further aim of this study is to investigate the 
influence of demographic variables and whether these mediate the outcome of the 
intervention activity. For example, Schooler & Mulatu (2001) showed that there is a 
symbiotic relationship between cognitive activity, leisure activity, social interaction and 
current cognitive functioning. This research was also supported by Jopp & Hertzog 
(2007) who used structural equation modelling to show that demographic factors can 
change the impact of cognitive activity on cognitive functioning. Other studies have 
also demonstrated how factors such as number of years in education can interact with 
current cognitive activity (both in cross-sectional/longitudinal demographic research 
and in intervention studies). For example Christensen & Mackinnon (1993) and van 
Hooren et al. (2007) showed how the impact of cognitive activity can be affected by the 
number of years in education that a person has. Jopp & Hertzog (2007) and Hultsch et 
al. (1999) also showed a direct relationship between novel information processing and 
cognitive functioning in later life, therefore a further aim of this study is to investigate 
whether undertaking cryptic crosswords on a frequent basis has a larger impact on 
participants who are not used to attempting cryptic crosswords and are therefore 
undertaking a novel information processing activity.  
 
Recent research has attempted to address the relationship between cognitive activity and 
cognitive decline by using intervention activities which are more closely associated 
with everyday leisure activities (such as word games and crosswords; e.g. Tranter & 
Koutstaal, 2008). Indeed, previous intervention studies which have used more 
laboratory-based activities have failed to show that cognitive benefits of the 
intervention can be transferred to everyday functioning (e.g. Ball et al., 2002). It is 
relevant to note that in a follow-up to Ball et al. (2002), Willis et al. (2006) showed that 
reasoning training had a significant impact on everyday functioning while more 
laboratory-based training techniques such as mnemonics and speed of processing did 
not show benefits in everyday functioning. The reasoning based technique had activities 
which one could draw analogies with completing cryptic crosswords, specifically logic 
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tasks which have been used in other intervention studies and proved successful (e.g. 
Tranter & Koutstaal, 2008). Therefore an intervention, similar to that of Tranter & 
Koutstaal (2008) which is based around leisure activities would be a more realistic use-
dependency based intervention.  
 
5.1.3 The relationship between cognitive activity and metacognition 
 
Previous research has suggested that MemSE is important in aging due to its role in 
mediating metacognition. However there is an alternate explanation of the association 
between cognitive activity and cognitive decline which is centred around the 
relationship between MemSE and metacognition (see Chapter One for full details; Jopp 
& Hertzog, 2007). To recap, unlike Bandura (1989) who believed that the promotion of 
MemSE can be beneficial for cognition (based on the social concept of confidence and 
memory ability) this thesis postulates that a significant amount of cognitive decline 
associated with healthy aging is due to overconfidence in cognitive abilities of older 
adults. Metacognition can only function adequately if one tests one‘s cognitive 
functioning regularly. For example, Dunlosky et al. (2003) demonstrated how self-
testing can enhance cognitive functioning in older adults. Their results show that 
memory performance can be enhanced when individuals are taught to self-test during 
the learning phase of a memory test (see also Dunlosky et al., 2007). 
 
According to the classical theory of metacognition (e.g. Nelson & Narens, 1990) an 
accurate metacognitive system relies on interactions between the meta- and object-level. 
In Nelson & Narens‘ (1990) model this feedback is termed monitoring and control. As 
covered in Chapter One, the meta-level in Nelson & Narens‘ (1990) model is one‘s 
internal estimation of one‘s cognitive functioning. The more a person undertakes 
cognitive tasks the more feedback she/he will receive i.e. monitoring (e.g. Hertzog & 
Hultsch, 2000). However, monitoring is only valuable when the person decides on how 
much effort a specific task requires (i.e. control). Research has shown that older adults 
are significantly impaired at determining the amount of effort required for tasks which 
increase in difficulty (e.g. Souchay & Isingrini, 2004). There is also evidence that older 
adults have a deficit in the control aspect of metacognition in terms of selecting the 
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most efficient memory strategy for an episodic memory task. For example, Rabinowitz 
(1989) showed that age-related deficits in episodic memory tasks can be significantly 
reduced by encouraging older adults to select more appropriate task-related mnemonic 
strategies. Furthermore, Brigham & Pressley (1988) showed that older adults, compared 
to younger adults, were significantly impaired when choosing the most appropriate 
strategies when the memory task changed. Finally, Dunlosky et al. (2007) showed how 
on experimenter-paced trials older adults were unable to apply new strategies to aid 
recall, indicating a deficit in the control pathway of metacognition. This was supported 
by Brehmer et al. (2008), who showed that older adults did not employ mnemonic 
strategies, which had been taught eleven months earlier, without being retrained. 
Therefore, the consensus is that age-related episodic memory deficits are a product of 
impaired metacognition. 
 
The monitoring process during a cognitive functioning task is also important. For 
example, Roediger III & Karpicke (2006b) have shown that repeated testing can 
improve episodic memory performance. This is not due to repeated exposure to the 
same stimulus due to the fact that participants showed long term memory gains during 
repeated memory testing which were significantly greater than when participants were 
shown the stimulus repeatedly without being subjected to repeated memory tests. 
Furthermore, earlier research has shown that participants do not achieve significantly 
higher recall on single trial tests when they are allowed unlimited study time. The 
‗labour in vain‘ effect demonstrates how individuals require feedback before they can 
master an episodic memory test (Nelson & Leonesion, 1988). This supports the results 
of Dunlosky et al. (2007, 2003) that has shown that training individuals in the art of 
self-testing can promote episodic memory ability.  
 
However, there is clear evidence that older adults have a deficit in monitoring during a 
learning trial. For example, Dunlosky & Connor (1997) and Souchay & Isingrini (2004) 
have demonstrated that older adults are significantly poorer at allocating study time on 
self-paced trials compared to experimenter-paced trials. Indeed, Souchay & Isingrini 
(2004) show that older adults, compared to younger adults, did not increase study time 
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(or repetitions) during self-paced trials even though they were aware that the task 
requirements increased in difficulty.  
 
It is possible that cognitive activities can promote metacognition by encouraging 
individuals to test their cognitive functioning more often. For example, research by 
Forshaw (unpublished) has shown that attempting to solve cryptic crossword clues 
requires individuals to repeatedly check their solutions with the clue and other solutions 
which fit in with certain letters. Furthermore, Forshaw (unpublished) and Nickerson 
(1977) explained that checking is increased during solving cryptic clues due to the fact 
that cryptic clues tend to have two components which will produce the same solution. 
 
Research by Tranter & Koutstaal (2008) has used tasks which are similar in origin to 
cryptic crossword clues and have shown that fluid intelligence can be increased over a 
period of ten weeks. Previous research has shown that there is a bi-directional 
relationship between fluid intelligence and metacognition (Veenman & Spaans, 2004). 
There is also well documented empirical research which has shown that executive 
functioning determines the efficiency of metacognition in older adults (Souchay & 
Isingrini, 2004). Furthermore, Karbach & Kray (2009) have shown that training older 
adults in tasks associated with executive functioning can increase overall cognitive 
functioning in other domains.  
 
The role of MemSE and metacognition has also been investigated in intervention 
techniques to examine whether gains produced by laboratory based intervention 
techniques can be transferred to everyday functioning (e.g. Cavallini et al., 2003). 
Laboratory based intervention programs have produced little evidence that gains found 
on tests related to the intervention training could be transferred to other empirical tests 
of memory (e.g. Carlson et al., 2008) or everyday functioning (e.g. Ball et al., 2002). 
According to previous studies which have used an increase in MemSE to produce an 
increase in memory performance (e.g. Rebok & Balcerak, 1989), the ability to transfer 
this newly developed skill to a different task requires enhanced metacognitive abilities 
(Kimball & Hollyoak, 2000).  Kimball & Hollyoak (2000) also suggest that the ability 
to transfer the newly acquired skill is also reliant on executive functioning. Therefore it 
 -230- 
is logical to assume that undertaking cognitive activities stimulates the executive 
functioning and metacognitive abilities of individuals, and that these systems, in turn, 
are necessary to be able to transfer any skill (developed through the cognitive activity) 
to other similar cognitive activities or functions (e.g. a JOL task).  
 
Therefore, it is logical to assume that intervention techniques such as the one employed 
by Tranter & Koutstaal (2008) show that cognitive activity increases fluid intelligence 
through mediating executive functioning and MemSE, which in turn mediates 
metacognition (e.g. Jopp & Hertzog, 2007). However, the results are inconclusive for 
example Dellenbach & Zimprich (2008) have shown that there is a significant 
correlation between typical intellectual engagements (TIE) and crystallised intelligence 
but not fluid intelligence. This is puzzling as Dellenbach & Zimprich (2008) defined 
TIEs as activities which were very similar to those used in the intervention activities of 
Tranter & Koutstaal (2008). One explanation could be that there is an interaction with 
demographic mediating factors which neither Tranter & Koutstaal (2008) nor 
Dellenbach & Zimprich (2008) took into account (e.g. low previous cognitive activity 
or low socialisation; Jopp & Hertzog, 2007). Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that 
Dellenbach & Zimprich (2008) used a cross-sectional design and therefore causation 
between the relationship of TIEs and fluid or crystallised intelligence cannot be 
determined.  
 
5.1.4 Aims and Objectives 
 
Thus, the aim of this study is three-fold; firstly, to investigate whether cryptic 
crosswords change participants‘ subjective and objective measurements of 
metacognition, MemSE, verbal learning and/or episodic memory. Secondly, to uncover 
whether there is a significant difference between the subjective and objective dependant 
variables when using a within-subjects intervention approach. Finally, to investigate 
whether demographic variables mediated or influenced the intervention as proposed by 
Glisky & Glisky (1999). 
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5.2 Method 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
 
Twenty volunteers were recruited from the local community. Written consent was 
obtained. One participant left after baseline due to transport problems and two further 
participants were omitted from the analysis due to non-compliance with the crossword 
intervention activity. The remaining seventeen participants had a mean age of 70.4 
years (SD = 5.54) and a mean number of years in education of 15.74 (SD = 3.98). All 
participants‘ mini-mental state examination (Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975) scores 
were over 28, indicating an absence of cognitive impairment. The mean age, number of 
years in education, frequency of cognitive activity, final cryptic crossword completion 
score, socialisation score, MMSE and range of cognitive assessment scores for all 
participants in the study can be found in Table 5.2. The participants have been separated 
into two groups based on which intervention activity they completed first. 
 
5.2.2 Materials and activities 
 
This study used a within-subjects technique with two interventions, with each 
intervention running over a 6 week period (in line with previous cognitive intervention 
studies such as Cavallini et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2002 and Rasmussen et al., 1999). The 
experimental intervention investigated the effects of cryptic crossword activity on a 
number of objective and self-rating tests of memory and metacognition. The control 
activity was colouring as it was hypothesised that minimal cognitive/executive 
functions were required for this activity.  
 
The cryptic crossword activity required participants to attempt three cryptic crosswords 
a week for a minimum of one hour a day for the 6 week period. This resulted in a 
minimum cognitive stimulation total of 2520 minutes compared to 540 in Ball et al. 
(2002), 840 in Rasmussen et al. (1999) and 450 on Cavallini et al. (2003). The 
colouring activity required participants to colour in an assortment of patterns for 20 
minutes a day over the 6 week period. During the period of colouring activity 
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participants were asked to refrain from doing any crosswords. The study was 
counterbalanced by randomly assigning participants to either begin with the crosswords 
(N = 8) or colouring (N= 9) intervention. Participants had a 4 week rest period before 
undertaking their second intervention activity. 
 
The proportion of each crossword participants were able to complete was monitored. A 
cumulative score was calculated for each week then added to make a total for each 
participant. The study took into account the final crossword completion rate of each 
participant. This technique of measuring how accomplished participants were at 
completing the cryptic crosswords has not been taken into account in previous studies. 
A participant could have a final total crossword completion score ranging from 0- 1800; 
participants had a percentage score for each crossword they completed, therefore this 
figure represents the total completion rate over the six week period.  
 
5.2.3 Cognitive assessment 
 
Participants were required to make three visits for assessment of cognitive functioning 
for each intervention period. A baseline assessment was also executed two weeks prior 
to starting the initial intervention activity. This resulted in a total of seven visits for 
cognitive assessment over an eighteen week period. Table 5.1 shows the timetable for 
the entire intervention period.  
 
Subjective and objective measures were taken for memory awareness, metacognition, 
verbal memory and episodic memory (including measures of recall, encoding and 
consolidation). First, regarding subjective measures, four questionnaires were used to 
assess MemSE (two questionnaires), metacognition and memory strategies used (Troyer 
& Rich, 2002), and a measure of overall cognitive confidence which is named cognitive 
strength (Troyer & Rich, 2002). One of the MemSE questionnaires was also taken from 
Troyer & Rich (2002) and focused on many different types of memory such as working 
memory, perspective memory, and episodic memory; this was entitled Total MemSE. 
Another MemSE questionnaire was adapted from Berry, West & Dennehy (1989) and 
specifically focused on episodic memory confidence; this was entitled Episodic MemSE 
 -233- 
Table 5.1. Timescale of Intervention Period  
Testing period Rest Testing period Rest Testing period 
Baseline. One 
testing session 
Two weeks 
Intervention 
period one. 
Three testing 
sessions 
totalling six-
weeks 
Four weeks 
Intervention 
period two.  
Three testing 
sessions 
totalling six-
weeks 
 
Regarding objective measurements of cognitive functioning there were two 
measurements of metacognition which both utilised judgement of learning (JOL) 
ratings. The first technique calculated JOL magnitude and the second rating calculated 
JOL gamma correlation (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954). Recall and recognition of verbal 
memory was measured with an adapted form of the Hopkins Verbal Learning Test 
(Brandt, 1991), however these results will not be presented due to no significant 
findings. Episodic memory was assessed by using an intertrial learning technique, 
adapted from Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996). Measurements of recall, encoding and 
consolidation were taken (see Chapter Three for full details).  
 
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Overview 
 
The aim of this section is to present the baseline data first, then the results of the 
intervention period will be presented for each cognitive assessment measured (outlined 
in section 6.2.3), covariate analyses will then follow each cognitive assessment section. 
As mentioned earlier previous studies have indicated that certain demographic factors 
may mediate the impact of an intervention technique, therefore this will be included in 
the analysis in two ways; firstly through correlational analysis to investigate any direct 
impact of the covariate on the specific cognitive assessment, and secondly through the 
use of ANCOVAs to ascertain whether the covariate mediates the impact of cryptic 
crosswords on the specific cognitive functioning variables. Covariates which were taken 
into account when conducting analysis were: number of years in education, previous 
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total crossword activity, previous total cognitive activity, socialisation score and cryptic 
crossword completion rate.  
 
5.3.2 Baseline results 
 
Table 5.2. Demographic and cognitive assessment means scores (standard 
deviations) separated by order of intervention activity 
 First Intervention Activity 
Mean Demographic and Cognitive 
Assessment scores 
Crosswords Colouring 
Age 73.13 (5.72) 68.00(4.33) 
Education 15.75(3.37) 15.72(4.66) 
Mini-Mental State Examination 29.63(0.52) 29.67(0.50) 
Socialisation 9.13(4.49) 5.78(4.02) 
Total Crossword Frequency 3.5 (3.02) 2.56 (2.13) 
Total Cognitive Activity 11.75(4.43) 10.89(4.51) 
Final Crossword Completion Score 862.54(772.79) 742.67(609.61) 
JOL correct proportion 5.22(1.10) 4.17(0.97) 
JOL incorrect proportion 4.27(0.93) 3.52(0.74) 
JOL Gamma correlations 0.44(0.57) 0.55(0.29) 
Episodic MemSE 46.88(9.25)* 55.11(6.62)* 
Total MemSE 44.25(18.10) 49.11(4.29) 
Memory strategy 42.63(9.94) 37.22(13.48) 
Cognitive strength 47.63(8.80) 50.33(10.56) 
Intertrial recall trial 1 7.00(2.00) 8.44(1.81) 
Intertrial recall trial 2 9.38(1.92) 10.11(1.45) 
Intertrial recall trial 3 10.88(2.75) 11.22(1.72) 
Intertrial recall trial 4 12.13(2.36) 12.11(2.15) 
Intertrial recall trial 5 13.50(3.12) 12.89(2.03) 
Intertrial consolidation 1 79.68(15.23) 69.95(16.71) 
Intertrial consolidation 2 64.72(21.00) 66.73(13.62) 
Intertrial consolidation 3 74.27(18.94) 68.77(13.62) 
Intertrial consolidation 4 76.26(14.71) 73.56(7.19) 
Intertrial encoding 1 35.00 (10.00) 42.22(9.05) 
Intertrial encoding 2 29.95(8.54) 37.27(5.10) 
Intertrial encoding 3 44.06(16.73) 45.17(10.01) 
Intertrial encoding 4 40.77(11.48) 49.71(14.82) 
Intertrial encoding 5 53.17(17.88) 50.31(24.19) 
* Significant to 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 5.2 shows the demographic, covariates and cognitive assessments for individuals 
who were separated on the basis of first task. As demonstrated in the table the results 
show no significant difference in terms of age, mini-mental state assessment or any of 
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the cognitive assessment measures with the exception of Episodic MemSE. This t-test 
shows that individuals who undertook the colouring intervention activity first had a 
significantly higher Episodic MemSE than those who did the crossword activity first (t 
(1, 15) = 2.13, p = 0.05). Statistical analysis was needed to ensure that the typical results 
of metacognitive assessments and episodic memory assessment were evident in this 
sample population.  
 
5.3.2.1 JOL magnitude  
 
Table 5.2 indicates that participants gave higher Judgements of Learning values to 
words which they recall compared to words that they forgot (status: recalled versus non-
recalled). The results of the baseline JOL magnitude test showed a significant main 
effect of status i.e. the JOL for correctly recalled words was significantly higher than 
those for incorrectly recalled words (F (1, 16) = 9.106, p<0.05, η²=0.363). Therefore it 
can be concluded from the JOL magnitude results that the participants display the 
appropriate level of metacognitive functioning.  
 
5.3.2.2 JOL gamma correlations  
 
As shown in Table 5.2 JOL gamma correlations are positive, this indicates that 
metacognitive functioning is appropriate. There was no significant difference between 
JOL gamma correlations for individuals who undertook the crossword or colouring 
intervention first (t = 0.439).  
 
5.3.2.3 Intertrial learning 
 
Table 5.2 shows the mean intertrial recall (ITR), intertrial consolidation (ITC), and 
intertrial encoding (ITE) for individuals who undertook the crossword or colouring 
intervention first. In line with Dunlosky & Salthouse (1996) ITR significantly increased 
across trials (F (4, 60) = 28.993, p<0.001, η² = 0.659). There was a borderline main 
effect of trial on ITC (F (3, 45) = 2.718, p = 0.056, η² = 0.153). There was also a 
significant main effect of trial on ITE (F (4, 60) =3.957, p<0.05, η² = 0.209). As shown 
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in Table 5.2 both ITC and ITE increased across trials. Furthermore, there was no 
significant difference of ITR, ITC or ITE between the two groups of participants.  
 
5.3.2.4 Covariates 
 
As mentioned earlier a number of covariates were taken into account throughout the 
analysis and the means can be found in Table 5.1. As the table shows, there was no 
significant difference of any covariate on the basis of which intervention activity 
participants began the study with.  
 
Between-subjects groups were created based around the median for each covariate. 
These were included in the ANOVAs for each dependant variable and will be reported 
if they change the significance of the interactions between any of the original factors or 
the main effects of the intervention activity. It was important to take into account 
whether there was any significant difference at baseline between the between-subjects 
covariate groups for each dependant variable, therefore t-tests (or ANOVAs) were used 
to investigate this.  
 
When participants were split on the basis of final cryptic crossword completion there 
was no significant difference between the two groups on the basis of the episodic 
MemSE questionnaire (t = 1.935), the total MemSE questionnaire (t = 0.885), memory 
strategies (t = -0.564), cognitive strength (t = -1.212), JOL magnitude (t = 0.837), JOL 
gamma correlations (t = -0.067) or intervention activity order (t = -0.215). However the 
results did show that there was a significant difference between the final cryptic 
crossword completion groups in the basis of intertrial recall (F (1, 15) = 19.183, p = 
0.001, η² = 0.561), intertrial encoding (F (1, 15) = 4.633, p<0.05, η² = 0.236) and 
intertrial consolidation (F (1, 15) = 13.575, p<0.005, η² = 0.475). Participants who 
completed more of the cryptic crosswords intervention had a mean recall 23.7% higher 
than those who completed less of the cryptic crossword intervention. The results also 
show that mean encoding and consolidation was 13.88% and 25.62% higher for those 
who completed a greater proportion of the cryptic crosswords during the intervention 
period compared to those who completed a smaller proportion. This indicates that the 
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cognitive ability associated with being able to complete cryptic crosswords is also 
associated with recall, encoding and consolidation in episodic memory when using an 
intertrial task.  
 
5.3.3 Intervention period results 
 
With the exception of the intertrial measures of recall, encoding and consolidation the 
analysis used an intervention activity (2 levels) X visit (3 levels) X first intervention 
activity (2 levels) ANOVA initially. Covariates were then added when deemed 
appropriate. Further analysis using covariates included a further between-subjects factor 
which always had 2 levels. The results of the subjective dependent variables will be 
presented first followed by the results of the objective dependent variables.  
 
5.3.3.1 Episodic MemSE results 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the mean episodic MemSE results. The data has been separated on the 
basis of first intervention activity. The figure shows that episodic MemSE appears to be 
lower when participants are undertaking the cryptic crossword activity compared to the 
colouring activity; this appears to be the case regardless as to which intervention 
participants began with. There also does not seem to be a large fluctuation in terms of 
episodic MemSE over the three visits for either intervention activity.  
 
There was no significant main effects of either visit (F = 1.590) or first intervention 
activity (F = 0.438) on episodic MemSE. There was a significant main effect of 
intervention activity on episodic MemSE (F (1, 15) = 5.465, p<0.05, η²= 0.267). The 
marginal means indicate that when participants undertook the colouring intervention 
activity they had a mean episodic MemSE which was 5.06% higher than when they 
were attempting the crossword intervention. None of the three factors produced a 
significant two-way or three-way interaction with one another.  
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To analyse whether any of the covariates have a direct impact on episodic MemSE 
correlations were used across all visits. The results showed none of the covariates 
mentioned above had a significant direct impact on episodic MemSE. ANCOVAs were 
used to investigate any interaction between the covariates and the original factors on 
episodic MemSE. The results indicated a two-way interaction between number of years 
in education and visit on episodic MemSE.  Therefore the between-subjects factor of 
number of years in education was included in the original ANOVA. No notable results 
were found.   
 
An ANCOVA also showed that controlling for previous total crossword activity 
produced a significant three-way interaction between the original three factors on 
episodic MemSE (F (2, 28) = 5.395, p=0.01, η²=0.278). The marginal means indicate 
that participants who began with the crossword intervention show an increase in 
episodic MemSE over the six intervention visits while those who started with the 
colouring show a drop in episodic MemSE over the visits. Furthermore, the difference 
between the two groups appears greater during the earlier visits. The pattern is 
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eventually reversed on the final visit when individuals who started with the crossword 
intervention report a higher episodic MemSE than those who began with colouring. 
 
 
 
The between-subjects factor of previous total crossword activity was included in the 
original ANOVA. The factor of previous total crossword frequency interacted 
significantly with intervention activity (F (1, 13) = 5.088, p<0.05, η² = 0.281), this was 
the only significant interaction on Episodic MemSE. The interaction between 
intervention activity and previous total crossword frequency shows that individuals who 
regularly completed crosswords in the past did not show a great deal of variation on 
memory self-efficacy ratings while undertaking either cryptic crosswords or colouring. 
Conversely participants who reported a lower past total crossword frequency score had 
a lower memory self-efficacy rating while undertaking crosswords compared to when 
completing colouring (see Figure 5.2). These results suggest that individuals who 
regularly attempt crosswords have a relatively fixed memory self-efficacy (perhaps due 
to the theory that completing crosswords acts as a feedback around individuals to 
monitor their cognitive functioning). However, for those who do not complete 
crosswords on a regular basis it is possible that the crossword intervention enables them 
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to gain more insight into their cognitive functioning and specifically those cognitive 
abilities that decline with age. 
 
Total cognitive activity, socialisation score and final cryptic completion rate were all 
included in ANCOVAs separately. The results did not show any significant changes to 
the original main effects or interactions. This was also the case when the between-
subject factors for each covariate were added to the original ANOVA. Therefore these 
results will not be discussed here 
 
5.3.3.2 Total MemSE results 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the mean total MemSE for individuals who started with either the 
crosswords or colouring intervention activity. The figure does not suggest that mean 
total MemSE changes over either intervention period for participants who attempt either 
the crossword or colouring intervention first. Statistical analysis was repeated for this 
dependent variable. The results showed no significant main effect of intervention 
activity (F = 0.352), visit (F = 0.227) or first intervention activity (F = 3.224) on total 
MemSE. Furthermore, there were no significant two-way or three-way interactions 
between any of the factors.  
 
Correlational analysis showed that none of the covariates, with the exception of final 
cryptic crossword completion rate, had a significant direct impact on total MemSE. 
Final cryptic crossword completion rate had a significant negative correlation with total 
MemSE at baseline and when participants were undertaking their final measurements 
during the colouring intervention (r = -0.523, p<0.05, and r = -0.531, p<0.05 
respectively). The correlation suggests that being unable to complete cryptic crosswords 
reduces participants‘ confidence in their overall memory ability20. With the exception of 
socialisation score none of the covariates affected the main effects or interactions of the 
original ANOVA when included in an ANCOVA or as between-subjects factors.  
                                               
20  However, it must be noted that final cryptic crossword completion rate did not have a 
significant main effect when entered as a covariate or a between-subject factor.  
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When ANCOVA analysis included socialisation score the results showed a significant 
main effect of first intervention activity on total MemSE (F (1, 14) = 4.96, p<0.05, η² = 
0.262). Marginal means confirmed that participants who undertook colouring first had a 
Total MemSE score which was 22.96% higher on average than those who started with 
the crossword intervention. 
 
The between-subjects factor of socialisation was therefore included with the original 
factors. The results confirmed a significant main effect of first intervention activity (F 
(1, 13) = 9.393, p<0.01, η² = 0.419). There was also a significant main effect of 
socialisation score on Total MemSE (F (1, 13) = 8.999, p = 0.01, η² = 0.409). The 
marginal means show that individuals with a higher socialisation score report a MemSE 
which is 23.52% higher than individuals with a lower socialisation score. No other 
noteworthy results were found.  
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5.3.3.3 Memory strategy results 
 
The results showed no significant main effects of memory strategies for intervention 
activity (F = 0.876), visit (F = 0.892) or first intervention activity (F = 0.85). The two-
way interactions between intervention activity and first intervention activity (F = 
0.881), intervention activity and visit (F = 0.881), and visit and first intervention 
activity (F = 0.883) on memory strategies were all non-significant. Also, the three-way 
interaction between all three factors on memory strategies was non-significant (F = 
0.883). Correlational analysis indicated that number of years in education was 
significantly related with a higher use of memory strategies (e.g. r=0.527, p<0.05 on the 
final visit during the colouring intervention). However when this covariate was included 
in an ANCOVA and as a between-subjects factor no notable results were found. None 
of the other covariates had significant correlations or change the results of the original 
ANOVA when entered in ANCOVAs or as between-subjects factors.  
 
5.3.3.4 Cognitive strength results 
 
There was no significant main effect of either intervention activity (F = 0.220) or visit 
(F = 2.661) on the cognitive strength dependent variable. Even though baseline results 
did not show a significant difference in terms of cognitive strength between those who 
undertook either crosswords or colouring first the intervention period showed that those 
who completed the colouring intervention first had a significantly higher cognitive 
strength throughout the whole intervention period compared to those who attempted the 
crossword intervention first (F (1, 15) = 4. 830, p<0.05, η² = 0.244). There were no 
significant two-way or three-way interactions between the factors on cognitive strength.  
 
Correlational analysis showed that none of the covariates had a significant direct impact 
on cognitive strength. Number of years in education, previous crossword activity and 
total cognitive activity were included in ANCOVAs and as between-subjects factors in 
ANOVAs. None of these covariates changed the outcome of the original ANOVA. 
However, when socialisation score was entered in an ANCOVA the results showed a 
significant main effect of intervention activity on cognitive strength (F (1, 14) = 5.029, 
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p<0.05, η² = 0.264). The marginal means indicated that participants had a 1.10% higher 
cognitive strength score when they were undertaking the crossword intervention than 
when completing the colouring intervention. However, this result was not repeated 
when social score was added as a between-subjects factor. Final cryptic crossword 
completion rates did not affect the results when included as a covariate or a between-
subjects factor. 
 
5.3.3.5 JOL magnitude results 
 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the JOL magnitude scores for correctly recalled and incorrectly 
recalled words for individuals who started with the crossword intervention and the 
colouring intervention respectively. The table shows that JOL magnitude is always 
higher for correctly recalled words than incorrectly recalled words. The difference 
between JOL magnitude for correctly and incorrectly recalled words is known as status 
and is included in the original ANOVA and has two levels. 
 
Table 5.3. Mean JOL magnitude for correctly and incorrectly recalled words 
(standard error) for baseline (BL) and visits (V) 1-6 of the intervention period for 
individuals who undertook the crossword intervention first.   
 BL V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Correctly recalled 
5.22 
(0.39) 
4.38 
(0.69) 
4.37 
(0.29) 
3.96 
(0.42) 
4.31 
(0.29) 
4.12 
(0.44) 
4.33 
(0.31) 
Incorrectly recalled 
4.27 
(0.33) 
3.15 
(0.34) 
3.27 
(0.33) 
3.28 
(0.36) 
3.8 
(0.29) 
3.35 
(0.22) 
3.74 
(0.34) 
 
Table 5.4. Mean JOL magnitude for correctly and incorrectly recalled words 
(standard error) for baseline (BL) and visits (V) 1-6 of the intervention period for 
individuals who undertook the colouring intervention first.   
 BL V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Correctly recalled 
4.17 
(0.32) 
3.44 
(0.42) 
3.53 
(0.24) 
3.6 
(0.4) 
3.49 
(0.28) 
3.5 
(0.3) 
3.41 
(0.25) 
Incorrectly recalled 
3.52 
(0.25) 
2.64 
(0.3) 
2.57 
(0.28) 
2.85 
(0.22) 
3.26 
(0.5) 
3.12 
(0.31) 
2.8 
(0.26) 
 
The results of the ANOVA showed that there was no significant main effect of visit on 
JOL magnitude (F = 0.175). There was also no significant main effect of either 
intervention activity (F = 0.032) or first intervention activity (F = 3.832) on JOL 
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magnitude. Status had a significant main effect on JOL magnitude (F (1, 15) = 57.913, 
p<0.001, η² = 0.794).  The marginal means confirmed that JOL magnitude for words 
correctly recalled was always higher than JOL magnitude of words forgotten. The 
results showed no significant two-way, three-way or four-way interactions for this 
dependant variable.  
 
Correlational analysis did not show a direct impact of previous total crossword activity 
on JOL magnitude. However, when the covariate was included in an ANCOVA the 
results showed a significant three-way interaction between first intervention activity, 
intervention activity and status (F(1, 14)= 5.364, p<0.05, η²= 0.277). The marginal 
means show that the difference in JOL scores for words which were correctly and 
incorrectly recalled was larger when participants were undertaking their first 
intervention activity. This indicates that individuals became over confident during their 
second intervention regardless of the intervention activity they were undertaking. 
 
 
 
As the factor of status indicates the accuracy of the JOL, only findings which include 
this factor will be discussed in terms of covariates. Regarding covariates, correlational 
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analysis showed that number of years in education was significantly correlated with 
JOL magnitude for status on the first visit during the colouring intervention (r=0.642, 
p<0.05). Although the results suggest that participants who have a higher number of 
years in education show superior metacognition compared to those with fewer years in 
education this was only apparent on one visit, therefore it is questionable whether this 
relationship is reliable. Furthermore, there was no relationship, in terms of JOL 
magnitude and intervention activity, so it is possible that the correlation is unreliable. 
None of the other covariates showed a significant direct correlation with JOL 
magnitude. Both ANCOVA analysis and entering number of years in education as a 
between-subjects factor did not change any of the original main effects or interactions. 
 
Previous total crossword activity was included as a between-subjects factor and the 
ANOVA was repeated. There was a significant three-way interaction between 
intervention activity, previous total crossword activity and status on JOL magnitude (F 
(1, 13) = 6.489, p<0.05, η² = 0.333). The marginal means indicate that individuals who 
had a low previous total crossword activity had a more accurate metacognition when 
they were attempting the crossword intervention activity as opposed to the colouring 
intervention activity. However this relationship appears to be reversed for individuals 
classed as having a high previous total crossword activity, that is, their metacognitive 
functioning appeared to be more accurate during the colouring intervention activity 
compared to the crossword activity. The results also suggest that the overall magnitude 
for words which were recalled correctly was higher for the low previous total crossword 
activity group when they were attempting their cryptic crossword intervention 
compared to the colouring intervention. This was reversed but to a smaller degree in the 
higher previous total crossword activity group. The results also confirm those found in 
the ANCOVA, that is, a significant three-way interaction between first intervention 
activity, intervention activity and status on JOL magnitude (F(1, 13) =  4.864, p<0.05, 
η²= 0.272).  
 
The covariate of total cognitive activity did not show a direct relationship with JOL 
magnitude when correlational analysis was used. Furthermore there were no noteworthy 
results when the covariate was included in an ANOVA or as a between-subjects factor. 
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This was also the case for the covariate of socialisation score and final cryptic 
crossword completion rate.  
 
5.3.3.6 JOL gamma correlation results 
 
Table 5.5 shows the mean gamma correlations across baseline and the two intervention 
periods for participants who started with either the crossword or the colouring 
intervention activity. The results show no significant main effects on JOL gamma 
correlations of intervention activity (F = 0.190), visit (F = 1.162) or first intervention 
activity (F = 0.297). There were also no significant two-way or three-way interactions 
for this dependent variable.  
 
Correlational analysis shows a significant relationship between number of years in 
education and JOL gamma correlations when participants were undertaking the second 
visit during the colouring intervention (r = 0.648, p = 0.005). This indicates that 
participants who have a higher number of years in education display superior 
metacognitive abilities, however this was only apparent on one visit. The covariate was 
included in an ANCOVA. It yielded a significant main effect of intervention activity on 
JOL gamma correlations (F (1, 14) = 6.92, p<0.05, η² = 0.331). The marginal means 
show that on average participants had a JOL gamma correlation that was 9.81% higher 
when they were completing crosswords compared to when they were completing the 
colouring intervention activity.  
 
Table 5.5 Mean gamma correlations (standard error) for baseline (BL) and visits 
(V) 1-6 of the intervention period for individuals who either started with the 
crossword or the colouring intervention 
 BL V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Crosswords  
0.44 
(0.22) 
0.45 
(0.14) 
0.43 
(0.11) 
0.37 
(0.14) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.48 
(0.14) 
0.22 
(0.08) 
Colouring 
0.55 
(0.11) 
0.39 
(0.06) 
0.42 
(0.12) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
0.18 
(0.09) 
0.30 
(0.14) 
0.35 
(0.13) 
 
Number of years in education was entered as a between-subjects factor. The results 
showed a significant two-way interaction between intervention activity and education 
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group (F (1, 13) =11.308, p<0.01, η² = 0.465). The marginal means showed that 
participants who were classed as having a higher number of years in education had a 
mean gamma correlation which was 21.29% higher when they were attempting the 
colouring intervention activity compare to the crossword activity. However, individuals 
who were classed as having a lower number of years in education had a mean gamma 
correlation which was 128.1% higher when they were doing the cryptic crossword 
intervention activity compared to the colouring activity. This indicates that cryptic 
crosswords promote metacognition in individuals who have a relatively low number of 
years in education. 
 
 
 
There was also a significant three-way interaction between first intervention activity, 
number of years in education and intervention activity on JOL gamma correlations (F 
(1, 13) = 11.504, p<0.01, η² = 0.469). The marginal means indicate that while 
individuals with a low number of years in education always have a higher gamma 
correlation when they are doing crosswords the individuals with a higher number of 
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years in education always have a higher gamma correlation on during their first 
intervention activity regardless of the intervention activity.  Furthermore the results 
show that individuals who have a lower number of years in education tend to be less 
confident at predicting overall recall (for recalled and forgotten items) than those with a 
higher number of years in education (see Figure 5.5). Correlational analyses showed 
that none of the other covariates had a significant direct relationship with JOL gamma 
correlations. When each covariate was included in ANCOVAs and as between-subjects 
factors in ANOVAs separately no noteworthy results were found.  
 
5.3.3.7 Intertrial recall (ITR) results 
 
Table 5.6 and 5.7 show the mean ITR for participants who either started with the 
crossword or colouring intervention first. The within-subjects factor of trial was 
included in the analysis to produce a 2 x 3 x 5 x 2 ANOVA. The results showed a 
significant main effect of trial on ITR (F (4, 60) = 99.126, p<0.001, η² = 0.869). The 
marginal means confirmed that recall was on average 59.29% higher on the fifth trial 
compared to the first trial. None of the other factors produced significant main effects 
on ITR. There were two significant two-way interactions; firstly, between trial and visit 
(F (8, 120) = 2.435, p<0.05, η² = 0.140), and secondly, between first intervention 
activity and intervention activity (F (1, 15) = 33.863, p<0.001, η² = 0.693). The first 
interaction does not shed any light on the impact of either activity on ITR and the 
second interaction simply indicates that participants, on average, recall 12.25% more 
words during their second intervention period compare to their first, regardless of 
specific activity. There were no three-way or four-way significant interactions on ITR.  
 
Correlation analysis showed that while participants were on their last visit during the 
colouring intervention there was a significant relationship between the higher number of 
years in education and mean ITR (r = 0.487, p<0.05). However this was not found on 
any other visit. The covariate was included in an ANCOVA and as a between-subjects 
factor in an ANOVA and no noteworthy results were found. Correlational analysis 
showed that neither previous total crossword activity nor total cognitive activity was 
significantly associated with ITR. When these covariates were included in ANCOVAs 
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and as between-subjects factors the original ANOVA results were repeated and neither 
factors produced a significant interaction with the original factors. 
 
Table 5.6 Mean ITR (standard error) for baseline (BL) and visits (V) 1-6 of the 
intervention period for participants who began with the crossword intervention 
activity 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 
BL 7.00 (0.71) 9.38 (0.68) 10.88 (0.97) 12.13 (0.83) 13.50 (1.10) 
V1 7.50 (1.09) 10.63 (1.08) 11.38 (0.98) 12.88 (1.41) 12.63 (1.28) 
V2 8.13 (1.49) 10.63 (1.08) 12.13 (1.19) 13.63 (0.94) 13.63 (1.12) 
V3 7.75 (1.03) 10.50 (0.73) 12.50 (1.02) 13.25 (0.92) 14.50 (0.68) 
V4 8.75 (1.08) 12.63 (1.03) 12.88 (1.13) 15.25 (0.84) 15.13 (1.09) 
V5 8.75 (0.45) 12.50 (1.48) 15.50 (0.85) 15.63 (1.13) 16.00 (0.89) 
V6 10.25 (1.11) 12.88 (1.52) 13.88 (1.87) 14.50 (1.43) 16.38 (1.28) 
 
Table 5.7 Mean ITR (standard error) for baseline (BL) and visits (V) 1-6 of the 
intervention period for participants who began with the colouring intervention 
activity 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 
BL 8.44 (0.60) 10.11 (0.48) 11.22 (0.57) 12.11 (0.72) 12.89 (0.68) 
V1 9.11 (0.65) 10.13 (0.88) 12.56 (0.73) 13.11 ( 0.81) 14.33 (1.14) 
V2 8.89 (0.63) 11.44 (0.75) 14.11 (0.84) 14.56 (0.58) 15.44 (0.84) 
V3 8.67 (0.53) 11.44 (0.41) 12.11 (0.93) 13.67 (0.67) 15.44 (1.00) 
V4 9.89 (0.92) 12.56 (0.82) 13.33 (0.76) 14.78 (0.91) 16.22 (1.04) 
V5 11.11 (0.75) 13.78 (1.06) 14.89 (0.86) 16.11 (0.95) 15.89 (1.22) 
V6 9.44 (0.84) 11.89 (0.87) 13.89 (0.70) 15.00 (0.78) 17.00 (0.75) 
 
There was a significant negative correlation between socialisation score and mean ITR 
during the first and second visit of the crossword intervention period (r = -0.614, p<0.01 
and r = -0.515, p=0.01 respectively) and on the first visit of the colouring intervention 
period (r = -0.551, p<0.05).These results suggest that individuals who have a higher 
socialisation score recall significantly fewer words on average during the intertrial 
tasks. Socialisation score was entered as a covariate and as a between-subjects factor 
but no notable results were found.  
 
Correlational analysis confirmed the baseline findings that final cryptic completion rate 
was significantly related to mean ITR (r = 0.734, p = 0.001). The analysis also shows a 
positive relationship between final cryptic crossword completion rate and mean ITR for 
participants who were on their final visit during the colouring intervention (r = 0.518, 
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p<0.05). These results suggest that the ability to complete cryptic crosswords is linked 
to superior ITR. No noteworthy were found when this covariate was included in an 
ANCOVA or as a between-subjects factor in an ANOVA.  
 
5.3.3.8 Intertrial consolidation (ITC) results  
 
Table 5.8 and 5.9 show the ITC for individuals who started with the crossword 
intervention activity and colouring activity. Unlike ITR there was only four levels for 
the factor of trial because ITC could not be calculated for the last trial, therefore a 2 x 3 
x 4 x 2 ANOVA was used (see Chapter Three for explanation). There were no 
significant main effects of either intervention activity (F = 0.102), visit (F = 1.574) or 
first intervention activity (F = 0.21) on ITC. There was, however, a significant main 
effect of trial on ITC (F (3, 45) = 7.336, p<0.001, η² =0.328). Mean consolidation was 
10.44% higher on the last trial compared to the first trial. Once again there was a 
significant two-way interaction between first intervention activity and intervention 
activity (F (1, 15) = 10.192, p<0.01, η² = 0.405). Mean consolidation was 6.93% higher 
during the second intervention activity. There were no other significant two-way, three-
way or four-way interactions for ITC.  
 
Table 5.8 Mean ITC (standard error) for baseline (BL) and visits (V) 1-6 of the 
intervention period for participants who began with the crossword intervention 
activity 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 
BL 79.68 (5.39) 64.72 (7.42) 74.27 (6.70) 76.26 (5.20) 
V1 73.32 (7.38) 77.32 (4.21) 80.57 (7.59) 80.70 (5.11) 
V2 78.90 (5.04) 79.02 (7.08) 85.75 (3.13) 79.90 (4.06) 
V3 69.24 (6.30) 69.82 (10.86) 79.12 (5.44) 84.06 (3.82) 
V4 87.40 (5.56) 76.46 (5.09) 86.34 (3.51) 84.10 (3.53) 
V5 77.83 (6.01) 84.64 (4.35) 80.47 (5.26) 84.88 (4.55) 
V6 69.92 (9.16) 85.43 (5.68) 84.84 (3.44) 94.49 (1.81) 
 
Correlational analysis showed that there was no direct relationship between number of 
years and education and ITC. The covariate was included in an ANOVA and as a 
between subjects factor, but no notable results were found. The results show that 
previous total crossword activity was significantly inversely related to ITC when 
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participants were undertaking the first and last visit in the crossword intervention period 
(r = -0.558, p<0.05 and r = -0.571, p<0.05, respectively). When the covariate was 
included in an ANCOVA and as a between-subjects factor in an ANOVA there was no 
evidence to support these correlations which indicate that participants who were more 
accustomed to attempting crosswords had a lower ITC when undertaking the crossword 
intervention activity. There was also no change to the results of the original ANOVA 
when this covariate was included.  
 
There was no evidence of a direct relationship between ITC and total cognitive activity 
when using correlational analysis. When this covariate was included in an ANCOVA 
the results showed a significant interaction between intervention activity and visit (F (2, 
28) = 4.150, p<0.05, η² = 0.229). The marginal means suggest that ITC increased across 
the colouring intervention period but not the crossword intervention period. However it 
must be acknowledged that ITC peaks during the second visit for each intervention 
period, therefore the results are likely to be an anomaly. The results of the ANCOVA 
suggested two significant three-way interactions between intervention activity, visit and 
total cognitive activity (F (2, 28) = 4.446, p<0.05, η² = 0.241) and visit, trial and total 
cognitive activity (F (6, 84) = 2.315, p<0.05, η² = 0.142). However, when total 
cognitive activity was entered as a between-subjects factor none of these interactions 
were significant. Correlational analysis did not show a direct relationship between 
socialisation score and ITC. Furthermore this covariate did not change the results of the 
original ANOVA and there were no noteworthy results when the covariate was included 
as a between-subjects factor.  
 
Table 5.9 Mean ITC (standard error) for baseline (BL) and visits (V) 1-6 of the 
intervention period for participants who began with the colouring intervention 
activity 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 
BL 69.95 (5.57) 66.73 (4.38) 68.77 (4.54) 73.56 (2.40) 
V1 62.78 (7.52) 66.38 (5.72) 78.20 (4.85) 78.68 (5.22) 
V2 76.79 (4.87) 76.45 (3.58) 82.07 (2.05) 83.94 (4.74) 
V3 77.16 (4.97) 70.65 (6.46) 75.67 (2.55) 81.86 (4.08) 
V4 74.18 (5.75) 82.16 (3.40) 81.11 (3.99) 83.02 (5.50) 
V5 81.03 (3.67) 83.66 (3.01) 87.49 (4.29) 79.98 (5.84) 
V6 80.13 (4.35) 77.43 (2.04) 83.80 (3.42) 88.80 (3.44) 
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The correlation results confirm the positive relationship between final cryptic crossword 
completion rate and mean ITC, however this was only evident at baseline (r = 0.746, 
p=0.001). It is unclear why this relationship was not apparent across the entire 
intervention period since final cryptic crossword completion was a post-hoc calculation. 
However, the results of the ANCOVA also suggested that final crossword completion 
rate had a significant main effect on ITC (F (1, 14) = 4.788, p<0.05, η² = 0.255). 
Controlling for final cryptic completion rates did not any results of note. This was also 
true when the covariate was included as a between-subjects factor in an ANOVA. 
  
5.3.3.9 Intertrial Encoding (ITE) results 
 
The mean ITE for participants who started with the crossword or colouring intervention 
activity are illustrated in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 respectively. A 2 x 3 x 5 x 2 ANOVA 
included the within-subjects factor of trial to analyse the ITE results (see chapter 2 for 
justification). There was a significant main effect of trial on ITE (F (4, 52) = 10.062, 
p<0.001, η² = 0.436). The marginal means show mean ITE was 17.58% higher on the 
last trial compared to the first trial. There were no other significant main effects on this 
dependent variable. The only significant two-way interaction on ITE was between the 
factors of intervention activity and first intervention activity (F (1, 13) = 6.664, p<0.05, 
η² = 0.339). On average ITE was 9.48% higher during the second intervention period 
compared to the first. There were no other significant three-way or four-way 
interactions. 
 
On the last visit for the colouring intervention correlational analysis indicated that there 
was a positive relationship between number of years in education and ITE (r = 0.612, 
p<0.01), however this was not apparent over any other visit. The ANCOVA which 
included the covariate of number of years in education showed no noteworthy results. 
This was also the case when number of years in education was included as a between-
subjects factor and added to the original ANOVA  
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Table 5.10 Mean ITE (standard error) for baseline (BL) and visits (V) 1-6 of the 
intervention period for participants who began with the crossword intervention 
activity 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 
BL 35.00 (3.54) 29.95 (3.02) 44.05 (5.92) 40.77 (4.06) 53.17 (6.32) 
V1 37.50 (5.43) 41.86 (5.78) 37.11 (7.92) 43.21 (7.97) 44.07 (13.97) 
V2 40.63 (7.47) 37.21 (5.58) 41.06 (7.38) 52.19 (12.10) 47.92 (10.75) 
V3 38.75 (5.15) 46.27 (5.70) 50.28 (4.34) 45.15 (7.18) 47.88 (9.96) 
V4 43.75 (5.41) 46.02 (4.23) 42.74 (8.43) 64.86 (11.71) 58.19 (12.81) 
V5 43.75 (2.27) 52.65 (10.26) 61.63 (7.04) 61.90 (16.08) 66.67 (10.29) 
V6 51.25 (5.57) 55.55 (7.77) 43.68 (8.38) 52.68 (11.33) 62.02 (10.63) 
 
Figure 5.6 shows that the pattern in terms of mean ITE is relatively similar between 
individuals classed as having a high or low number of years in education when they are 
undertaking each activity for the first two visits. However individuals with a high 
number of years in education show a drop in mean encoding when they are attempting 
the crossword intervention and an increase in mean encoding when they are doing the 
colouring intervention on their final visit. Individuals who were classed as having a 
lower number of years in education show the opposite relationship, that is a mean drop 
in ITE when they are attempting the colouring intervention and a slight increase in 
mean ITE when they are doing the crossword intervention (on the final visit). 
 
Table 5.11 Mean ITE (standard error) for baseline (BL) and visits (V) 1-6 of the 
intervention period for participants who began with the colouring intervention 
activity 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 
BL 42.22 (3.02) 37.47 (2.00) 45.17 (3.34) 49.71 (4.94) 50.31 (8.06) 
V1 45.56 (3.27) 39.35 (5.23) 59.39 (4.96) 49.20 (10.17) 63.89 (8.83) 
V2 44.44 (3.17) 41.58 (3.57) 63.98 (6.01) 54.44 (7.72) 63.00 (10.25) 
V3 43.33 (2.64) 44.40 (4.94) 46.03 (5.13) 58.97 (7.19) 69.09 (9.26) 
V4 49.44 (4.60) 53.41 (8.18) 43.58 (6.64) 61.64 (7.07) 65.74 (12.49) 
V5 55.56 (3.77) 57.35 (7.94) 66.54 (6.83) 65.83 (8.46) 71.11 (13.60) 
V6 47.22 (4.18) 42.52 (6.66) 62.08 (9.64) 57.90 (11.98) 78.84 (7.57) 
 
Correlational analysis did not show any direct relationship between previous total 
crossword activity and ITE. The covariate did not change the original results when it 
was included in an ANCOVA or in an ANOVA as a between-subjects factor. There was 
also no direct relationship between total cognitive activity and ITE when using 
correlational analysis. The ANCOVA showed a significant main effect of intervention 
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activity on ITE (F (1, 12) = 5.355, p<0.05, η² = 0.309). The marginal means showed a 
2.67% higher ITE when participants undertook the colouring intervention compared to 
the crossword intervention. The results also indicated a significant interaction between 
intervention activity and total cognitive activity on ITE (F (1, 12) = 4.771, p<0.05, η² = 
0.284).  
 
 
 
When total cognitive activity was included as a between-subjects factor the results 
confirm the significant two-way interaction between intervention activity and total 
cognitive activity (F (1, 11) = 7.429, p<0.05, η² = 0.403). The marginal means showed 
that for individuals classed as having a high previous total cognitive activity mean ITE 
during the crossword intervention were 24.29% higher than individuals classed as 
having a low previous total cognitive activity. Whereas during the colouring 
intervention individuals with lower previous total cognitive activity encoded on average 
2.42% more during the colouring intervention than those in the high total cognitive 
activity group.  
 
Figure 5.6. Significant three-way interaction between number of years in 
education, intervention activity and visit on ITE. 
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There was a significant three-way interaction between first intervention activity, trial 
and intervention activity on ITE (F (4, 44) =3.440, p<0.05, η² = 0.238). The marginal 
means showed that encoding across trials was always higher for participant‘s second 
activity. The results also show the highest ITE was gained on trials 4 and 5 for 
individuals who started with the colouring intervention but while they were undertaking 
the crossword intervention. There was also a significant three-way interaction between 
intervention activity, trial and total cognitive activity on ITE (F (4, 44) = 3.275, p<0.05, 
η² = 0.229). The marginal means indicate that individuals who are classed as having a 
high total cognitive activity have a higher mean ITE across all trials for both 
intervention activities. However the results also indicate that participants who have a 
lower total cognitive activity show a greater ITE while undertaking the colouring 
intervention compared to the crossword intervention. This pattern is reversed for 
individuals with a higher total cognitive activity; ITE, on average, is higher when they 
are attempting the crossword intervention activity as opposed to the colouring activity. 
 
There was no evidence of a direct relationship between socialisation score and ITE with 
correlational analysis. The ANCOVA which included socialisation score showed no 
notable results. When the covariate was included as a between-subjects factor there was 
a significant three-way interaction between socialisation score, first intervention activity 
and intervention activity on ITE (F (1, 11) = 5.682, p<0.05, η² = 0.341). Figure 5.7 
shows that participants who are classed as having a low socialisation score have a 
higher mean overall ITE when they attempt the crossword intervention activity first, 
compared to the colouring activity, even though they achieve a slightly higher mean 
ITE while attempting the cryptic crossword intervention activity. For the high 
socialisation participants, mean ITE is higher when they are taking part in their second 
intervention, regardless of the specific activity. Furthermore this group showed a higher 
overall mean ITE when they start with the colouring activity compared to the crossword 
intervention activity.  
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Socialisation, intervention activity and trial significantly interacted on ITE (F (4, 44) = 
3.539, p<0.05, η² = 0.243). The marginal means suggested that for overall encoding 
there was almost no difference between individuals classed as having a high or low 
socialisation score. However ITE increased at a greater rate across trials for individuals 
with a higher socialisation score when they were attempting the crossword intervention 
activity compared to the colouring activity. For individuals with a low socialisation 
score the pattern was reversed but to a lesser degree; encoding across trials was slightly 
greater when these participants were undertaking the colouring intervention activity 
compared to the crossword intervention activity.  
 
There was also a significant three-way interaction between trial, visit and intervention 
activity on ITE (F (8, 88) = 2.281, p<0.05, η² = 0.172). The marginal means indicate 
that ITE across later trials is greater on visits 1 and 2 for people who are attempting the 
crossword intervention activity than for individuals who are undertaking the colouring 
intervention activity. However, for those who are attempting the cryptic crosswords 
mean encoding across later trials is lower on the final visit compared to the first two 
visits and the last two visits for individuals who are undertaking the colouring 
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Figure 5.7. Significant three-way interaction between socialisation score, 
intervention activity and first intervention activity on ITE.  
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intervention activity. There was an apparent direct relationship between final cryptic 
crossword completion rate and ITE for participants who were on their last visit of the 
colouring intervention activity (r = 0.715, p = 0.001). This covariate did not produce 
any results of note when included in an ANCOVA or as a between-subjects factor.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
This study aimed to investigate whether attempting cryptic crosswords on a regular 
basis altered cognitive performance. This study also examined whether there was a 
difference in terms of subjective and objective measures of cognition. Throughout the 
analysis demographic variables were taken into account to explore whether these 
variables mediated the effects of the intervention activity. Table 5.12 summarises the 
key findings of the results.  
 
Table 5.12. Overview of significant main effects of cryptic crossword intervention, 
significant interactions between the crossword intervention and visit, and the 
influence of demographic variables (covariates). 
 
Crossword 
Intervention 
activity 
Intervention 
activity X 
visit 
Effects of covariates 
E
p
is
o
d
ic
 M
em
S
E
 
Yes No 
Controlling for previous total cognitive activity 
produced a significant interaction between visit, 
intervention activity and first intervention activity 
(see section 6.3.3.1). Significant interaction 
between previous total crossword activity and 
intervention activity (see Figure 5.2). 
 
T
o
ta
l 
M
em
S
E
 
No No 
Direct effect of socialisation score indicating a 
higher socialisation score associated with a higher 
total MemSE.  
M
em
o
ry
 
S
tr
at
eg
y
 
No No None 
C
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
S
tr
en
g
th
 
No No 
Small effect of crossword intervention activity 
when controlling for socialisation score (see 
section 6.3.3.4). 
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JO
L
 
M
ag
n
it
u
d
e
 
No No 
Controlling for previous total crossword activity 
produced a significant interaction (Figure 5.4). 
Also significant interaction between intervention 
activity, status and previous total crossword 
activity. 
JO
L
 G
am
m
a 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
No No 
Significantly higher JOL gamma correlation when 
controlling for number of years in education. 
Significant interaction between number of years in 
education, intervention activity and first 
intervention activity (see Figure 5.5). Significant 
interaction between number of years in education 
and intervention activity (see section 6.3.3.6)  
 
IT
R
 
No No 
Direct negative association with socialisation 
score. Direct positive association with final cryptic 
crossword completion rate. 
 
IT
C
 
No No 
Direct negative association with previous total 
crossword activity. Controlling for total cognitive 
activity produced significant interaction between 
intervention activity and visit (see section 6.3.3.8). 
Direct positive association with final cryptic 
crossword completion rate.  
 
IT
E
 
No No 
Significant interaction between number of years in 
education, visit and intervention (see Figure 5.6). 
Significant interaction between total cognitive 
activity and intervention activity. Significant 
interaction between socialisation score, 
intervention activity and first intervention (see 
Figure 5.7). 
  
 
5.4.1 Subjective Measures 
 
Previous research has shown that cognitive training can significantly improve subjective 
measures of memory and cognitive functioning (e.g. West et al., 2008; Rapp et al., 
2002). Furthermore, there has shown to be a direct link between cognitive activity and 
self-reported cognitive functioning (e.g. Wilson et al., 2005). This study did not show a 
significant relationship between reported total cognitive activity, as measured by using a 
similar questionnaire to Wilson et al. (2005) and self-reported cognitive functioning at 
baseline. This is interesting as four self-report measures were used which covered 
 -259- 
episodic MemSE, global MemSE, confidence in one‘s own cognitive ability and the use 
of memory strategies. Therefore, the baseline results do not show support for either the 
use-dependency theory or cognitive reserve hypothesis when using self-reported 
cognitive activity and functioning measures. This is supportive of Jopp & Hertzog 
(2007) who showed no relationship between attempting activities such as cryptic 
crosswords and self-reported cognitive functioning when studying a cross-sectional 
sample population. 
 
The intervention period also showed a lack of support for the use-dependency theory. 
The crossword intervention did not produce an increase or decrease in reported total 
MemSE, cognitive strength or the use of memory strategies.  This was true when a 
mean was calculated over the two intervention periods for each dependent variable or 
when the results took into account the potential interaction with visit  across each 
intervention period (see Table 5.12). These results do not show that interventions, 
training or an increase in cognitive activity is associated to an increase in overall 
MemSE as reported by previous researchers such as Rebok & Balcerak (1989).  
 
However, the results do show support for the view that undertaking cryptic crosswords 
increases monitoring during episodic memory tasks. Table 5.12 shows that participants 
re-evaluate their episodic memory abilities when undertaking the crossword 
intervention. This supports research by Dunlosky et al. (2007, 2003) who demonstrated 
that self-testing (in this case undertaking cryptic crosswords) can encourage participants 
to reappraise their episodic memory abilities. This result is also supportive of Cavallini 
et al. (2003) who showed that specific cognitive intervention techniques can be more 
effective for one‘s cognitive functioning compared to another. For example, they found 
that different intervention techniques can have a larger impact on episodic memory 
ability or awareness and not affect everyday memory awareness or overall 
metacognition. There are two reasons why the current results show a dissociation 
between total MemSE and episodic MemSE; first, the intervention period is too short 
for any gains to be transferred to other, more general aspects of MemSE. Second, 
certain cognitive interventions only promote awareness of episodic memory. The 
second possibility is most likely because Cavallini et al. (2003) demonstrated that 
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abilities promoted by certain cognitive interventions can be transferred to objective 
measures of everyday memory functioning even if participants are unaware of it. 
Brehmer et al (2008) also showed that in comparison to younger participants, older 
participants need to be encouraged to use mnemonic strategies, which had been learnt 
effectively eleven months earlier. This indicates that although older adults are able to 
improve their memory with certain strategies they are unable to initiate the strategies 
without environmental supports. Furthermore, older adults who develop strategies 
through training to develop their cognitive functioning appear to be unable to transfer 
the new techniques to different cognitive tasks (e.g. Ball et al., 2002).  
 
If one assumes that the results support the view that undertaking regular cognitive 
activity promotes the monitoring aspect of Nelson & Narens‘ (1990) model, then the 
results indicate that older adults also have a deficit in the control aspect of the 
metacognition model.  Specifically, there was no evidence that participants reported 
using more mnemonic strategies as measured by the memory strategy questionnaire (see 
Table 5.12). This supports the research of Brigham & Pressley (1988), which shows that 
older adults are significantly impaired when choosing the most appropriate memory 
strategy for an episodic memory task. This is also supportive of Souchay & Isingrini 
(2004) who demonstrated that older adults do not adjust the amount of effort they put 
into cognitive tasks even though they are aware that the task has increased in difficulty. 
Furthermore Rabinowitz (1989) had confirmed a deficit in strategy selection by 
showing that age-related memory deficits can be significantly reduced by encouraging 
older adults to choose more appropriate mnemonic strategies. The results presented in 
Chapter Two also support the theory that all the adults do not apply strategies, which 
have been developed through attempting cryptic crosswords, to other aspects of 
cognitive functioning.  
 
Overall, the subject measures results show that reasonable doubt must be cast over 
research which has used self-report measures of cognitive activity or cognitive 
functioning. Unlike Bandura (1989) the results do not support the view that under 
taking cognitively stimulating activities promote confidence in ones cognitive abilities 
(e.g. MemSE). Furthermore, the results support the research of Sunderland et al. (1986) 
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who showed that self-report and subjective measures of cognitive appraisal can be 
unreliable. Hence, the current results must raise questions over the validity of previous 
research which has indicated a link between previous and/or current cognitive activities 
and cognitive functioning when using self-report measures of either variable (e.g. 
Wilson et al., 2005; Friedland et al., 2001; Christensen & MacKinnon, 1993). However 
it is important to take into account the mediating effects of demographic variables, 
which have been shown to influence the impact of both cognitive activity and cognitive 
interventions (e.g. Glisky & Glisky, 1999; Kondo et al., 1994). This is covered in 
Section 5.4.3.  
 
According to Berry (1999) the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive 
functioning is mediated by MemSE. However, Jopp & Hertzog (2007) have provided 
evidence that MemSE is a product of the interaction of cognitive activity and current 
cognitive functioning. Using structural equation modelling Jopp & Hertzog (2007) 
demonstrated that the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning 
is independent of beliefs about current memory ability, whereas the relationship 
between cognitive activity and MemSE is dependent on current cognitive functioning 
and the level of current cognitive activity. As testified in the next section even though 
older adults became more aware of their episodic memory functioning, there is no 
evidence that they used this increase in awareness to modify their episodic memory 
functioning. Due to the longitudinal nature of this study, the results suggest that the 
relationship between cognitive activities and cognitive functioning is not mediated by 
MemSE which is in support of the results of Studies Four and Four (a).  
 
5.4.2 Objective Measures  
 
Research has suggested that cognitively stimulating activities can produce observable 
change in objective measures of cognition when controlled intervention studies are 
conducted (e.g. Tranter & Koutstaal, 2008; Carlson et al., 2008). However the results of 
the current study provided no evidence to support the view that a prolonged cognitive 
intervention produces a significant increase in objective measures of metacognition, 
recall, consolidation or encoding of episodic or verbal memory. This was the case when 
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comparing the overall means for each intervention period and when the factor of visit 
was taken into account.  
 
As demonstrated in Table 5.12 there is no evidence of an improvement in cognitive 
functioning during the intervention period. This is not supportive of the use-dependency 
theory, and does not support previous research which has shown that an increase in 
cognitive activity through an intervention is also associated with an increase in memory 
functioning (e.g. Tranter & Koutstaal, 2008; Carlson et al., 2008; Willis et al., 2006; 
Cavallini et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2002). Furthermore, there is a lack of support for the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis from the baseline results. For example, there is no 
evidence that participants who have a higher number of years in education or who 
undertake more cognitive activities demonstrate superior metacognition or episodic 
memory abilities. This is not supportive of previous research such as van Hooren et al. 
(2007) or Wilson et al. (2005), which has shown that participants who report 
undertaking more cognitive activities and who have a greater number of years in 
education display improved cognitive functioning.  
 
The results also raise questions about the link between executive functioning, 
metacognition and cognitive functioning. Ball et al. (2002) and Willis et al. (2006) 
showed how a strategic cognitive intervention promoted objective measures of episodic 
memory and memory awareness. According to Kimball & Hollyoak (2000) there is a 
link between metacognition, executive functioning and the ability to transfer newly 
acquired skills to other cognitive tasks (see also Karbach & Kray, 2009). Furthermore if 
the view is accepted that undertaking cognitive activities promotes the monitoring 
component of Nelson & Narens‘ (1990) model the results should demonstrate that 
undertaking cryptic crosswords on a regular basis promotes metacognition, however 
this was not the case (see Chapter Two). Forshaw (unpublished) shows that cryptic 
crossword solving involves strategic cognitive functions which can be viewed as similar 
to the strategic training which was effective in Ball et al. (2002) and Willis et al. (2006), 
but the current study has not shown that these strategic tasks (associated with 
attempting cryptic crosswords) are transferred and improved objective measures of 
metacognition or episodic memory. Once again, the results support those of Brehmer et 
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al. (2008) who show that older adults are impaired at initiating memory strategies which 
they have been taught or have developed through training. 
 
Even though the subjective measures suggest that participants became more aware of 
their deficits in episodic memory there was no evidence that they used this awareness to 
enhance their episodic memory functioning. This is not supportive of Dunlosky et al. 
(2007, 2003) who showed that teaching participants to self-test can counteract the age 
deficits in episodic memory. It is possible however, that the participants were not aware 
that their specific objective metacognition or recall tasks were similar to the functioning 
which they appeared to become aware of lacking on the episodic MemSE questionnaire. 
Therefore the results support the view that older adults have difficulties transferring 
newly acquired memory strategies or metacognitive skills to other tasks (e.g. Karbach & 
Kray, 2009; Brigham & Pressley, 1988).  
 
The subjective measures of MemSE and the objective measures of metacognition 
support the results of Chapter Two, that is, that attempting cryptic crosswords promotes 
the monitoring pathways in older adults. Chapter Two suggests that older adults did not 
believe that attempting cryptic crosswords would be of an advantage for actual memory 
functioning which appears to have been supported with the objective measures of both 
episodic and verbal memory in this study. However, one possibility where older adults 
did not show an increase in memory functioning while doing the cryptic crossword 
intervention could be because the memory tests were experimenter-paced and not self-
paced. Dunlosky et al. (2007) provided convincing evidence that self-testing (presumed 
to have been increased by attempting the cryptic crosswords) only enhanced memory 
functioning when the participants had time to self-test during the learning task. 
Therefore, it is not inconceivable that cryptic crosswords can increase episodic memory 
functioning, but only under self-paced learning conditions.  
 
The results demonstrate the inconsistencies that have been apparent in previous research 
which has investigated the use-dependency theory. For example Floyd & Scogin (1997) 
concluded that an intervention activity is likely to have a larger impact on objective 
rather than subjective measures of cognition, whereas Rapp et al. (2002) concluded that 
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it is easier to alter participants subjective views of their cognitive abilities compared to 
actual objective measures when conducting an intervention study. This current study 
supports the results of Rapp et al. (2002) with regards to the larger impact on subjective 
compared to objective measures of memory and cognition. Once again, in line with 
Jopp & Hertzog (2007) their results suggest that the relationship between cognitive 
activity and actual cognitive functioning is not mediated by subjective opinions of 
cognitive functioning as suggested by Berry (1999). In fact, the results suggest that the 
relationship between cognitive activity and self reported cognitive functioning is 
independent of actual cognitive functioning, especially with regard to episodic memory.  
 
Overall the results from the objective measures do not show that a cognitive 
intervention which is based on an everyday cognitive activity (i.e. cryptic crosswords) 
can improve objective measures of either metacognition or episodic memory. This does 
not support previous research by Tranter & Koutstaal (2008) who showed that 
undertaking problem solving and word game activities promoted objective measures of 
cognition. The results support those of Rapp et al. (2002) who suggested that it is more 
likely to find a subjective rather than an objective change in cognitive functioning 
following an intervention activity. Finally the results support the view that evidence 
which has been provided for support of the cognitive reserve hypothesis or use-
dependency theory may be due to the use of a between-subjects technique and not a 
direct relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning/decline. Hence, 
supporting Jopp & Hertzog (2007) the results suggest that there is a different 
relationship between cognitive activity and both self-reported and objective cognitive 
functioning. However, unlike Jopp & Hertzog (2007) the results suggest that cognitive 
activity does not have a significant influence on objective measures of cognitive 
functioning. Therefore, in line with the conclusions of Chapter Two, the results indicate 
that cognitive activity promotes the awareness of cognitive functioning in older adults, 
these individuals do not utilise this awareness to modify their cognitive functioning.  
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5.4.3 Demographic Mediating Factors 
 
Table 5.12 illustrates how demographic factors can mediate the effectiveness of a 
cognitive intervention. Of interest is that the results show that there is a difference in 
terms of the effectiveness of the crossword intervention between participants who differ 
on the basis of total cognitive activity or number of years in education. This is apparent 
on the episodic MemSE and the two objective measures of metacognition. The results 
show that individuals who can be classed as having a low cognitive reserve (i.e. who 
have fewer number of years in education or report a lower participation in cognitive 
activities) appear to show a significant increase in cognitive awareness when 
undertaking the crossword intervention activity. 
 
In fact, the results show that both objective and subjective measures of memory 
awareness (particularly episodic memory awareness) are significantly improved for 
individuals who can be classed as having a low cognitive reserve. This supports the 
research by Christensen & Mackinnon (1993) which showed that cognitive decline was 
significantly lower in individuals who were highly cognitively active but who had a 
relatively low number of years in education compared to those who were both 
cognitively inactive and had a low number of years in education.  The results also 
support those of Carlson et al. (2008) who showed that an everyday cognitive 
intervention had a significant impact on participants who have been classed as being at 
risk of cognitive decline due to demographic factors (e.g. Van der Bij et al., 2002). 
  
There is also some evidence that the crossword intervention can be beneficial for 
objective measures of encoding for participants classed as having a low cognitive 
reserve. For example Figure 5.6 shows that over the intervention period ITE increased 
for participants who had fewer years in education when they were attempting the 
crossword intervention and ITE decreased for these participants when they were 
attempting the colouring intervention. This pattern was reversed for individuals who 
had a higher number of years in education.  
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However, the results did not demonstrate that the crossword intervention promoted 
objective measures of episodic memory functioning in individuals who could be classed 
as having a low cognitive reserve. In fact, the results showed that individuals who 
reported a higher total cognitive activity showed a significant increase in ITE while 
undertaking the crossword intervention, which was not evident for participants who 
reported a lower total cognitive activity. This pattern is reversed for the colouring 
activity, that is, participants who are classed as having a lower total cognitive activity 
show a higher ITE than those who have a higher total cognitive activity classification. 
This is supportive of Bissig & Lustig (2007) who demonstrated that intervention 
techniques appear to be more effective for individuals who display a higher level of 
cognitive functioning
21
.  
 
Although the majority of the sample population had not undertaken cryptic crosswords 
before the intervention activity, the results suggested a link between the ability to 
complete cryptic crosswords and objective measures of episodic memory. The baseline 
results illustrated that the ability to undertake cryptic crossword (measured post-hoc 
when participants attempted the crosswords) was directly associated with both episodic 
memory recall and consolidation. Unfortunately it is not possible to determine the 
causal relationship but it is likely that the ability to solve cryptic crosswords and to 
complete the episodic memory tests have a number of abilities in common. Furthermore 
the results support the idea that processes which are required to complete cryptic 
crosswords are also associated with improving one‘s own memory abilities. It is unclear 
what these specific functions might be, however based on the research of Forshaw 
(unpublished) and Dunlosky et al. (2003; 2007) it is likely that the ability to complete 
cryptic crosswords involves both metacognition and executive functioning. Both 
metacognition and executive functioning have been shown to be critical for the transfer 
of cognitive training to other cognitive abilities (e.g. Kimball & Hollyoak, 2000).  
 
However, there was no evidence to support Hultsch et al. (1999) who showed that novel 
information processing activities (i.e. attempting cryptic crosswords) was associated 
                                               
21  Although it must be noted that ITE is higher across both intervention periods for participants who 
report a higher total cognitive activity compared to those who report a lower total cognitive activity. 
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with higher objective measures of cognitive functioning. This does not support Park et 
al. (2007) who suggested that a novel activity is a more effective cognitive intervention 
as novel activities tend to stimulate neurogenesis more than well practised activities 
(e.g. Grabner, Neubauer & Stern, 2006). Furthermore, the results also showed that there 
is no apparent difference between those who are able to complete the cryptic 
crosswords and those who are less able to do so, on subjective or objective measures of 
cognition.   
 
In conclusion, the results demonstrate how a within-subjects technique can be used to 
assess a cognitive intervention by removing demographic mediating factors. The design 
has also demonstrated how mediating factors which have been implicated as being 
almost impossible to control for (e.g. Hertzog, 2009; Jopp & Hertzog, 2007) can be 
analysed in the second phase of analysis. Unlike Park et al. (2007) the results suggest 
that individuals who have the hallmarks of a lower cognitive reserve benefit more from 
a realistic cognitive intervention which supports Karbach & Kray (2009). This design 
supports the view of Salthouse (2006; 2007) in that when mediating factors are all 
controlled for (i.e. using a within-subjects design) there is a distinct lack of support for 
the use-dependency theory. However, the results do support those of Glisky & Glisky 
(1999) in that an intervention could benefit a certain subgroup of older adult. 
 
5.4.4 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the baseline results do not provide any support for either the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis or the use-dependency theory. This is not supportive of the results of 
studies covered in Chapter Two of this thesis. For the entire sample population there is 
also no evidence for the use-dependency theory from the intervention period results. 
This is true for subjective and objective measures of cognition with the exception of 
subjective measures of episodic MemSE. The results from the episodic MemSE analysis 
indicate that undertaking cognitive activities, specifically cryptic crosswords, promote 
cognitive awareness in later life. This finding supports the view that attempting a 
cognitive activity on a regular basis can reinforce the monitoring component of the 
metacognition model proposed by Nelson & Narens (1990). However, the results also 
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show that older adults have a deficit in the control function of this model because there 
is no evidence that the participants are able to use this increase in awareness to enhance 
their metacognitive or episodic memory abilities.  
 
There is a disparity between subjective and objective measures of cognition. This is 
magnified when mediating demographic factors are included in the analysis. These 
results support the view of Glisky & Glisky (1999) who highlighted the fact that certain 
cognitive interventions will only be beneficial for individuals with specific demographic 
factors, for example people who have been relatively cognitively inactive or who have a 
lower number of years in education. This does not support Park et al. (2007) who 
suggested that cognitive interventions are more effective of individuals who have higher 
levels of cognitive functioning (e.g. those who have a greater number of years in 
education), however the results are in line with Karbach & Kray (2009) in that an 
everyday cognitive intervention appears to benefit all the adults who can be identified 
as at risk of low functioning. Finally, the results show the importance of not relying on 
self-report measures of either cognitive activity or cognitive functioning which has been 
the case in previous research. The results show that there is a need to use a within-
subjects design and take objective measures of both cognitive activity and functioning 
when investigating the use-dependency theory.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Overview of thesis aims 
 
The majority of research has shown a positive correlation between cognitive activity 
and cognitive functioning throughout the lifespan and particularly in later life. This 
gave rise to the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency theory. However, it is 
in no way conclusive that an increase in cognitive activity (throughout life or in later 
life) will attenuate the cognitive decline associated with healthy or pathological aging. 
Methodological issues have meant that the interpretation of previous research (e.g. Jopp 
& Hertzog, 2007; Barnes et al., 2006; Verghese et al., 2003) is difficult. That is, further 
research was (and still is) needed to understand whether an increase in cognitive activity 
at any stage in life can reverse or slow the cognitive aging process. With regards to 
methodology of previous research, this thesis addressed four specific topics. These are 
specifically: the use of a between- versus within-subjects design, the measures of 
cognitive activity, the assessment of cognitive functioning and the use of questionnaire 
compared to intervention techniques.  
 
6.1.1 Between-subject versus within-subject techniques 
 
First, whether the use of a within-subjects design would provide different evidence for 
either the use-dependency theory or cognitive reserve hypothesis. The majority of 
previous research has compared two groups of participants; one who has been 
categorised as being active and another who has been categorised as relatively inactive 
(in terms of cognitive activity, in particular, but also social and physical activity). Elias 
& Wagster (2007) are amongst a number of researchers who have indicated that 
demographic factors can directly and indirectly affect the course of cognitive decline 
throughout the lifespan. Furthermore, certain cognitive factors (e.g. MemSE and 
cognitive functioning) can mediate the relationship between cognitive activity and 
cognitive decline, potentially in combination with mediating demographic factors. 
Hertzog (2009) acknowledged that it was impossible to control for every potential 
 -270- 
mediating or confounding variable when using a between-subjects technique. Therefore 
this thesis compared the use of a between- and within-subjects technique when 
investigating both the cognitive reserve and use-dependency theories.  
 
6.1.2 Measures of cognitive activity 
 
The second issue addressed by this thesis is related to the measure of cognitive activity. 
The measures of cognitive activity have varied greatly over the 30 years of investigation 
into the use-it-or-lose-it theory. Salthouse (2007) suggested that there is no consensus as 
to what constitutes a cognitive activity when investigating the relationship between 
cognitive activity and cognitive decline. Typically, research has used self-reported 
measures of cognitive activity. Not only has the type of activity varied between studies, 
but also the time period of undertaking the activity being measured has also varied. For 
example Barnes et al. (2006) investigated self-reported cognitive activity throughout the 
entire lifespan (starting in early childhood), whereas Dellenbach & Zimprich (2008) 
focussed on current cognitive activity. Furthermore, some research has taken self-
reported retrospective activity measures from family members/friends of patients with 
dementia (e.g. Friedland et al., 2001; Kondo et al., 1995).  
 
Both Sunderland et al. (1986) and Memon et al. (2003) have argued that older adults are 
less reliable with reporting facts which have occurred previously compared to younger 
adults. Furthermore, activity can be directly affected by preclinical dementia and other 
psychological disorders such as depression (e.g. Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004; Verghese et 
al., 2003). Salthouse (2006) has also shown how different cognitive activities require a 
different amount of cognitive effort, therefore it is potentially invalid to produce a 
composite of total cognitive activity based on self-reported measures. This is especially 
the case when the activity questionnaires have been developed by younger adults who 
may not be aware of leisure activities undertaken by older adults (Salthouse, 2007).  
 
A further issue with a number of activity measures used to investigate the use-
dependency theory is that they have either grouped cognitive activities differently (e.g. 
Jopp & Hertzog, 2007; Hultsch et al., 1999) or not discriminated between specific types 
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of cognitive activity (e.g. types of crosswords). Hambrick et al. (1999) and Forshaw 
(unpublished) have demonstrated that the cognitive skills required to complete a cryptic 
crossword are different to those required to solve a general knowledge or quick 
crossword; and it is possible that these different skills may have a different effect on 
cognitive decline associated with healthy aging. 
 
This thesis used two different measures of cognitive activity: the standard self-report 
technique (but separating reported frequency of different crossword types) and a 
manipulation of stimulus characteristics. As covered in Chapter One, Three and Four, it 
is likely that differences within a specific cognitive domain (i.e. language) can be used 
as an analogy of either the cognitive reserve hypothesis or use-dependency theory. The 
benefit of this is that cognitive activities (i.e. stimulus characteristic) are measured 
objectively and therefore removes possible confounds. An objective measurement of 
cognitive activity was also provided in the intervention study (Chapter Five). 
Participants were required to attempt cryptic crosswords on a regular basis, and an 
objective measure of crossword completion rate was taken. Both these methods 
removed the potential problem of using self-report techniques when measuring 
cognitive activity.  
 
6.1.3 Assessing cognitive functioning 
 
The third aim of this thesis was to investigate whether the use-dependency theory 
and/or the cognitive reserve hypothesis was more evident when using subjective or 
objective measures. Similar to the second aim, previous research has shown that an 
increase in cognitive activity has a larger impact on objective measures of cognitive 
functioning (e.g. Rapp et al., 2002) whereas other research has found an increase in 
subjective, but not objective, measures of cognitive functioning when  using cognitive 
intervention techniques (e.g. Rebok et al., 2007; Floyd & Scogin, 1997).  
 
If an increase in cognitive activity attenuates cognitive decline in later life, it is 
important to understand how this association is brought about. Berry (1999) has argued 
that the relationship between cognitive activity and objective measures of cognitive 
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functioning is mediated by MemSE (subjective memory awareness). Berry (1999) states 
that an increase in MemSE will encourage older adults to undertake more cognitive 
activities and be more confident in their cognitive functioning. This is believed to be a 
reciprocal relationship. However, Jopp & Hertzog (2007) argued that subjective ratings 
of MemSE are a by-product of current cognitive functioning. They argue that as 
functioning declines with age, people feel less confident (i.e. have a drop in MemSE) 
and therefore attempt fewer cognitive activities. Jopp & Hertzog (2007) also believe 
that this relationship is reciprocal and has demonstrated that the relationship between 
cognitive activity and objective measures of cognitive functioning is independent of 
MemSE. Furthermore, Jopp & Hertzog (2007) showed that the relationship between 
MemSE and cognitive activity is mediated by current cognitive functioning.  
 
This thesis postulates that the metacognition system is vital to understanding how 
cognitive activity influences cognitive functioning. Through questionnaire technique, 
laboratory studies and intervention technique, it was possible to investigate the 
relationship between different measures of cognitive activity and the relationship with 
both subjective and objective measures of cognitive functioning.  
 
6.1.4 Questionnaire versus intervention techniques 
 
Finally, previous studies have used questionnaires to identify potential cognitive 
activities which are negatively associated with cognitive decline in later life (e.g. Jopp 
& Hertzog, 2007). However, cognitive intervention studies have tended not to use these 
activities when formulating interventions (e.g. Smith et al., 2009). The majority of 
cognitive interventions appear to only be effective for the cognitive domain which has 
been targeted by the intervention activity (e.g. Willis et al., 2006); that is they appear to 
be non-transferrable to everyday functioning.  
 
Hertzog (2009) is one of a number of researchers who have argued that there is a need 
to develop cost effective interventions which are based on an everyday cognitive 
activity. By doing this, the intervention will not require a large investment with regards 
to training participants and will be widely available. This thesis used questionnaire 
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studies to identify a particular everyday activity which appeared to increase cognitive 
awareness in older adults. This activity (taking part in cryptic crosswords) was then 
used in an intervention technique using a within-subjects design (see above and Chapter 
Five). This enabled a comparison of subjective and objective measures of both 
undertaking cryptic crosswords and cognitive functioning in a number of cognitive 
domains.  
 
6.2 Summary of thesis findings 
 
Table 6.1 shows the key findings from each study which constitutes this thesis. Each 
study provides information which has focussed on one or more of the specific aims 
outlined in Section 6.1. Discussion of the key findings will follow in subsequent 
sections.  
 
 Table 6.1. Summary of key findings. 
Study Design Key Findings 
 
One 
 
Questionnaire: 
Between-subjects 
 
 Subjective ratings of one‘s own memory 
decline with age. 
 Cryptic crossword frequency had a larger 
impact than quick or general knowledge 
crosswords on subjective measures of 
cognition (especially in older adults 
compared to younger adults). 
 
Two Questionnaire: 
Between-subjects 
 Significant negative correlation between age 
and both MemSE and self-reported 
metacognition. 
 Cryptic crosswords, in particular, positively 
associated with increase in cognitive 
awareness but not the use of cognitive 
strategies. 
 When controlling for crossword completion 
rate, older adults who attempted more cryptic 
crosswords appeared to have a more realistic 
view of their cognitive abilities than those 
who attempted fewer such crosswords.  
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Three Questionnaire: 
Between-subjects 
 MemSE decreases with age. 
 Cryptic crosswords promote self-reported 
cognitive awareness and MemSE in the 
whole sample population.  
 Compared to the younger adults, older adults 
who attempt more cryptic crosswords believe 
that such crosswords promote cognitive 
awareness, which is not the case for general 
knowledge crossword frequency. 
Four Questionnaire: 
Between-subjects 
 Older adults reported giving up attempting 
cryptic crosswords more than younger adults. 
 Proportion of one‘s life spent attempting 
cryptic crosswords and perceived ease of 
cryptic clues were positively associated with 
episodic MemSE in older but not younger 
adults. 
 Participants who had given up cryptic 
crosswords had a significantly lower episodic 
MemSE than those who still attempted 
cryptic crosswords. This was more evident in 
older than younger adults.  
 Reading cryptic clues appeared to cause older 
adults to re-evaluate their memory 
functioning.  
 
Four 
(a) 
Questionnaire: 
Between-subjects 
 For older adults, attempting cryptic clues 
before taking an episodic MemSE test 
resulted in significantly lower MemSE 
compared to the opposite (i.e. doing the 
MemSE test before attempting cryptic clues).  
 This relationship became more apparent 
when taking into account participants‘ 
abilities to solve the clues, but only when 
participants attempted the clues before the 
MemSE test.  
 The results support the theory that attempting 
cryptic crosswords promotes the monitoring 
facet in metacognition.  
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Five Experimental: Mixed 
(between-subjects for 
age groups and within-
subjects for stimulus 
characteristics/cognitive 
activity, specifically 
high- versus low-
frequency words) 
 Older adults showed significantly poorer 
recall, encoding and consolidation (but not 
retention/retrieval) than younger adults.  
 High-frequency words were recalled and 
encoded significantly better than lower-
frequency words for the whole sample 
population. However there was no significant 
difference for consolidation or 
retention/retrieval of high- or low-frequency 
words. 
 Recall, encoding, consolidation and 
retention/retrieval of low-frequency words 
did not occur at a different rate across trial for 
younger and older participants. However, 
older adults showed a significantly greater 
recall of high-frequency words, across the 
five trials, than younger adults. This was not 
the case for consolidation, encoding or 
retention/retrieval.  
 The conclusion was that the increased 
activation of high- compared to low-
frequency words, across the lifespan, 
protected the high-frequency words from 
cognitive atrophy associated with healthy 
aging. This supports the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis.  
 
Six Experimental: Mixed 
(between-subjects for 
age groups and within-
subjects for stimulus 
characteristics/cognitive 
activity, specifically 
early- versus later-
acquired words) 
 Overall, older adults showed deficits in recall 
and encoding but not consolidation and 
retention/retrieval compared to younger 
adults. 
 Early-acquired words were significantly 
better recalled, consolidated and 
retained/retrieved (but not encoded) than later 
acquired words.  
 There was no dissociation in the rates that 
younger compared to older adults recalled, 
consolidated and encoded and 
retained/retrieved early- and later-acquired 
words.  
 These results suggest that age-related decline 
has significant deficits for consolidation, 
whereas manipulation of stimulus 
characteristics appear to affect encoding; 
even though there is an overall effect of both 
factors.  
 In conclusion, there is little evidence for the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis. 
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Seven Experimental: Mixed 
(between-subjects for 
age groups and within-
subjects for stimulus 
characteristics/cognitive 
activity, specifically 
popular versus 
unpopular proper 
names) 
 Overall, there was no evidence that older 
adults recalled, encoded, consolidated or 
retained/retrieved fewer first names than 
younger adults. 
 Compared to names which had become less 
popular, names which had remained popular 
were significantly better recalled, encoded, 
consolidated and retained/retrieved across the 
whole sample population. 
 Between younger and older adults, there was 
no dissociation between the rate at which 
they recalled, encoded, consolidated and 
retained/retrieved popular compared to 
unpopular names.  
 In conclusion, there is no support for the use-
dependency theory when using stimulus 
characteristics compared to self-reported 
cognitive activity. 
Eight Intervention: Within-
subjects 
 Significant impact of intervention activity on 
subjective, but not objective, measures of 
episodic memory functioning.  
 Significant impact of cognitive intervention 
on metacognition when taking into account 
possible mediating factors. This indicated 
that participants who can be regarded as at 
risk benefitted from cognitive intervention. 
 On objective measures of episodic memory 
functioning certain sub-samples of 
participants (e.g. who differed in socialisation 
score, crossword completion rate, previous 
history of crossword activity) benefitted more 
from the cryptic crossword intervention. 
 
 
 
This thesis has used both between- and within-subjects designs when investigating both 
the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency theory. For the whole sample 
population there is strong support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis when using a 
between-subjects technique, and some support for the use-dependency theory when 
using the same type of design. For example, Studies One through Four (a) showed that 
participants who report taking part in more cognitive activities show a greater 
awareness of their cognitive functioning. This has complemented the majority of 
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previous research into both theories (e.g. Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; Barnes et al., 
2006; Verghese et al., 2003). 
 
However, when using a within-subjects design the results of studies in this thesis have 
shown no evidence for the use-dependency theory for the whole sample population. 
Furthermore, there is only a modicum of evidence for the cognitive reserve hypothesis 
when using this type of technique. However, the results of Study Eight have provided 
support for the use-dependency theory when comparing older adults who are regarded 
to be at-risk or at a higher rate of cognitive decline. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
evidence for the use-dependency theory, in particular, is only apparent in certain sample 
populations and the proposed association between cognitive activity and functioning in 
the general elderly population may not be as clear as previous research has suggested 
(e.g. Hertzog et al., 2009). 
 
6.3 Methodological Issues 
 
6.3.1 Between-subjects versus within-subjects techniques 
 
When using a between-subjects design it is arguably impossible to identify a causal 
relationship between two factors and consider or control for every possible mediating 
factor or confounding variable. Thus it is very difficult to confirm a direct causal 
relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive decline when using a between-
subjects design (Hertzog, 2009). Elias & Wagster (2007) along with King & Suzman 
(2009) reiterate the fact that many known (and possibly unknown) factors influence 
cognitive functioning in later life. Furthermore, many of these factors (e.g. education, 
diet, genetic makeup, stress) affect the potential impact of cognitive activity on 
cognitive functioning throughout life. Even though a between-subjects design can have 
the benefits of identifying potential factors which affect cognitive decline, a within-
subjects approach would be needed to identify the causal relationship between overall 
or specific cognitive activity and cognitive functioning.  
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It is not surprising that when using a between-subjects design research has confirmed a 
positive relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning. To 
recapitulate the findings from this thesis and other research (e.g. Jopp & Hertzog, 
2007), many factors which are positively related to a decrease in cognitive decline in 
later life are also positively related to cognitive activity or education. This is the case for 
demographic factors (e.g. healthcare, ability to cope with stress, socioeconomic status) 
and other cognitive measures which are also related to objective measures of cognitive 
functioning (e.g. MemSE, psychological wellbeing, cerebral blood flow). To include all 
these factors as covariates in analysis would decrease the significance of the variance 
associated with cognitive activity with regards to cognitive functioning (e.g. Hertzog, 
2009).  
 
Studies Five through Eight used a within-subjects design to investigate the effect of 
cognitive activity on cognitive functioning in later life. For the whole sample 
population, there was no evidence to support the use-dependency theory and only a 
modicum of support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis. The key fact here is that other 
factors, apart from cognitive activity, appear to influence the cause of cognitive decline 
in healthy aging. This was also the case when considering the effects of manipulating 
stimulus characteristics, for example, Studies Five, Six and Seven suggested that the 
cognitive stimulation (associated with the comparison of recall for stimulus which 
varies in either frequency, AoA or popularity) was insufficient to account for the 
deficits in episodic memory which are empirically supported in the cognitive aging 
literature (e.g. Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996).  
 
Study Eight, in particular, demonstrated how a cognitive intervention could use a 
within-subjects counterbalanced design which would automatically only identify the 
direct relationship between the cognitive intervention activity and the cognitive 
functions which are measured
22
. Although the sample population was relatively small in 
this intervention and therefore the effect of the intervention may be more detectable 
when using a larger sample population, Basak et al. (2008) used a similar size 
experimental group and found significant effects of an everyday cognitive 
                                               
22 Assuming that demographic/mediating factors remain constant throughout the study period. 
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activity/intervention. It is possible that Basak et al.‘s (2008) use of a between-subjects 
approach may have contributed to an apparent effect the intervention activity compared 
to the control group. However, it is also possible that either the intervention in their 
study was more cognitively stimulating, or that the cognitive functioning measures were 
easier (or less stressful) for the intervention sample to complete as they were presented 
via a computer, similar to the intervention activity. It is well documented that older 
adults are less confident at using information technology than younger adults (e.g. 
Salthouse, 2006).  
 
The results of Study Eight support the findings of the questionnaire studies in that 
attempting cryptic crosswords increased cognitive awareness in older adults. This 
pattern of results was repeatedly found in Studies One through Four (a). The suggestion 
that cryptic crosswords could increase cognitive awareness could not be regarded as 
causal from the questionnaire studies due to both the between-subjects design and the 
cross-sectional nature, however Study Eight provided strong evidence of this causal 
relationship. Study Eight also confirms the result of Study Seven and provided no clear 
support of the use-dependency theory when using objective measures of cognitive 
activity and functioning (see Sections 6.3.2, 6.3.3, 6.3.4 and 6.4 for further discussion).   
 
Studies Five, Six and Seven used a within-subjects technique and demonstrated how an 
analogy of the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency theory could be 
produced by manipulating stimulus characteristics. Although these are discussed in the 
next section, it is important to point out that the use of a within-subjects design has 
produced different results for word frequency, AoA and name popularity on recall. 
Specifically with regards to AoA and name popularity, the results suggest that 
heterogeneity between sample populations when using a between-subjects technique 
appear to have produced artificial effects of stimulus characteristics on recall (further 
discussion Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4). To clarify, when using the same multi-trial 
technique, the effect of age on cognitive decline has differed when measuring the 
effects of recall, encoding, consolidation and retrieval/retention, when different stimulus 
is used. There are suggestions that the variance associated with age-related cognitive 
decline may be shared by or even a consequence of stimulus characteristics. For 
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example, Studies Five and Six both showed a significant effect of age on recall, 
however this was not evident in Study Seven even though an identical design was used. 
Thus, it must be concluded that the stimulus characteristics of Studies Five through 
Seven had a significantly different impact on younger compared to older adults. 
 
In conclusion, between-subjects techniques have the benefit of comparing groups of 
participants which differ on a number of factors which appear to impact on cognitive 
functioning/decline. Previous research which has used techniques to compare groups of 
people who are classed as relatively cognitively active or inactive has indicated that 
cognitive activity can attenuate cognitive decline in aging. However the within-subjects 
technique used in this thesis has demonstrated that a difference in cognitive activity 
alone is insufficient to change objective measures of cognitive functioning in later life. 
Between-subjects designs are useful for comparing different subsamples which may 
represent at-risk groups. For example, participants with fewer numbers of years in 
education appear to benefit more from attempting cryptic crosswords. However, when 
investigating the effect of an intervention on the whole sample population it is 
necessary to use a within-subjects technique to control for mediating factors and 
component variables which may influence the effectiveness of the intervention. It is 
entirely possible that a cognitive intervention will not have a significant effect on 
participants who are relatively cognitively active and who have a high level of 
educational achievement (Hertzog, 2009), but the cognitive intervention may be very 
effective for individuals who are at-risk who have started to display significant 
cognitive decline.  
 
6.3.2 Cognitive activity measures versus stimulus characteristics 
 
Almost all previous research investigating the use-dependency theory and arguably the 
cognitive reserve hypothesis have taken a measure of cognitive, social and/or physical 
activity (e.g. Hertzog et al., 2009; Jopp & Hertzog, 2007; Barnes et al., 2006; Verghese 
et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 2002). Many of these measures are subjective and cannot be 
confirmed by objective measures (e.g. self-report activity questionnaires). In brief, 
using self-report measures of cognitive activity can be regarded as unreliable and 
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invalid, especially in older adults (Sunderland et al., 1986). However, questionnaires 
and self-report techniques are critical at uncovering the relationship between specific 
cognitive activities and perceived cognitive functioning. For example throughout 
Studies One to Four, there were significantly higher correlations between cryptic 
crossword participation and measures of cognitive awareness, which was not the case 
for quick or general knowledge crosswords (see below for further discussion).  
 
There has also been a disagreement about what constitutes a cognitive activity 
(Salthouse, 2006) and how cognitive activities are combined to form constructs of 
different forms of total cognitive activity. For example, Jopp & Hertzog (2007) included 
crossword participation as a game compared to Hultsch et al. (1999) who included 
crossword participation as a novel information processing activity, whereas Parslow et 
al. (2006) did not include a measure of crossword participation in their inventory. 
Furthermore, to date, no cognitive activities measure has separated the assessment of 
crossword frequency by specific crossword type. This is important as cryptic 
crosswords appear to require a unique type of processing compared to quick and general 
knowledge crosswords (e.g. Hambrick et al., 1999; Forshaw, unpublished).  
 
The questionnaire studies in this thesis indicate that cryptic crosswords have a different 
effect on the metacognition system of older adults compared to younger adults, which 
was not the case for quick or general knowledge crosswords. Self-report techniques 
were imperative for uncovering differences in participants who did or did not attempt 
cryptic crosswords regularly; that is, comparing those who have given up attempting 
such crosswords to those who never attempted or still attempted such crosswords. 
However, the self-report technique in Study Four (a) demonstrated how the formulation 
of questionnaires can have a significant effect on the cognitive awareness of participants 
completing the questionnaire. These are discussed further in Section 6.3.3, but the key 
aspect here is that subjective measures of cognitive activity can have a direct impact on 
subjective measures of cognitive functioning.  
 
Hertzog & Nesselroade (2003) commented on the fact that self-report cognitive activity 
measures may be determined, at least in part, by current cognitive functioning. That is, a 
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number of researchers have hypothesised that the relationship between cognitive 
activity and cognitive functioning in later life may be symbiotic (e.g. Hertzog, 2009; 
Hertzog & Nesselroade, 2003; Schooler & Mulatu, 2001). This is critical because any 
subjective measure of cognitive activity would be positively correlated with measures 
of cognitive functioning (e.g. Wilson et al., 2007). This is also the case for longitudinal 
research such as Hultsch et al. (1999), because it is possible that preclinical dementia or 
cognitive decline has a negative impact on cognitive activity frequency from mid-life 
(e.g. Friedland et al., 2001). Therefore, an objective measure of cognitive 
activity/stimulation is required to investigate both the cognitive reserve hypothesis and 
use-dependency theory; this technique was used in Studies Five, Six and Seven.   
 
Studies Five through Seven produced analogies of the cognitive reserve hypothesis and 
use-dependency theory by manipulating stimulus characteristics of the to-be-
remembered words. Ellis & Lambon-Ralph (2000) and Li (2009) proposed that high-
frequency and early-acquired words would be stored in more interconnected 
neuronal/cognitive networks than low-frequency and later-acquired words respectively. 
Therefore, according to the cognitive reserve hypothesis, high-frequency and early-
acquired words should show less of an effect of cognitive aging than low-frequency and 
later-acquired words. In older adults, high-frequency words were recalled at a greater 
rate across trials than low-frequency words; however this dissociation was not evident 
in younger adults. Conversely, there was no dissociation in terms of recall (and all other 
measures of memory) of words which differed in terms of AoA between younger and 
older adults.  
 
The results from Study Five support the cognitive reserve hypothesis, that is, a constant 
higher level of stimulation/activation of certain cognitive networks (i.e. high-frequency 
words) appears to protect such networks from cognitive activity, which appears to take 
a larger toll on cognitive networks which are activated less frequently (i.e. low-
frequency words). One implication of this is that it suggests that the cognitive decline 
seen in healthy aging is akin to the cognitive decline seen in dementia. For example, 
Taylor (1998) showed that in dementia patients high-frequency objects were identified 
significantly faster than low-frequency objects, which suggests that the repeated activity 
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of the high- compared to the low-frequency cognitive representations reduced the 
impact of the cognitive/neuronal atrophy of the dementia. This pattern of being able to 
name high-frequency objects faster than low-frequency objects is also evident in 
participants who do not show cognitive impairment (e.g. Carroll & White, 1973), 
suggesting a similar form of protection (from cognitive/neuronal atrophy associated 
with healthy aging) of high- compared to low-frequency words through an increase in 
activation of such words.  
 
Study Six did not support the cognitive reserve hypothesis, that is, early-acquired words 
were not recalled significantly better than later-acquired words by older adults 
compared to younger adults. To provide support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis, 
the result must show that the impact of stimulus characteristics, representing life-long 
activation, is greater in older than younger adults. This is due to the fact that episodic 
memory deteriorates with age, therefore the hypothesised protection of the increase 
activation of early- over later-acquired words should be more evident older adults. 
However, for the whole sample population, the results of this study show early-acquired 
words were significantly better consolidated and retained/retrieved than later-acquired 
words. This resulted in a recall benefit of early- over later-acquired words, however 
there was no evidence that early-acquired words were encoded better than later-
acquired words. The opposite was the case when considering the significant effect of 
the age of the participants on recall; to clarify, older adults showed an encoding deficit 
but not a consolidation and/or retrieval/retention deficit compared to younger adults.  
 
It is important to consider this result in relation to previous research which has 
investigated either the effects of AoA on recall (e.g. Dewhurst et al., 1998) or 
investigations into the effects of chronological age on recall (e.g. Dunlosky & 
Salthouse, 1996). First, the effects of AoA on recall have typically shown that the later-
acquired words are recalled significantly better than earlier-acquired words. The results 
of Study Five and previous research (e.g. Morrison & Ellis, 2000) suggest that earlier-
acquired words are accessed and thus encoded faster than later-acquired words. As 
covered in Chapter Three, this result may indicate that later-acquired words received a 
greater amount of processing time/resources, when using mixed-lists, than early-
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acquired words and therefore were encoded to the same degree (or better than). Study 
Six showed that when participants spent an equal amount of time studying each type of 
word, early-acquired words are encoded more effectively than later-acquired words. 
Therefore it is important to match study time when comparing words which differ on 
specific stimulus characteristics.  
 
Second, with regards to studies which have investigated the age-related effects of 
cognitive functioning on recall it is important to consider the stimulus characteristics of 
the to-be-remembered words. For example, many studies control word frequency when 
comparing metacognition or memory in younger and older adults (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 
2007; Dunlosky & Salthouse, 1996), however many do not report whether or not the 
AoA of the to-be-remembered words is also matched. Even though both stimulus 
characteristics are highly correlated (e.g. Morrison et al., 1997) the results of Studies 
Five and Six demonstrate that word frequency and AoA have a different impact on 
memory function. It is arguably possible that results which have demonstrated an 
encoded/recall deficit of older over younger adults may be detected and effects of 
stimulus characteristics and not age (especially since age does not appear to 
significantly affect encoding; Study Six). Equally, it is possible that word frequency 
may be the underlying cause of some research which has investigated the age-related 
effects of repeated exposure to stimulus as Study Five has indicated that older adults 
show a dissociation between learning high- compared to low-frequency words, which 
was not the case for younger adults. It is important to consider whether the effects of 
stimulus characteristics may have had an impact on recall, which had not been 
acknowledged, when studying other sample populations (e.g. patients with brain 
damage or other conditions which have been assumed to affect memory).  
 
Forbes-McKay et al. (2005) argued that the results of their study showed that the 
protection of words with an earlier AoA (or higher word frequency) meant that such 
words were accessed faster than later-acquired (or low-frequency) words in patients 
with dementia compared to healthy controls. If dementia is an accelerated version of 
normal/healthy aging then it would be interesting to investigate whether the dissociation 
between high- and low-frequency words, with regards to recall, is evident when 
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comparing patients with dementia to either healthy older adults or younger adults. 
Furthermore, Forbes-McKay et al. (2005) argued that AoA had a larger impact on 
verbal fluency in dementia than word frequency; therefore it would be of interest to 
investigate whether this transferred to a recall, encoding, consolidation and/or 
retention/retrieval benefit of early- or later-acquired words to a greater degree in 
participants with dementia compared to controls. If this is the case, then it may be 
possible to incorporate this intervention/rehabilitation technique targeted at dementia.  
 
The majority of previous research has shown that names which are popular are easier to 
learn and recall than names which are less popular (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007). 
Research has also shown that older adults show significant deficits in name recall 
compared to younger adults (e.g. James, 2004), especially in terms of episodic memory 
(Semenza et al., 1996). Study Seven confirmed the recall advantage of popular over 
unpopular names, however there was no evidence of an age-related deficit in name-
recall. This was the case when considering overall recall as well as encoding, 
consolidation and retention/retrieval. According to previous research (e.g. Jones & 
Rabbitt, 1994) the use of pure-lists of names and the focus on episodic memory should 
have provided strong evidence of the deficit in name recall for older compared to 
younger adults. However, this was not the case and thus there was no evidence for the 
use-dependency theory when using objective measures of cognitive activity/stimulation 
and cognitive functioning. Methodological issues of previous research are discussed in 
Section 6.5.  
 
Finally, Study Eight suggested that self-reported questionnaires of cognitive activity 
may reflect more than just the frequency of taking part in certain cognitive activities. In 
line with the results from Studies One through Four (a), Study Eight showed that the 
ability to complete a cognitive activity (specifically cryptic crosswords) appeared to be 
as, if not more important, than simply attempting the activity. Therefore it is important 
for future questionnaire studies to investigate the competency of doing cognitive 
activities as well as the frequency (as commented on by Salthouse, 2006). This is 
discussed further in Section 6.4, but it can be argued that frequency questionnaires 
reflect a combination of participants‘ competency and accessibility to take part in 
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cognitive activities and not simply the frequency of doing so. Using more objective 
measures of cognitive activity (e.g. using intervention techniques or manipulating 
stimulus characteristics) is arguably a more objective way of investigating the 
relationship between cognitive stimulation/activity and cognitive functioning.     
 
In conclusion, cognitive activity measures can be unreliable and may be influenced by a 
number of mediating/demographic factors. By manipulating stimulus characteristics 
Studies Five through Seven were able to investigate the direct relationship between 
cognitive activity/stimulation and cognitive functioning. Not only did these studies 
produce a lack of support for the use-dependency theory they also showed how 
methodological designs can produce findings which are incorrectly attributed to 
differences between participants or stimulus characteristics (e.g. age of the sample 
population or frequency of cognitive activity). Future research is needed to investigate 
whether manipulating stimulus characteristics affects other domains such as 
metacognition and whether the results observed in this thesis are evident in different 
sample populations.  
 
6.3.3 Subjective versus objective dependent variables 
 
The research literature has provided inconclusive evidence as to whether cognitive 
activity or cognitive interventions have a larger impact on subjective or objective 
measures of cognitive functioning (e.g. Rebok et al., 2007; Rapp et al., 2002; Floyd & 
Scogin, 1997). This has had a large implication on the understanding of how cognitive 
activity may influence objective measures of cognitive functioning. For example, Berry 
(1999) has argued that MemSE is the critical factor in determining whether older adults 
undertake cognitive activity regularly, whereas Jopp & Hertzog (2007) have 
demonstrated that the relationship between cognitive activity and actual/objective 
cognitive functioning determines whether an individual feels confident enough to 
continue undertaking certain cognitive activities. 
 
Studies One through Four (a) showed how subjective dependent variables are highly 
correlated with self-reported activity. However, Studies Four and Four (a) showed how 
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subjective dependent variables can be influenced directly from the order of the 
questionnaire or design used. Conversely, Studies Five to Seven showed that objective 
measures of memory functioning reduced the variance between younger and older 
adults, in response to manipulations of stimulus characteristics. Finally, Study Eight 
showed how, for the whole sample population, cognitive activity appeared to have a 
larger impact on subjective rather than objective measures of cognitive functioning.  
 
There are critical implications of the results from Studies Four and Four (a) when 
considering the results of previous research. For example, Cavallini et al. (2003) 
showed that a metacognitive and mnemonic training intervention promoted cognitive 
awareness and MemSE. However it is unclear as to whether participants completed the 
subjective dependent variables before or after attempting the objective cognitive 
functioning tasks (e.g. episodic memory recall tests). Furthermore, longitudinal 
intervention studies have used MemSE training to promote objective measures of 
cognitive functioning (e.g. West et al., 2008). It is possible that participants in the 
experimental group received MemSE training before completing the cognitive measures 
for each visit. If this is the case, it is possible that the effects of the MemSE training 
were relatively short-term as demonstrated in Study Four (a).  
 
The relationship between subjective and objective cognitive functioning is the basis of 
theories of metacognition (e.g. Nelson & Narens, 1990). As metacognition declines 
with age, one important question is whether the decline is due to a deficit in cognitive 
awareness (i.e. the monitoring pathway) or a decrease in the ability to change ones‘ 
behaviour (i.e. the control pathway). This is discussed at length in Section 6.4 and in 
previous chapters. However, this quandary lies at the heart of the question as to whether 
studies which investigate the use-dependency theory and/or cognitive reserve 
hypothesis should monitor/investigate subjective or objective measures of cognitive 
functioning. As discussed in Section 6.4 it is likely that subjective awareness of current 
cognitive functioning is a critical component of the use-dependency theory. 
Undertaking cognitively stimulating activities appears to promote older adults‘ 
awareness of the current cognitive functioning. Thus subjective feedback during 
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cognitively demanding tasks may illuminate the metacognitive processes of older adults 
(e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2007).  
 
Salthouse (2007; 2006) has argued that evidence for the use-dependency theory must be 
produced by providing an objective difference in cognitive functioning of older adults 
who are either relatively cognitively active or inactive. This thesis supports that view 
because there is clear evidence from subjective measures of cognitive functioning that 
participants who are more cognitively active (or undertake a cognitive intervention) 
show changes in subjective measures of cognitive functioning; whereas there is 
relatively no evidence that objective measures of cognitive functioning are changed by 
(self-reported or objectively manipulated) variations in cognitive activities. This is 
definitely the case for the whole sample population of various studies, but as discussed 
in Section 6.4 various sub-samples do show changes in objective measures of 
functioning in response to variation in cognitive activity.  
 
The results of the thesis show support for Rebok et al. (2007) and Floyd & Scogin 
(1997) in that an increase in cognitive activity appeared to have a larger effect on 
subjective measures of cognitive functioning and did not appear to affect objective 
measures of functioning. One reason for this could be that older adults have a deficit in 
metacognitive control (e.g. Brehmer et al., 2008). Even when asking older adults 
directly, as in Study Three, the results show that older adults believe they become more 
aware of their cognitive frailties when undertaking certain cognitive activities (e.g. 
cryptic crosswords). However, these individuals appeared to believe that they were 
unable to use the increase in cognitive awareness to modify current cognitive 
functioning. This was also apparent in the intervention study (Study Eight) whereby 
older adults showed an increase in metacognition and episodic memory awareness but 
did not use this awareness to improve their actual memory ability (see Section 6.4 for 
further discussion). Finally, it is important to quantify the difference between self-
reported cognitive functioning and self-reported beliefs about cognitive functioning. For 
example, the results of Study Three suggested that older adults believe that cryptic 
crosswords promoted cognitive awareness to a greater degree than younger adults. This 
was specifically the case when comparing those participants who attempted such 
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crosswords to those who did not. These results are solely about the beliefs of 
participants and further research is needed to investigate whether these beliefs are based 
on participants‘ experiences or information taken from the media or other sources (e.g. 
advertisements about Nintendo Brain Training).  
 
6.3.4 Questionnaire versus intervention results 
 
On the whole, the results from the questionnaire studies support those from Study Eight 
(the intervention). The majority of the results from Studies One through Four (a) 
indicate that attempting cryptic crosswords promotes cognitive awareness in older 
adults to a greater degree than younger adults. The intervention (Study Eight) also 
showed that attempting cryptic crosswords on a regular basis increased cognitive 
awareness, especially with regards to episodic memory functioning. The benefits of an 
intervention technique is that findings from questionnaire studies can attempt to be 
reproduced under tightly controlled conditions. Furthermore, intervention techniques 
can take into account objective measurements of the ability to complete cognitive 
activities and objective measures of cognitive functioning. As discussed in Section 
6.3.1, there is a need to use a similar intervention technique as that of Study Eight and 
investigate the effect of other cognitive activities, particularly those which are 
commercially available (e.g. Nintendo Brain Training).  
 
6.4 Theoretical issues and implications 
 
6.4.1 A proposed model of the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency 
theory 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency 
theory are not mutually exclusive and it is likely that individuals who are cognitively 
stimulated at an earlier age continue to seek out and undertake cognitively stimulating 
activities throughout the lifespan (e.g. Dellenbach and Zimprich, 2008). Thus a model 
of how cognitive activity affects cognitive functioning in later life must consider the 
effects of cognitive activity/stimulation in early life. Furthermore, as discussed by Jopp 
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& Hertzog (2007) and Berry (1999), it is important to consider the relationship between 
actual objective measures of cognitive functioning and subjective measures of cognitive 
awareness or MemSE when investigating the impact of current cognitive activity 
(especially in later life).  
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the proposed model which encompasses both the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis and the use-dependency theory. This model is based on the results of this 
thesis as well as other results from empirical research, including animal research (e.g. 
Held, 1965). The arrows depict the effect of the four different components on each 
other, while the dashed arrow represents a pathway which appears to be less efficient in 
older adults.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
In Figure 6.1, Early Life Cognitive Activity represents all cognitive stimulation and 
activity (including education) before the age of around twenty-five. Current Cognitive 
Activity Level represents the frequency that an individual undertakes cognitively 
stimulating leisure and work activities as well as further educational or self-enhancing 
training activities (e.g. learning a foreign language). The Current Cognitive Activity 
Level represents the level of activity of an individual at any stage of mid-life onwards. 
The Cognitive Functioning component represents the actual level of cognitive 
functioning which includes episodic memory, executive functioning and some aspects 
of working memory (e.g. attention). The component of Cognitive Awareness/MemSE 
Figure 6.1. A model of the effects of cognitive activity on subjective and 
objective measures of cognitive functioning (see text for full explanation).  
Current Cognitive 
Activity Level 
Early Life Cognitive 
Activity 
Cognitive 
Awareness/MemSE 
Cognitive 
Functioning 
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represents the metacognition system as well as overall self-efficacy relating to overall 
cognition, not just memory functioning.  
 
Regarding the relationships between the components in Figure 6.1, previous research 
has shown that Early Life Cognitive Activity can produce neuronal growth in animals 
(e.g. Held, 1965) and humans (e.g. Mortimer et al., 2003). The results from Studies Five 
and Six also demonstrate that Early Life Cognitive Activity can have a significant 
impact on Cognitive Functioning for both younger and older adults. Certain researchers 
have also suggested that this type of activity (e.g. access to cognitive resources at a very 
young age, succeeding in education) produces a symbiotic relationship between 
cognitive functioning and cognitive activity in early life (e.g. Dellenbach & Zimprich, 
2008; Barnes et al., 2006). Studies One through Four (a) also suggest that participants 
with a greater number of years in education take part in more cognitive activity, thus 
there is a direct impact between Early Life Cognitive Activity and Current Cognitive 
Activity Level. This is also supported by previous research such as Dellenbach and 
Zimprich (2008) and Wilson et al. (2007), in that participants who have been 
cognitively stimulated regularly at an earlier age seek out more intellectual activities in 
later life. Previous research has shown that participants who have a higher level of 
education also show superior metacognitive functioning (e.g. Romainville, 1994), 
which was also confirmed in Studies Two and Three of this thesis, hence the direct link 
between the Early Life Cognitive Activity and Cognitive Awareness/MemSE 
components.  
 
For the Current Cognitive Activity Level, this thesis has only shown evidence that this 
has a direct effect on Cognitive Awareness and MemSE; specifically, Studies One 
through Four (a) and Study Eight showed a significant impact of specific cognitive 
activities (e.g. cryptic crosswords) on metacognition and MemSE (specifically relating 
to episodic memory). This has also been reported in the literature, for example Cavallini 
et al. (2003) and Rebok & Balcerak (1989) showed how a cognitive intervention could 
promote MemSE and certain aspects of metacognition. Once again, the relationship 
between Current Cognitive Activity Levels and Cognitive Awareness/MemSE appears 
to be symbiotic. Schooler & Mulatu (2001) showed how older adults would retire from 
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work or give up certain leisure activities due to feeling less confident at being able to 
complete them. This was also proposed by Berry (1999) as one of the main reasons why 
older adults gave up attempting cognitive activities. This was supported in Study Four, 
in particular, whereby older adults who had given up attempting cryptic crosswords 
showed a significantly lower MemSE than those who still attempted cryptic crosswords. 
This association was not as evident in the younger sample population, indicating a 
symbiotic relationship between MemSE and cognitive activity, which is enhanced over 
time. 
 
However, the relationship between Current Cognitive Activity Level and Cognitive 
Awareness/MemSE is not the only interaction which appears to underpin the use-
dependency theory; the relationship of both components to the Cognitive Functioning 
component appears to be a key factor.  Supporting Jopp & Hertzog (2007) the results of 
Studies Four and Four (a) suggest that older adults have given up attempting certain 
cognitive activities due to a perceived or actual decrease in Cognitive Functioning. It is 
possible that this relationship is representing the impact of a decrease in MemSE on 
Current Cognitive Activity Level, but the results confirm that participants who were 
less able to complete a cognitive task (solving cryptic crossword clues) reported giving 
up attempting such cognitive activities but only showed a lower MemSE if they 
attempted the activity before completing the MemSE test and not if they completed the 
MemSE test prior to attempting to cognitive activity. Hence there appears to be a direct 
influence of Cognitive Functioning on Cognitive Awareness/MemSE, but arguably 
there is also a direct effect of Cognitive Functioning on Current Cognitive Activity 
Level.  
 
Study Eight has indicated how the Cognitive Functioning, Current Cognitive Activity 
Level and Cognitive Awareness/MemSE components interact to produce the subjective 
findings and a lack of significant objective results. Cognitive Functioning, when 
considered in relation to Study Eight, can include the abilities necessary to complete the 
cryptic crossword intervention (as well as the objective measures of memory 
functioning taken). The baseline results showed that post-hoc crossword completion 
rates were significantly correlated with MemSE, indicating that cognitive functioning 
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had a direct impact on an individual‘s confidence in their own memory. The results also 
confirmed the bi-directional relationship between Current Cognitive Activity Level (i.e. 
doing cryptic crosswords) and the Cognitive Awareness/MemSE component; that is, 
participants who were attempting cryptic crosswords reported a significantly lower 
episodic MemSE after controlling for the effects of Early Life Cognitive Activity (e.g. 
education), but this was more evident for participants who attempted the cryptic 
crosswords after the placebo/control intervention.  
 
 Therefore the ability to complete the cognitive intervention was having a direct and 
indirect (through the Current Cognitive Activity Level component) effect on the 
Cognitive Awareness/MemSE component. However, as illustrated by the dashed link in 
Figure 6.1, the increase in Cognitive Awareness/MemSE did not have significant 
impact on Cognitive Functioning (e.g. objective measures of episodic memory ability, 
metacognition control and verbal learning). This proposed model is not supportive of 
the views of Berry (1999) and West et al. (2008) who proposed that MemSE had a 
direct effect on Cognitive Functioning and Current Cognitive Activity Level. These 
researchers did not fully agree that Cognitive Functioning or Current Cognitive Activity 
Levels influenced MemSE, although they felt that Cognitive Functioning and Current 
Cognitive Activity Levels had a symbiotic relationship.  
 
Figure 6.1 dictates that Current Cognitive Activity Levels do not have a direct impact 
on Cognitive Functioning, because this is mediated by Cognitive Awareness/MemSE 
(i.e. metacognition). This is supportive previous research which has shown that 
metacognitive training can promote Cognitive Functioning but only if older adults are 
reminded to use the skills which they had developed in training, that is the Current 
Cognitive Activity Level and Cognitive Awareness/MemSE components are activated 
(e.g. Brehmer et al., 2008). The model of showed a supportive view of Bherer, Kramer 
& Peterson (2008) and Dunlosky et al. (2005), in that the control pathway of 
metacognition appeared to be impaired in older adults (represented by the dashed link 
between Cognitive Awareness/MemSE and Cognitive Functioning in Figure 6.1).  
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This model of the cognitive reserve and use-dependency theory is similar to that of 
Hertzog (2009) and Jopp & Hertzog (2007). These researchers emphasise how 
Cognitive Functioning can have a direct impact on Current Cognitive Activity Levels. 
They also confirmed that this will influence the bi-directional relationship between the 
components of Current Cognitive Activity Level and Cognitive Awareness/MemSE, 
alongside the direct impact of Cognitive Functioning on MemSE (although to a lesser 
degree). However, Jopp & Hertzog (2007) in particular do not consider the effect of 
Early Life Cognitive Activity on the other three components. Furthermore Jopp & 
Hertzog (2007) believe that the relationship between Cognitive Awareness/MemSE and 
Cognitive Functioning is intact, which the results of Study Eight do not support. The 
results of Studies Four and Four (a) suggest that the impact of Cognitive Functioning on 
both Current Cognitive Activity Level and Cognitive Awareness/MemSE is 
significantly larger than what Jopp & Hertzog (2007) or Hertzog (2009) believed. 
Studies One to Three also suggest that Early Life Cognitive Activity may have a larger 
impact on both Current Cognitive Activity Level and Cognitive Awareness/MemSE 
compared to the views of Jopp & Hertzog (2007) or Herzog (2009).  
 
In conclusion, for the general sample population of older adults, Figure 6.1 illustrates 
that early life experiences can have a significant affect on cognitive functioning 
throughout the lifespan. This can be directly as a result of the high levels of 
neuroplasticity evident in early life or indirect through influencing later cognitive 
activity and cognitive awareness or metacognition. Cognitive activity in later life is 
directly influenced by the ability to undertake such activities (i.e. cognitive 
functioning). There is not evidence that cognitive activity in later life has a direct effect 
on cognitive functioning, but it does appear to have a direct effect on metacognition and 
cognitive awareness. The only way in which cognitive activity in later life can 
positively affect cognitive functioning is by modifying behaviour through the 
metacognition system. Unfortunately, for older adults it appears that the metacognition 
system has a significantly less effective influence on cognitive functioning compared to 
younger adults (e.g. Brehmer et al., 2008; Dunlosky et al., 2005; Dunlosky et al., 2003). 
Therefore, a negative feedback loop is created between the level of current cognitive 
activity and the individual‘s overall cognitive self-efficacy system. This negative 
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feedback discourages participants from undertaking cognitive activities due to the 
inability to enhance cognitive functioning, and thus complete the cognitive activity and 
in turn promote self-efficacy.      
 
6.4.2 The effect of mediating demographic/cognitive factors 
 
Figure 6.1 is a proposed model of how the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-
dependency theory operate in the general older adult population. However, throughout 
this thesis results from certain sub-samples of participants have shown that higher levels 
of cognitive activity in later life produced a significant improvement in objective 
measures of cognitive functioning. This is also evident in previous research which has 
shown strong evidence which supports the use-dependency theory, either in the whole 
sample population or in specific sample populations (e.g. Carlson et al., 2008; Basak et 
al., 2008; Stine-Morrow et al., 2007; MacKinnon et al., 2003; Christensen & 
MacKinnon, 1993).      
 
Glisky & Glisky (1999) are one of a number of research groups who have suggested 
that cognitive intervention may be more effective on certain groups of older adults than 
others. To recapitulate, some studies have demonstrated that cognitive interventions 
appear to be more effective on older adults who show higher levels of functioning at 
baseline, specifically executive functioning (e.g. Karbach & Kray, 2009), whereas the 
majority of research has suggested that cognitive interventions are more effective on 
adults with lower levels of cognitive functioning at baseline (e.g. Carlson et al., 2008).  
 
One possibility for the findings of research such as Carlson et al. (2008) is that higher 
functioning older adults may show ceiling effects, whereby they are functioning close to 
their optimum level (e.g. Salthouse, 2006); thus adults with lower levels of cognitive 
functioning have a greater dimension for improvement. Another explanation (which 
may act in conjunction to the potential ceiling effects) may depend on the intervention 
activity used. For example, Carlson et al. (2008) used an everyday cognitive activity 
which was not based in the laboratory, however Karbach & Kray (2009) used a 
relatively theoretical training technique. Study Eight demonstrated how an everyday 
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cognitive activity improved cognitive awareness and metacognition of older adults who 
either had few years in education or reported taking part in few cognitive activities 
(especially crosswords). For these individuals, who can be regarded as at risk (e.g. Van 
der Bij et al., 2002), attempting a unique cognitive activity will stimulate the Current 
Cognitive Activity Level in Figure 6.1, which will then activate the Cognitive 
Awareness/MemSE component. Both components would not have been activated as 
much by the Early Life Cognitive Activity component compared to individuals with a 
greater number of years in education.
23
  
 
These results support the theories of Park et al. (2007) and the research of Noice & 
Noice (2006) in that older adults appear to show a greater improvement in Cognitive 
Functioning when the intervention is a novel task, that is an activity which the 
participants have not attempted before. Park et al. (2007) suggest that this is because 
attempting novel activities stimulates different neural networks, which then causes an 
increase in neurogenesis. This is contrary to the view of Cianciolo et al. (2006) who 
proposed that older adults can build up a level of expertise in one specific domain and 
transfer this expertise to solve new problems. It is unclear, from the results of Study 
Eight, whether the novelty of attempting cryptic crosswords or the expertise needed to 
solve the cryptic crosswords had a larger effect on either subjective or objective 
measures of Cognitive Functioning. However, the results suggested that for certain 
individuals, the novelty of attempting cryptic crosswords promoted metacognition 
functioning and cognitive awareness.  
 
As mentioned throughout this thesis, it is impossible to account for every single 
potential mediating factor which may affect any of the components of the model in 
Figure 6.1. However, further research is needed to use a similar technique with a larger 
sample population to investigate the roles of known mediating factors on the 
relationship between everyday cognitive activities and cognitive functioning. For 
example, a difference in socialization score between participants in Study Eight 
appeared to mediate the relationship between the components of Cognitive 
                                               
23 It can also be argued that the Cognitive Functioning component would not have affected either the 
Cognitive Awareness/MemSE or Current Cognitive Activity Level components as much because of the 
influence of Early Life Cognitive Activity on Cognitive Functioning.  
 -297- 
Awareness/MemSE and Cognitive Functioning, specifically for encoding episodic 
memories. If future research can identify groups of participants who appear to benefit 
from certain cognitive activities, then everyday cognitive interventions can target 
individuals with these specific demographic characteristics to enhance the pathway 
between Cognitive Awareness/MemSE and Cognitive Functioning.  
 
Intervention techniques did not necessarily have to modify cognitive activities. For 
example, if it is the case that an increase in socialization can enhance episodic memory 
encoded in individuals who undertake certain cognitive activities, the result should be to 
use a social intervention activity (e.g. Stine-Morrow et al., 2007). It is also likely that 
multi-modal intervention techniques will be more effective than simple cognitive 
interventions (Rebok et al., 2007). Thus, based on Study Eight, a combination of 
attempting crosswords while socializing may increase the transfer of the increase in 
cognitive awareness to actual cognitive functioning. One example of this could be using 
social crossword clubs as an intervention.  
 
It is also clear that some of the mediating demographic factors represent aspects of 
components in this model (Figure 6.1), for example, the number of years in education 
represents a key factor in the Early Life Cognitive Activity component, and previous 
cognitive/crossword frequency is encapsulated in Current Cognitive Activity Levels. 
Therefore, it can be argued that to a certain degree mediating factors are taken into 
consideration in this model of cognitive functioning in later life. However, it is 
acknowledged that many other mediating factors, such as socialization, ability to cope 
with stress, personality, need to be represented in this model (e.g. Elias & Wagster, 
2007). Further research, perhaps using structural equation modelling, is needed to 
understand the relative effects of each component on one another and how other 
mediating factors impact on the components of Figure 6.1.  
 
In conclusion, the results of Studies One through Four (a) and Study Eight have shown 
how the relationships between the components of the model depicted in Figure 6.1 can 
be influenced by mediating factors. Many other mediating factors which have been 
identified by other research (e.g. King & Suzman, 2009; Hertzog et al., 2009; Elias & 
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Wagster, 2007; Salthouse, 2006) were not measured throughout this thesis due to 
logistical reasons (e.g. genetic markers of decline, allostatic stress response, diet, 
physical activity), need to be incorporated into future investigation using a similar 
design. However the questionnaire studies have highlighted a number of possible 
mediating factors which have not been taken into account in previous studies which 
have investigated the use-it-or-lose-it theory or used cognitive interventions (e.g. the 
order of undertaking tasks, reasons for giving up certain activities, completion rates of 
activities/intervention). Therefore, the results support the view of Glisky & Glisky 
(1999) in that certain cognitive interventions will be more effective and appropriate for 
different groups of older adults. Cognitive interventions should target individuals who 
are at risk and who have low cognitive functioning. Finally, within-subjects designs are 
vital when investigating the effectiveness of an intervention or cognitive activity on a 
whole sample population, because potential mediating factors are controlled for and can 
be investigated in post-hoc analysis.  
 
6.5 Implications regarding previous research 
 
With regards to the use of cross-sectional questionnaire studies to investigate the use-
dependency theory or cognitive reserve hypothesis, there is a very important message 
from this thesis, which has appeared to be ignored by researchers studying the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis or use-dependency theory (e.g. Wilson et al., 2007; Barnes et al., 
2006; Willis et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2002; Ball et al., 2002), which is that the 
relationship between cause and effect with regards to cognitive activity and cognitive 
functioning must be data driven and not theoretically derived. Chapter One describes 
the theories of non-linear dynamics in learning and the views of Shadish et al. (2002), 
which state that the causal relationship between a dependent variable and its antecedents 
is never as simple as first identified by the pioneers of experimental psychology (e.g. 
James, 1890). The assumptions of Occam‘s razor (e.g. Gauch, 2003) have been adopted 
by researchers such as Wilson et al. (2007) and it was theorised that cognitive activity 
must be positively correlated with cognitive functioning. Therefore studies which 
produce evidence to the contrary (i.e. a negative relationship between reported cognitive 
activity and cognitive functioning) were dismissed as having either inappropriate 
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measures of cognitive activity or cognitive functioning (or both, as well as reportedly 
weak methodology). This meant that such research would not necessarily be published 
due to the fact that it did not fit with the theoretical concepts of cognitive reserve or the 
use-dependency theory. 
 
Chatton‘s anti-razor fits closely with the non-linear dynamic view of chaos theory (e.g. 
Harle, 2010; Fromberg, 2010), which dictates that an extreme number of variables 
impinge on any causal relationship, therefore to exclude any of these variables may 
adjust the statistical power and/or the understanding of the relationship between one 
variable and another. Shadish et al. (2002) describes an inus condition where a 
minimum number of variables must be present in order to elicit the expected causal 
effect. The studies in this thesis demonstrate that there are multiple factors which can all 
have an effect on the cognitive functioning of older adults, even though many other 
factors could not be taken into account (e.g. genetics, personality, stress etc). In line 
with Glisky & Glisky (1999) the theory of Shadish et al. (2002) dictates that a condition 
whereby cognitive activity can elicit a decrease in cognitive decline or an increase in 
cognitive functioning it is determined by a vast number of mediating factors such as 
previous cognitive activity, the type of activity undertaken, the proportion of life spent 
attempting specific activities and the ability to use feedback from attempting activities. 
Only then can the relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive functioning be 
examined. The next stage in this process would be to identify a condition whereby older 
adults appear to gain an insight into their current cognitive functioning (e.g. for older 
adults who have never attempted cryptic crosswords to start attempting them on a 
regular basis) and to investigate whether this condition produces subjective or objective 
results in terms of cognitive functioning in different cognitive domains.  
 
With regards to experimental techniques investigating age-related decline in everyday 
memory functioning, the results of Study Seven suggest that previous research which 
has shown an age difference in the recall of names may have done so due to stimulus 
characteristics or the methodology used. For example, older participants reported 
grouping names on the basis of categories (e.g. the royal family), which was not 
reported by younger adults during debriefing. Therefore it is possible that previous 
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research (e.g. James, 2004) used names which were less familiar to older adults. 
Furthermore, some studies have used face recognition to cue recall of the to-be-
remembered names (e.g. James, 2004). Studies have shown that older adults are more 
easily distracted than younger adults (e.g. Hasher & Zacks, 1988) and therefore 
presenting older adults with a face and a name may reduce the attention/process time of 
the name in older adults to a greater degree than younger adults. Naveh-Benjamin, 
Guez, Kilb & Reedy (2004) have demonstrated that older adults show a greater deficit 
for name-face associative recall than for recalling faces or names alone.  
 
Study Seven presented participants with pure-lists of first names and asked participants 
to rate the names for liking. Older participants received 50% extra study and recall time, 
which has not always been the case in previous studies (e.g. James & Fogler, 2007). By 
rating each name participants have to process each name to a relatively similar degree. 
Also it is likely that the increase in study and recall time allows older adults to organise 
names in a specific way which enables them to recall the names successfully. These 
differences in the methodology of Study Seven compared to previous research shows 
how older adults can appear to have specific deficits which may have been produced by 
the design used and not an underlying cognitive deficit.  
 
Finally, the cognitive intervention conducted in Study Eight has highlighted the issue of 
whether mediating factors should receive greater attention when conducting 
intervention studies. The revolutionary use of a within-subjects design highlighted the 
fact that the specific cognitive intervention was not effective with regards to promoting 
cognitive functioning for the whole population. However, there was clear evidence that 
subsamples of the sample population benefitted from the intervention. Research which 
uses standard clinical trials to investigate cognitive inventions need to consider whether 
mediating demographic factors change the degree of effectiveness of the intervention. 
Furthermore, Study Eight demonstrated that an everyday cognitive activity could be 
used as an intervention for certain sample populations, reducing their need for 
expensive time-consuming training programmes that are not accessible to the general 
population.   
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6.6 Future research 
 
Cross-sectional questionnaire studies which investigate use-dependency theory and 
cognitive reserve hypothesis need to consider whether the order of the questionnaire 
affects both subjective and objective measures of cognitive functioning. Study Four (a), 
in particular, demonstrated how the order of a questionnaire can have a significant 
effect on the outcome of subjective measures of cognitive functioning. It would be of 
interest to investigate whether this was also the case with regards to objective measures 
of cognitive ability. Finally, with regards to questionnaire studies, it is necessary to 
investigate whether a combined measure of frequency of cognitive activity and 
competency or effort required to undertake the activity provides a different relationship 
between self-reported cognitive activity and subjective and/or objective measures of 
cognitive function (e.g. Salthouse, 2006).  
 
Further research is needed to investigate whether word frequency or AoA has effects on 
other cognitive functions such as metacognition, and longer term delayed recall, when 
using a similar multi-trial technique to that used in Chapter Three. As discussed in 
Sections 6.3.3 and 6.4, cognitive activity/stimulation appears to have a significant effect 
on cognitive awareness/metacognition (see Chapter Two and Five). Therefore it is 
possible that high-frequency and early-acquired words will show more accurate JOL 
responses than low-frequency and later-acquired words respectively. If this is the case, 
then it is necessary to consider stimulus characteristics when investigating the area of 
metacognition, especially metacognitive intervention studies (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 
2007).  
 
The results of Studies Five, Six and Seven also need to be replicated in different sample 
populations. There is evidence that AoA, word frequency and potentially name 
popularity all have significantly larger effects in patients who have dementia (e.g. 
Forbes-McKay et al., 2005; Taylor, 1997), specifically in naming latencies. Thus it 
would be interesting to investigate whether there is a dissociation in terms of recall, 
encoding, consolidation and/or retention/retrieval of words which differed in terms of 
stimulus characteristics between younger adults, healthy older adults and patients with 
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dementia. Once again, this could also investigate the overall recall as well as the JOL 
abilities. 
 
Finally, it is also the case that Study Eight only investigated the impact of an increase in 
activity/frequency of one specific activity (cryptic crosswords), therefore future 
research needs to repeat this type of technique to investigate the impact of other types of 
cognitive activity on cognitive functioning. The within-subjects intervention design 
used in Study Eight cannot replace the classic clinical trial technique if researchers want 
to conduct follow-up investigations
24
, however the within-subjects approach should be 
conducted alongside of standard clinical trial approaches. Due to the recent increase in 
commercial products, which advertise brain training and cognitive enhancement, it 
would be prudent to assess the effectiveness of such products while using a within-
subject technique (King & Suzman, 2009). It must also be acknowledged that a greater 
number of cognitive functioning measures are required than those which were used in 
Study Eight. In particular there is a need to incorporate measures of working memory 
and executive functioning (e.g. verbal fluency and task-switching).  
 
6.7 Summary 
 
This thesis began with a critical review of the theories and evidence behind the use-it-
or-lose-it idea. As discussed in Chapter One, the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-
dependency theory are not mutually exclusive and a combination of the two concepts 
has been presented throughout this thesis to explain the possibility of cognitive activity 
(throughout the lifespan) affecting cognitive functioning in later life. It has been argued 
that differences in methodologies, measures of cognitive activity and cognitive 
functioning have produced an oversimplified picture of the relationship between 
cognitive activity and cognitive decline in later life. Many psychologists (e.g. Schooler, 
2007) are adamant that an increase in cognitive activity throughout the lifespan will 
attenuate cognitive decline associated with healthy aging. Numerous cross-sectional and 
longitudinal techniques have provided evidence in support of this view (e.g. Hertzog et 
                                               
24 Although the time period between the intervention activity and start of the placebo/control activity (or 
vice versa) be lengthened to incorporate a follow-up period. 
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al., 2009; Smith et al., 2009; Verghese et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 2002; Hultsch et al., 
1999).  
 
However, there are a number of discrepancies in the research earlier which calls for 
clarification as to the type of cognitive activity that would influence cognitive 
functioning, the age at which an increase in cognitive activity is needed to slow 
cognitive decline and the types of individuals who would benefit from cognitive 
interventions. As the majority of research investigating both the cognitive reserve 
hypothesis and use-dependency theory used a between-subjects design it is arguably 
impossible to draw a direct causal relationship between cognitive activity and cognitive 
functioning (Hertzog, 2009). It is clear that other factors (e.g. genetics, diet) have a 
significant influence on cognitive functioning (particularly in later life) and can mediate 
the effect of cognitive activity on cognitive functioning/decline in healthy aging (e.g. 
Elias & Wagster, 2007).  
 
This thesis used a combination of questionnaire studies, experimental studies and 
intervention techniques to investigate if and how cognitive activity impacted on 
cognitive functioning in later life. This involved subjective and objective measures of 
both cognitive activity/stimulation and cognitive functioning. Traditionally self-
report/subjective measures of cognitive activity have been used when investigating this 
research area (e.g. Barnes et al., 2006). Chapter Two describes the questionnaire studies 
used in this thesis to identify the effects of different cognitive activities on self-reported 
cognitive functioning. As hypothesised, cryptic crossword frequency appeared to have a 
significantly greater impact on cognitive awareness of older adults than other types of 
crosswords. This was critical because previous research had failed to discriminate 
between the type of crossword being attempted when measuring crossword frequency 
as a cognitive activity (e.g. Verghese et al., 2003).  
 
The concern about using self-report measures of cognitive activity is that current 
cognitive functioning may directly influence the level of cognitive activity (e.g. Jopp & 
Hertzog, 2007) and therefore produce a significant cognitive correlation between 
activity and functioning which supports the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-
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dependency theory (e.g. Wilson et al., 2007). Furthermore, self-report measures of 
either cognitive activity or cognitive functioning appear to be unreliable, especially in 
sample populations of older adults (e.g. Sunderland et al., 1986) and when using 
retrospective accounts of cognitive activity (e.g. Barnes et al., 2006; Kondo et al., 
1995). Thus, the experimental studies in this thesis attempted to manipulate stimulus 
characteristics to produce analogies of the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-
dependency theory when using a within-subjects design to control for possible 
mediating or external factors which may affect both cognitive activity and cognitive 
functioning.  
 
Studies Five, Six and Seven manipulated stimulus characteristics of to-be-remembered 
words to produce analogies of the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency 
theory. Of note was the fact that high-frequency words appear to be afforded protection 
from cognitive atrophy associated with healthy aging to a greater degree than low-
frequency words. This finding was only evident for overall recall and not for measures 
of encoding, consolidation and/or retention/retrieval. There was no evidence of a similar 
age X stimulus characteristics interaction when manipulating the AoA of the to-be-
remembered words. One possibility is that the effect of word frequency on cognitive 
representations is enforced throughout life which is not necessarily the case for the 
effect of AoA (e.g. Li, 2009; Ellis & Lambon-Ralph, 2000). Although this provided 
some evidence for the cognitive reserve hypothesis, Study Seven did not provide any 
evidence for the use-dependency theory. That is, there was no dissociation, in terms of 
recall, encoding, consolidation and/or retention/retrieval, of names which had remained 
popular compared to names which had become unpopular between younger and older 
participants. Thus, when using objective measures of both cognitive stimulation (or 
activity) and cognitive functioning there is a modicum of support for the cognitive 
reserve hypothesis but no support for the use-dependency theory.  
 
Study Eight used a revolutionary within-subjects intervention technique to investigate 
the impact of an everyday cognitive activity (i.e. attempting cryptic crosswords) on 
subjective and objective measures of cognitive functioning. The results confirm that 
older adults report a significant increase in cognitive awareness when undertaking an 
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increase in cognitive activities. However, the older adults apparently are unable to use 
this increase in cognitive awareness to promote objective measures of cognitive 
functioning. The results of Study Eight were taken with the results of the previous 
studies and the model of the use-dependency theory and cognitive reserve hypothesis, 
illustrated in Figure 6.1, was produced to explain the results.  
 
Overall, the novel model (Figure 6.1) suggests that cognitive functioning can be 
affected by early life experiences, such as cognitive stimulation and the number of years 
in education. However, this relationship appears to be bidirectional, in that an increase 
in cognitive functioning will enable younger adults to undertake more cognitively 
stimulating activities. Early life experiences also appear to determine the level of 
cognitive activity in later life. Supporting research by Dellenbach & Zimprich (2008), 
older adults who have a greater number of years in education also appear to take part in 
more cognitive activities later in life. Early life experiences, specifically education, also 
appear to directly and indirectly affect the level of cognitive awareness and MemSE that 
an older adult possesses. Figure 6.1 shows that contrary to the use-dependency theory 
there is no direct relationship between current (later life) cognitive activity level and 
objective/actual levels of cognitive functioning. Supporting the views of Hertzog (2009) 
and Jopp & Hertzog (2007), the current level of cognitive activity appears to be directly 
influenced by participants‘ actual cognitive functioning level, as well as their level of 
confidence/self-efficacy (which is also directly affected by current cognitive 
functioning). In this model, the only way cognitive activity in later life can affect 
cognitive functioning is through the metacognition system. However, unfortunately it 
appears that older adults have a deficit in the control pathway of metacognition (e.g. 
Brehmer et al., 2008), in that even if they become aware of a deficit in cognitive 
functioning and that certain activities promote the awareness of this, they are unable to 
modify their behaviour to counteract this deficit in cognitive functioning. 
 
Figure 6.1 is a representation of how (earlier and later) cognitive activity affects 
cognitive functioning for the general population of older adults. However, it is clear 
through the studies presented in this thesis and previous research (e.g. Carlson et al., 
2008) that cognitive interventions and/or a higher level of cognitive activity in later life 
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are beneficial, in terms of cognitive functioning, for certain groups of older adults. This 
indicates that mediating factors can have a significant impact on the relationships 
between the components of the model presented in Figure 6.1. This also supports the 
view of Glisky & Glisky (1999), that cognitive interventions must be tailored to the 
needs of specific groups of older adults. It is the case that some older adults age 
successfully (Salthouse, 2007; 2006), thus the direct influence of the components 
Cognitive Awareness/MemSE and Cognitive Functioning of the model must be intact. 
Therefore it is necessary to identify how cognitive interventions can be used in at-risk 
sample populations to enhance the relationship between metacognition and actual 
cognitive functioning. 
 
In conclusion, this thesis has taken into account the critique of previous research which 
has investigated the cognitive reserve hypothesis and use-dependency theory 
(collectively known as the use-it-or-lose-it theory). The types of cognitive activities 
measured and the cognitive functioning measures are both critical factors when 
investigating the use-it-or-lose-it theory. However, the methodology used is also 
important and can have a direct and/or indirect influence on the results of studies. This 
thesis demonstrated certain cognitive activities (e.g. cryptic crosswords) appear to have 
a larger impact on cognitive functioning (specifically cognitive awareness and/or 
metacognition) than other activities (e.g. quick or general knowledge crosswords). 
However, when using objective measures of cognitive activity/stimulation and cognitive 
functioning there was no evidence supporting the use-dependency theory and only 
partial evidence for the cognitive reserve hypothesis. A revolutionary within-subjects 
intervention technique confirmed the theory that cognitive activity has a significantly 
greater impact on subjective compared to objective measures of cognitive functioning 
for the whole sample population. Finally, the results suggest that mediating factors play 
a significant role in determining whether cognitive activity can modify actual/objective 
measures of cognitive functioning in later life. It is clear that older adults have a 
significant deficit in modifying their cognitive functioning even though (through 
participating in certain cognitive activities) they become aware of cognitive deficits 
associated with healthy aging. Future intervention techniques need to focus on the 
metacognition system as it is clear that older adults, compared to younger adults, show a 
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deficit in the control pathway of the classic metacognition model (e.g. Nelson & 
Narens, 1990). These intervention techniques must be based on everyday activities, 
which are economical and accessible to all older adults, but especially those who are 
deemed to be at-risk (e.g. those with fewer years in education and who are or have been 
relatively cognitively inactive).  
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8 APPENDIX ONE 
 
MEMORY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Thank you for showing interest in this study.  The following questions are designed to 
investigate the relationship between intellectual activity levels and memory function. 
Please type the appropriate response or tick the boxes. These questions are for 
research purposes only. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Your 
responses and results will be kept anonymous and not passed on to any third party.  
 
Section One 
 Please type your responses below 
Age  
Sex  
Number of years in formal education  
Occupation or previous occupation  
 
 
Section Two 
For this section, a rating scale will be used to show how often you do the following 
things. 
 
 Every 
day 
 
Several 
times a 
week 
Several 
times a 
month 
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Never 
Quick crossword      
Cryptic crossword      
General knowledge crossword      
Read books or newspaper      
Playing cards      
Quiz      
Board games (eg cluedo, chess etc)      
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Section Three 
For each type of crossword you attempt regularly, please indicate how well you 
typically complete it: 
 
 Finish it 
all 
 
Finish 
more 
than 
half 
Finish 
about 
half 
Finish 
less than 
half 
Fail to 
finish 
any of it 
Quick crossword      
Cryptic crossword      
General knowledge crossword      
 
Section Four 
Do you complete the crossword on your own, with someone else, or with another form 
of help, for example a dictionary or thesaurus?  Please tick all that apply: 
 
 Alone 
 
With a 
regular 
partner 
With an 
occasional 
partner 
Other 
form of 
help 
Quick crossword     
Cryptic crossword     
General knowledge crossword     
 
 
Section Five 
Please indicate how you consider yourself, compared to your prime. 
 
 Much 
better 
Slightly 
better 
The same 
Slightly 
worse 
Much 
worse 
Overall health      
Memory      
Crossword skills      
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Section Six 
This section will address the frequency in which you make mistakes in everyday 
activities which everyone makes from time to time. 
 
 
Every 
day 
Several 
times a 
week 
Several 
times a 
month 
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Never 
Forget people‘s names 
 
     
Read something again because you 
have not been concentrating 
     
Forget why you went into a 
specific area of your house 
     
Forget which turning to take on a 
familiar road that you rarely use 
     
Forget if you‘ve locked the door or 
close a window 
     
Struggle to find the correct word to 
use 
     
Miss certain appointments 
unintentionally 
     
Forget where you‘ve left your keys 
 
     
Struggle to remember a word on 
the tip of your tongue 
     
Forget what you went to the shops 
to buy 
     
Become easily distracted or 
confused with a difficult task 
     
Put something in an inappropriate 
place (e.g. butter in the bread-bin) 
     
 
Thank you for taking part in this questionnaire.  We hope that this research will enable 
us to better understand changes in memory in older people.  If you are interested in 
taking part in further research focusing on this area, please leave your name and contact 
details.  All details will be treated confidentially and not passed on to any other source 
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9 APPENDIX TWO 
 
MEMORY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Thank you for showing interest in this study.  The following questions are designed to 
investigate the relationship between intellectual activity levels and memory function. 
Please type the appropriate response or tick the boxes. These questions are for 
research purposes only. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Your 
responses and results will be kept anonymous. 
  
 
Section One 
 Please type your responses below 
Age  
Sex  
Age you left school / college / university  
Occupation (or previous occupation)  
 
 
Section Two 
For this section, please rate how often you do the following things on the scale shown. 
 
 Every 
day 
 
Several 
times a 
week 
Several 
times a 
month 
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Never 
Quick crossword      
Cryptic crossword      
General knowledge crossword      
Read books or newspaper      
Playing cards      
Quiz      
Board games (eg cluedo, chess etc)      
Play a musical instrument      
Study a foreign language      
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Section Three 
For each type of crossword you attempt regularly, please indicate how well you 
typically complete it: 
 
 Finish it 
all 
 
Finish 
more 
than half 
Finish 
about 
half 
Finish 
less than 
half 
Fail to 
finish 
any of it 
Not 
applicabl
e 
Quick 
crossword 
      
Cryptic 
crossword 
      
General 
knowledge 
crossword 
      
 
Section Four 
Do you complete the crossword on your own, with someone else, or with another form 
of help, for example a dictionary or thesaurus?  Please tick all that apply: 
 
 Alone 
 
With a 
regular 
partner 
With an 
occasiona
l partner 
Other 
form of 
help 
Not 
applicabl
e 
Quick crossword      
Cryptic crossword      
General knowledge 
crossword 
     
 
 
Section Five 
Please indicate how you consider yourself, compared to your prime. 
 
 Much 
better 
Slightly 
better 
The same 
Slightly 
worse 
Much 
worse 
Overall health      
Memory      
Crossword skills      
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Section Six 
 
Below are statements about feelings that people may have about their memory. Read 
each statement and decide whether you agree. Think about how you have been feeling 
over the past two weeks. Then, place a tick in the appropriate box. 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
I am generally 
pleased with my 
memory ability.  
 
     
There is something 
seriously wrong 
with my memory.  
 
     
When I forget 
something, I fear 
that I may have a 
serious memory 
problem.  
     
My memory is 
worse than most 
other people my 
age. 
  
     
I have confidence 
in my ability to 
remember things. 
  
     
When I have 
trouble 
remembering 
something, I‘m not 
too hard on myself.  
     
I am concerned 
about my memory.  
 
     
My memory is 
really going 
downhill lately.  
 
     
I am generally 
satisfied with my 
memory ability.  
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I get annoyed or 
irritated with 
myself when I am 
forgetful.  
     
I worry about my 
memory ability.  
 
     
 
 
Below is a list of common memory mistakes that people make. Decide how often you 
have done each one in the last two weeks, then place a tick in the appropriate box 
 
 All the 
time 
Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
Forget to pay a bill 
on time.  
 
     
Misplace 
something you use 
daily, like your 
keys or glasses.  
     
Have trouble 
remembering a 
telephone number 
you just looked up.  
     
Not recall the 
name of someone 
you just met.  
 
     
Leave something 
behind when you 
meant to bring it 
with you.  
     
Forget an 
appointment.  
 
     
Forget what you 
were just about to 
do; for example, 
walk into a room 
and forget what 
you went there to 
do.  
     
Forget to run an 
errand.  
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In conversation, 
have difficulty 
coming up with a 
specific word that 
you want.  
 
     
Have trouble 
remembering 
details from a 
newspaper or 
magazine article 
you read earlier 
that day.  
     
Forget to take 
medication.  
 
 
     
Not recall the 
name of someone 
you have known 
for some time.  
     
Forget to pass on a 
message.  
 
 
     
Forget what you 
were going to say 
in conversation.  
 
     
Forget a birthday 
or anniversary that 
you used to know 
well.  
 
     
Forget a telephone 
number you use 
frequently.  
 
     
Retell a story or 
joke to the same 
person because 
you forgot that you 
had already told 
him or her.  
     
Misplace 
something that you 
put away a few 
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days ago.  
 
Forget to buy 
something you 
intended to buy.  
 
     
Forget details 
about a recent 
conversation.  
 
     
 
 
People often use different tricks or strategies to help them remember things. Several 
strategies are listed below. Decide how often you used each one in the last two weeks. 
Then, place a tick in the appropriate box. 
 
 All the 
time 
Often Sometime
s 
Rarely Never 
Use a timer or alarm 
to remind you when 
to do something.  
     
Ask someone to 
help you remember 
something or to 
remind you to do 
something.  
     
Create a rhyme out 
of what you want to 
remember.  
     
In your mind, create 
a visual image of 
something you want 
to remember, like a 
name and a face.  
     
Write things on a 
calendar, such as 
appointments or 
things you need to 
do.  
     
Go through the 
alphabet one letter at 
a time to see if it 
sparks a memory for 
a name or word.  
     
Organise 
information you 
want to remember; 
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for example, 
organise your 
grocery list 
according to food 
groups.  
Say something out 
loud in order to 
remember it, such as 
a telephone number 
you just looked up.  
     
Use a routine to 
remember important 
things, like checking 
that you have your 
wallet and keys 
when you leave 
home.  
     
Make a list, such as 
a grocery list or a 
list of things to do.  
     
Mentally elaborate 
on something you 
want to remember. 
     
Put something in a 
prominent place to 
remind you to do 
something, like 
putting your 
umbrella by the 
front door so that 
you will remember 
to take it with you.  
     
Repeat something to 
yourself at 
increasingly longer 
and longer intervals 
so that you will 
remember it.  
     
Create a story to link 
together information 
you want to 
remember.  
     
Write down in a 
notebook things that 
you want to 
remember.  
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Create an acronym 
out of the first letters 
in a list of things to 
remember, such as 
carrots, apples, and 
bread (cab).  
     
Intentionally 
concentrate hard on 
something so that 
you will remember 
it.  
     
Write a note or 
reminder for 
yourself (other than 
on a calendar or in a 
notebook).  
     
Mentally retrace 
your steps in order 
to remember 
something, such as 
the location of a 
misplaced  
     
 
 
Thank you for taking part in this questionnaire.  We hope that this research will enable 
us to better understand changes in memory in older people.  If you are interested in 
taking part in further research focusing on this area, please leave your name and contact 
details.  All details will be treated confidentially and not passed on to any other source. 
 
If you have a partner or know someone who may be interested in completing this 
questionnaire, please ask them to either fill in a blank copy of their own, or to contact us 
for another one. We are interested in people who do and do not complete crosswords. 
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10 APPENDIX THREE 
 
Thank you for showing interest in this study.  Some of you may have taken part in a 
similar questionnaire around 18months ago. If this is the case your answers would 
still be valuable here. The following questions are designed to investigate the 
relationship between intellectual activity levels and memory function. Please tick the 
boxes to indicate the correct response. These questions are for research purposes 
only. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Your responses and 
results will be kept anonymous. 
  
Section One 
 Please type your responses below 
Age  
Sex  
Number of years of education (including 
university etc.) 
 
Occupation (or previous occupation)  
   
Section Two 
For this section, please rate how often you do the following things on the scale 
shown. 
 
 Every 
day 
 
Several 
times a 
week 
Several 
times a 
month 
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Never 
Quick crossword      
Cryptic crossword      
General knowledge crossword      
Read books or newspaper      
Playing cards      
Quiz      
Board games (eg cluedo, chess etc)      
Play a musical instrument      
Study a foreign language      
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Please indicate the combination that best describes your crossword participation 
 
I attempt…  
No Crosswords  
Only Quick Crosswords  
Only Cryptic Crosswords  
Only General Knowledge Crosswords  
Cryptic and  Quick Crosswords  
Cryptic and General Knowledge Crosswords  
Quick and General Knowledge Crosswords  
Cryptic, Quick and General Knowledge  
 
Section Three 
Please indicate in the boxes how much you agree with each of the following 
statements regarding cryptic crosswords. 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Not 
Applicable 
Doing cryptic 
crosswords helps to 
keep my mind sharp 
      
Cryptic crosswords 
help me with 
everyday mental 
challenges 
      
I find cryptic 
crosswords much 
more difficult 
nowadays 
      
I feel I have lost the 
mental sharpness to 
do cryptic 
crosswords 
      
Cryptic crosswords 
are enjoyable 
      
Doing cryptic 
crosswords helps 
me meet people 
      
When I cannot 
solve a cryptic clue 
it makes me 
concerned about my 
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mental ability 
Finishing a cryptic 
crossword makes 
me feel good about 
my mental abilities 
      
The logic behind 
cryptic crossword 
clues has no bearing 
on everyday 
reasoning  
      
 
Doing cryptic 
crosswords makes 
me more aware of 
how my memory 
has declined with 
age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doing cryptic 
crosswords helps 
me think of other 
ways to keep my 
mind sharp 
      
Doing cryptic 
crosswords prevents 
Alzheimer‘s disease 
      
I‘ve found as I‘ve 
aged that cryptic 
crosswords have got 
easier 
      
 
Section Four 
 
Please indicate in the boxes how much you agree with each of the following 
statements regarding general knowledge crosswords. 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Not 
Applicable 
Doing general 
knowledge 
crosswords helps to 
keep my mind sharp 
      
General knowledge 
crosswords help me 
with everyday 
mental challenges 
      
I find general 
knowledge 
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crosswords much 
more difficult 
nowadays 
I feel I have lost the 
mental sharpness to 
do general 
knowledge 
crosswords 
      
General knowledge 
crosswords are 
enjoyable 
      
Doing general 
knowledge 
crosswords helps 
me meet people 
      
When I cannot 
solve a general 
knowledge clue it 
makes me 
concerned about my 
mental ability 
      
Finishing a general 
knowledge 
crossword makes 
me feel good about 
my mental abilities 
      
 
Doing general 
knowledge 
crosswords makes 
me more aware of 
how my memory 
has declined with 
age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doing general 
knowledge 
crosswords helps 
me think of other 
ways to keep my 
mind sharp 
      
Doing general 
knowledge 
crosswords prevents 
Alzheimer‘s disease 
      
General knowledge 
crossword clues 
have no bearing on 
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everyday reasoning  
I‘ve found as I‘ve 
aged that general 
knowledge 
crosswords have got 
easier 
      
 
Section Five 
 
Please indicate in the boxes how much you agree with each of the following 
statements 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
If I was given a list of 10 random 
words I would be able to 
remember all of them without 
noting them down 
     
I am able to devise mental 
strategies to remember important 
things (e.g. visualising an item I 
need to buy) 
     
When information is on the tip of 
my tongue I can generally 
retrieve it 
     
I rely on making notes/lists to 
remember things 
     
I rely on other people to ensure I 
remember important things 
     
 
Section Six 
Please complete the sentences below by choosing a percentage value 
 
 100% 75% 50% 25% 0% 
If I was shown a list of 15 words I would 
remember ___% of them 
     
In my prime, if I was shown a list of 15 
words I would remember ___% of them 
     
If I went grocery shopping without a list I 
would remember ___% of the items I 
went to buy 
     
If I was introduced to 10 people I would 
remember ___% of their names one hour 
later. 
     
 
Thank-you very much for taking part in this questionnaire. If you have any 
queries please feel free to email me at nalmond944@aol.com  
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11 APPENDIX FOUR 
 
 
Although this questionnaire is asking for information about habits regarding 
crosswords we are extremely interested in individuals who have either never 
attempted crosswords or have given up attempting crosswords. Please take a few 
minutes to fill in the questionnaire. Many of the questions only require a tick in the 
appropriate box. Your responses will be treated anonymously and will not be 
passed on to any third parties.  
 
Section One 
 
 Please type your responses below 
Age  
Sex  
Number of years of education (including 
university etc.) 
 
Occupation (or previous occupation)  
   
Section Two 
For this section, please rate how often you do the following things on the scale 
shown. 
 
 Every 
day 
 
Several 
times a 
week 
Several 
times a 
month 
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Never 
Quick crossword      
Cryptic crossword      
General knowledge crossword      
 
If you currently attempt all three crosswords, please move to section 4. Otherwise, 
please continue with section 3. 
 
Section Three 
 
This section focuses on individuals who do not undertake a specific type of crossword 
on a regular basis (regular basis indicates more than twice a month), please tick the 
appropriate description of each activity. 
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 Used to do but 
given up 
Never attempted 
on a regular 
basis 
NA 
Quick crossword    
Cryptic crossword    
General knowledge 
crossword 
   
 
If you used to attempt any type of crossword please fill in the next four tables. If you 
have never attempted any crosswords on a regular basis please proceed to section five.  
 
Please indicate what proportion of your life you have attempted each type of 
crossword on a regular basis. 
 0 – 25% 26 – 50% 51 – 75% 76 – 100% NA 
Quick crossword      
Cryptic 
crossword 
     
General 
knowledge 
crossword 
     
 
Quick Crosswords 
 
If you have given up quick crosswords please indicate the reason for this. You can tick 
as many options as you like. 
 
 Agree NA 
Lost interest   
No time   
Taken up other hobbies   
Lost confidence   
Found them too difficult    
Lost the mental ability to complete 
them 
  
Lost the physical ability to complete 
them 
  
Unable to get hold of crosswords   
Other   
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Cryptic Crosswords 
 
If you have given up cryptic crosswords please indicate the reason for this. You can tick 
as many options as you like. 
 
 Agree NA 
Lost interest   
No time   
Taken up other hobbies   
Lost confidence   
Found them too difficult    
Lost the mental ability to complete 
them 
  
Lost the physical ability to complete 
them 
  
Unable to get hold of crosswords   
Other   
 
General Knowledge Crosswords 
 
If you have given up general knowledge  crosswords please indicate the reason for this. 
You can tick as many options as you like. 
 
 Agree NA 
Lost interest   
No time   
Taken up other hobbies   
Lost confidence   
Found them too difficult    
Lost the mental ability to complete 
them 
  
Lost the physical ability to complete 
them 
  
Unable to get hold of crosswords   
Other   
 
Section Four 
 
Please only fill in this section if you currently attempt any specific types of crosswords 
on a regular basis.  
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This table is about how long you attempt each type of crossword for. Please indicate 
what proportion of your life you have attempted each type of crossword on a regular 
basis.  
 
 
 0 – 25% 26 – 50% 51 – 75% 76 – 100% NA 
Quick 
crossword 
     
Cryptic 
crossword 
     
General 
knowledge 
crossword 
     
 
Section Five 
 
Please rate how easy you feel that these cryptic crossword clues are to solve. 
 
 Very Easy 
Fairly 
Easy 
Moderate 
Fairly 
Difficult 
Very 
Difficult 
1. Misshapen hat placed in 
cradle, rocked in church 
(9) 
     
2. Antelope – just born, 
we hear (3) 
     
3. Came in, holding can 
containing last of tea, and 
played host (11) 
     
4. Animal hiding in 
wardrobe? A stallion, 
maybe? (5) 
     
5. Be aware of shelf for 
encyclopaedia, perhaps (9) 
     
6. She was tied up, and 
Rome dared to hide her 
(9) 
     
7. Hirg? (Pythagorean) 
(11) 
     
8. Protection for chassis is 
subject to secrecy (9) 
     
9. Chase away, holding 
current carpet-cleaner (7) 
     
10. Observe bishopric (3)      
 
The solutions will appear at the end of the questionnaire.  
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Section Six 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements  
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Undecide
d 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
If I was given a list of 
10 random words I 
would be able to 
remember all of them 
without noting them 
down 
     
I am able to devise 
mental strategies to 
remember important 
things (e.g. 
visualising an item I 
need to buy) 
     
I get the feeling I‘m 
searching my memory 
for information that‘s 
on the tip of my 
tongue quite often.  
     
I rely on making 
notes/lists to 
remember things 
     
I rely on other people 
to ensure I remember 
important things 
     
 
Section Seven 
Please tick the box which best completes  the sentences below.  
 
 100% 75% 50% 25% 0% 
If I was shown a list of 15 
words I would remember 
___% of them 
     
In my prime, if I was 
shown a list of 15 words I 
would remember ___% of 
them 
     
If I went grocery shopping 
without a list I would 
remember ___% of the 
items I went to buy 
     
If I was introduced to 10 
people I would remember 
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___% of their names one 
hour later. 
 
 
 
Solutions to Cryptic Clues 
 
1. Misshapen hat placed in cradle, rocked in church CATHEDRAL.  
Misshapen is an anagram indicator, so an anagram of hat becomes ATH, cradle, rocked 
(another anagram indicator) becomes CEDRAL. The anagram of hat must then be placed 
within the anagram of cradle giving CATHEDRAL which is a type of church. 
2.  Antelope – just born, we hear GNU 
‗We hear‘ is an indicator of a homophone, meaning a word which sounds like another but 
is spelt differently. Just born can be new, and a type of antelope which sounds like new is 
a GNU. 
3. Came in, holding can containing last of tea, and played host. ENTERTAINED 
Came in gives us ENTERED, holding implies one word in another word. Can refers to a 
container, in this case a TIN. The ―last of tea‖ gives us A. If you put these parts together 
with the cryptic meaning of ―holding‖ you get ENTERTAIN. ―Played the host‖ in this 
clue is the meaning indicator i.e. another word for ENTERTAINED. 
4. Animal hiding in wardrobe? A stallion, maybe? BEAST  
This clue suggests that there is an animal ‗hiding‘ in the clue, this indicates the name can 
be found in the text but possibly split between words. In this case ‗wardroBE A STallion‘ 
gives BEAST. ―Maybe‖ indicates that the solution could be some kind of animal. Not 
necessarily a horse. 
5. Be aware of shelf for encyclopaedia, perhaps KNOWLEDGE 
To be aware of something is to KNOW and another word for shelf is LEDGE, put 
together to make KNOWLEDGE. Encyclopaedia is the meaning clue but the word 
‗perhaps‘ indicates that it is not another word for it, but it is a clue to the meaning.  
6. She was tied up, and Rome dared to hide her ANDROMEDA 
‗Hide‘ is an indicator that the word is hidden within the text of the clue, ‗AND ROME 
DAred‘. The clues ‗she‘ and ‗tied up‘ allude to a famous women who has been tied up, in 
Greek mythology ANDROMEDA was tied up by her father. 
7. Hirg? (Pythagorean) RIGHTANGLED 
 This is a backward anagram. Of the word in the clue ‗Hirg‘ and the word tangled, which 
is an anagram indicator. The word ‗Hirg‘ itself has no meaning. When Hirg and tangled 
are mixed up they make RIGHTANGLED the sort of triangles which feature in 
Pythagoras‘s famous theorem. This clue is extremely difficult and it is unlikely that other 
cryptic crosswords will have anything as difficult. 
8. Protection for chassis is subject to secrecy UNDERSEAL 
A double definition clue both halves allude to the same word. UNDERSEAL can mean to 
seal the chassis of a car with tar, but if something is under a wax seal it means it is subject 
to secrecy. 
9. Chase away, holding current carpet-cleaner SHAMPOO 
Chase away means the word SHOO, and held within this word is a word meaning current 
AMP, making SHAMPOO, which can be a carpet cleaner. 
10. Observe bishopric. SEE 
This is a double definition clue. Observe can represent SEE and bishopric. 
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12 APPENDIX FIVE 
 
This is a very quick questionnaire which is designed to assess the difficulty of certain 
cryptic crossword clues. We hope that you will find two minutes to fill in the 
questionnaire. We are trying to recruit individuals who do and do not attempt cryptic 
crosswords. PLEASE COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE ORDER 
OUTLINED BELOW (i.e. section 1-4) AND PLEASE DO NOT FLICK THROUGH.  
 
Thank you for taking time to complete the questionnaire. 
 
 
Section 1 
 
Please fill in the following background information. 
 
Age:  
Number of years in education (e.g. Primary 
school through to Postgraduate study): 
 
Occupation (or previous occupation if 
retired): 
 
 
Section 2 
 
Please report your current crossword activity: 
 
 Everyday 
Several 
times a 
week 
Several 
times a 
month 
Less than 
once a 
month 
Never 
Cryptic crosswords      
Quick crosswords      
General knowledge 
crosswords 
     
 
 
Please indicate the amount of each crossword you complete (if you do not attempt a 
specific crossword more than several times a month, please tick not applicable): 
 
 
 
0 – 25%  26 – 50%  51 – 75%  76 – 100%  
Not 
applicable 
Quick crossword      
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Cryptic crossword      
General knowledge 
crossword 
     
 
Please indicate how much effort is required to complete each type of crossword (if you 
do not attempt a specific crossword more than several times a month, please tick not 
applicable): 
 
 0 – 25% 
effort 
26 – 50% 
effort 
51 – 75% 
effort 
76 – 100% 
effort 
Not 
applicable 
Quick crossword      
Cryptic crossword      
General knowledge 
crossword 
     
 
Section 3 
 
Please complete the following sentences by writing your answer in the space provided: 
 
 Percentage 
If I was shown a list of 15 words at my present age, I would 
remember ___% of them. 
_ _ _% 
When I think back to when I was in my prime (regarding my age), 
if I was shown a list of 15 words I would remember ___% of them. 
_ _ _% 
At my present age, if I went grocery shopping without a list I 
would remember ___% of the items I went to buy. 
_ _ _% 
At my present age, if I was introduced to 10 people I would 
remember ___% of their names one hour later. 
_ _ _% 
 
Section 4 
 
Please try and complete the following ten cryptic crossword clues (even if you do not 
regularly attempt cryptic crosswords, please have a go): 
 
1. Misshapen hat placed in cradle, rocked in church (9)     _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ 
 
2. Antelope – just born, we hear (3)      _ _ _ 
 
3. Came in, holding can containing last of tea, and played host (11)  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ _ _ 
 
4. Animal hiding in wardrobe? A stallion, maybe? (5)    _ _ _ 
_ _ 
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5. Be aware of shelf for encyclopaedia, perhaps (9)    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ 
 
6. She was tied up, and Rome dared to hide her (9)    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ 
 
7. Hirg? (Pythagorean) (11)      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
8. Protection for chassis is subject to secrecy (9)    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ 
 
9. Chase away, holding current carpet-cleaner (7)    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
10. Observe bishopric (3)       _ _ _ 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in this questionnaire. The solutions to each clue are on 
the next page. 
 
Note that this appendix represents version one of this questionnaire and version two 
exchanged Section Three and Section Four. The solutions to Section Four can be found 
in Appendix IV.  
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13 APPENDIX SIX 
 
Table A6.1. Word frequency ratings (Celex, 1993: wordforms per million for 
combined spoken and written frequency), AoA (months) and imageability ratings 
(1-7) taken from Morrison et al. (1997) for stimulus in Study Five.  
Low-frequency High-frequency 
Word AoA Frequency Imageability Word AoA Frequency Imageability 
Anchor 80.4 1.75 5.95 Apple 28.8 3.9 6.5 
Axe 56.4 6.2 6.2 Arm 19.8 4.15 6.15 
Bear 30.6 2.6 6.4 Biscuit 21.6 4.05 6.1 
Bell 40.8 2.5 6.6 Bottle 27 4.25 6.35 
Camel 64.8 1.65 6.4 Carrot 42 3.4 6.5 
Cannon 82.8 1.5 5.55 Cigarette 66 3.3 6.25 
Diamond 72 1.95 6.15 Dog 12 3.5 6.65 
Donkey 40.8 2.1 6.55 Door 21.6 4.5 5.95 
Flute 72 2.15 6.1 Foot 18 3.5 5.9 
Gun 54 2.35 6.5 Glass 42 4.1 6 
Harp 68.4 1.45 6 Hand 12 3.95 6.3 
Helicopter 52.8 2 6.35 House 12 4 6.65 
Judge 82.8 2.2 5.6 Jumper 38.4 4.15 6.2 
Kite 49.2 1.65 6.65 Kettle 46.8 4.45 6.25 
Leopard 66 1.55 6.15 Lips 32.4 2.85 6.2 
Lobster 78 1.7 5.95 Microwave 108 3.2 5.85 
Medal 70.8 1.6 5.8 Nose 14.4 3.6 5.8 
Mountain 52.8 2.3 6.65 Pencil 37.2 4.05 6.35 
Nut 82.8 2.6 5.7 Potato 36 3.9 6.2 
Parachute 84 2.05 6.3 Purse 51.6 3.6 5.6 
Pipe 68.4 2.05 5.65 Ring 48 3.45 5.95 
Pumpkin 63.6 1.75 6.25 Ruler 54 3.1 5.75 
Racoon 90 1.55 5.4 Sandwich 34.2 3.95 6.45 
Shawl 79.2 1.55 5.45 Scissors 48 3.45 6.2 
Ski 68.4 2.25 5.65 Shirt 46.8 3.75 6.3 
Submarine 68.4 1.85 5.9 Table 25.2 4.2 6.55 
Thimble 74.4 1.7 6 Telephone 42 4.35 6.4 
Trumpet 63.6 1.9 6.4 Television 32.4 4.15 6.35 
Windmill 55.2 1.9 6.5 Watch 42 4.1 6.3 
Wizard 54 1.9 6.15 Window 38.4 3.85 6.15 
 
Mean 65.58 2.08 6.1 Mean 36.62 3.83 6.21 
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14 APPENDIX SEVEN 
 
Table A7.1. AoA (months; taken from Morrison et al., 1997), Word frequency 
ratings (Celex, 1993: wordforms per million for combined spoken and written 
frequency), and imageability ratings (1-7; taken from Morrison et al., 1997) for 
stimulus in Study Six.  
Early-acquired Later-acquired 
Word AoA Frequency Imageability Word AoA Frequency Imageability 
Aeroplane 42 3.1 6.55 Accordion 111.6 1.3 5.15 
Balloon 28.8 2.9 6.55 Ashtray 70.8 2.9 5.55 
Banana 25.2 3.7 6.55 Barn 64.8 2.2 5.75 
Box 32.4 3.65 5.6 Barrel 79.2 2.15 6.1 
Cake 28.8 3.4 6.4 Cactus 78 1.8 6.3 
Clown 38.4 2 6.7 Candle 66 3.05 6.1 
Cooker 44.4 4 5.85 Chisel 102 1.7 5.2 
Crown 45.6 1.8 6.4 Eagle 66 1.95 6.2 
Fence 42 2.4 5.95 Envelope 66 3.15 5.8 
Flower 25.2 3 6.9 Genie 79.2 1.45 6.35 
Glove 45.6 2.75 5.95 Microphone 97.2 2.05 6.1 
Hat 23.4 2.9 6.66 Needle 69.6 2.6 6.05 
Jelly 34.2 2.1 6 Nun 74.4 1.9 6.2 
Jigsaw 38.4 1.95 6.25 Ostrich 67.2 1.65 5.65 
Mitten 40.8 1.5 5.6 Padlock 81.6 2.6 5.6 
Moon 34.2 3 6.65 Peach 64.8 2.95 5.9 
Paintbrush 43.2 2.1 6.4 Pepper 62.4 3.6 5.45 
Piano 45.6 2.65 6.35 Pineapple 64.8 2.65 6.25 
Scarecrow 48 1.85 6.05 Pliers 98.4 1.9 5.85 
Sheep 25.2 2.8 6.4 Porter 114 3.35 4.4 
Slide 37.2 2.45 5.9 Scales 69.6 2.6 5.6 
Snake 34.2 2.3 6.7 Screwdriver 72 2.5 6 
Snowman 25.2 2.2 6.55 Seahorse 72 1.45 5.45 
Strawberry 44.4 2.75 6.6 Skunk 80.4 1.35 5.55 
Swing 32.4 2.35 6.3 Telescope 76.8 1.85 5.95 
Tiger 46.8 2.2 6.6 Typewriter 67.2 2.1 5.85 
Tractor 45.6 2.35 6.15 Vase 70.8 2.5 6.55 
Umbrella 46.8 2.5 6.6 Violin 64.8 2.15 6.4 
Wheel 38.4 2.95 6.45 Waistcoat 79.2 2.6 5.7 
Witch 42 2.3 6.7 Zebra 68.4 1.75 6.5 
 
Mean 37.48 2.6 6.34 Mean 76.64 2.26 5.85 
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15 APPENDIX EIGHT 
 
Table A8.1. Ranked popularity of proper names taken from Merry (1995) used in 
Study Seven.   
Popular Names Unpopular Names 
Name 1944 Rank 1994 Rank Name 1944 Rank 1994 Rank* 
Andrew 45 20 Alan 8 101 
Anthony 6 56 Barbara 10 101 
Catherine 42 45 Barry 20 101 
Charles 38 41 Bernard 37 101 
Christopher 16 14 Brian 7 101 
David 2 24 Carol 12 101 
Edward 29 43 Colin 15 101 
Elizabeth 15 25 Dennis 34 101 
George 21 17 Derek 27 101 
Georgina 84 33 Eric 39 101 
Harry 65 6 Evelyn 71 101 
Heather 58 76 Frederick 42 101 
Helen 45 80 Gordon 44 101 
Henry 63 48 Graham 22 101 
James 10 2 Ian 23 101 
Jennifer 18 42 Julia 70 101 
John 1 37 Keith 14 101 
Maria 57 86 Malcolm 24 101 
Martin 41 87 Norman 43 101 
Mary 4 94 Pamela 17 101 
Michael 3 11 Pauline 14 101 
Nicholas 76 42 Raymond 17 101 
Patrick 31 63 Reginald 71 101 
Paul 28 66 Ronald 26 101 
Peter 4 51 Roy 30 101 
Richard 11 49 Shirley 39 101 
Robert 5 25 Terence 18 101 
Sarah 86 12 Trevor 33 101 
Thomas 19 2 Valerie 11 101 
William 9 7 Veronica 52 101 
 
Mean 31.07 40.13 Mean 29.67 101 
 
*All names ranked as 101 due to only ranking available was 1 through 100.  
 
 
 
 
